Despite past attempts to legally protect environmental rights in Canada, we have yet to see any legislation recognizing the right of all people to live in a healthy environment. Although it wasn’t passed, the proposed Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights (Bill C-438) offers an interesting peek at what environmental rights legislation might look like in Canada. One section of the Bill stuck out to me for its potential ethical implications – Section 19, titled “No action for remedial conduct” (Bill C-438 2019).

While most of Bill C-438 outlines the protective legal actions that an individual can take against environmentally harmful practices, Section 19 describes when such actions cannot be taken. In brief, it says that one cannot take protective action against a given environmentally harmful conduct, if said conduct was done to prevent or reverse damage to “human, animal or plant life or health,” or in the interest of public security, humanitarian needs, peacekeeping, or defending members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Bill C-438 2019). These conditions are valid so long as the alleged conduct was also “reasonable and consistent with public safety” (Bill C-438 2019).

Yet these criteria, which allow potential environmental harm, leave plenty of room for interpretation and ethical uncertainty. To what point, for example, can we act in a way that helps one part of the environment while damaging another? How do we determine when it is justifiable to harm the environment in the interest of public security? Doesn’t environmental degradation itself pose a threat to public safety?

In his opinion piece in Policy Options, Emmett Macfarlane (2014) points out that enshrining environmental rights in the Constitution places responsibility on the Courts to answer such questions as the ones I’ve just raised. Macfarlane insists that judges are not the best suited to answer questions dealing with various economic and social dimensions. I would also argue that rulings on these questions would be subject to each judge’s ethical leanings, whether those leanings are conscious or not.

For example, how would an ecocentrist, a biocentrist, and an animal rights theorist each assess the implications of a conduct that harms one species while generally benefiting the surrounding environment? This might arise if, for instance, a conservation agency decided to eliminate an invasive species for the health of a whole ecosystem. Under Section 19, so long as this process is “reasonable and consistent with public safety,” no one could take legal action against it for the harm it does to one species.

This might get varied responses from ecocentrists, who value whole ecosystems over individual life forms. Most ecocentrists would then support the removal of an invasive species. However, if that species were to go extinct, this would raise concerns for ecocentrists like Rolston (1985), who believe we owe moral duties to whole species as an evolutionary unit.

Biocentrists like Paul Taylor (1981), on the other hand, view each individual life form as intrinsically valuable. So, killing individuals of an invasive species would not be justifiable, even if this was done to save the surrounding ecosystem. A slightly more nuanced biocentrist like Robin Attfield, on the other hand, might be able to justify killing an invasive species if it was lower in terms of moral hierarchy than other individuals in the ecosystem. For example, Attfield (1987) believes that we owe more moral obligation to animal species than we do to plants.

Finally, an animal rights theorist like Peter Singer (1974) would absolutely not support killing or harming animals for the betterment of an ecosystem. If the invasive species were a plant, however, then animal rights theorists likely wouldn’t see a problem with its elimination, especially if it would lead to animal flourishing.

My short review of these various ethical responses highlights the open-endedness of Bill C-438, Section 19. Regardless of whether the judges viewing these cases would consider them in these ethical terms, the vague language in this section of the bill raises some important questions for environmental ethicists. If a law like Bill C-438 is ever passed in Canada, I think a careful ethical review would be in order.

-Mary

References

Attfield, Robin. 1987. “Biocentrism, Moral Standing and Moral Significance.” Philosophica 39(1): 47-58. https://www.philosophica.ugent.be/wp-content/uploads/fulltexts/39-5.pdf.

 BILL C-438: An Act to enact the Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights and to make related amendments to other Acts. 2019. https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-438/first-reading.

Macfarlane, Emmett. 2014. “Parliament, not the courts, should decide.” https://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/second-regard/boyd-macfarlane/

Rolston, Holmes. 1985. “Duties to Endangered Species.” BioScience 35 (11): 718-726. https://sites.google.com/a/rams.colostate.edu/rolston-csu-website/environmental-ethics/ee-chbk/duties-edangered-species-biosci-a-pdf.

Singer, Peter. 1974. “All Animals Are Equal.” Philosophic Exchange 5(1): 103-116. https://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol5/iss1/6/?utm_source=digitalcommons.brockport.edu%2Fphil_ex%2Fvol5%2Fiss1%2F6&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages.

Taylor, Paul W. 1981. “The Ethics of Respect for Nature.” Environmental Ethics (3):197-218. https://www-pdcnet-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/collection/authorizedshow?id=enviroethics_1981_0003_0003_0197_0218&file_type=pdf.

David Suzuki in his report advocated that Canada should establish an environmental bill to protect people’s living environments. David thought that Canadian people had the moral right to enjoy a healthy environment. So his suggestion was moral. In the current world, more and more countries regard the right of citizens to enjoy a healthy living environment as one of the civil rights. The citizen’s right to enjoy a good environment is the right to live and develop in a healthy, comfortable and beautiful environment. The environmental right is a new concept of right arising from the crisis of the human environment, which is the legalization of moral rights and due rights. It is also the combination of collective rights and individual rights, and the high unity of rights and obligations. In the social relationship of environment, each subject of this right not only enjoys and utilizes the environment but also undertakes the obligation not to cause damage to the environment enjoyed and utilized by other subjects. This belongs to the category of moral obligation. Human existence cannot break this moral principle.

The suggestion of establishing the related law to protect humans’ right to live in a healthy environment is moral for the whole society. David’s idea is reasonable that “progress is possible when enough people recognize its necessity and come together to make it happen” (Suzuki 2015). His words reflect a reality that human beings as a whole need to cooperate to protect the environment, and the premise of realizing this national consciousness is to turn environmental rights into the rights of every citizen. In this report, he proposes the Canadian government to join the environmental plan. The reason is that many countries in the world have been actively promoting the strategy of a healthy environment. If Canadians want to achieve sustainable development, the Canadian government also needs to make a moral decision. So David Suzuki’s idea is in line with the common moral requirement of the whole humans society.

I also support David’s suggestion because the environment is closely related to the living conditions of human beings. In modern industrial society, human social activities have caused serious damage to the environment. Air pollution, water pollution, climate change and other issues have caused serious threats to humans’ health. If humans’ right to subsistence cannot be guaranteed, then other social development and progress will lose their basic significance. Therefore, it is a good decision to add environmental rights to civil rights. For example, some industries engage in the production which causes environmental damage for their own economic interests, such as the arbitrary emission of chemical wastewater, which is not in line with moral values. Because they destroy the living environment of the surrounding residents, at the same time, in a broad sense, they are also destroying their own living environment, because human beings live on the same earth. Therefore, if we can establish laws to protect people’s living environment, it will be beneficial to all mankind. Obviously, it is not an easy thing to achieve this goal because it also requires the society and the government to pay more costs and improve the regulatory force. For Canada, the author’s idea will also receive different feedbacks from different parties. However, in the face of the harsh reality of environmental pollution and destruction, people gradually realize that the environmental right, such as breathing fresh air, has been harmed and deprived, and seriously endangers the survival and development of human beings. Therefore, people put forward the requirements of citizens’ environmental rights in order to strive for a clean and good living environment. It has become an important part of social morality and reminds humans to care about their living environment.

Work Cited

Suzuki, David. (2015) “Canada Has to Join the Environmental Rights Movement”. Huffpost.

https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/david-suzuki/environmental-rights_b_6103258.html?utm_hp_ref=ca-right-to-a-healthy-environment.

De-extinction is a relatively new conversation in environmental circles. Previously, extinction was seen as the end for a species, with no way for that species to return (this is still the general and popular view in the general public). De-extinction has given environmentalists and conservationists a way to possibly reverse this. De-extinction is the general term that is used to describe the process of reviving previously extinct species using genetics and synthetic biology. This process could be used to revive species that have been extinct for several decades or even millennia (Sandler). As this is being discussed more, it is essential to discuss the ethicality surround such technology and whether it would be used as a tool to absolve human guilt for previously destructive actions (which stems from an anthropocentric view) or in other ways.

Ronald Sandler in his paper, The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species, talks about the concept of de-extinction and the ethical considerations surrounding this concept. The first point he brings up is the concept of restorative justice for species such as the passenger pigeon and thylacine which went extinct due to anthropogenic causes such as habitat destruction and hunting (Sandler). This point resonated with me the most in the ethical arguments for de-extinction because I am a strong believer in restorative justice in other areas of life and found that logic sound. However, as I thought about it a bit more, I realized that while it is a good starting point, it would not be sufficient response to the issue that led to the extinction of these species in the first place. If the scientists and researchers are successful in reviving the passenger pigeons or thylacine, what are the chances that they would not go extinct again or be endangered? I asked myself this because while improvements have been made in regulating hunting and protection of endangered species, we are not here yet as it concerns habitat conservation. Many species are endangered and on the verge of extinction today, and I am concerned that we may not yet have fully addressed the reasons for their extinction. 

What stood out to me in this point though, was the fact that Sandler says that species and ecosystems lack ‘interests and welfares distinct from the individuals that constitute and populate them’ and that for this reason, there is no ethical responsibility grounded in restorative justice to engage in restorative justice (Sandler). I would have to disagree with Sandler on this point from an ecocentric point of view. Looking at this through the lens of ecocentrism, de-extinction would be trying to revive species that were once a part of an ecosystem. And trying to repair an ecosystem that had previously been disrupted due to anthropocentric causes would be an ethical responsibility well-grounded in the idea of restorative justice to that ecosystem. 

Further into the paper, Sandler discusses ethical arguments against de-extinction and the point that stood out the most to me was the fact that de-extinction, as it is presented now, is a form of luxury conservation and a technological fix (Sandler). I agree with Sandler on this and the fact that de-extinction does not fully address any pressing ecological or social problems (Sandler). As I mentioned earlier in this post, it presently seems to be a way to absolve human guilt and concern without dealing too much with the root issue which is human behaviour. De-extinction as technology is not inherently problematic and could be beneficial in repairing disrupted ecosystems. However, a lot more work concerning human behaviours and attitudes will be required before this can happen effectively. 

– Oseyi

Sources:

1. Sandler, R. (2014). The ethics of reviving long extinct species. Conservation Biology, 28(2), 354-360.

In “Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” by Ronald Sandler, various arguments are presented both in favour of and against the de-extinction of animals. The article’s numerous arguments supporting de-extinction research provide a clear picture of de-extinction’s limitations. I will be looking at some of these arguments and expand on them to further state it’s shortcomings.

Sandler states “Deep de‐extinction may offer an optimistic and creative research agenda in comparison with what some see as the current primary conservation biology activities” (Donlan et al. 2006; Brand 2013; Novak 2013 as cited in Sandler 2013). This argument presents de-extinction technology as an easy way out compared to traditional mitigation and maintenance efforts. However, this raises the question of why traditional methods are incapable of “offering optimistic and creative research methods”. It could be stated that de-extinction brings forth a new way of understanding and tackling environmental problems; along with the numerous scientific advancements the field would generate. However, this creates the idea that people should give up on traditional methods because they lack novelty and instead focus on de-extinction research. But novelty in no way indicates that de-extinction is as effective as traditional methods. Researching de-extinction technology is significantly easier than completely re-structuring the world’s consumption, waste management, and environmental protection systems. Yet, time and time again, case studies show that traditional methods are effective and are capable of generating long term environmental sustainability with proper implementation. So, rather than ponder on the capabilities of a relatively young branch of science, we should do all we can to prevent further environmental degradation where possible. As Sandler stated, ” deep de‐extinction is not itself a significant species conservation strategy because it does not prevent species from going extinct. Nor does it address the causes of extinction.” Humans need to solve the problem at its core rather than looking for temporary solutions or deceiving themselves in the potential that de-extinction projects have. Firms and countries alike should work together to make traditional efforts more practical and easily applicable rather than funding the unknown potential of an expensive scientific innovation.

Another argument Sandler uses to support de-extinction technology is: “many people would find it wondrous and awesome to see a living ivory‐billed woodpecker, thylacine, or mammoth, even if only in a zoo or wildlife park.” Sandler makes the previous statement as a support for the value that de-extinction can create for people as such it is likely Sandler did not intend to imply that humans would bring back extinct species for the sole purpose of human satisfaction. However, assuming de-extinction to be possible, it’s likely that companies and countries alike would attempt to profit off of the created animals as much as possible. Which begs the question: is the resurrection of species for human pleasure ethical? I would argue that it’s not. Given that such animals would have less intrinsic value compared to their original ancestors because they did not evolve into existence. Creating these animals for the sole purpose of profit would only further strip them of any value they have left. Since animals gain value from their interconnectedness with their environment, an animal with no environment to become interdependent on would become meaningless.

An additional argument used to support de-extinction technology is its ability to be used as a last resort, specifically: “If all other conservation efforts for a species fail, then at least the species’ DNA can be preserved so that it can be revived later when the threats to it are mitigated, habitat is reestablished, or it will be useful to us.” But this argument assumes that it’ll be physically possible to reestablish the environment using previously extinct species when nothing else works. Realistically, assuming Sandler is right about de-extinction’s ability to be used as a last resort, it’s likely that when such a time comes the environment will already be irreparable. If a large number of species were to go extinct then the earth would likely be in a position where supporting life, let alone large numbers, would be close to impossible. At which point, the chance of ever reestablishing habitats and environments after they have been completely destroyed isn’t feasible. De-extinction isn’t a good last resort because it only works so long as an environment exists that can support the animals we will introduce into it. But if such an environment doesn’t exist or is on the verge of collapse, de-extinction technology becomes useless. Society needs to use the current strategies developed to combat environmental destruction and develop long term sustainability. Ignoring the problem and suddenly reviving numerous species because of environmental degradation is not the answer. Like Sandler later states: “What would be problematic is using de‐extinction in lieu of alternative approaches.”

Lastly, Sandler takes a utilitarian perspective in his comparison of animal welfare: “Compared with the number of animals already used in research (estimated to be 10–25 million/year in the United States alone) and in animal agriculture (estimated to be 56 billion land animals/year globally), conservation cloning (let alone deep de‐extinction) does not pose a special or very large animal welfare problem.” The argument applies a bias against small groups when compared to larger ones. I found myself asking why the intense suffering of a few is considered less than the suffering of the many? If a small village were to be hit by a tornado and all of the people were to die, would we say that their suffering is less compared to if an earthquake had destroyed New York City killing everyone. The average person wouldn’t make such a claim, so why is it justified to make the same claim with animals? People accept that in either case, the deaths of any number of people is a horrible thing, yet we count and compare animals’ lives as if they were nothing more than statistical figures, all the while disregarding their worth and value. By the logic of Sandler’s argument, it follows that we should disregard the elderly and sick, and focus on the young, middle-aged and healthy since they make up a larger proportion of the population. It’s a radical claim, rather we should not disregard the suffering experiences of a set of people nor animals simply due to their lack of numbers.

First of all, I would like to distinguish deep de-extinction from cloning. It means revive species that been extinct decades ago rather than more recent species. (355) Although a similar technique uses in both situations, the value and purpose of these two are different. In “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species,” Ronald Sandler argues that deep de-extinction is not intrinsically problematic but not so urgent or more ethically important compare to other conservation measures and concerns. (359) According to Sandler’s article, I will discuss the duty that humans have to make up their past the concerns associate with deep de-extinction. Then, I would explain Sandler’s idea about deep de-extinction is mainly techno-science oriented instead of conservation-oriented.

Human interruption is the major cause for species extinction, and intrinsic values associated with species are independently from humans. Some people would argue that some species are non-scient. And since they are no longer exist, they would not have feelings or interests in bringing back to life. However, every species has its values, and we as humans should respect that. If humans are the cause of their extinction, even they do not have interests or feelings. It is our responsibility to help restore their lives as they have the right to live. Therefore, we could use deep de-extinction as a tool to reintroduce into the environment. However, it is almost impossible to send these revive species back to their habitat. Since they were “born” in a lab setting and their habitats are different from the past. Also, even we use deep de-extinction to bring them back, many of them will use for research and exhibition instead of release. (358) In this way, to solve people’s concern for ecology and human health. While these “new-born” species would lose their intrinsic value as well as ecological value. They were not in the ecosystem means they cannot contribute to the environment. In the end, they would become subjects people use to study and display rather than species who deserve our respects. Hence, humans still own duty for the extinct species since their life cannot restore by deep de-extinction.

Deep de-extinction could create scientific and even economic value for the extinct species, but it cannot restore their intrinsic and ecological value. Additionally, it is not a critical species conservation strategy due to it cannot prevent extinction or address the cause of extinction. (357) To achieve the deep de-extinction would require advanced technology, intelligent researchers, and human-made habitat for the species. It need support from the government and companies to keep this program running. However, these supporters care less about conservation than getting profit. And these researchers need to convince them to invest. Therefore, despite the unpredictable risk associate with release these species, they need them to make profits. Although these technologies can contribute to other conservation methods, it is not urgent for de-extinction. To achieve conservation, we would need people to realize the cause of these extinctions and prevent them in the future. Moreover, the conservation approach to the currently endangered species is more significant. They are alive and would impact the ecosystem and other species around them. The consequence of losing them is far more severe than bring back the species that we already a lost long time ago.

In conclusion, I would agree with Sandler’s argument on it is that urgent to achieve de-extinction. And there are more substantial conservation methods we could consider rather than develop new technology.

Ruoxin

Reference:

Sandler, Ronald. “The Ethics of Reviving Long extinct species.” Conservation Biology, 2013.

After study with the  specific analysis of the potential crisis leading to the extinction of homing pigeons, the concept of de-extinction was introduced by Kasperbauer. In fact, the idea of resuming extinction has existed for a long time, because since the rapid development of mankind, the environmental pollution and ecological damage caused by industrialization have become more and more serious, and this effect has accelerated the extinction and disappearance of species. This is a painful thing for human beings and the natural world. If conditions permit, the idea of resuming extinction is not impossible. However, whether the moral ethics and environmental ethics contained in it are in line with the status quo of survival is complicated. And far-reaching thinking content. Kasperbauer pointed out that he focused on the extinction value. The development of de-extinction technology has not yet reached a reliable realization.

So when Kasperbauer uses biotechnology, the idea that the genome is combined with the embryo and develops sounds effective, but the result is that there are genetic differences between the extinct species and the previously extinct species, and their offspring are 80% similar- 90% (2017). In fact, this shows that there is still a lot of room for the complete restoration of extinction. The reason may be the developmental environment or genetic changes. So in this case, the resulting situation is unpredictable. And how do we choose the species to return to extinction? How do we consider whether a species is worthy of restoration? First, consider the impact on the ecological environment, and secondly, are human interests? Is the current ecological environment suitable for extinct species? Should it be abandoned if it has nothing to do with human interests or species that cannot satisfy human interests? This is one of the profound issues that are very complex and contains ethics. Therefore, we assume that the restoration of extinction can be achieved. Taking into account that the reproduction of ancient biological embryos requires specific development occasions, and the physiological structure of modern organisms and ancient organisms have obvious differences when people want to use modern organisms to breed ancient biological embryos, it is very difficult. Moreover, there are huge differences between the current ecological environment of the earth and ancient times. Therefore, even if the ancient species is restored, if the environment suitable for the survival of this species cannot be reconstructed, the survival rate of this species is difficult to guarantee (2018).

Kasperbauer pointed out the five challenges of de-extinction, these are also our concerns. I want to explain two of the challenges. The first is that there may still be reasons for the extinction of species in the current living conditions. We cannot know whether the reasons leading to species extinction are eradicated, because of the complexity of the reasons, and the reasons for existence are likely to accumulate and evolve over time and have become or diverge into more potential causes of extinction. Therefore, if we do not completely eradicate the root cause of the existential threat to extinct species, then even if we resurrect them, the survival rate will be difficult to guarantee. The second challenge is related to the invasion. Kasperbauer proposed that people can genetically modify extinct species to make them less aggressive, but more friendly(2017). I think this challenge is unethical. I think it is not advisable if we can modify the genes of extinct species to be what we want. Because every species, no matter what attributes it is, is given by nature and conforms to the laws of nature. Human beings have no right to change the genes of any species, even if it is of great benefit to the interests of mankind, this is against ethics. So this is a very worthy question.

Although de-extinction technology is still immature, I think it can still help human beings make up for the extinction caused by their own faults. It is also a feasible idea to restore the diversity of the ecological environment. Therefore, when we measure whether this technology should be widely used, I hope that it can continue to progress in accordance with the changes of the times and the progress of human thinking while avoiding the survival threats brought by the restoration of extinction to species and humans, which is the most meaningful.

work cited:

Kasperbauer, T.J. (2017). Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction. Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20(1): 1-14.

Zhihu. (2018). Could we use DNA technology to realize de-extinction? https://www.zhihu.com/question/304934951

In Ronald Sandler’s “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” the question of the moral permissibility of bringing back extinct species is addressed. Sandler explores the reasons in favour of their revival first; justice, the establishment of lost value, creative value, and serving as a conservational last resort. Sandler also engages with arguments against revival, these being the unnaturalness of it, animal welfare concerns, ecological and health concerns and the issue of hubris. Sandler takes a mostly anthropocentric approach in grappling with the issues. 

Sandler provides very salient points in favour of reviving long extinct species but ultimately concludes that there are more pressing issues to be prioritized such as “efforts to conserve existing species and that the ecological, animal welfare, conservation, legal, and health concerns”. I completely agree with this position based on concern for existing animals and the extinct species. 

The argument is pretty straight forward for why existing species should be prioritized but I’ll still briefly address them. Firstly there is an ongoing threat to animals in existence that doesn’t exist for already extinct species. Animals that are alive today have to compete to survive whereas there is no danger presented to already extinct animals (it’s not like you can go double extinct). One could argue that the longer a species goes without existence the less prepared to deal with existence they will be when they return. This opposition holds some merit but realistically, barring catastrophic disaster, there is no way that the environment will change enough for a species to be completely unable to adapt to their environment, especially with the aid of scientists. Additionally, there is an important distinction made by Sandler to centre the discussion around long-extinct species. Specifying that the species have been extinct for a long time already suggests that whatever concerns might arise from the resurfacing of the species are not of significant concern. For these reasons, this argument doesn’t sway my perspective.  

On the other hand, in the case of the extinct species, we might assume that to not exist is bad. However, I would argue that this is not the case. To adopt an epicurean view; existence is the absence of pain which is good and an absence of pleasure which is neither nor bad. This suggests that not existing is, at very least, a neutral endeavour. There are numerous ways to object to this position of course and in this application, the most salient would be that individuals are missing out when they do not exist, therefore not existing is bad on the deprivation account. While there is merit to this perspective from our perspective as existing but if one was to not exist, there would be nobody to be deprived of experiences. 

At the centre of my perspective is still agreement. Just as Sandler outlines in their paper, there is nothing wrong with reviving long-extinct species. However, we should focus on species that are currently in existence and how we can protect them, the ecosystems and the health of the planet. Once we have dealt with those concerns, the question of bringing back extinct species can be re-examined.

– Luke

Work Cited:

Sandler, R. (2014), The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species. Conservation Biology, 28: 354-360. https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1111/cobi.12198

As an animal lover myself, I am fascinated by all the different animals and the little intrinsic differences they have between them: each species is unique and valuable on its own. Because of this, extinction is a sad word to me, as it means that every single member of an unique animal species disappears forever from this planet. Extinction due to natural causes are perhaps more acceptable, such as the mammoths and dinosaurs. But when it comes to extinction with some or more anthropogenic causes, I experience frustration with the human race and the destruction it has done to the planet. When I first came across the concept of de-extinction, it seemed absolutely wonderful. De-extinction is “accomplished by reconstructing close approximations of the extinct species’ genomes based on information found in preserved DNA and on genetic information from close living relatives.” ¹ It seems that being able to bring back the species that we have forced into extinction is a matter of justice, an effort of making amends for our past wrongs. Ronald Sandler, however, does not agree with this belief. He takes a generally negative view on the matter of de-extinction, remaining only slightly open to its development when it does not compromise “ethically important things.” ¹ When it comes to justice, he denies this claim, explaining that while individual animals are alive, the species as a whole is not alive, and therefore does not deserve moral considerations. Further, Sandler puts more emphasis on reparations and rehabilitation, rather than a restorative approach. Which means that it is more important to “reform our practices and institutions so as to minimize future extinctions.” ¹ Sandler’s arguments makes it apparent that even though we may feel compelled to fix our mistakes through de-extinction, it is difficult to justify such an urge of justice. I began to think if there are more concerns that I have overlooked.

While Sandler discusses that revived species could have some value to them (thought different from before they went extinct),¹ he overlooks the possibility that de-extinction could render all species’ intrinsic value worthless. While animals’ ecological and instrumental values could remain relatively the same, something intrinsic is undoubtedly lost when biotechnologies are capable of modifying an entire species. In modifying the genes of a species, gene-drive technologies have already undermined much of that value. But with de-extinction, we would be creating an entire species with pieces of DNA invisible to the naked eye, nearly “out of thin air”. This thought is terrifying. If we could easily make our own species, then how valuable would that make all animal species that existed from evolution, who took existence on their own? The respect that we have for nature’s creations would decrease drastically if we are capable of doing the same thing. Sandler expresses a similar concern that conservationist efforts would likely be threatened as resources are diverted,¹ but I think this loss of value concerns beyond the endangered species that need our protection. When we are capable of personalizing and creating species to our hearts’ desires, all that has been made by nature becomes a lot less valuable, as we can easily do the same thing. Sandler addresses this issue of hubris in his paper, in defending that proponents of de‐extinction often “emphasize the value of species and are motivated at least in part by wonder and a sense of responsibility toward extinct species”. As well, he explains that responsibly pursuing de-extinction will not be problematic, including concerns for ecological sensitivity and compassion for the animals involved. I agree entirely with his views. Where I diverge from his opinions is my concern for the reaction from the public. It is reasonable to think that proponents of de-extinction, motivated by science and responsibility, will not take a hubristic attitude towards the natural world. However, such experts cannot prevent a decline of animals’ intrinsic value in the eyes of the public. When something becomes more easily attainable, its value usually decreases. This remains an important concern of mine.

Perhaps my most significant concern is the unstoppable nature of new technology. It seems that we can address many ethical concerns with new technology, allowing more cautious measures to be taken when it comes to their implementation and development. Nonetheless, we don’t seem to be able to halt their development, no matter how much fear is attributed to them. Artificial intelligence is one such technology in which many individuals acknowledge their potential threats to us humans. Still, as Arend Hintze, an expert of AI comments, AI will continue to be developed despite these fears.² Sandler also points out that de-extinction creates value in being a “tremendous scientific and technological achievement” when achieved. How likely is it that we will cease pursuing such an achievement? That is, perhaps, the most terrifying part about technologies. We may be able to contribute to this debate in bringing up more issues to be addressed, but the development and study of this technology will continue to proceed, against all odds.

References

¹ Sandler, Ronald. “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species.” Conservation Biology 28, no. 2 (2014): 354–60. https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.12198.

² Hintze, Arend. “What an Artificial Intelligence Researcher Fears about AI.” 11 Nov. 2019, theconversation.com/what-an-artificial-intelligence-researcher-fears-about-ai-78655.

In Sandler’s The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species the question of deep de-extinction (the revival of long extinct species as opposed to recently extinct species) has its ethically for and against arguments explored, followed by Sandler’s take on DDE.

I: Sandler’s Arguments for and Against Deep De-Extinction (DDE)

The ethical arguments Sandler explores in favor of DDE are the justice, lost value, creation of value, and last resort arguments. First, the justice argument states that some species considered for DDE went extinct due to humans, meaning we ‘owe’ them their revival (355). However, considering species broadly do not have interests to be impeded (355) nor are the specific individuals around anymore, justice in the restorative sense gives no ethical duty to develop DDE. Second, the lost value arguments states species are valuable ecologically, instrumentally, and intrinsically (356) so their revival restores ‘worldly’ value. Sandler counters this, as a species’ value is “relational and context sensitive, [DDE] alone is insufficient to reestablish it.” (356). For example, a revived mammoth lost its natural habitat, its niche is non-existent, and intrinsically (as DDE hybridizes DNA of revived species) is a ‘new’ creature. Resultingly, lost value gives no ethical duty to develop DDE. Third, the creating value argument holds that “even if [DDE] cannot replace lost values, it may nevertheless create value.” (356). It is true many would like to see a live mammoth or extinct flora as spectacle, further the biotech behind DDE is a massive leap in technology anyway. Though interesting, Sandler recognizes creating value is not necessarily ethically bound to developing DDE for extinct species’ revival. Fourthly, the last resort argument concludes that should conservation efforts fail, DDE insures species revival later (357). Though, Sandler notes that this neither prevents nor fixes the causes of extinction (357) and may take the focus on preserving DNA rather than species in their natural context. Broadly, none of these pro-DDE arguments give an ethical duty to develop DDE. The creation of value is intriguing, but not ethically bound.

The ethical arguments Sandler explores opposed to DDE are the unnatural, animal welfare, eco/health concerns, and hubristic arguments. To begin, the unnatural argument fits those same people who object to other genetic altering technologies as it creates new hybrid organisms (357). Sandler opposes this as hybrids exist in nature, and human agriculture has been just a slower process of ‘gene altering’ anyway (357). While Sandler thinks GMOs should be labelled to respect other’s beliefs (357), this does not ethically forbid developing DDE. Following, the animal welfare argument states DDE cloning may result in genetic abnormalities, so animal suffering is possible (358). But Sandler adds DDE research will have the same oversight as any other research/conservation practice (358) so is not a new ethical debate, rather one already under a watchful eye, so again DDE is not necessarily ethically forbidden. Next, the eco/health concerns argument carries that DDE species may be released or escape, leading to unknown injuries to ecosystems and humans (358). However, “many revived species will be intended for research and exhibition, not release” (358) and that it is equally unknown if a revived species may really benefit its new environment. Lastly, the hubristic argument claims humans are ‘playing God’ and researchers overestimate their control over biotechnology, treat the symptoms and not the causes of extinction (358), and treat living things as things for humanity to design (359). Sandler states that DDE is more of a neutral tool and might be used hubristically if to redesign nature as humanity desires but can be used properly if held under careful oversight and respect (359). Once again, DDE is not necessarily ethically prohibited so long as it is used responsibly.

With the pro and anti DDE arguments established, Sandler concludes that DDE should be held as ‘Luxury Conservation’. DDE does not solve the causes or responsibilities of past mistakes, there is no ethical incentive to develop DDE nor ethically prohibit it (359). “[DDE] is fine to pursue if people want so long as it does not interfere with or compromise ethically important things” so can is ‘luxury conservation’ (359). Sandler concludes that DDE is a luxury, and so long as it does not take resources or focus on more pressing conservation efforts, so long as it is not abused simply because humanity can, and that it is used with respect and an understanding of its luxurious status (likely very expensive to clone) there is nothing inherently wrong or duty bound in developing DDE, rather it is ‘extra’; a fascinating potential not required of anyone to achieve.

II: Application

Consider the case of reviving a Woolly Mammoth. The poor things were likely hunted to extinction by our ancestors but considering their natural context is gone and so are the humans that killed them, humanity presently is neither obligated to revive nor keep them extinct. Absolutely, a live mammoth would be a spectacle and a symbol of our biotechnical prowess, but nothing more as it would likely require humans to sustain it in an artificial habitat. The arguments provided above do not necessarily forbid nor incentivize the revival of the woolly mammoth. It would be cool, but unnecessary, much like a luxury! Further, DDE may give some peace regarding hyper important species such as pollinators. I absolutely think present conservation efforts must be pursued to their extreme before DDE is considered, yet DDE can provide relief knowing that if humanity does screw up the conservation of a mass pollinator species, such as bees, there is a potential for more chances to clean up our act.

III: Question for Sandler

What are the implications of borderline cloning biotechnology? The creating value section discusses the potential for technological progress for the sake of progress in DDE in a kind of throw away manner (understandably, the scope of Sandler’s exploration is regarding animal cloning). Yet I feel the first question that will be asked after a form of animal cloning has been developed is “can and should we clone a human?”. I do not feel like this is entirely off the point, as humans are made of the same building blocks DDE would use to hypothetically revive long dead organisms. Human cloning is a logical application of this technology, and I would like to know if Sandler considered the aftermath of DDE tech in this direction.

Sources:

Ronald Sandler. The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species. Conservation Biology Vol. 28 No. 2 354-360 (2013) Society for Conservation Biology DOI: 10.1111/cobi.12198

This week in Philosophy 355 we are discussing the topic of de-extinction as a method for conservation. De-extinction is a novel conservation technology heavily influenced by cloning; however, it is defined by T.J. Kasperbauer as “the process of reviving genetically extinct species” (2017, pg. 1).

Since many extinctions are catalyzed by humans, proponents of this technology argue that de-extinction is a good idea for various ethical reasons such as: restoring justice, reestablishing lost value, creating value, and that it is a conservation last-resort (Sandler 2013). However, those who are in opposition to the technology are in disagreement due to it being unnatural, along with concerns about animal welfare, the potential ecological and human health impacts, and it is essentially a way of “playing God” with nature (Sandler, 2013, pg. 357). This blog post will examine the debate of de-extinction through an ecocentric philosophical ethical theory standpoint using Holmes Rolston’s viewpoints to drive the discussion as to whether this technology is unnatural or not.  

As mentioned, Rolston is an ecocentrist — a philosophical ethical theory that extends moral considerability to all things (no matter if they are sentient or not) and species as wholes while rejecting anthropocentrism (the view where only humans are assigned moral value). In his paper, Rolston speaks a lot about the importance of species and how species lineages have gone through natural selection in which valuable traits are chosen to help the organism, and therefore the species adapt and sustain life. Rolston responds to the claim that artificial selection (where humans interfere in natural selection by choosing desired traits of the organism) for de-extinction  is “unnatural” where he rebuttals and claims that “most of our cultural activities are unnatural in the sense that they are not found in wild spontaneous nature” (2002, pg. 10). Furthermore, according to Rolston, this genetic manipulation of the organism’s DNA is no more unnatural than that of plant breeding, where we use artificial selection to genetically alter more favourable and lucrative plants for consumption (2002). Rolston concludes his rebuttal in saying that as long as those who are manipulating or artificially selecting things that are found in nature are to go about it in a respectful way that appreciates and acknowledges the intrinsic value typical to natural selection, then it is okay to continue (2002). 

In my personal opinion, I really agree with Rolston’s critique on those who think de-extinction is unnatural. I feel as though a lot of people do not realize how frequent it is to artificially select traits or modify DNA sequences for common things such as the crops we eat. Furthermore, in response to his concluding statement, I think that it is important for everyone to value the intrinsic worth of all life on Earth when going about daily life or performing these novel de-extinction experiments. While it is a new technology and many of the workings have to be sorted out in order for those who are wary of it to subscribe to it, I think that it is very interesting and it has the potential to be a great conservation tool. I look forward to seeing this technology progress in the future. 

-Ashley 

References:

Kasperbauer, T.J. (2017). Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction. Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20(1): 1-14.

Rolston, H. (2002). What do we mean by the intrinsic value and integrity of plants and animals? Department of Philosophy, Colorado State University. 5-11. https://mountainscholar.org.  

Sandler, R. (2013). The Ethics of Reviving Long Lost Extinct Species. Department of Philosophy, Northeastern University. 354-360. https://conbio-onlinelibrary-wiley-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca.

The topic of this week’s readings was that of de-extinction, a burgeoning technology which combines our knowledge of ecosystems, genealogy, and the extinction process with our knowledge of cloning and genetic modification. This technology would enable us to effectively “bring back” species both from the brink of extinction as well as back through history.

In his ‘Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species’ Ron Sandler specifies between recently extinct species and ones that have not been around for a long time, calling these latter projects ‘deep de-extinction’, and focusses his paper on these. Sandler goes over some objections to this technology, namely “that it is unnatural; that it could cause animal suffering; that it could be ecologically problematic or detrimental to human health; and that it is hubristic or akin to playing God” (Sandler 4). He also discusses arguments that favour de-extinction efforts, “that it is a matter of justice; that it would reestablish lost value; that it would create new value; and that we need it as a conservation last resort” (2). Sandler concludes that these are valid considerations and that ultimately “de-extinction is in many respects a luxury. It is fine to pursue if people want, so long as it does not interfere with or compromise ethically important things” (6).

I enjoyed Sandler’s paper, agreeing with his thoughtful analysis of both sides of the issue, but found myself in disagreement with his conclusion. I do not believe that de-extinction, especially deep de-extinction is “fine” to pursue on the whim of humans for luxurious hobbyist purposes.

For me there are many unknowable risks (or perhaps these are simply unknowns to me, someone who is scientifically illiterate): Animals exist within an eco-system. If we bring back long-dead species, they may not have the appropriate habitat or food available. Additionally, they could be competition for whatever species have moved into their place in the ecosystem, putting them at risk. How will they learn the behaviours needed for survival in their new environment?

Quite often these animals are only brought back for study and are not released into the wild, which Sandler defends by saying there are many animals who live in lab conditions and that “the animal welfare concerns [raised] do not significantly differentiate it from many other research and conservation practices involving animals” (5) concluding that deep de-extinction should not be abandoned due to this. However at this point I am forced to wonder; if we are not bringing these animals back to release them into the wild, to fill some ecological gap, for what purpose would we be pursuing this? If the animals are destined to live in a lab, other than our own vanity and desire to play with science, what benefit does deep de-extinction bring? And especially what benefits does it bring that actually outweigh the possibility for suffering? My opinion is that there is very little value.

As a result of the above concerns I was refreshed to watch Stanley Temple’s Tedx talk. Temple argues that de-extinction should be pursued with the utmost caution, but helped enlighten me to some areas in which the technology can be used in cases of more recently extinct species who went extinct as a result of their habitats being eroded but now those habitats are thriving, or when they went extinct due to extreme hunting, but now we are better at preventing out of control hunting like that today, especially through the use of ecological reserves and the like.

The most promising case to me though was the cases he described in which an ‘evolutionary bottleneck’ has occurred. This happens when a species is so endangered that there are so few members left that cloning and other de-extinction technologies can be used promote greater genetic diversity and healthy reproduction.

So this is the main way in which I agree with Sandler: de-extinction is best used as a conservational last resort (4), in tandem with other conservation efforts to promote the other factors that are affecting that species’ ability to thrive. When a species is on the brink of extinction and we are actively working to conserve that species’ habitat so we know it will have a context in which to thrive, I argue that de-extinction technologies can and in fact should be used to promote biodiversity and to prevent the unknown impacts that losing that animal could have on its ecosystem. However, I believe there are too many unknowns about long extinct species, and bringing them back just to live in a scientifically studied context is just not worth the potential harms to the animals.

• Renée

Sources

Sandler, Ronald. (2013) ‘The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species’ Conservation Biology, Volume 28, No. 2, (pp 354–360). Boston MA. Available at:

https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1111/cobi.12198

Temple, Stanley. (2013) ‘De-extinction: a game-changer for conservation biology’. TedxDeExtinction Talk. Available at:

https://reviverestore.org/events/tedxdeextinction/de-extinction-a-game-changer-for-conservation-biology/

This week in PHIL 355, we shift our attention to issues concerning de-extinction as a form of conservation. According to T.J. Kasperbauer, reviving previously extinct species has the potential to preserve biodiversity, restore diminished ecosystems and undo previous harm caused by humans (2017, pg. 1). Throughout his paper, he focuses specifically on the de-extinction for the passenger pigeon and identifies five critical challenges affiliated with its pursuit.

When evaluating the means of pursuing de-extinction of passenger pigeons, Kasperbauer argues that humans have a duty to consider the morally-relevant interests of individual members of the species and subsequently not inflict pain and suffering upon them (2017, pg. 5). Because a species as a whole cannot experience pain or pleasure, he argues that there is no need to consider their interests when re-introducing a species back into existence (Kasperbauer, 2017).

I found this challenge particularly interesting because it works directly in opposition to the beliefs of many Eco-centrists. Unlike Kasperbauer, Holmes Rolston argues that morally-considerable interests should be extended to species as a whole since individual members would seize to exist without the evolutionary process put forward by its species (1985).

This got me thinking: When considering the impact of de-extinction processes from a utilitarian point of view, is it enough to only take into consideration the morally-relevant interests of individual members of a species? Should the relevant interests of the species as a whole be considered as well?

In the article, Kasperbauer argues that many sentient’s believe that the initial threats of predation will subsequently generate an enormous amount of suffering for individual members of a species (2017). This, he argues, illegitimatizes the idea that we should consider the interests of species as a whole first and foremost simply because de-extinction allows the species to thrive.

In my opinion, I would argue against this and believe that we should foremost consider the interests of species as a whole when considering the impacts of de-extinction.

Firstly, it is important to bear in mind that evolution happens at the species rather than the individual level (Rolston, 1985). As such, individual members of a species will only exist if they are constituents of a lineage that pass on their genes. In the case of passenger pigeons, the perpetuation of their existence depends upon a very large minimum colony size in order to reproduce successfully (Kasperbauer, 2017). The process of de-extinction would thus impose significant initial challenge and suffering for the species as a whole, whereas individual members may succeed in reproduction and not experience a significant degree of suffering.

Even when evaluating the risk of de-extinction to groups outside of the newly introduced species, we do not do so on an individual basis. Rather, we evaluate the risks associated with the re-introduction of a new species on the pain and suffering it could potentially inflict on species and ecosystems as wholes.

So why would we assess the risks of the newly introduced species any differently?

For example, consider the risk of invasion that may stem from the re-introduction of Passenger Pigeons. Because they tend to travel in flocks and may very well move beyond their native ecosystem, these pigeons would conflict with other native animals that have come to rely on the food resources and other ecosystem services in their surrounding habitats (Kasperbauer, 2017, pg. 4). This has the potential to disrupt the functioning of entire ecosystems through means of biodiversity loss, which would affect entire species whom of which depend on the services provided by other species (not individuals) to ensure their survival. As a result, the pain and suffering inflicted on species as wholes must be considered.

Moreover, the de-extinction of a potentially invasive animal could afflict significant pain and suffering towards the human population by imposing significant threats to ecosystem productivity. Although the magnitude and severity of threat may vary across regions and countries, the disruption of ecosystems through biodiversity loss is a major threat to the human species as a whole. It is through the richness of our biodiversity that perpetuates functioning ecosystems that serves as a kind of life support for humans- supplying our global population with oxygen, clean air and life that would seize to exist without it. While the potential loss of biodiversity from de-extinction may imminently impact more vulnerable regions over others, its true impact effects the human species as a whole.

All in all, I believe that it is more important to take into consideration the interests of species as wholes when evaluating the impacts of de-extinction.

Work Cited:

Kasperbauer, T. (2017). ‘Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction’, In Ethics, Policy & Environment.

Rolston, H. (1985). ‘Duties to Endangered Species’, In BioScience.

This blog post will be examining the ethical analysis for de-extinction by Sandler in his paper “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” in the context of passenger pigeons (Sandler 2014). Sandler presents a multi-dimensional overview of the ethical considerations of de-extinction, considering both proponent and opponent arguments. The idea of de-extinction remains a highly controversial topic with many different perspectives dictating the science’s future. Passenger pigeons are an avian species that went extinct in the 1914’s as a direct result of anthropogenic causes, primarily overhunting (Kasperbauer 2017). The species of passenger pigeons have been considered one that could be a possible candidate of de-extinction due to their close relations to living species, the quantity of available DNA, and there perceive value.

Sandler’s first argument deals with the restorative justice owed by humans to species that have gone extinct as a result of anthropogenic means (Sandler 2014). Sandler argues that despite the extinction of a species resulting from human activity, de-extinction would not be justifiable. The argument against the ethical ideal focuses on that a species cannot be awarded restorative justice. There is no moral obligation to the species. As all individual organisms are extinct, then there remains no obligation towards restoration. In the case of passenger pigeons, this argument remains true; not only would re-establishing the species provide no justice to the historical organisms as they would remain dead. Their extinct organisms DNA would be used meaning the “new” species also would not be the same as the historic (Kasperbauer 2017). As the technology stands, the de-extinction process would create a close replication of the historical passenger pigeon, but not an exact copy. Furthermore, passenger pigeons’ de-extinction wouldn’t negate the previous causes of the species extinctions; overhunting. Without an increase in regulations regarding the hunting of the species, the de-extinction of passenger pigeons would not even meet the criteria of reparation and rehabilitation justice (Sandler 2014)

Both the second and third arguments examine how the value of the species and organisms would impact the ethical consideration of de-extinction (Sandler 2014). The three central values mentioned by Sandler are a species ecological value, instrumental value, and their intrinsic value, another value that wasn’t discussed explicitly by Sandler is a species existence value (Kasperbauer 2017). Considering passenger pigeons, their ecological value and instrumental value are relatively similar; the value resides in the species ability to spread the seeds of nut-bearing trees. Considering that the region where passenger pigeons were previously located is now more densely populated, the significance of the species ecological and instrumental value is minimal. The passenger pigeons’ intrinsic value would also be considerably different, as the species itself is not the same as the distinct historical form. A species’ existence value is another essential factor to consider; passenger pigeons have a unique history and could be regarded as valued merely for the ability to see one, the wondrous value (Sandler 2014). The value of passenger pigeons as a species would be considerably more minimal if they were brought back negating the purpose of de-extinction, as a way to create or re-establish the species historical value.

The last argument presented by Sandler pertains to the viability of de-extinction as a last resort technology. When no other conservation and environmental management strategies have been effective in mitigating a species’ extinction, then at least the DNA can be preserved (Sandler 2014). In the case of passenger pigeons, the practicality of de-extinction as a last resort is minimal; there is a requirement in population size for the continued survival of the species, which would be costly and time-consuming to implement. Furthermore, de-extinction does nothing to actually deal with the anthropogenic factor in their historic extinction. There is no point in using de-extinction technologies if the cause of extinction is not dealt with; reintroducing an extinct species in the historic environment with no changes will likely result in a repeat extinction. The case stands that if no other conservation efforts have been useful, then there is little practical use in de-extinction as the results will remain the same. If passenger pigeons were reintroduced, they would likely still be considered pests and overhunted until extinction for the second time (Kasperbauer 2017).

By examining passenger pigeons’ case, it’s easy to see that the moral considerability of de-extinction is reliant on many contingent factors. Restorative justice is inadmissible to extinct species, but reparation is possible if regulations are put in place to limit the amount of overhunting. There is only limited value of de-extinction passenger pigeons, especially in their historical regions but, there is a possibility to create value in new ecosystems, as a new species remains. Conservation focus must not be entirely on de-extinction, but instead on mitigating climate change, habitat degradation, and pollution otherwise history will be repeated (Sandler 2014). There are many possibilities of future research in the field of de-extinction, morality must be considered at every step.

Sources

T.J. Kasperbauer (2017) Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction, Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20:1, 1-14, DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

R. Sandler (2014) The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species, 28:2, 354-360, DOI: 10.1111/cobi.12198

De-extinction is a peculiar topic. I never thought I’d have to consider the ethics of resurrecting the genetic line of a lost species, but science continues to surprise and scare me with its possibilities. On one hand, several immediate moral objections against this technology immediately come to mind, many of which T.J. Kasperbauer more thoroughly discusses in his paper (from which this blog post draws to inform its content). On the other hand, I would love to see a living woolly mammoth. My mom probably would, too. And I don’t think it’s too controversial an opinion to believe that many people have their own ‘woolly mammoths,’ i.e., their own personal preferences of species that they would love and appreciate to see in-person (perhaps constituting an ethical problem in itself, for those insensitive and foolish enough to hold captive dangerous animals in their backyard, primarily for these creatures’ exotic status). Still, the satisfaction of my preferences, nor of those of any human, should not serve as the chief basis of justifying de-extinction; on the contrary, there better be good, defensible reasons for bringing back species that have gone extinct, many of whom have died out in the first place due to human arrogance and moral negligence.

I will ignore for now the objection that these scientific developments are unnatural, or that they are another reprehensible human attempt of achieving mastery over nature. I admit I do believe there’s something fundamentally disturbing about so intimately manipulating genes – I think there’s some wisdom to be found in Shelley’s Frankenstein, alongside other pertinent science fiction cautioning us against zombifying life – but I’m willing to set aside my feelings for the sake of considering whether there are ecological benefits to de-extinction, as well as individual benefits for the animals and plants themselves. One obvious reason for pursuing this technology is the potential good it offers to eco-systems that would benefit from the re-introduction of extinct species (Kasperbauer 3). These animals and plants could provide critical functions that regulate and work towards the health of an eco-system, such as deterring pests, or acting as predators, or serving as prey themselves. Insofar as de-extinction offers a means of providing these vital roles that other species (or other forms of technology) may not be able to fulfill, the potential benefits do seem valuable. Of course, we’d still have to consider the individual suffering entailed by bringing these animals into existence,¹ but if we are holistic eco-centrists who endorse the value of species and their genetic lines over individuals, as espoused by Rolston,² then this objection appears less grave. Kasperbauer does point out, however, that the original cause of extinction for many of these animals still exists, as with hunting practices (4), and de-extinction doesn’t address these other separate moral (and indeed, political) dimensions that are, in themselves, matters of ethical debate. We certainly wouldn’t want to revive an animal species solely to create more targets for a crossbow, and I think in this conversation regarding de-extinction, we should take more seriously the question of whether we humans are even ready for this kind of power and technology.

I’m inclined to believe otherwise. And I don’t see it as unwarranted cynicism due to past human failures. I do firmly believe that science holds so much wondrous potential to affirm our proper relationship to the natural world, to restore so much that has been lost, and to discover what good can yet be done for our eco-community. So, perhaps in the future I wouldn’t have to be as worried as I am whenever new and powerful scientific developments are on the horizon. I think such caution is justifiable now, however. At present, humankind appears to me to be at the precipice of a drastic ideological shift in how we ought to view our relationship to the natural word, relative to the existential threats (of climate change, of massive pollution, of plastic, of other environmental problems) to ourselves and to the plants and animals with whom we live. I do fear that de-extinction carries with it a real moral hazard to become complacent and morally deficient with how we treat species at present. After all, if reviving these animals in the future always remains a possibility, why worry about their continued existence in the present? Why not defer responsibility to the future, especially during this time when we humans are already playing with our own potential extinction? This line of thinking seriously worries me, and I think it should worry anyone who wouldn’t normally give a second thought about the ethics of de-extinction. Certainly, I don’t think this technology necessarily entails this type of outcome; nor do I believe that this technology, which, by itself, has much value in other areas of scientific research, is morally impermissible despite its potential for abuse. Still, I think there is much prudence in withholding my desire to see a woolly mammoth, until the day I know it will arrive in a safer and more responsible world.

Footnotes

¹ Plants involve a more complex discussion since they lack sentience, and it is being debated whether their lack of sentence entails a lack of interests that can be violated, or if this objection can apply to them.

² Rolston discusses this topic extensively in his paper.

Works Cited

Kasperbauer, T.J. “Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction.” Ethics, Policy & Environment, vol. 20, no. 1, 2017, pp. 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

~ John

This blog post draws on “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” by Ronald Sandler. 

Upon reading this title, my brain immediately jumps to Steven Spielberg’s Jurassic Park. However, I had to remind myself that this was about the ethics of reviving extinct species, not about the possible ramifications of doing such a thing. Sandler does conclude that the reasons for de-extinction are ethically problematic (355). De-extinction does not address the causes for extinction, nor does it promote the prevention of extinction of other species (355). Therefore, it could have unforeseeable negative ramifications towards conservation efforts. Sadly, Sandler decides that we can’t find it ethically acceptable to have dinosaurs walk the earth again until we address issues of human health, animal welfare, and legitimate political and ecological concerns (355). Despite my sadness about not being able to pet a Triceratops anytime soon, I do agree that this idea is not ethically sound until the anthropocentric reasons for extinction are addressed in an adequate way.

Sandler does address several ethical arguments in favour of de-extinction, for example that of justice (355). Species that went extinct due to anthropogenic reasons such as habitat destruction or hunting may be owed de-extinction (355). But Sandler decides to walk away from this argument and instead argues that it is impossible to harm a species – as species do not have aims distinct from the individual organisms making up a species (355). But Holmes Rolston would take offense to this idea because of his holism approach. Rolston prompts his readers to think of species as genetic lifelines, and millions of years of effort taken by individual organisms to create an entity (722). Rolston and holism require us to therefore think of the duties we may owe to species, or even to ecosystems that we are endangering (725). To me, Sandler’s logic therefore is flawed in saying that species can’t be owed justice.

If we continue to use Rolston to address justice that we may owe species that experienced extinction due to human causes, he would most likely agree that these species should be brought back – provided that their reintroduction would not be to the detriment of ecosystems. The reintroduction of wolves into Yellowstone National Park bodes well for this concept of de-extinction for the benefit of an ecosystem (Tori 2020). There was a 70 year gap between when wolves were completely eradicated and reintroduced, and yet the ecosystems are now thriving once more (Tori 2020). The initial removal of the species caused several negative effects on other animals and plants, and even the rivers of Yellowstone National Park (Tori 2020). The reintroduction of wolves means that now the elk population is under control and preventing overgrazing (Tori 2020). So as long as we are willing to accept that we owe a species justice, we can have a hope that their re-introduction could be good for other species.

Despite my disagreement with Sandler over this specific moral reasoning for not going through with de-extinction, I do agree with him that it is outweighed by animal welfare. Animal welfare concerns are a reason that Sandler cites under the reasons for not permitting de-extinction (358). Sandler talks about the issues with cloning that cause health defects and abnormalities in both surrogates and in offspring (358). These issues, combined with how little we can be sure we know about species we are pulling from deep extinction, could cause suffering in the beings that are produced from this process. Sandler cites Singer to tell us that animals are morally considerable, and therefore their suffering is ethically significant (358). Our lack of knowledge about how effective our current de-extinction methods can be requires us to pause any efforts towards this. Rolston would also most likely agree that we should not attempt to revive a species if further harm is going to be done to it. This is a larger argument to consider as well; is it ethically permissible to bring back a species if humans are only going to exploit them once more?

It is not ethically permissible to bring long extinct species back given our current capacity to do so. Further, I want to argue that the only species we should consider bringing back are ones who experienced extinction for solely anthropogenic reasons. The species who were made extinct by humans are the animals who are owed justice, and therefore should be eligible for de-extinction. Which means I do not ever get my triceratops, whether or not we become sure that we can bring them back without harming them. Sandler’s general conclusion about reviving long extinct species is correct. The reasons to pursue de-extinction are currently outweighed by the reasons to not undergo such a thing.

~Suzanah

Peglar, Tori. “1995 Reintroduction of Wolves in Yellowstone.” My Yellowstone Park, 30 June 2020, www.yellowstonepark.com/park/yellowstone-wolves-reintroduction.

Sandler, R. “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species”. Conservation Biology, 28: 354-360, 18 March 2014. https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1111/cobi.12198

Rolston, Holmes. “Duties to Endangered Species.” BioScience, vol. 35, no. 11, 1985, pp. 718–726. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1310053.

This week we are discussing de-extinction, a topic that is very fascinating to me because it is actually very good news for us to be resurrecting extinct creatures. Climate change, human exploitation, and habitat destruction are wreaking havoc on life on Earth. Living organisms adapt to the harsh environment and they reproduce or die out over time, but nowadays, with the increase of human activities, thousands of species go extinct every year. Therefore, the recovery of extinct organisms has become a subject of research for many scientists. In fact, with the advancement of technology, this impossibility has become a reality. But the emergence of this technology inevitably raises many questions that we should consider, namely, is it ethical? Today’s blog will briefly analyze this technology through Kasperbauer‘s article.

First of all, what is de-extinction? Kasperbauer stated that “‘De-extinction’ refers to the process of reviving previously extinct species, discussed most recently in the context of advances in synthetic biology.” (2017) That is, by first sequencing the DNA of the extinct species and then inserting their DNA into the denucleated oocyte of a close relative and then into the embryo for development (2017). Kasperbauer mentioned that “an optimistic estimate predicts that the genes of the extinct species will not be identical to those of the previously extinct species. offspring will be 80-90% similar”. (2017) This means that our recovered organism is optimistically close to the previous life form and its offspring can be mostly similar to the previous organism. Therefore, this means that we are not yet able to get a fully de-extinction organism.

So, let’s think about some of the problems we face and how we should deal with them once we can fully recover an intact extinct organism. I think its emergence could bring some degree of benefit to our ecosystem. The rigorous Kasperbauer also identifies five key challenges of de-extinction, which means that if it is indeed feasible, we need to address these challenges first to protect our existing ecosystem. The challenge for de-extinction is that, for many species, the original cause of extinction still exists.” (2017) It means that we first need to Verify that the main cause of the threat in the environmental community has been removed or reduced. So if we don’t solve the problem, even if we recover it, it’s going to be endangered in a similar way. The second point is “invasiveness”, which I understand to mean that when a new species enters an ecosystem, it causes an imbalance in the ecosystem, i.e., it takes away resources from similar species (2017). (2017) This means that the invasion will cause problems for other species. The third point is that it is still about “invasion”, which means that if we resurrect organisms that are vulnerable to extinction, we can genetically modify them to be less aggressive. The fact that this means they are less likely to survive means even more that this so-called de-distinction may be short-lived for them. The fourth point that I think is worth considering is that even if we bring back extinct species, it will be difficult to mimic the ecosystems in which they once lived. I believe the author is more interested in conveying to us the difficulty of this project. Because a single species can be produced when we have the technology to do so, but over time our ecosystems have become very different from what they were before. So, the question that comes to mind is, will we be able to bring it back to Earth in a way that will create a good environment for it to live in and not affect the habitat of other organisms? The last and most important challenge that Kasperbauer brings to us here is that “it seems to entail significant suffering for sentient individual animals.” (2017) Here I think that in fact, the evolution of organisms is about reproducing offspring, and perhaps we don’t know if they want to be de-extinct or not. considering the suffering of sentient animals is something we morally need to give them respect. However, if it really can bring more good than bad to the ecosystem, I think the suffering is worth it.

In general, I do find that De-extinction seems to be a good technology for our lives. Perhaps it will also allow us to compensate for our impact on the environment. I personally would support it if it could really “rejuvenate” the ecosystem. At the same time, we need to remain cautious, even if it brings us psychological comfort. But we also need to consider whether this compensation is really what they (extinct species) want it to be.

Work cited：

T. J. Kasperbauer (2017) Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction, Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20:1, 1-14, DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

-Linfeng Xie

One of the required readings for this week was “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species,” written by Ronald Sandler. In this paper, he gives several reasons for why a person may argue for or against using cloning to reverse the extinction of a species. Ultimately, he concludes with the thought that there is no strong justification for using what he calls “deep de-extinction” to revive a species, but there is also no strong justification to completely put it out of the question. Therefore, cloning could be responsibly used to revive specific species, but it must not be the one and only method of conservation we should use (359). In fact, Sandler argues deep de-extinction ought not to be the first conservation method we should entertain. There are many reasons for this, but the central idea is that it does not protect a species from extinction; it can only bring them back after the fact (357). I will use this blog post as an opportunity to analyze why this is the case. 

First off, we have an ethical responsibility to prevent future species extinction due to human activity (Sandler 357). Because of this, modern conservation methods must be developed in an attempt to save a species at risk of extinction. One of the ways we could hypothetically conserve a species is through deep de-extinction, where the species is revived through cloning techniques. However, as stated previously, that does not prevent the initial extinction. And, if the species went extinct in the first place, who is to say the environmental and/or anthropogenic pressures for its extinction have also disappeared? It is entirely possible that the resurrection of a species would also result in its re-extinction. 

One of the worries behind using this method is that it will create the idea that we do not need to develop conservation methods. If we can simply bring a species back, why should we go to extraordinary lengths to prevent the initial extinction in the first place? Again, if the species went extinct in the first place, it will go extinct again if we do not incorporate rehabilitation efforts after we revive the species (Sandler, 355-356). I am willing to argue that these rehabilitation efforts are similar to, if not the same as, the conservation methods we ought to use before the extinction event. For example, if a species went extinct due to hunting by humans, we could either incorporate laws to prevent species extinction beforehand, or we could invest a large sum of money into reviving the species through controversial methods. If we decide to revive the species instead of conserving it, we would still need to introduce laws and policies to prevent the hunting of that species anyway, just at a later date. Therefore, we need to develop conservation or rehabilitation methods regardless of if we use deep de-extinction. 

Ultimately, the successful revival of a species would need to involve some form of a rehabilitation method. These methods will look the same as (or be very similar to) the conservation methods one would use to prevent a species extinction in the first place. Thus, while I do not see any particularly enticing ethical reason to reject the use of cloning to resurrect a species, its use is ultimately redundant. Of course, there are cases where a species could be revived to be kept in captivity, but that is not the topic I have been discussing in this blog post. I am merely commenting on the use of deep de-extinction to resurrect a species for reintegration into our modern ecosystems. 

– Leah

Works cited

Sandler, Ronald. “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species.” Conservation Biology, vol. 28, no. 2, 2014, pp. 354–360., doi:10.1111/cobi.12198. 

Many familiar species, such as mammoths, thylacine, and passenger pigeons, have disappeared from the planet, some due to species competition or environmental changes, others due to human activities. Their extinction was once thought to be irreversible, but with the rapid development of genetic engineering technology, scientists have found that it is possible to resurrect these extinct animals through “De-extinction” biotechnology. Currently, no previously extinct species has been successfully resurrected. (2017)Scientists estimate that the technology holds the promise of a milestone breakthrough within the next few decades. (2017)Although the technology is still far from being ready for use, the potential problems it may cause have already caused widespread concern in society. In Tyler J. Kasperbauer’s article “Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction,” he summarizes 5main challenges for “De-extinction” biotechnology. I will selectively discuss the first, second, and the fifth challenge.

1)Species resurrected by anti-extinction techniques may become extinct again for the same reason.
2)There is potential for resurrected species to become invasive.
3)The dilemma between resilience and reversibility.
4)Bringing back only one species may not provide meaningful ecosystem services.
5)Ethical Challenges

Taylor believes that one of the biggest causes of the extinction of the traveling pigeon is human hunting practices. Many people consider them to be pest birds, and if they are resurrected, they will probably be hunted again. (2017)If certain human activities led to some species’ extinction, then we should be prepared to ensure that these behaviors do not occur again before resurrecting the species. I believe the human overhunting problem is relatively easy to solve with better laws, more effective hunting regulations, and more education. We should carefully consider resurrecting species that have become extinct due to habitat loss or climate change. Species that extinct due to environmental reasons may be less suitable for resurrection using anti-extinction techniques, as recreating the right Living Environment for them may be very difficult or costly.

Secondly, he points out that the resurrected species may become invasive. After the extinction of the traveling pigeon, its place in the ecosystem has been taken by other species. Suppose the pigeon population was to be revived and released， it will undoubtedly affect other animals in the ecosystem that share the same food source as the pigeon and even leading to the extinction of other endangered species. In the past, as many as five billion passenger pigeons lived in the United States. If the cloned pigeon population could be increased to a level similar to that of the original, the natural balance disturbance would be unimaginable. Maybe we will need to hunt to control passenger pigeons’ population, as ironic as it may sound since human hunters exterminated them.

In the fourth challenge, he brings up a popular misconception that I think is critical to De-Extinction technology. A common argument is that resurrecting extinct organisms can conserve diversity and restore stability to declining ecosystems, which is inaccurate. Given the large population size of passenger pigeons, their resurrection could significantly increase or decrease the stability of the ecosystem. In most cases, however, a single species cannot significantly affect the stability of an ecosystem. (2017)If the goal is to increase environmental stability and species diversity, it is essential to consider bring back numbers of associated species together. But doing so tends to increase the risks associated with De-Extinction significantly.

Finally, We still have many questions to answer before we can resurrect the traveling pigeon. I believe that there are many limitations and side effects to the use of De-Extinction techniques. Protecting species diversity requires more consideration of how to protect currently endangered species and environmental stability. If we try to protect the environment through technology that brings back extinct species, it’s likely to be half the results with double the effort.

-Dengnan Chen

Reference:
T. J. Kasperbauer (2017) Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction, Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20:1, 1-14, DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

I love the idea of reversing extinctions. Though in my opinion it must be done with an ecocentric set of morals. This means animals that went extinct due to non-human causes must be left extinct: no dinosaurs, no dire wolves or cave bears, no North American horses, nothing that went extinct because of normal climate changes from the flux of ice ages. Human induced damage should be reversed when possible, as Kasperbaur says, to reestablish a species’ former role within an ecosystem. The integrity of an ecosystem should be a paramount goal of an environmentally responsible society. While we try our best to remove invasive, likewise we should do our best to de-extinct the animals we killed off. Kasperbauer introduced some primary ethical challenges that complicate a desire for de-extinction: I will attempt to nullify what in my opinion were the most prominent three.

The first complication that Kasperbauer introduces is that “for many species, the original cause of extinction still exists” (2017). For his example of a passenger pigeon this means humans as a threat still exist, therefore human over hunting could happen again. I think classifying humans as the threat is too convenient and simple. Culture was the problem. The culture that decimated bison (and the passenger pigeon) is gone. If it were not then the few remaining bison in our parks would not be remaining. Instead of following through with the extinction we are now trying to stabilize the population. Social media of today also strongly discourages practises like overhunting – look how trophy hunters are treated on facebook. The original threat IS gone.

“The second challenge for de-extinction is that there is a risk of species becoming invasive” (2017). Kasperbauer says passenger pigeons would be classified as ‘invasive’ if they caused a negative impact on an ecosystem, he goes on to describe how their huge flocks may consume large amounts of food and habitat other birds currently depend on (2017). This in my eyes would be healthy competition. The other bird species living in the native habitat of passenger pigeons got on before the extinction and they would again with a reintroduction. Other bird species’ populations would certainly fall to make room for the passenger pigeons (resources are finite), but there is no reason to believe they would be pushed to extinction themselves.

“The most challenging moral issue raised by de-extinction is that it seems to entail significant suffering for sentient individual animals” (2017). To this I would argue that evolution happens for one sole purpose and that is to increase fitness and survivability in order to pass on your genes. It is my opinion that the one goal in life, common to all living things, is to have kids; it is the driving force behind evolution. To this end, as having offspring is the ultimate achievement, I do not think suffering is a valid consideration. Suffering would be welcome if it means being given the chance to continue your lineage (your species). More, I think suffering is viewed in this example with a narrow mind. Just because suffering is ‘bad’ does not mean it should be avoided. Sometimes suffering is necessary for the achievement of a greater goal, such as suffering through university.

I think there is no reason not to pursue de-extinction. It should be done with caution, but it must be done in order to restore ecological integrity.

T. J. Kasperbauer (2017) Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction, Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20:1, 1-14, DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

Humans are indisputable dependent on the world they occupy. Sharing the world are countless organisms that form a vast, interconnected network that exchange and recycle both matter and energy. This continuous movement of resources serve as the foundation of all life on Earth by creating the necessary conditions and equilibrium for life to exist and thrive. Conversely, this means that disruptions to the perpetual flow of resources threaten both the systems that rely on it and the systems that preceded it. A simple way to visualise this is probably the food chain where relationships of consumption from one species to another are illustrated. Combine several food chains together and a food web emerges, portraying the dynamic relationships between species because they usually have more than one food source.

Should one link disappear because a species has gone extinct, it is not hard to imagine how the change would ripple outwards through the food web and to the systems beyond. Being an independent self-reliant system, the Earth mitigates these shocks by introducing redundancies, such as animals have more than one food source, and evolutionary mechanics so that a new equilibrium can be formed. However, when too many sudden shocks impact the system, too quick for the system to correct itself, the collapse of one system threatens the next and so forth in a spiraling cascade with the worst case scenario being system collapse. This is when the flow of resources stagnate and the conditions and equilibrium that enable humanities’ survival turn hostile instead. The extinction of other species imposes two existential threats on humans, the threat of reducing resiliency of the systems we need to survival and the threat to very idea of our continuity. That if other species can go extinct, then so can we.

In the “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” by Ronald Sandler, the author outlined his arguments for deep de-extinction as a tool of scientific advancement, rather than species conservation. Sandler argued that because species themselves lack any goal, interest or preference distinct from its members that make up the species, we have no obligation to act on the species’ behalf. Furthermore, for sufficiently long extinct species, the ecological system they were a part of has adjusted to their absence and so their reintroduction would be a disruption. Therefore, after the death of all members of a species and destruction or evolution of those that rely on them, there is no one to whom humans have an obligation to act on behalf of. Instead, only humans will find them valuable for scientific discoveries. This demonstrates a strong biocentric view, the belief that humans have duties only to individual living things, while rejecting ecocentrism, the belief that humans have duties to collectives as well. Suppose we continue to apply this view point hereafter. In the cases of recently extinct species, we can conclude that their absence is still affecting the ecological system they were a part of and any species that relied on them would be struggling to adjust. As members of those struggling species still exist, we would have an obligation to ease their suffering and aid their survival.

Another concern Sandler discussed is that de-extinction for species conservation would diminish or displace current conservation efforts or the obligation and urgency humans feel towards conservation. While this is a valid concern, there is another barrier to conservation that de-extinction may ease, despondent helplessness. In spite of all our efforts and wishes, some more than others, conservation seems like a losing battle. Every day, it seems that more species are added to the endangered list or go extinct than species are removed from the list, causing the systems we rely on to become evermore fragile. There always seem to be new ecological crises that we can only slow with tremendous effort. This generates enormous amounts of unhappiness and dissatisfaction that we should not only dispel for its own sake, but also because it may discourage people from taking action to help. De-extinction presents humans with new hope to ease our existential fears. Conservation is still of vital importance, but should we fail, there is still another method to restore the systems we have broken. Even if we think that we have no obligation to the systems themselves, surely we have an obligation to save ourselves by saving the systems. At its core, de-extinction promises that even after the death of all the members of a species, it is still not the end. Not for the animal and perhaps not for humans either. That very promise, I think, is why de-extinction is so necessary and compelling.

Keisey

Work Cited

Sandler, R. (2013). The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species. Conservation Biology, 28(2), 354-360. 10.1111/cobi.12198

This weeks readings covered an interesting topic that I had not thought of before, The ability to Bring back species from extinction (known as De-extinction). My mind ran straight towards the thought of bringing back dinosaurs (thinking immediately of  Jurassic park). My immediate reaction was negative as, that would be near impossible based on the environmental requirements of dinosaurs, plus the danger that would come with having them around. However, the two articles I will discuss did not mention dinosaurs, but instead animals that have only recently gone extinct such as the Passenger pigeon. Both T.J. Kasoerbauer and Ronald Sandler brought up important concerns and questions regarding de-extinction that I agree are vital to answer before moving forward with the prospect of bringing back extinct species. I would like to go over all the points I agree with but I lack time so I will go over two key arguments and concerns that jumped out at me. First being our real obligation towards extinct species, and second, the potential outcome of successfully accomplishing de-extinction.

Ronald Sandler mentions that a reason to bring back species who’s extinction was caused by humans is to bring justice to the species and right our wrong. However, as he mentions soon after, “it is not possible to harm or wrong a species because a species do not have aims or welfares distinct from those of the organisms that’s comprise them.”(Pg. 355)  So to bring back a species to make up for what has already happened does not work and in fact as Kasperbauer points out, “for many species, the original cause of extinction still exists.” (Pg.4) so even if we were to bring them back for the sake of justice, they could very well end up extinct again because of us. Sandler goes on to say that it would be more beneficial to look after future populations of species rather than focusing on bringing back ones we have already lost. The wrong can be made right again by acknowledging our mistakes, learn from them,  and  treat the species we do have better than before. I agree that it would be more beneficial to focus our efforts on conserving the species we still have that are endangered. Even in the event that we use de-extinction on a species such as the passenger pigeon, they will not be the individuals that were harmed in the past, and won’t necessarily even be the same as those species. We can try our best to recreate the species but it will most likely not be a 100% match anyways. Another argument towards the supposed justice it would bring is that de-extinction could potentially only harm the individuals as the very process of reviving a species will involve a large number of failed attempts and lost lives. With this in mind, bringing back a species could possibly cause more harm to them rather than fixing what has happened.

An issue that both articles raise is the effect de-extinction will have after it has been successfully accomplished. There is a chance the species could become invasive and only create more of an environmental problem for us and for other animals. Although one of the main reasons for pursuing De-Extinction is that the species could prove highly beneficial to the environment and help create more diversity where it may be needed, it could also have an opposite effect. Sandler does point out however, that the animals that are in line to be tested would most likely be unable to survive long if they were able to spread because there would be low genetic diversity and rates of reproduction(Pg. 358). Kasperbauer believes that in the case of passenger pigeons, there is a significant chance that they could become invasive as they were known to travel in flocks of billions, because of this, there is a dangerous chance that they could eat up food supplies for other animals and cause great damage. I believe it really depends on the species, as Sandler mentions that mammoths, for example, would have a low rate of reproduction, making it less likely for them to really become a threat as numbers would be easier to control. Of course research should be done on each species that is being considered for de-extinction so as to run through all potential risks they may have on the environment.

Both articles brought up interesting and important points regarding de-extinction. It is definitely hard to come to a definite decision on whether this technology should be fully pursued or not as there are many good arguments for and against it. But as both articles and I  agree, extensive research is required before decisions can be made. I do believe that we have a bigger obligation towards maintaining the populations we have now rather than focusing on long gone species but I do also see the positive implications this technology could bring to the field as well.

-Olivia Salioh

Sources Cited

Sandler Ronald.(2014). The ethics of reviving long extinct species. Conservation Biology, 28(2), 354-360.

T. J. Kasperbauer.(2017). Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction, Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20:1, 1-14.

Up until now, extinction has always been considered an irreversible phenomena and conservation efforts have focused on the prevention of species extinction in order to mitigate the effects of biodiversity loss. However, advancements in technology now allow for the possibility of reviving species that have gone extinct using genetics and synthetic biology – a process that has been dubbed “de-extinction”. Sandler explores the ethical dimensions of de-extinction in his paper titled “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” in which he discusses some prominent arguments for and against the technology. At the end of the article, Sandler comes to the conclusion that it is ethically permissible to pursue de-extinction, so long as it does not interfere with efforts to prevent extinction from occurring in the first place. While I agree with this conclusion, I do not necessarily agree with the way that Sandler arrived at it. In this blog post, I will be dissecting one of Sandler’s arguments and providing my own thoughts on the matter. 

The first ethical consideration that Sandler assesses in his article is the idea that we have a responsibility to revive certain species as a matter of justice. This is specifically in regards to species that went extinct due to anthropogenic causes, in which case some would argue that we have a moral obligation to make up for the wrongs that we did to that species or ecosystem. In response to this, Sandler argues that it is not possible to harm a species or ecosystem due to the fact that these collectives themselves do not have goals or interests. Therefore, Sandler believes that it is not a restorative justice approach that must be taken to extinction, but rather a reparation and rehabilitation approach. What this means is that we focus on minimizing the impact of species extinctions and preventing them from happening in the future. Sandler argues that de-extinction would not be beneficial in furthering these efforts, as it would not prevent species from going extinct nor would it address the causes of extinctions. 

While I agree with Sandler that de-extinction would not serve to prevent extinctions from occurring, I do believe he made an oversight when claiming that it is not possible to harm a species or ecosystem. I say this because ecocentrists such as Leopold argue that we still have a moral obligation to entire species and ecosystems – despite their lack of sentience. According to Leopold, each species plays an important role in the ecosystem and is therefore deserving of moral consideration. If Sandler had taken an ecocentric approach to the question of justice, he would arrive at a much different conclusion regarding whether or not we have a moral responsibility to revive certain species. This may in turn lead to Sandler taking a restorative justice approach to anthropogenic extinction after all. 

To conclude, I support Sandler’s position on de-extinction in that it is ethically permissible so long as it is approached with caution. However, I do think his argument could benefit from an ecocentric perspective as this would allow him to consider the moral significance of entire species and ecosystems. Nevertheless, Sandler’s paper provides a well-rounded analysis of de-extinction and its place in relation to broader conservation efforts. I believe that his paper makes a meaningful contribution to literature discussing genetic technology and should be read by anyone interested in environmental ethics. Thank you for reading!

– Keira

Sources

Leopold, A. (2014). The land ethic. In The Ecological Design and Planning Reader (pp. 108-121). Island Press, Washington, DC.

Sandler, R. (2014). The ethics of reviving long extinct species. Conservation Biology, 28(2), 354-360.

The issue of discussion for this week focuses on the idea of “de-extinction” of a species. I will be specifically focusing on the ideas of Ronald Sandler in his ethical analysis, “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species”. In his essay, Sandler analyzes various arguments in favour and against the practice of species de-extinction, but ultimately makes the conclusion that, although neither of the ethical arguments are very strong, it is not a priority that humanity should readily accept without addressing the concerns. For such an idea to be considered “ethically acceptable”, Sandler states that there are many concerns that need to be addressed first. I will be analyzing the concerns that Sandler mentions regarding the unnaturalness, animal welfare, and ecological issues tied to the process of bringing a species back from extinction (Sandler 355).

The technology used to bring a species back from extinction involves the use of “transgenic biotechnology” which is used to mix genomic material of individuals that could not have bred otherwise. This is where protests arise against the “unnaturalness” of de-extinction and the associated technology (Sandler 357). Although he does acknowledge the validity of this argument, he identifies potential flaws in this argument. One of which is that our society is reliant upon many things that would not exist without human intervention or the purposeful crossbreeding of species for the benefit of humans (Sandler 357). Specifically, vaccines and much of the agricultural products exist today because of the use of some form transgenic biotechnology and the intervention by humans.

The concerns regarding animal welfare are valid and these concerns can be tied into many other fields of scientific research and just the overall impacts of humans on animal species. Sandler provides a rebuttal to this through examples of the current use of animals in scientific research and the animal agriculture. Sandler argues that because of how we already treat animals, concerns regarding animal suffering in the use of transgenic biotechnology do not pose a special or particularly imposing problem (Sandler 358). However, I am inclined to disagree with his argument, specifically the use of the example in the argument itself. Our current treatment of animals in research and agriculture is not ethical, at least in my opinion. The concerns regarding animal welfare need to be addressed in these issues as well as the issues surrounding de-extinction. I believe Sandler makes a mistake of the use of a logical fallacy in his argument. His justification that it de-extinction does not pose any more harm onto animals as does scientific research and agriculture is a red herring that pushes the focus away from the question that should actually be discussed, if our current practices should be considered ethically acceptable.

The ecological concerns regarding the de-extinction of a long-lost species are valid, and I believe should be of the top arguments against the use of transgenic biotechnology. Sandler argues that bringing an extinct species back does not address the environmental or ecological issues that caused extinction in the first place, climate change is an example that he referred to (Sandler 358). Another concern pertains to the potential impact the de-extinct species could have on the ecosystem (Sandler 358), as it is arguably very different from when the species was last alive because this topic is discussing a species that has long been extinct. Many of the potential lost species to choose from were lost due to human activity and destruction of habitat and without addressing the human activities that caused the extinction in the first place, biotechnology to bring a species back from extinction will not help us.

While it sounds like a very cool scientific advancement to bring a species back from extinction, I do not believe it can be considered ethically acceptable. Although, the technology does have implications for future conservation efforts on endangered species, and as alluded to by Sandler, can be used as a last-ditch conservation effort (Sandler, 354). I agree with Sandler’s conclusion that this topic is not a priority over current issues that plague animals’ species, however I do believe that parts of his argument for the use of transgenic biotechnology may be slightly flawed.

Sources:

Sandler, R. (2014). The ethics of reviving long extinct species. Conservation Biology, 28(2), 354-360.

This week, one of the readings that I decided to analyze was T.J. Kasperbauer’s “Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Exitinction,” and I agree with how he evaluated the ethics of de-extinction, which is, “…the process of reviving previously extinct species…in the context of advances in synthetic biology.” (1) One of the normative ethical theories that I recognized from the beginning of the course is how Utilitarianism (maximize the overall good/consequences for the greatest number of individuals) plays into the ethical concerns about justifying possible suffering (for example: genetic malformations, unadaptability in the current environment that a certain species is not used to, hunting, etc.)  that might come from de-extinction technologies. Kasperbauer criticizes that this justification is problematic, for the idea is that any species that undergoes de-extinction would have its first few generations initially suffer yet this would allow for the species to successfully continue existing in the future. So the suffering of animals, in a utilitarianists’ view, can be dismissed to provide the successful future consecutive offspring.

I agree that this argument is fallacious, as Kasperbauer notes that it could be possible that the species that undergoes de-extinction technology could suffer significantly in the future as well; would the initial suffering of the species be justifiable then? (6)Do the ends justify the means? No, I argue they would not because there is significant suffering that the species would be experiencing as a whole(initially and consecutively) due to being subjected to de-extinction technology.

In addition to this major concern about species suffering, there are other important, foreseeable negative impacts on the environment and human beings that Kasperbauer highlights: not addressing the original cause of extinction for that particular species, the species becoming invasive to the environment, etc. (4) So with these negative, unethical impacts on the environment as a whole, I argue that there needs to be more research done on de-extinction technologies before more advancement is established in this area of science.

But despite Kasperbauer’s numerous criticisms about the probable negative impacts of this new technology, he advocates for scientists to proceed in the researching of de-extinction technology without a plan for re-introduction. (10) I completely disagree with his stance, for how can this technology continued to be developed when there are more foreseeable negative outcomes than positive outcomes? For instance, Kasperbauer asserts that this technology, “…has the potential to provide a number of benefits to both humans and animals, and much of the technology can be developed without causing harm to any sentient beings.” (10)

First, from a ethical standpoint, I wonder how is it possible to avoid causing significant suffering to a species when there is a threat of genetic malformations, unadaptability in the current environment that a certain species is not used to, and hunting, especially if there is no plan to curb these threats? Yes, there might be a possiblity that the technology can be developed where genetic malformations are non-existent/minimal, however the other threats to the de-extinction species cannot be extinguished just by advancing technology; there needs to be a plan to reintroduce these animals that ensures the safety of the environment as a whole, where no/minimal suffering is probable.

Second, what exactly are these benefits that Kasperbauer claims would come from de-extinction technology? Conservation, of course, is a significant target for this scientific advancement where Kasperbauer notes that instrumental de-extinction (“bringing back those species that can serve some useful function for either human beings or ecosystems”(3)) would be a fairly large benefit, such as “enhancing the ecosystem function”(3) and advancing science. The benefits for the environment seem to provide enough reason to continue with de-extinction technology, but I would argue that there would be more damage to the environment that would result from this technology (mentioned above), especially if there is not a plan put in place before more time, energy, and resources are complied into this scientific advancement. Also, I believe that this scientific advancement in an ethical context, does not uphold the justification for the foreseeable damages (without a re-introduction plan) that will cause suffering to the de-extinct species and the ecosystem as a whole; the human benefit from de-extinction technology seems quite meager in comparison to me. However, if a re-introduction plan is properly curated, then I would agree with Kasperbauer that advancing this technology would definitely be a great benefit for humanity.

So, should de-extinction technology be completely dismissed, based off of the negative effects/risks this new technology poses to the environment? No, I believe that with this technology there are significant benefits for the ecosystem, especially with the species that have gone extinct because of humans. Yet creating a plan beforehand, with the aid of more research, could prevent suffering and irreversible damage to species and the environment. Ethically, the best possible plan of action is to conduct more research before advancing de-extinction technologies.

By: Melissa

Works Cited

Kasperbauer, T. J. “Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction.” Ethics, Policy, and Environment, vol. 20, no. 1, 2017, pp. 1-14. Taylor and Francis Online, DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

Today’s society is an era of the rapid development of science and technology. Gene-drive technology can change the genes of mosquitoes to reduce the number of mosquitoes and control the spread of disease. In Sandler’s article, he mentioned de‐extinction technology (Sandler, 2013). This technology can revive species that have been extinct for decades or even longer (Sandler, 2013). This is to reconstruct the DNA of extinct species by extracting DNA from extinct species (available from some fossils and specimens), and obtaining genetic information from closely related species, so as to revived extinct species (Sandler, 2013).

The development of de-extinction also brings some ethical concerns. In Sandler’s article, it is mentioned that this technology is unnatural and may cause suffering to animals (Sandler, 2013). The revived species may be harmful to the environment and human beings. Moreover, human beings are playing the role of God (Sandler, 2013). After the revived species, it may be released back to nature, but changes in the environment can cause unadapted of the revived species (Sandler, 2013). This will make it difficult for the revived species to survive in the new environment and may cause extinction again. This deep de-extinction technique may lead to some health problems in offspring and increase the suffering of animals (Sandler, 2013). It is immoral that human behaviour increases the pain of animals. Sandler’s article also mentioned that if this technology is used to alleviate human’s guilt, but does not fully respect nature and species, then the technology is ” hubristic” (Sandler, 2013). Moreover, the technology is not perfect and cannot guarantee its success. At the same time, this technology also has a lot of uncertainty. So far, no species have been successfully revived (kasperbauer, 2017).

At the end of Sandler’s article, it is mentioned that this technology cannot solve the existing ecological problems, nor can it make up for the harm people have done to these species in the past (Sandler, 2013). Therefore, there is no very strong or persuasive ethical reason to revive species that have been extinct for a long time. At the same time, this technology will bear high costs and high risks (Sandler, 2013).

In my opinion, I am not in favour of reviving extinct species by using de-extinction technology. The ecological environment will change slowly with the passage of time, and the structure of some species will also change. If the de-extinction technology enables species revived, it may be considered invasive species and may cause damage to the ecosystem and food chain. Environmental changes may lead to the fact that the revived species cannot survive independently (Sandler, 2013). Although it is mentioned that many of the revived species will be used to research and exhibited rather than release (Sandler, 2013). However, such behaviour increases the pain of animals, which is not in line with ethics and violates animal welfare. At the same time, the development of this technology is irresponsible, because through this technology, people can revive these species when they need to. That makes people will not fully respect and protect the environment and protect the existing species. In my opinion, human beings have not taken up the moral responsibility of treating species equally and protecting the environment.

In general, there are some ethical concerns in reviving the extinct species. I think we should pay more attention to how to protect the existing endangered species. At the same time, I think it is more important for humans to take responsibility for protecting the environment instead of making up for it with technology.

Yiyang

Reference

kasperbauer, T., J. (2017). Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

Sandler, R. (2013). The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species. https://conbio-onlinelibrary-wiley-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/doi/full/10.1111/cobi.12198

Stanley A. Temple in TEDX expresses his dissatisfaction with extinction. His experience in conservation works with three strategies for preventing extinction those are, protection, conservation and restoring. But Temple talks about a fourth strategy that is now being incorporated, revive. But there are concerns with reviving from extinction, he says that this is a new ball game where extinction has never not been permanent before and we must consider the effects of reviving and the implications. The questions he is analyzing is should we revive?

It seems many would quickly react to supporting this idea of de-extinction. Bringing back a species that was previously extinct. But how does that impact the ecosystems and other species around them? And further, how do we decide which species get to be revived, and who gets to choose? There is more complicated implications to de-extinction in considering what is morally correct. Reviving species could potentially advance far enough that we would be reviving species that have been extinct for several decades, centuries, or millenia. Should we engage in this deep de-extinction of long dead species or are the risks too complicated?

Sandler speaks to a justice approach for why we should be involved in de-extinction, he ends up disagreeing with the argument. The justice approach states that if humans were the cause of extinction for example overhunting as a cause, then we should revive the species. The main issue Sandler takes to this is that it is not the proper way to correct the wrongs, as on an individual level we could not restore the same animal and the species as a whole doesn’t have the capacity to be wronged. I agree with Sandler here to some extent, in recognizing the wrongs humans have caused it is a matter of making sure we changed our actions for the future. We are already working towards de-extinction but continue to display the same behaviour patterns on other animals. Many species have been over hunted or over fished by humans and it is more important to attack that problem instead of revitalizing species.

Within an ecosystem species play many different roles and whether we deem them necessary they are important and valuable intrinsically. Sandler concludes that for this reason anthropogenic extinction is wrong and we should use de-extinction to restore the value that was lost. I have to challenge this thought, as mentioned before we would not be restoring the individual but would be reviving the closest genetic makeup so I still conclude we would not be restoring the damage that has been done.

I think Sandler makes a very important argument, deep de-extinction as luxury conservation. This again addresses as mentioned before avoiding addressing human actions and instead coming up with fixes to ensure our actions have a lesser impact. Humans have a tendency to view themselves above other species, also known as speciesism. If we have the ability to revive any species after extinction, I do believe that humans would be less inclined to change their actions and the harms they are creating. De-extinction would soon be seen as a quick fix instead of dealing with the implication and real consequences of human actions.

“It is fine to pursue if people want, so long as it does not interfere with or compromise ethically important things.” Sandler concludes in his argument that as long as de-extinction practices do not interfere with other things such as human welfare, and existing species then it is ok to engage. I do not agree with him as for as long as de-extinction is a practice that is seen as a “luxury” the right intentions are not being practices. What is ethically important needs to be re-assessed.

Alison

Sandler, Ronald. Dec 20, 2013. The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species. Society for Conservation Biology. https://conbio-onlinelibrary-wiley-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/doi/full/10.1111/cobi.12198

Stanley A. Temple. De-extinction: a game changer for conservation biology. https://reviverestore.org/events/tedxdeextinction/de-extinction-a-game-changer-for-conservation-biology/

This week in Environmental Ethics, we are discussing the issue of “de-extinction,” the technological revival of a species, as a conservation strategy. As Ronald Sandler explains, the process of de-extinction involves “reconstructing close approximations of the extinct species’ genomes based on information found in preserved DNA…and on genetic information from close living relatives” (2013, 355).

In his essay, “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species,” Sandler provides an in-depth analysis of ethical considerations regarding the technological revival of extinct species like the Passenger Pigeon and the Ivory-billed Woodpecker (2013). These include ecological concerns, the problematic nature of “technofixes,” and biocentric arguments for creating or restoring intrinsic value held by extinct forms of life.

Although Sandler explores several important ethical concerns to explain why de-extinction is not currently a viable conservation strategy, I believe he fails to address the concerns regarding instrumental use of animals for human achievement, making his arguments largely anthropocentric.

Sandler provides solid reasoning for his objections to de-extinction as a conservation strategy. First, he explains that the re-creation of extinct species will not necessarily re-establish the value they once held. In particular, he raises an important point regarding the ecological impacts of re-introducing a long-gone species. For instance, there is the fact that the environment has since evolved to exist without the niche once held by that species, such that reintroducing them would not restore lost ecological relationships and may even cause suffering to reintroduced individuals (Sandler 2013, 356).

Sandler further explains that viewing de-extinction as a “conservation last resort” is a techno-fix, leaving the root causes of extinction unaddressed (2013, 357). Current conservation strategies, on the other hand, do aim to prevent the causes of extinction by “mitigating, managing, and documenting loss” (Sandler 2013, 357). Therefore, the uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of de-extinction for conservation, and its potential to cause harm to individual members of species by introducing them into an environment that can no longer support them, are reasons enough to avoid its implementation as a conservation strategy.

Despite his conclusion that de-extinction should not be used for conservation, Sandler considers how it could create value as a scientific and technological advancement, without explaining who would benefit from this scientific value (2013, 356).

In this case, it is humans, of course, who have the most to gain from scientific advancement, seeing as Sandler has dismissed de-extinction as a conservation strategy. Having explained the reasons why de-extinction would not benefit ecosystems, species, or individual members of species, the ensuing argument for the value of technological innovation is ultimately anthropocentric. Sandler even explains how “Many revived species will be intended for research and exhibition, not release,” indicating that they will only be brought into existence for human use and/or enjoyment (2013, 358).

The treatment of non-human life as instrumental to human enjoyment is even clearer in Sandler’s acknowledgement that “It is polar bears roaming the arctic, salmon spawning in the rivers, and Passenger Pigeons in mass migration that people value,” beyond simply the species’ genetic preservation (2013, 257). Therefore, even when advocating for conservation, Sandler still promotes an anthropocentric view of preserving species for the value they bring to humans. Even more concerning is Sandler’s prioritization of charismatic megafauna like polar bears, indicating the possibility that de-extinction for conservation may not be used equally for smaller species that have equal or greater ecological significance.

Overall, I agree with Sandler’s stance that there is not enough ethical justification or scientific evidence for de-extinction to be an effective conservation strategy. However, I think Sandler leaves out an important ethical consideration that non-human life should be valued intrinsically, rather than for its role in human advancement. Therefore, I do not support Sandler’s stance that de-extinction is valuable as a technological achievement, if that achievement only serves human knowledge and excludes ecological priorities.

-Mary

Reference:

Sandler, Ronald. 2013. “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species.” Environmental Ethics 28(2): 354-350. https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1111/cobi.12198.

Wouldn’t it be just a magical scientific phenomenon to bring back extinct species from the past decade, century, or millennia? With deep de-extinction, this may be possible. Deep de-extinction is bringing back extinct species by rebuilding close prototypes of the extinct species genome from preserved DNA or from genetic information from close living relatives (Sandler 355). Basically, it’s Jurassic Park in real life. Obviously, before we move forward with this new radical and powerful scientific technology, it needs to be ethically evaluated. There is support for this technology from ethicists and also disapproval. I will look into some of these supports and disapprovals with specific regards to the deep de-extinction of mammoths.

First of all, having mammoths back in the world will create value. It may not create lost value because Homo Sapiens and woolly mammoths were not present at the same time. However, it would bring scientific and technological value by advancements in genetic and synthetic biology (Sandler 356). Additionally, even if put these mammoths in the zoo, many people will be pleased to see this wondrous creature that they have only seen in its skeleton, or drawings, or animated movies (Sandler 356). Think about it in terms of species from today. Even if you have never seen a panda upfront, aren’t you happier with the thought that they are not extinct yet? Let’s look at the other way around. Brazil’s Spix macaw are now extinct in the wild and this has created much sadness around the (Twitter) world. Hence, outside of scientific progression, it would be wondrous to see a mammoth during our lifetime.

Should Wholly Mammoths be Brought Back?

Regardless of value, we still need to consider other reasoning for why we should use deep de-extinction with mammoths. Some ethicists claim that we need to bring back species that faced artificial (human-led) extinction (Sandler 355). What about species that did not face artificial extinction? It is widely debated on how exactly the mammoth went extinct, however, many claim that it was due to natural climate change. Around 10,500 years ago, global warming led to the loss of the wholly mammoth habitat, which left isolated populations in islands. These isolated populations faced reduced fertility and diabetes due to mutations and weak genetic variation. Thus, the question is asked: are humans responsible for bringing back mammoths that faced natural extinction? Should humans bring them back? After all, one can claim that mammoth extinction is “meant to be”. This may sound cosmic, but maybe there is a reason why the mammoths species died out before the rise of the Homo Sapiens.

There are also other aspects to consider if the mammoths are brought back. Do we have the expertise, habitat, and technology to create a safe and healthy environment for them? Do we have to create an ecological context for the mammoths (Sandler 356)? Should we not use those recourses to perhaps preserve the species that are going extinct currently? Again, very cosmic, but maybe there is a reason a species exists at the same time as we do. Thus, we may have a more pertinent duty to preserve the current endangered species rather than invest our resources in bringing back another species from thousands of years ago.

Questions for the comments: Are there other reasons that can be found in approval or disapproval of the deep de-extinction of mammoths? Are there consequences such as ecological, economic, and social burdens that will surface with the revival of mammoths through deep de-extinction?

Sources:

SANDLER, R. (2014), The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species. Conservation Biology, 28: 354-360. https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1111/cobi.12198

The development of genetics and synthetic biology offers a possibility of cloning extinct species and bring them back to life again. This technology sounds like an excellent opportunity for humans to repair the diversity in the ecosystem. However, there are still a lot of debates in relation to the safety and effectiveness of this technology, particularly its ethical concerns. This paper holds the opinion that de-extinction is not an ethical choice for humans to repair their mistakes because it might bring suffering to animals and fail to copy the original species.

First, de-extinction might make extinct animals suffer again. The cloning technology has a low success rate and often causes “donors, surrogates, and offspring with health problems and abnormalities” (Sandler 358). It is probably that this technology will bring suffering to extinct animals. In order to increase the success rate and reduce negative impacts on animals’ health, there must be a lot of experiments taken. During this process, extinct animals will suffer a lot of pain in those experiments, which is brutal and unethical.

Second, de-extinction might fail to 100% copy those extinct species. It is not sure whether the technology can bring back extinct species exactly as they were. Cloning and genetic engineering cannot make an identical copy to the original extinct species. In addition to the limitation of the technology, changes in the environment can also influence the result. Shapiro argues that “even organisms cloned from frozen cells will not be identical to the extinct organism with which they share their nuclear genome” (1000). It is possible that humans create a new species based on an extinct species. In that case, humans bring new threats to the current ecosystem and break its balance instead of repairing the ecosystem to its previous balance.

Third, de-extinction cannot solve the threat to the extinction of animals and might repeat the same mistake without a sound system to protect animals and the ecosystem. Even though extinct species are brought back to life, they might go extinct again without a sound system of protection. The original cause of their extinction still exists, such as human hunting, environmental pollutions, and changes in the climate (Kasperbauer 4). It is meaningless to bring extinct species back to life without offering them a safe and suitable environment in which they can reproduce quickly. As long as the threat to animals’ extinction exists, those extinct species might soon go extinct again even though the de-extinction technology succeeds.

There are still some supporters who try to promote this technology for the benefits of humans and the ecosystem. Supporters of de-extinction believe that this technology can maintain justice by correcting humans’ mistakes, reestablish lost value, and even create new value (Sandler 355). However, the benefits of de-extinction are offered based on the benefits of humans instead of those extinct animals. Humans want to use this technology to repair their previous mistakes so that they can be less guilty. They want to bring some useful extinct species back to life because those extinct species can bring benefits to them and create new values. De-extinction is still based on humans’ selfishness.

Thus, de-extinction should not be supported due to its unethical nature, the possible suffering to extinct animals, and the failure in copying extinct species 100%. Moreover, the technology hasn’t been mature, and there are a lot of possible negative impacts or low success rates. It is not worth investing so much in a technology that still fails to solve the problem of animal extinction because those threats to animals still exist.

-Kaize

Sources:

Kasperbauer, T. J. “Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction.” Ethics, Policy & Environment, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2017, pp. 1-14.

Sandler, Ronald. “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species.” Conservation Biology, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2013, pp.354-360.

Shapiro, Beth. “Pathways to de-extinction: how close can we get to resurrection of an extinct species?” Functional Ecology, Vol. 31, 2017, pp. 996-1002.