Many countries have begun to introduce a variety of laws to include the right to a healthy environment, but will these laws be successful in protecting their citizens against climate change and global pollutant? It’s widely known that ecosystems have no boundaries, rivers flow across countries, air circulates globally, and organisms travel across borders. Pollutants, similar to ecosystems, have no regard for state boundaries, and as such, should be considered at a global scale. It is essential to consider how a state could protect its citizen’s right to a healthy environment if environmental degradation is occurring outside of its boundaries? This blog will be applying the Canada’s lack of a right to a healthy environment to the discourse surrounding why it is crucial for an internationally accepted protection of a healthy environment.

Canada is one of the few countries that lack a right to a healthy environment in the charter of freedoms (Suzuki 2014). Despite the lack of a right to a healthy environment, Canadians continue to face health repercussions caused by various pollutants (Brinker 2017). With many drinking advisories and continued health concerns caused by poor environmental quality, why hasn’t Canada introduced a right to a healthy environment? Canada is not the only country lacking in the right to a healthy environment; there are dozens of states that have so far failed to protect its citizens.

Why does it matter if another country introduces the legal right to a healthy environment? Pollutants travel globally, and the repercussions of environmental degradation occur both locally, regionally, and globally. An anthropogenic forest fire at a local scale causes ecological degradation, but the smoke from the fire can spread throughout many countries causing increased health concerns at larger scales. How can a state protect its citizen’s right to a healthy environment if environmental degradation and pollution are occurring outside state boundaries? The answer is an internationally accepted right to a healthy environment. Countries must come together to determine what a healthy environment consists of and how to protect it. This is especially important in developing countries that are often disproportionately affected by the repercussions of environmental degradation (Unprecedented Impacts of Climate Change 2019). Within Canada, minority groups are also disproportionately impacted by the consequences of environmental degradation; many indigenous communities experience health concerns related to pollutants at increased rates (Brinker 2017).

The need for an international right to healthy living is further supported by various ethical theories. To an ecocentrist, the ecosystem and every abiotic and biotic organism found within are morally significant (Rolston 1985). From this perspective, the right to a healthy environment is ethically essential in the duty of protecting both humans and the environment. Similarly, biocentrism argues that every living being is morally considerable, and as such, there is a moral imperative to protect not only humans from environmental degradation but all biotic organisms (Taylor 2011). Introducing the right to a healthy environment is only the first step in protecting people and the environment.

Without international acceptance and commitment to a universal right to a healthy environment, people globally will continue to experience the negative impact caused by pollutants and environmental degradation (Unprecedented Impacts of Climate Change 2019). Canada is one of a dozen countries that has failed to implement a right to a healthy environment, despite the ongoing need (Suzuki 2014). There is an ethical obligation, not only to every person but to the environment, to introduce laws protecting people’s right to a healthy environment.

 

Brinker, Coleman. “Your Right to Live in a Healthy Environment: Phantom or Reality?” Centre for Constitutional Studies. University of Alberta Faculty of Law, August 4, 2017. https://ualawccsprod.srv.ualberta.ca/2017/08/your-right-to-live-in-a-healthy-environment-phantom-or-reality/.

Suzuki, David. “Canada Has to Join the Environmental Rights Movement.” HuffPost Canada. HuffPost Canada, January 5, 2015. https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/david-suzuki/environmental-rights_b_6103258.html?utm_hp_ref=ca-right-to-a-healthy-environment.

Rolston, Holmes. “Duties to Endangered Species.” BioScience 35, no. 11 (December 1985): 718–26. https://doi.org/10.2307/1310053.

Taylor, Paul W. “The Ethics of Respect for Nature.” Essay. In Respect for Nature: a Theory of Environmental Ethics, 197–218. Princeton Univ Pr, 2011.

“Unprecedented Impacts of Climate Change Disproportionately Burdening Developing Countries, Delegate Stresses, as Second Committee Concludes General Debate | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases,” October 8, 2019. https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gaef3516.doc.htm.

 

This blog post will be examining the ethical analysis for de-extinction by Sandler in his paper “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” in the context of passenger pigeons (Sandler 2014). Sandler presents a multi-dimensional overview of the ethical considerations of de-extinction, considering both proponent and opponent arguments. The idea of de-extinction remains a highly controversial topic with many different perspectives dictating the science’s future. Passenger pigeons are an avian species that went extinct in the 1914’s as a direct result of anthropogenic causes, primarily overhunting (Kasperbauer 2017). The species of passenger pigeons have been considered one that could be a possible candidate of de-extinction due to their close relations to living species, the quantity of available DNA, and there perceive value.

Sandler’s first argument deals with the restorative justice owed by humans to species that have gone extinct as a result of anthropogenic means (Sandler 2014). Sandler argues that despite the extinction of a species resulting from human activity, de-extinction would not be justifiable. The argument against the ethical ideal focuses on that a species cannot be awarded restorative justice. There is no moral obligation to the species. As all individual organisms are extinct, then there remains no obligation towards restoration. In the case of passenger pigeons, this argument remains true; not only would re-establishing the species provide no justice to the historical organisms as they would remain dead. Their extinct organisms DNA would be used meaning the “new” species also would not be the same as the historic (Kasperbauer 2017). As the technology stands, the de-extinction process would create a close replication of the historical passenger pigeon, but not an exact copy. Furthermore, passenger pigeons’ de-extinction wouldn’t negate the previous causes of the species extinctions; overhunting. Without an increase in regulations regarding the hunting of the species, the de-extinction of passenger pigeons would not even meet the criteria of reparation and rehabilitation justice (Sandler 2014)

Both the second and third arguments examine how the value of the species and organisms would impact the ethical consideration of de-extinction (Sandler 2014). The three central values mentioned by Sandler are a species ecological value, instrumental value, and their intrinsic value, another value that wasn’t discussed explicitly by Sandler is a species existence value (Kasperbauer 2017). Considering passenger pigeons, their ecological value and instrumental value are relatively similar; the value resides in the species ability to spread the seeds of nut-bearing trees. Considering that the region where passenger pigeons were previously located is now more densely populated, the significance of the species ecological and instrumental value is minimal. The passenger pigeons’ intrinsic value would also be considerably different, as the species itself is not the same as the distinct historical form. A species’ existence value is another essential factor to consider; passenger pigeons have a unique history and could be regarded as valued merely for the ability to see one, the wondrous value (Sandler 2014). The value of passenger pigeons as a species would be considerably more minimal if they were brought back negating the purpose of de-extinction, as a way to create or re-establish the species historical value.

The last argument presented by Sandler pertains to the viability of de-extinction as a last resort technology. When no other conservation and environmental management strategies have been effective in mitigating a species’ extinction, then at least the DNA can be preserved (Sandler 2014). In the case of passenger pigeons, the practicality of de-extinction as a last resort is minimal; there is a requirement in population size for the continued survival of the species, which would be costly and time-consuming to implement. Furthermore, de-extinction does nothing to actually deal with the anthropogenic factor in their historic extinction. There is no point in using de-extinction technologies if the cause of extinction is not dealt with; reintroducing an extinct species in the historic environment with no changes will likely result in a repeat extinction. The case stands that if no other conservation efforts have been useful, then there is little practical use in de-extinction as the results will remain the same. If passenger pigeons were reintroduced, they would likely still be considered pests and overhunted until extinction for the second time (Kasperbauer 2017).

By examining passenger pigeons’ case, it’s easy to see that the moral considerability of de-extinction is reliant on many contingent factors. Restorative justice is inadmissible to extinct species, but reparation is possible if regulations are put in place to limit the amount of overhunting. There is only limited value of de-extinction passenger pigeons, especially in their historical regions but, there is a possibility to create value in new ecosystems, as a new species remains. Conservation focus must not be entirely on de-extinction, but instead on mitigating climate change, habitat degradation, and pollution otherwise history will be repeated (Sandler 2014). There are many possibilities of future research in the field of de-extinction, morality must be considered at every step.

 

Sources

 

T.J. Kasperbauer (2017) Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction, Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20:1, 1-14, DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

 

R. Sandler (2014) The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species, 28:2, 354-360, DOI: 10.1111/cobi.12198

The purpose of this blog post is to discuss and critique the arguments set forth by Harrison and Tanner in their paper, “Better not to have children” (Harrison & Tanner 2011). This piece presents a highly extremist perception concerning the continued existence of humans as a species. The authors present four main arguments to support the idea that people should cease having children entirely to allow for humans’ extinction. The concepts put forth in this paper are extremist concerning the morality of procreation, exemplifying a radical anti-natalist view that perceives procreation as inherently negative (Rothman 2017). The authors attempt to take an almost objective tone towards the human species, viewing individuals as nothing more than an obstacle of destruction and unhappiness.

The first critique focuses on the argument presented concerning the damage and destruction humans cause throughout the environment (Harrison & Tanner 2011). The idea that humans have negatively impacted all ecosystems is undeniably true. Humans, as a species, both influence and are influenced by the external environment (Holmes 1985). Harrison and Tanner propose the end of human procreation as a means of extinction to end the destruction of the earth. This argument uses a basis from the philosophical ideals of ecocentrism, where the ecosystem as a whole is morally significant, with the components of an environment’s primary importance in terms of their combined interactions of a balanced ecosystem. The problem with this argument is that Harrison and Tanner attempt to keep humans as entirely separate from the ecosystem. The entire concept of ecocentrism is based on the moral significance of the interactions and inseparability of an ecosystem’s abiotic and biotic components. Saying that humans’ extinction as a species would be beneficial is a contradiction, as species are morally significant as a component of an ecosystem. As such, the human race would be ethically considerable.

The second critique focuses on the argument that being born is not an inherently good action but is, in fact, predominantly negative (Harrison & Tanner 2011). This argument is entirely focused on the hypothetical struggles an individual can encounter throughout life, negating the net happiness or satisfaction a person might experience. It is almost impossible to determine what struggles or triumphs an individual will experience before they are born, so any conclusions based on a hypothetical existence are irrelevant. Moreover, even if an individual experiences various burdens, their overall lives may still be positive. There is no way to accurately predict every burden and triumph an individual will experience and the happiness and unhappiness that is associated with each event.

The third critique focuses on the last argument made; in the end, most parents have negative net happiness regarding their children. The observation of happiness or satisfaction as the measure of moral consideration is a utilitarian argument, that because parents are overall unhappy with having children, they should no longer have children (Singer 2011). The primary issue with this argument is it views happiness as the only measure of moral significance. Using a Kantian theology, satisfaction is not the only nor the most important human value; personal autonomy is (Kant 1981). One of the significant difficulties in using utilitarianism in a practical argument is the difficulty in determining overall satisfaction. Whether or not an individual wants to use satisfaction as the most important value in a person’s life doesn’t change the fact that it is often complex to calculate. The satisfaction of the parent matters, but so does the children’s happiness, as no individuals’ satisfaction is more important than another’s (Singer 2011), and this article presents no consideration of others happiness.

The article highlights the need for an essential discussion on the sustainability of the human population, but Harrison and Tanner’s arguments failed to represent the issue properly. The article’s tone was dismissive and cold in the extreme, with little considerations of any value outside of superficial happiness. Without a doubt, the human population is unsustainable, and procreation management is one available technique in minimizing the global population.

 

Sources:

Harrison, Gerald, and Julia Tanner. “Better Not To Have Children.” Think 10, no. 27 (2011): 113–21. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1477175610000436.

Kant, Immanuel, and James W. Ellington. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: With, on a Supposed Right to Die Because of Philanthropic Concerns. Indiana: Hackett Pub. Co., 1981.

Rolston, Holmes. “Duties to Endangered Species.” BioScience 35, no. 11 (December 1985): 718–26. https://doi.org/10.2307/1310053.

Rothman, Joshua. “‘Person of Interest’: The TV Show That Predicted Edward Snowden,” November 27, 2017. https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/person-of-interest-the-tv-show-that-predicted-edward-snowden.

Singer, Peter. “About Ethics.” Essay. In Practical Ethics, 1–15. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

This blog post’s primary purpose is not to discuss the merits of being either pro-GMO or anti-GMO; instead, this blog will serve to highlight and critique the difficulties inaccessibility of the sciences that Lynas emphasized throughout his speech (Lynas 2013). Furthermore, this blog post will provide a basic overview of the debate surrounding genetic modification and introduce what genetically modified organisms are.

Genetically modified organisms or GMO’s are the results of highly complex biotechnologies that have the potential to revolutionize the agriculture industries (Hadfield 2000). To state in a simplified manner, the biotechnology regarding GMOs uses the manipulation of genetic material within an organism, such as a plant, resulting in the creation of advantageous traits. These favourable traits can range from increased resistance to pests or higher crop yields in the agriculture industry. The debate regarding GMO’s varies from the ethicality of using genetic modifications to the positive and negative health impacts related to GMO’s (Comstock). Proponents and opponents of genetic modification present strong fronts for their beliefs, raising valid concerns and purposes in using GMOs and biotechnology.

In his speech at the 2013 oxford farming conference, Mark Lynas opens up with his history in the controversial genetically modified organism (GMO) debate (Lynas 2013). The discussion regarding GMO’s is well established, with many individuals going to extremes to develop or diminish regulations. Lynas, now a notable supporter of GMO’s, reflects on his previous staunch support of the debate’s anti-GMO side. He calls his prior beliefs distinctly “anti-science” in that his understanding of the pro-GMO side, which he considers to be parallel to the scientific side of the debate, was limited in both academic and personal knowledge (Lynas 2013). Even with Lynas’ previous experiences within the science academia’s, a lack of accessibility highlights the barriers many individuals experience when dealing with scientific topics. Lynas described the lengthy process of educating himself on reading scientific papers and understanding what he was reading (Lynas 2013).

Barriers in academia and science have made accessibility difficult in developed countries, and almost impossible in developing countries (Davis & Walters 2011). Subscription cost and highly complex concepts and language make understanding academic journals almost impossible for any individual without a multifaceted understanding of the relevant topic (Davis & Walters 2011). Even with the introduction of resources available through libraries and open access documents, gaining the in-depth knowledge needed to understand scientific journals is difficult. Media presents an additional barrier to science, with both sides of the debate using various media forms to slander and diminish their opposition. Facebook groups rife with inaccuracies, news posts that purposefully mispresent the ongoing issue, and a demonization of the opposition all act as constraints to accessibility; examples such as the GMO debate highlight the difficulties in creating genuinely accessible academia without barriers to knowledge.

Fully understanding GMOs and the debate surrounding the controversial topic can change individuals’ beliefs on both the proponent and opponent side. In the case of Mark Lynas, an in-depth understanding of GMOs resulted in a shift in his stance. GMO’s are just one of many instances that highlight the difficulty in bridging the sciences with the political sphere.

Sources

Lynas, Mark. “Mark Lynas at 2013 Oxford Farming Conference.” Vimeo. Oxford Farming Conference, October 11, 2020. https://vimeo.com/56745320.

Hadfield, Linda. “The Debate over Genetically Modified Organisms: Scientific Uncertainty and Public Controversy.” Foresight 2, no. 3 (June 2000): 257–68. https://doi.org/10.1108/14636680010802663.

Nelson, Gerald C. “Introduction .” Essay. In Genetically Modified Organism in Agriculture: Economics and Politics, 3–6. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2001.

Davis, Philip M, and William H Walters. “The Impact of Free Access to the Scientific Literature: a Review of Recent Research.” Journal of the Medical Library Association : JMLA 99, no. 3 (July 2011): 208–17. https://doi.org/10.3163/1536-5050.99.3.008.

Comstock, Gary. “Ethics and Genetically Modified Foods.” Food Ethics, 2010, 49–66. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5765-8_4.

 

The development of technology has revolutionized our society. From the internet that connects individuals globally, to medical innovations that save lives, technology is often perceived as the solution to all problems.  Genetic modification, a branch of biotechnology, is viewed by many as the solution to world hunger. This technology could possibly eradicate food insecurities. With genetic modifications that increase yield, eliminate the need for pesticides, and make crops resistant to climate changes, biotechnology could solve all agricultural problems. However, the reality of the situation is not so easy. There are fallacies related to using technologies to solve every problem that arises. Dane Scott highlights both philosophical and practical criticisms of a technological fix mindset in his paper about biotechnology (Scott 2010). This paper will be using the criticisms Scott presents in terms of the agricultural sector.

Scott presents a multidimensional discussion on the criticisms regarding the concept of “technological fix” concerning the agricultural industry (Scott 2011). A technological fix is a term used to describe the common ideology that technology has the capability to solve all problems, whether it be within the agricultural sector or external. Scott divides the criticism into two distinct categories, the first being philosophical and the second being practical. While both are essential to understanding the full range of objections regarding the technological fix, this paper will apply the practical criticisms to agricultural examples.

This first practical criticism Scott puts forth regards the actual inability within technology to solve the problem at hand. The development of Roundup Ready crops enabled the agricultural sector to freely use herbicides that previously would have harmed the crops (Folger 2014). Instead of the problem being damage to crops by weeds and invasive plants, genetically modified crops shifted the problem to pollution due to increased herbicide use (Scott 2011). These technological fixes focus almost singularly on solving one issue, while potentially creating or exasperating many others. The environment is an extremely complex web, with a vast amount of interconnecting parts.

The second practical criticism focuses on the cyclical nature of using technology to fix problems used by technological advancements (Scott 2011). As genetically modified crops evolve to become resistant to pests, the same pests may, in time, overcome the resistance. In the case of Bacillus thuringiensis corn, more commonly called Bt corn, genetic modifications were made to increase the crop’s resistance to corn rootworms. However, the evidence is now showing this resistance is diminishing (Folger 2014). This example illuminates how, despite technology solving pests’ previous problems, a new problem arises from using the same technology.

The third practical criticisms highlight the lack of concern and regard for underlying conditions regarding the technological fix ideology (Scott 2011). To assume that a genetically modified crop is the solution to end world hunger deals more accurately with the concepts put forth by the third criticism. Increased yields while abating the issue fail to deal with the systematic problem of food insecurity. Nobody is denying the agricultural success the comes from the genetic modification of crops; increased yields, pest resistance, drought tolerance are all characteristics that are important in maintaining the world’s food output. However, none of the genetic modifications deal specifically with the issue of accessing food.

There is no doubt that technology has its place within society. There are a vast number of benefits that can only be provided through technological advancements. However, the idea the technology is the solution to all problems presents many fallacies. Technology is not the only solution to our problems, nor is it always the best suited. The question that remains focuses on the limits of using technology to solve problems. At what point does technology itself become the problem?

 

Sources

Folger, Tim. The Next Green Revolution, October 2014. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/foodfeatures/green-revolution/.

Scott, Dane. “The Technological Fix Criticisms and the Agricultural Biotechnology Debate.” Agricultural & Environmental Ethics 24 (2011): 207–26. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-010-9253-7.