This blog post will be examining the ethical analysis for de-extinction by Sandler in his paper “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” in the context of passenger pigeons (Sandler 2014). Sandler presents a multi-dimensional overview of the ethical considerations of de-extinction, considering both proponent and opponent arguments. The idea of de-extinction remains a highly controversial topic with many different perspectives dictating the science’s future. Passenger pigeons are an avian species that went extinct in the 1914’s as a direct result of anthropogenic causes, primarily overhunting (Kasperbauer 2017). The species of passenger pigeons have been considered one that could be a possible candidate of de-extinction due to their close relations to living species, the quantity of available DNA, and there perceive value.

Sandler’s first argument deals with the restorative justice owed by humans to species that have gone extinct as a result of anthropogenic means (Sandler 2014). Sandler argues that despite the extinction of a species resulting from human activity, de-extinction would not be justifiable. The argument against the ethical ideal focuses on that a species cannot be awarded restorative justice. There is no moral obligation to the species. As all individual organisms are extinct, then there remains no obligation towards restoration. In the case of passenger pigeons, this argument remains true; not only would re-establishing the species provide no justice to the historical organisms as they would remain dead. Their extinct organisms DNA would be used meaning the “new” species also would not be the same as the historic (Kasperbauer 2017). As the technology stands, the de-extinction process would create a close replication of the historical passenger pigeon, but not an exact copy. Furthermore, passenger pigeons’ de-extinction wouldn’t negate the previous causes of the species extinctions; overhunting. Without an increase in regulations regarding the hunting of the species, the de-extinction of passenger pigeons would not even meet the criteria of reparation and rehabilitation justice (Sandler 2014)

Both the second and third arguments examine how the value of the species and organisms would impact the ethical consideration of de-extinction (Sandler 2014). The three central values mentioned by Sandler are a species ecological value, instrumental value, and their intrinsic value, another value that wasn’t discussed explicitly by Sandler is a species existence value (Kasperbauer 2017). Considering passenger pigeons, their ecological value and instrumental value are relatively similar; the value resides in the species ability to spread the seeds of nut-bearing trees. Considering that the region where passenger pigeons were previously located is now more densely populated, the significance of the species ecological and instrumental value is minimal. The passenger pigeons’ intrinsic value would also be considerably different, as the species itself is not the same as the distinct historical form. A species’ existence value is another essential factor to consider; passenger pigeons have a unique history and could be regarded as valued merely for the ability to see one, the wondrous value (Sandler 2014). The value of passenger pigeons as a species would be considerably more minimal if they were brought back negating the purpose of de-extinction, as a way to create or re-establish the species historical value.

The last argument presented by Sandler pertains to the viability of de-extinction as a last resort technology. When no other conservation and environmental management strategies have been effective in mitigating a species’ extinction, then at least the DNA can be preserved (Sandler 2014). In the case of passenger pigeons, the practicality of de-extinction as a last resort is minimal; there is a requirement in population size for the continued survival of the species, which would be costly and time-consuming to implement. Furthermore, de-extinction does nothing to actually deal with the anthropogenic factor in their historic extinction. There is no point in using de-extinction technologies if the cause of extinction is not dealt with; reintroducing an extinct species in the historic environment with no changes will likely result in a repeat extinction. The case stands that if no other conservation efforts have been useful, then there is little practical use in de-extinction as the results will remain the same. If passenger pigeons were reintroduced, they would likely still be considered pests and overhunted until extinction for the second time (Kasperbauer 2017).

By examining passenger pigeons’ case, it’s easy to see that the moral considerability of de-extinction is reliant on many contingent factors. Restorative justice is inadmissible to extinct species, but reparation is possible if regulations are put in place to limit the amount of overhunting. There is only limited value of de-extinction passenger pigeons, especially in their historical regions but, there is a possibility to create value in new ecosystems, as a new species remains. Conservation focus must not be entirely on de-extinction, but instead on mitigating climate change, habitat degradation, and pollution otherwise history will be repeated (Sandler 2014). There are many possibilities of future research in the field of de-extinction, morality must be considered at every step.

 

Sources

 

T.J. Kasperbauer (2017) Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction, Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20:1, 1-14, DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

 

R. Sandler (2014) The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species, 28:2, 354-360, DOI: 10.1111/cobi.12198