In William Cronon’s “The Trouble with Wilderness” he argues that humans have constructed the idea of ‘wilderness’ and that this construction continues the harm to the ecosystems that this term was constructed to protect as well as humanity. Cronon argues that by creating a polarisation between the human and the natural, we distance ourselves from our responsibility and connection to it. The consequences of this are that “If we allow ourselves to believe that nature, to be true, must also be wild, then our very presence in nature represents its fall. […] We thereby leave ourselves little hope of discovering what an ethical, sustainable, honorable human place in nature might actually look like” (11). Cronon’s solution to this duality is to recombine the wild with the human in our minds, to see the whole of the world as our home, because “[h]ome, after all, is the place where finally we make our living. It is the place for which we take responsibility, the place we try to sustain so we can pass on what is best in it […] to our children” (19). It seems key not to forget that much as we create many unnatural things, humans are as much a part of nature as anything else. Or are we not animals evolved from the primordial soup like all others?

This reading reminded me of the inner conflict I felt when doing the readings on utilitarianism earlier in the course, I am fairly depressed now as I was then, but reading Cronon was at least a little more uplifting in comparison. I remember thinking that in utilitarian terms I really should be dead. If we want to promote the good of the highest number of conscious beings (referencing Peter Singer here) then humanity should not necessarily be top of the list. In fact, there are more chickens than humans, and they certainly do not need us to thrive. There are many areas one can extrapolate this type of thinking out to, especially because it often feels like no matter what choice you make as a consumer you are contributing in one way or another to the death of our planet. Take clothes shopping for instance: if you want to shop ethically and not contribute to the enormous waste and bad ethics of the fast fashion industry there are plenty of pricey brand options at your disposal, with biodegradable fabrics and fair working conditions for their employees. However, suppose you do not have the money, or you do not have the (thin) body type that these sustainable brands tend to cater towards, then you could always thrift! But many thrift shops do not pay their workers well, the majority of the clothing donated to them ends up in a landfill in the end, and most times you still will not find what you are looking for. I find this cycle crops up in many of the choices I have to make on a day to day basis and Cronon addresses this sort of climate-depression (not using that exact language) in his essay. Cronon argues that “if wild nature is the only thing worth saving, and if our mere presence destroys it, then the sole solution to our own unnaturalness, the only way to protect sacred wilderness from profane humanity, would seem to be suicide” (13). By constructing this duality between the human and the natural, we humans have left ourselves in a murky spot since It does seem a difficult task to save the environment while also punishing ourselves.

Buying from sustainable fashion brands and thrift shops has a similar effect in my opinion to what Cronon describes as the effect of visiting nature preserves and national parks. “We work our nine-to-five jobs in its [society’s/the non-wild’s] institutions, we eat its food, we drive its cars (not least to reach the wilderness), we benefit from the intricate and all too invisible networks with which it shelters us, all the while pretending that these things are not an essential part of who we are. By imagining that our true home is in the wilderness, we forgive ourselves the homes we actually inhabit” (11-12). Whether you are ‘escaping to the wilderness’ or buying from thrift stores, both have the effect of displacing our guilt over the choices we don’t really have. Cronon’s solution, while imperfect in my opinion, at least lends us some forgiveness and assists in our ability to fight for the planet as a whole. Humans are not the devil, we all live here, we simply have to do our best to treat our planet as a home and to fight for change at an institutional level.

(disclaimer: I am not arguing that attempting to shop ethically is not a good thing to do in our fight to do our best, instead I am saying that it can in some instances act as a way to make ourselves feel better when the problem goes much deeper than individualized decisions.)

• Renée

Sources:

Cronon, William. (1995) “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature”, Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature (pp. 69-90). New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Available at: https://www.williamcronon.net/writing/Trouble_with_Wilderness_Main.html

In the past decades, environmental organizations such as Greenpeace and WWF have advocated for the conservation of the environment from a wilderness perspective, portraying charismatic animals in fantastic landscapes and highlighting the importance of preserving their natural environment. At the same time, people living in urbanized areas often perceive nature as an external setting to their everyday lives, only experienced during holidays or recreational activities. Critics have questioned this outlook on nature because it reinforces the notion that humans are outside of nature and only escape to the wilderness to find spiritual fulfillment and wonder. In this article I will examine wilderness environmentalism from two perspectives and discuss how we might incorporate a revised notion of wilderness into our environmental conservation initiatives and policies.

In “The Trouble with Wilderness”, William Cronon discusses the romanticized notion of wilderness as a sublime setting for human realization in which the human is entirely outside of the natural. He criticizes this constructed idea because “any way of looking at the natural world that encourages us to believe we are separate from nature is likely to reinforce environmentally irresponsible behaviour” (Cronon, 1995). Further, he asserts that the frontier idea of wilderness is a myth invented by white settlers to build up their own system of values and justify oppressive behaviour towards indigenous peoples. Instead of a pristine landscape untouched by human influence, Cronon argues, nature is a setting that has been altered for millennia by the people who inhabit it.

In response to ideas such as Cronon’s, the environmental movement has taken a shift from wilderness conservation to environmental justice. Environmental justice incorporates concerns such as racism and discrimination into the conservation debate. In the view of environmental justice activists, solving the environmental crisis is intrinsically intertwined with solving other social issues such as poverty, discrimination, and economic inequality because the domination of nature and the domination of people are closely related. Environmental justice activists go as far as saying that wilderness conservation and the protection of endangered species is a form of racism because the people advocating this part of the environmental agenda are mainly white people from the developed world. So is wilderness an entirely constructed idea? Should we abandon our efforts to preserve it? What types of values are we prioritizing when advocating for wilderness conservation?

In “A Wilderness Environmentalism Manifesto: Contesting the Infinite Self-Absorption of Humans” Micheal DeLuca discusses these questions from an alternative perspective. For DeLucca, abandoning wilderness conservation is wrong because it would place too much weight on human interests and human values. In his view, putting humans first dilutes the focus and efforts of environmental groups, whose main goal should be to preserve nature regardless of its relationship to human societies. Cronon himself recognizes that “[a]ny way of looking at nature that helps us remember—as wilderness also tends to do—that the interests of people are not necessarily identical to those of every other creature or of the earth itself is likely to foster responsible behaviour” (Cronon, 1995). This idea is a relevant critique to environmental justice because environmental interests are not always the same as human interests. As DeLuca puts it “social justice and human rights around the world are not a priori conditions for environmental protection” (DeLucca, 2007).

In my view, a new notion of wilderness and environmental conservation should take into account aspects of both Cronon’s and DeLucca’s views.  When thinking about “saving the environment” many people might think about a beautiful mountain range, a deep, biodiverse rainforest or an exotic animal. For many of us in large city centers, “saving the environment” does not evoke images of the place where we live, work, and form relationships. This is a large problem when trying to promote conservation efforts because nature is seen as something external to most people’s everyday experiences, and therefore external to their range of responsibility. The outlook on nature as something external to the human experience must change. Firstly, as Cronon argues, we should deconstruct the idea of wilderness as a pristine and sublime ideal. For many of us, wilderness is a place far away, untouched by human influence, where we go every once in a while to clear our minds and breathe fresh air. Then, as DeLucca suggests, we should construct an idea of wilderness as a place we inhabit, a place in which our very existence depends upon and a place that we are responsible for preserving. When it comes to environmental justice, we should be aware that human interests are not always compatible with the conservation of nature. This is a hard realization for many idealists on the political left who think we can solve all the world’s problems by abolishing the structures of power of capitalism. The reality is, nevertheless, much more complex than that. Preserving wilderness is sometimes compatible with pursuing human interests and social justice, but in many cases it is not. As DeLucca suggests, the environmental crisis is an opportunity to overcome human self-absorption and start viewing ourselves as part of a greater web of life on the planet.

~Monica

Photo credi:t Pixabay  https://www.pexels.com/photo/adventure-calm-clouds-dawn-414171/  (creative commons license)

Resources:

1. William Cronon. (1995). The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature. Excerpted from Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995, 69-90

2. Michael DeLuca. (2007). A Wilderness Environmentalism Manifesto: Contesting the Infinite Self-Absorption of Humans. Environmental Justice and Environmentalism. doi:10.7551/mitpress/2781.003.0005

Food Sovereignty

In Kyle Whyte’s essay on Food Sovereignty, Justice and Indigenous Peoples he focuses on the interactions of colonizers and colonial powers with Indigenous peoples and the impacts on food sovereignty. This post will offer a very current and relevant example of how settler colonial domination undermines indigenous culture and food security.

In Nova Scotia Sipekne’katik First Nation began a moderate livelihood fishery. The idea here is that the indigenous community could exercise their treaty rights, these treaty rights include “right to fish, hunt and gather to earn a moderate livelihood.” [1]This implementation has resulted in an eruption of violence against indigenous people, it is a perfect example of how colonialists work to dominate indigenous groups and create food injustices.

Food injustices are created “when at least one human group systematically dominates one or more other human groups through their connections to and interactions with one another in local and global food systems”[2] In exercising their right to fish and earn a moderate livelihood the Mi’kmaq first nations have permits to fish outside of “season”, this is creating tensions and anger with the commercial fisherman who are taking actions to stop this. In doing this, commercial fishing industry are using their connections to ensure local businesses will not buy lobster from Mi’kmaq fishermen. This is an example as to what Whyte is referring to as a food injustice. Along with interfering in their fishing, there is an unsafe work environment being created in this industry. The uproar in violence including cutting lines, intimidation, pelting buildings with rocks, barricading fishers, fires[3] are just the beginning is preventing a safe work environment or access.

Next Whyte introduces food sovereignty, that is “the right of peoples and governments to choose the way food is produces and consumed in order to respect livelihoods.”[4] Using the same lobster fishing example we can see how it is a situation where an indigenous group is seeking to govern themselves in “different respects as collective societies”[5] The violence targeting indigenous peoples is disrupting how they fish for cultural purposes. However, I agree with Whyte when he states “Indigenous peoples claims about the connections of particular foods to collective self- determination are much more complicated. The claims are more about how colonial domination, in contexts such as US settler colonialism, is organized to undermine certain human institutions that are pivotal to Indigenous peoples’ capacities to exercise collective self- determination, food sovereignty being a significant part of that.”[6]There may not necessarily be a spiritual or cultural need for the livelihood fishery they have set up, however, it is necessary for the indigenous group to continue living their lives without being under the power of colonialism and an industry that seeks to over-power their indigenous culture.

Just like in Whyte’s article like the salmon fishers the Lobster fishermen in Nova Scotia are exercising their treaty rights. “rights protecting Indigenous peoples’ relationships to particular foods from the actions of settlers.”[7]While indigenous people are having to fight for their fishing rights, more importantly they are fighting for their treaty rights and respect for them. The settler’s way of life in the lobster industry has been to have an off season in order to avoid overfishing and depletion, however, treaty rights state that indigenous people need not be impacted by settler activities and should have the right to continue fishing during off seasons. In order to avoid settler colonial domination this particular indigenous group in Nova Scotia must continue to fight for respect of their treaty rights.

The current crisis and uproar of violence against indigenous lobster fishermen in Nova Scotia is a suited example for Whyte’s article. It is relevant in discussing his main arguments and understanding how settler colonialism interferes in indigenous cultures and food security. It is representative of how indigenous connection and relation to this industry is also a fight for self-determination and avoidance of domination.

[1] Angel, Moore. Sipekne’katik chief’s message to Canada is moderate livelihood fishery is here to stay. Published October 20, 2020. APTN news

[2] Kyle Powys Whyte. Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance. Published March 2018. The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics.

[3] Amanda, Coletta. Indigenous People in Nova Scotia exercised their right to catch lobster. Now they’re under attack. Published Octover.26, 2020. The Washington Post.

[4] Kyle Powys Whyte. Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples

[5] Kyle Powys Whyte. Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples

[6] Kyle Powys Whyte. Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples

[7] Kyle Powys Whyte. Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples

References

Amanda, Coletta. Indigenous People in Nova Scotia exercised their right to catch lobster. Now they’re under attack. Published Octover.26, 2020. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/canada-nova-scotia-indigenous-lobster-fishery/2020/10/24/d7e83f54-12ed-11eb-82af-864652063d61_story.html

Angel, Moore. Sipekne’katik chief’s message to Canada is moderate livelihood fishery is here to stay. Published October 20, 2020. APTN news. https://www.aptnnews.ca/national-news/sipeknekatik-chiefs-message-to-canada-is-moderate-livelihood-fishery-is-here-to-stay/

Kyle Powys Whyte. Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance. Published March 2018. The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics.

Alison

After reading “Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance”, I had an answer to the question: why is conserving food so related to self determination of Indigenous peoples? Most of us are aware that settler colonialism undermines Indigenous sovereignty and Indigenous ways of living. So how does food come into the picture? In this blog post, I want to briefly go over Whyte’s discussion, and then apply it to the case of the lobster feud in Nova Scotia.
In the essay, Whyte discusses the claim that colonial powers violate Indigenous peoples’ collective self determination. The self determination discussed here specifically concerns food systems, or food sovereignty, and violations of these are food injustices. When we talk about food systems, we are referring to complex chains of “production, distribution, consumption, recirculation, and trade” (Whyte, 2018). Food sovereignty is the right of governments and peoples to choose the method in which food is consumed and produced for the purpose of respecting their livelihoods (Whyte, 2018). Food injustice occurs when a group of humans (in this case settler colonials) systematically dominates another (or several other) human groups by connecting and interacting with one another in both global and local food systems (Whyte, 2018). When we talk about food injustice, we’re discussing a structural issue. We’re concerned about the corporate consolidation that has created a monopoly of the agricultural industry – thereby encroaching on food consumption, and food sovereignty. What is important to understand in Whyte’s discussion of these topics, is that the demand for big agriculture was not a consumer demand, but that of the producer.
Indigenous peoples hold that one of the solutions to protecting food sovereignty might require conservation of particular foods (Whyte, 2018). Examples of these particular foods include salmon, and wild rice. But Whyte makes an argument that this type of claim (that conservation is necessary) pushes theories about food sovereignty and food injustice not grounded in fixed conceptions of Indigenous cultures (Whyte, 2018). Instead this claim, and others like it, can offer significant contributions for understanding how colonial domination of Indigenous cultures is a type of injustice undermining important relationships supporting collective Indigenous self determination (Whyte, 2018). To put this more simply, this claim that food sovereignty might require conservation wasn’t founded in Indigenous traditional knowledge. Therefore, we must acknowledge that colonial influences are taking away from Indigenous collective self determination by endangering their food sovereignty.
Whyte presents food sovereignty as a norm that defends self determination of collectives over their food systems. These collectives include societies, and governments, and therefore also includes Indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples themselves describe food injustice as violating their collective self determination over food systems. Essentially, we can conclude that Whyte is correct in saying that food is another area in which Indigenous sovereignty and right to self determination has been violated.
Briefly, the Nova Scotia lobster problem can be broken down to the title of a Washington Post Article: “Indigenous people in Nova Scotia exercised their right to catch lobster. Now they’re under attack”. Mi’kmaq fishers have experienced threats, their traps being pulled, and their lines being cut by non-Indigenous commercial fishers (Coletta, 2020). The goal apparently is to remove the Mi’kmaq fishers from St. Mary’s Bay. Angry mobs of non-indigenous fishers have ransacked Indigenous fisher’s catch, and burned down one of the two lobster pounds after pelting the building with rocks and dumping the lobster (Coletta, 2020). The issue at the centre of their anger is that the Sipekne’katik, a Mi’kmaq band, are asserting their right to pull lobster outside of the closed fishing season. This right is affirmed by both courts and the treaties. The Mi’kmaq have a constitutional right to hunt, fish, gather and secure necessities or a ‘moderate livelihood’ (Coletta, 2020).
The fact that non-Indigenous fishers have been allowed to get away with assaulting Indigenous self-determination and food sovereignty questions whether the government is truly committed to reconciling with Indigenous peoples. Non-Indigenous fishers’ spokespersons have claimed that this outrage is due to lobster conservation and protecting the livelihoods of fishers. This conservation claim is thin, as the Mi’kmaq have 11 licences to 11 boats with 50 traps each, in comparison to the 979 licensed boats with up to 400 traps each in this area of Nova Scotia (Coletta, 2020). Sounds like settler colonialism to me, and Whyte would be inclined to agree with me. Moreover, Dalhousie University biologist has affirmed that the Sipekne’katik pose a threat very close to zero to the lobster stock (Coletta, 2020).
If Whyte were to analyze this case, he would tell us that this is an example of attempting to remove food sovereignty from a group, thereby endangering their food system and causing food injustice. This case is exactly how infringing on Indigenous food systems threatens Indigenous rights of self determination. Furthermore, this undermines Indigenous collective self determination and the Sipekne’katik identity. The government should be protecting Indigenous rights in this case and prosecuting the people directly harming it. Failure to do so only further endangers the Indigenous peoples and their right to self determination.

~Suzanah

Coletta, Amanda. “Indigenous People in Nova Scotia Exercised Their Right to Catch Lobster. Now They’re under Attack.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 26 Oct. 2020, www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/canada-nova-scotia-indigenous-lobster-fishery/2020/10/24/d7e83f54-12ed-11eb-82af-864652063d61_story.html.

Whyte, Kyle. “Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance”. The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics. March 2018.

This blog post will explore the issues put forth by Whyte in his piece Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous People; an Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance” 

To begin Whyte describes how indigenous people often claim that colonial powers violate their people’s collective self-determination over their food systems or their food sovereignty. One of the proposed solutions to protect their food sovereignty is to conserve particular foods such as salmon and wild rice. Whyte makes the argument that when indigenous people make these claims, this offers us an important contribution to understand how settler colonial domination is a form of injustice that undermines key relationships that support the Indigenous self collective and self determination (Whyte, 2018). 

 Two key topics in Whyte’s paper are food injustice and food sovereignty. He introduces a concept called food injustice. Whyte says, “Food injustice occurs when at least one human group systematically dominates one or more other human groups through their connections to and interactions with one another in local and global food systems.” He then goes on to define food sovereignty as “the right of peoples and governments to choose the way food is produced and consumed in order to respect livelihoods (La Via Campesina, 2009). Food sovereignty helps to defend the self-determination of some collective over their food systems (Whyte, 2018). 

Foods can be connected to treaty rights. For example, salmon is an important resource. Billy Frank Jr. described his view on violations against  against the treaty tribes of western Washington in the Pacific Northwest:

Through the treaties, we reserved that which is most important to us as a people: The right to harvest salmon in our traditional fishing areas. But today the salmon is disappearing because the [US] federal government is failing to protect salmon habitat. Without the salmon there is no treaty right. We kept our word when we ceded all of western Washington to the United States, and we expect the United States to keep its word.

(Treaty Indian Tribes in Western Washington 2011, 6, as cited by Whyte, 2018)

For the indigenous people something such as salmon is not just a food source. Food systems connect greatly to resiliency of people whose ancestors survived very difficult times. Salmon are important parts of the ecosystem and removing them from the ecosystem would have harmful and negative consequences. This is why indigenous people had people known as title holders who would make informed decisions about salmon conservation for their house. Title holders could even be removed if their knowledge was insufficient (Trosper 2009,50-80). 

Having people such as title holders demonstrates that the indigenous people have knowledge and a great care to maintain ecosystems that they hunt and fish from. I also think that it is easier for the general public to accept salmon fishing traditions as being an important part of the Indigenous culture. However, there are indigenous groups who have more controversial hunting practices that can be harder to accept as an integral part of their identity. The example that I have in mind is seal hunting. I think a lot of people would be more willing to commit food injustice over the inuit people because the seal hunts upset them. 

The Inuit community in Resolute Bay has faced a lot of hardship from animal activist groups protesting the seal hunts. In 1983- 1985 when the seal hunt ban went into effect the average income of an Inuit seal hunter declined severely. It from $54,000- 1,000. The region has one of the highest unemployment rates in Canada and the highest suicide rate in the world (Randawha, 2017). 

A larger part of the controversy is the opening of a Toronto  restaurant called  Kū-kŭm Kitchen which sells seal meat. 

Is this restaurant ethical? I think whether or not it is ethical can depend on which philosophical view you examine the issue from. If you look at it from an animal rights view such as Regan’s, he would say this is completely unacceptable and you can’t kill seals. He would be fundamentally opposed to the entire system (Regan, 1987). On the other hand if you looked at it from a utilitarian perspective, they would consider the happiness of the aggregate. Limiting the seal hunt is causing people to kill themselves, and people are facing terrible hardships. 

I’m sure that Whyte would argue that banning the seal hunt and seal meat is another form of unacceptable food injustice. People have to do what they have to do to survive. Inuit people live in a harsh climate where it is difficult to survive. Another example of people who have to survive in a very harsh climate are the people who live in Omyakon Russia. This little hamlet can drop down to -60 in the winter. It is impossible to farm the frozen land so people survive off of a carnivorous diet. They eat reindeer meat, frozen fish, and horse blood. The 500 or so people here do not have much of a choice. These are the food sources which are available to them, and they can’t go vegan or vegetarian If a group tried to commit food injustice over the people in Omyakon, they would surely die. 

As I conclude this blog post, I have some questions,

What do you think about food injustice and food sovereignty? Is food injustice something that needs to be avoided?

Is there a middle ground between food injustice and killing animals? Would there be a middle ground for indigenous people and vegans?

Works used

1/) https://www-oxfordhandbooks-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199372263.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199372263-e-34?print

2.) (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/travel/destinations/life-in-oymyakon-the-coldest-inhabited-place-on-earth/as61356488.cms#:~:text=It’s%20actually%20great%20to%20see,degrees%20Celsius%20in%20the%20winters.

3.) Regan, T. (1987). The case for animal rights. In Advances in animal welfare science 1986/87 (pp. 179-189). Springer, Dordrecht.

This week in PHIL 355, we shift to practical issues concerning both Conservation and Reconciliation.

In ‘Food Sovereignty, Justice and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance’, Kyle Powys Whyte discusses how colonial settlement has interfered with the collective self-determination of Indigenous Peoples via the disruption of their food systems. Through the violation of Treaty Rights, U.S. settlers have engaged in practices such as intensive agriculture and urban development that have subsequently degraded the habitats of Treaty protected plants and animals, including salmon (Whyte, para. 13).

According to Whyte, the failure to appropriately conserve particular foods bares a significant impact on the collective continuance and self-determination of Indigenous Peoples (2018). Through traditional practices associated with particular food and food systems, Indigenous people are able to sustain traditional knowledge, cultural identity and self-respect (Whyte, para. 63). The degradation of habitats associated with these practices thus not only interfere with diet and food supply, but also provides less opportunities for social activities and traditional ceremonies that help in the preservation of their cultural identity (Whyte, para. 64).

One aspect of the reading that I found particularly striking was the importance for Indigenous Peoples to conserve particular foods for the purpose of reincarnation. According to this belief, members of particular tribe view salmon and humans as mutually responsible for sustaining one another overtime (Whyte, para. 25). The killing of salmon is therefore not necessarily seen as a means to an end, but rather an act of transformation that is necessary in order to honour the mutual respect, responsibility and accountability in the relationship between the two parties. (Whyte, para. 25).

This raises the question: Is it ethically justifiable for Indigenous people to be hunting salmon and other wildlife in order to preserve their spiritual connections associated with them? Does it make a difference whether or not they are conserving the wildlife and hunting these animals at sustainable rates?

To answer the first question, I would argue in favour of Indigenous hunting practices for reasons of spiritual connectivity. In accordance to the Land-Ethic Principe brought forward by Aldo Leopold, humans have to start thinking of themselves as interdependent members of a biotic community (1948). While Western settlers tend to hold a dichotomist view between people and the environment, Indigenous populations believe that people and animals are both physically and spiritually interrelated. Through their long and complex relationship with the land, hunting is a form of expression of both their sovereignty and unity between the natural and spiritual environment. Hunting therefore not only serves to permit these populations to achieve and maintain food security, but also provides a way for these people to connect to their spiritual values and beliefs.

For reasons of this spiritual connectivity, I believe that Indigenous populations have a greater incentive to conserve and hunt at sustainable rates. Unlike commercial hunters that accumulate their prey until populations are depleted, Indigenous populations engage in sustainable hunting in order to ensure a healthy dynamic between animals and the communities. This approach reflects Leopold’s idea of eco-communitarianism, which suggests that we owe duties to ecological communities (as wholes) upon which our social communities and lives as people depend upon (1948). The importance of ensuring eco-communitarianism is reflected in the article through the role of titleholders of potlach ceremonies, whom of which would have their positions stripped if their knowledge capacity was so insufficient in-so-far as they were giving beyond what was ecologically sustained (Whyte, 2018).

In addition to reasons of spiritual connectivity and sustainable practices, I would also argue that Indigenous hunting practices are justifiable because they are conducted as a means for survival. According to Whyte, food injustice occurs when one group systemically dominates another through their interactions with one another in local and global food systems (para. 2). While colonial settlers have impacted indigenous food systems by depleting local resources through natural resource development, their forced resettlement to isolated reserves have also had significant negative impact on their relationship with global food systems.

In the North, food prices are substantially higher due to shipping and transportation costs to these remote communities. When colonial settlers thus deplete these food resources through expansion, they subsequently force Indigenous populations to purchase commercial goods and services at extremely high prices. Hunting often involves a collective component where animals are shared amongst the community and distributed to individuals who are too poor to feed themselves. If members of these communities were unable to hunt and thereby forced to depend on commercial foods, many of them would consequently starve. As a result, subsistence hunting is justified for these communities because their interdependency to the land and connections offered through these practices is essential for their survival.

Leopold, Aldo. (1948). “The Land Ethic” in A Sand County Almanac.

Whyte, Kyle Powys. (2018). “Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance.” In The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics.

This week in Environmental Ethics, we read a piece titled “A Wilderness Environmentalism Manifesto: Contesting the Infinite Self-Absorption of Humans” by Kevin Michael De Luca (2007). De Luca argues that by focusing on social issues, the environmental justice movement detracts from environmental concerns due to an anthropocentric prioritization of human needs (2007, 29). Although De Luca raises some good points about the value of nature beyond its use to humans, the majority of his chapter can only be described as ecofascist. Despite De Luca’s recognition that humans are part of nature, I believe his claim that environmental justice is anthropocentric actually reinforces a human-nature dichotomy. Furthermore, De Luca’s flippant tone regarding human rights and social needs reinforce the ecofascist character of his writing.

Before getting further into De Luca’s writing, let me first define eco-fascism. Oxford’s Lexico dictionary defines it as “radical environmentalism of a type perceived as excessive, intolerant, or authoritarian,” (2020) while the Oxford Dictionary of Environment and Conservation describes it as environmentalism regardless of “personal wishes, preferences, or needs” (2007). Although the term is used in different ways, I understand eco-fascism to be the prioritization of the environment above any concern for social needs or human rights. As I will soon discuss, I believe true concern for the environment should always encompass social concerns. These issues are not separate.

De Luca is critical that “Environmental justice activists have redefined ‘environment’ to focus on humans” (2007, 29). To prove his point, De Luca points to organizations like the Sierra Club and Greenpeace, who have incorporated social and environmental sustainability in their slogans. Although he praises the Sierra Club’s valuable work, De Luca cautions that “Their move to adopt the principles of environmental justice at the expense of a focus on wilderness…is a grievous error” (2007, 46). Instead, De Luca argues that too much concern with cultural preservation and social sustainability is anthropocentric, claiming that “Putting humans first dilutes the focus and efforts of environmental groups” (2007, 45).

These claims are a serious mischaracterization of environmental justice, first and foremost because environmental justice does not claim to put humans above all else. Rather, environmental justice acknowledges that all humans, in all our diversity, are part of nature. As Environmental Justice Canada lays out, all humans deserve equal protection from environmental harms, and have equal rights to live in a healthy environment. In other words, environmental justice acknowledges that humans are equal to each other, not that humans are above other species or aspects of nature. Although De Luca emphasizes that humans are part of nature, his claim that environmentalism must prioritize “wilderness” instead of social justice actually reinforces the anthropocentric hierarchy that he tries to dismantle (2007, 30). Instead, it’s important to see that environmental justice is social justice, and vice versa.

This prioritization of wilderness above humans approaches the realm of eco-fascism when it implies that human rights and environmental concerns are unrelated. Several of the examples De Luca uses to support his arguments fail to recognize the root of the environmental problem at hand, which is often the fact that basic human needs aren’t met in the first place.

A key example is De Luca’s description of a restaurant serving prized wildlife as food. He condones how the environmental group WildAid raided the restaurant at gunpoint and “[did] not concern itself with the young teenage girls working as waitresses and prostitutes” (2007, 45). Although De Luca calls this a “brutal choice,” he concludes that “If environmental protection depends on eradicating prostitution, we may as well all go buy SUVs and retire to the beach,” completely failing to examine why young girls may become sex workers in the first place (2007, 45).

Although sex work is dignified work, and some people may simply choose it as their job, there are of course situations where it is a person’s only means to survive. In the case that De Luca describes, the eradication of forced sex work in wildlife restaurants would absolutely reduce environmental harms. Why? Because people who engage in sex work out of necessity, rather than choice, do so because they do not have access to basic needs. If the social problems of poverty, income inequality, and access to jobs were first addressed, then people would not have to work in an industry that thrives on killing endangered wildlife. Raiding a restaurant at gunpoint to save animals does not prevent employees from seeking similar jobs elsewhere out of necessity. The only sustainable solution to this wildlife restaurant, then, is to address social needs in tandem with environmental concerns.

There is a lot to unpack in De Luca’s chapter, and very little space to do so. Although De Luca is correct in his stance that humans are not above nature, his attack on environmental justice and social concerns are severely misguided. Rather than dismantling the human vs. nature dichotomy, I believe his disregard for social justice in protecting the environment actually reinforces a separation between humans and nature, rendering many of his arguments ecofascist. If we are to truly protect the environment, we must protect all of its components, which includes both human and non-human entities.

-Mary

Reference:

De Luca, Kevin Michael. 2007. “A Wilderness Environmentalism Manifesto: Contesting the Infinite Self-Absorption of Humans.” In Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to the Environmental Movement, edited by Ronald Sandler and Phaedra C. Pezzullo, 27-55. Cambridge: MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2781.003.0005.

Looking at Dale Jamieson’s “Ethics And Intentional Climate Change” provides an interesting perspective on climate change and Intentional Climate Change (ICC). I also think that it is particularly interesting that Jamieson mentioned the ‘Doctrine of Double Effect’ in relation to this discussion. Jamieson suggests that there are instances where we are responsible for what we do even if we did not intend to do them. I agree with this point but I think that there is a moral difference between purposefully doing harm and doing so accidentally.

The doctrine of double effect engages specifically with the idea that within war is it unacceptable to target civilians specifically, but, if civilians happen to be caught in the crossfire, that is morally permissible. This is the distinction between terror bombings and strategic bombings. This distinction comes from the idea that the desire was not to hurt the civilians and, if given the opportunity, a strategic bomb would prefer to remove all civilians from the area of effect. This is counter to the idea of terror bombings which need the civilians to be present in order to be successful. This is why, within the doctrine of double effect, terror bombings are immoral and strategic bombings, even if they hit civilians, are more morally permissible. 

Jamieson presents that the doctrine of double effect excuses unintentional consequences of your actions, however, this is not necessarily the case. The doctrine of double effect doesn’t seek to absolve individuals of their moral blameworthiness in the case of an unintentional negative outcome, instead, it suggests that the act itself isn’t wrong. The doctrine does not suggest that the negative outcomes aren’t tragic but only says that the intentions of the act are justifiable. 

It is easy to make the assumptions that there is no moral blameworthiness when presented with a case as black and as with the example terror bombings but in reality, there are a lot more nuanced details and more options. With the example of terror bombings, there are only two options, to bomb or not to bomb but in cases in the real world, there are many more options. This is the case with ICC. Jaimeson suggests that moving forward with ICC would be similar to the case of strategic bombings in that it may have unintentional consequences that we have yet to foresee. This point, I would agree with. However, it is our approach from here that differs. Jaimeson suggests that because of this, it would be similar to strategic bombings in that we may hit our target but have unintentional negative outcomes. For this reason, Jaimeson suggests that the act is not morally permissible as we are gambling with the wellbeing of individuals in a way that is unjust. Instead, I would suggest that while the socioeconomic outcomes may be terrible and tragic and fully agree with many of the other conclusions drawn in Jaimeson’s perspective. I think the alternative is much worse.

In the case of climate change, we’ve arrived at a point where climate scientists believe that we are teetering on the edge of no return. The climate death of our planet (or at very least the majority of life on the planet). Assuming that climate scientists are correct and we ignore any mass conspiracy theories, I would suggest that preventing the extinction of the global population is worth whatever economic and political conflict it may cause. Assuming climate change is real and something that heralds the mass destruction, it seems almost certain to be  created by humans. It seems almost just as certain that the effects of climate change will have just as devastating of effects on plants, animals, and ecosystems all across the world. And it is with that assumption that I believe that humanity has the moral responsibility to do whatever it takes to correct the mistakes we’ve made and accept any negative consequences onto ourselves, such as those associated with ICC. 

I believe that Jaimeson presented the doctrine of double effect in a way that misrepresented the ideals. The doctrine explains that we are responsible for negative outcomes but those outcomes do not necessarily make an act morally unacceptable. With this understanding of the doctrine, I believe that it is clear that despite the negative outcomes of ICC, the act itself is still permissible.

Jamieson, D. (1996). “Ethics And Intentional Climate Change.” Climate Change: University of Colorado, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00142580

This week, one of the readings I chose to read and discuss is Kyle Whyte’s “Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance,” where food injustices caused by settler states are highlighted as the key problem with indigenous people’s food sovereignty. Despite the treaties that were signed between these two groups, there have been many violations done by the settler states(the U.S and Canada) where they, “…establish their own ways of life,” (4) to gain access and exploit the lands and waters for themselves that was origninally under the ownership of the indigenous peoples. The access to food(via hunting and fishing) is not just essential for good nutrition and survival, but there is a connection between humans and the environment that is considered sacred to the indigenous peoples throughout North America: Salmon habituat [for example] is discussed as entwined with human institutions as a collective capacity supporting indigenous self-determination. (5) Collective self-determination in this context, as Whyte notes, is a group’s capacity to adapt to situational changes (5) and he asserts that the U.S still to this day is trying to diminsh this adaptation so that the U.S themselves can exploit more resources for their own gain and profit.

I believe that the U.S-endosed actions here are not just selish and entitled, but also anti-ecocentric(where there is not focus on the system of values in nature, where there are only human centered values) because there seems to be no concept of conservation when they exploit the resources that belong to the indigenous. For Whyte, he argues that a lot of forest ecosystems benefit from “salmon contributions,” (6) and it is the indigenous people’s traditional role to upkeep this conservation of salmon; they value the environment because they benefit from it, so they keep the fishing to a sustainable level to establish a healthy balance in the environment. (*for more information about how the salmon greatly contributes to forest ecosystems see page 6) The U.S does not conserve the environment in this situation, for there was a collapse of the salmon population due to damming on the lands and waters that is designated indigenous property. (4)

The U.S. also seems to diminish the collective continuance(“a society’s overall adaptive capacity to maintain its members’ cultural integrity, health, economic vitality, and political order into the future”) of the indigenous peoples by violating these treaties, (9) for the indigenous peoples need access to their own resources to survive, and keep the relationship between humans and ecosystem alive through conservation.

From this article by Whyte, I instantly was reminded of a current event that is happening in Nova Scotia: the indigenous group Mi’kmaq’s fishing rights are being disputed by non-indigenous fishermen. From the news article(cited below) we can see that the same violations of treaties about food sovereignty are happening:

“In 1999, Canada’s Supreme Court ruled in the landmark case R. v. Marshall that several treaties signed in the 1760s granting the Mi’kmaq the right to harvest and sell fish were still valid. The over 250-year-old agreement, known as the Peace and Friendship Treaties, specified that the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq had the right to earn a “moderate livelihood…”…Nova Scotia’s non-Indigenous fishers have called for the Sipekne’katik’s First Nation’s fishery to be closed, saying it is illegal and a threat to the environment…Jason Marr, one of the Mi’kmaw fishermen forced to take cover in a fishing pound from an angry mob trying to seize his fishing haul, said that it took the RCMP two hours to arrive despite multiple 911 calls. Marr said that after arriving, the RCMP stood by and watched the mob vandalize his car.” (Lao)

In my opinion, this infuriating case is parallel to the ones mentioned in Whyte’s article, especially the one about salmon. While the Supreme Court of Canada has established some areas on Nova Scotia’s coastline to be the property of the Mi’kmaq, the law did not do much in the way of protecting their rights to their fishing activities; they did not even protect them from the mobs of angry people trying to take their fishing haul. Based on the treaties signed so long ago, I believe that it is also a selfish and entitled act that the law and non-indigenous fishermen did to the Mi’kmaq, not to mention anti-ecocentric as well. Despite the calls that the indigenous groups were fishing to the point of damaging the environment(which was proven false later in the news article), it is not a logical argument to make as these non-indigenous fishermen would also be contributing to the claim of destroying the environment.

Also, when the fact that the Mi’kmaq are making a “moderate livelihood”(Lao) was brought up in the article, I also noticed another parallel aspect to the Whyte article: collective continuance. The treaties allowed indigenous groups to fish on designate property without interference from non-indigneous parties taking away their livelihood, which provides for their community to be collectively stable for the future that can allow them to adapt to different situations(such as a decrease in lobster populations). But with the treaty violated(and if it contiues to be violated), I believe that the collective continuance of the Mi’kmaq would significantly decrease because of the Canadian Government’s lack of protection of indigenous peoples and their rights.

Works Cited

Whyte, Kyle. “Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance.” The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics, 2018, pp. 1-15, doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199372263.013.34

Lao, David. “Mobs are attacking Indigenous fisheries in Nova Scotia. Here’s what’s going on.” Global News [Canada], 19 Oct. 2020, https://globalnews.ca/news/7403001/nova-scotia-lobster-explained/

The topic we are discussing this week in Philosophy 355 is eco-justice and reconciliation and its relationship with environmentalists. This blog post will focus specifically on Kevin DeLuca’s “A Wilderness Manifesto: Contesting the Infinite Self Absorption of Humans” in Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to the Environmental Movement. 

Environmental movements have continuously been gaining momentum over the last handful of decades and have had much success in increasing environmental awareness throughout the world. However, DeLuca points out that the original environmental movement that once only advocated for the conservation and preservation of wilderness (ie. land untouched by human influence (Cronon, 1)) has now been altered by environmental justice activists who want the movement to focus on more anthropocentric (human-centered) issues (27-29). This divide between what environmental movements should focus on has caused great tension between the two where environmental justice activists accuse environmentalists in engaging in racist and classist behaviour for wanting to focus on wilderness conservation rather than human issues (DeLuca, 30). 

DeLuca — a proponent of the preservation of wilderness — argues against environmental justice activists redefining the movement to focus on humans; instead, he believes that it is important for wilderness to be considered in the environmental movement for two reasons: wilderness is equally as important as human needs, putting human needs before the environment is why we face a multitude of environmental problems today; and wilderness is what made humans civilization possible (34, 28). 

While DeLuca does not explicitly say his opinion on the matter, I think that he may subscribe to an ecocentric point of view based on his arguments for including wilderness in environmental movements. Ecocentrism is a philosophical ethical theory that rejects anthropocentrism and extends moral considerability to systems as wholes whether they are sentient (have the capacity to feel pleasure or pain) or not. It is obvious from his stance on the matter that the authour is a proponent of wilderness and rejects the environmental movements shift towards anthropocentric goals. In addition, much of wilderness (ie. mountains, water, trees etc.) are not sentient beings and he still believes that humans need to preserve it even though they may not have much monetary value to humans. Secondly, DeLuca uses other ecocentrists like Aldo Leopold in order to make his point, specifically regarding how nature has helped make human civilization possible and “gives meaning to the human enterprise” (41). I think that it is important to discuss DeLuca’s possible underlying philosophical ethical theory because it not only helps to see where he is coming from and what his core values are, but also gives the argument context in why he reaches the conclusions he does. 

DeLuca concludes that we need to keep the environmental movement and the environmental justice movement separate from each other because the main concerns — preservation of wilderness versus human concerns — are not compatible enough to be classified into a single movement (47). I agree with this conclusion. I think that attempting to combine them has obviously proven to cause many harmful accusations (like being racist or classist), so the separation of them is probably for the best, unless they are able to work together in some cases. DeLuca mentions one case where they had success in working together, and that success happened due to making wilderness the grounds for environmental and social concerns (42). I wonder if an example of where the two could work together could be in a case like the Dakota Access Pipeline. Here, a proposed underground oil pipeline was to run through traditional Sioux land that they have inhabited for centuries. Perhaps the argument could be made that ecocentrists and environmentalists would want to preserve the traditional wilderness, and the environmental justice activists would want to advocate for marginalized people that are being taken advantage of by the government and big corporations invading their land. 

– Ashley

Cronon, W. (1995). The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature. In Uncommon Ground; Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

DeLuca, K. (2007). A Wilderness Manifesto: Contesting the Infinite Self Absorption of Humans, in Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to the Environmental Movement. MIT Press. pp. 27-56. 

William Cronon’s article, entitled “The Trouble With Wilderness; Or, Getting Back To The Wrong Nature,” speaks of how we discursively construct the concept wilderness without considering that this might really be a conceptual category that we have created that enables us to define the boundary to an urban civilised existence as opposed to being something that might really exist out there (…and certainly not too far out there). I do love this article though and I write nothing but exclamation marks beside what he says. On the other hand, I must concede also that Cronon’s essay to “rethink wilderness” made me cliche a bit too but with a small difference. I do go far out there but only as a tourist and never to the wilderness.

Cronon writes that if we are to get out of ‘othering’ the wilderness vis a vis constructing it as the negation of us and civilisation–that other way out there where we do not live–we must learn to “honor the Other within and the Other next door as much as we do the exotic Other that lives far [far] away […]. In particular, we need to discover a common middle ground in which all these things, from the city to wilderness, can somehow be encompassed in the word ‘home'” (19). I could not agree more–yes!, let us realise that we are never outside the space or spaces we call wilderness. The wilderness, really nature, is in the city and outside of it. On the other hand, when do we really get outside spaces we home categorically and thus discursively? We can’t. How else will we know?

Cronon asks us not to be the happy campers that go out into the wilderness and feel as though we have escaped civilisation and thus have entered that antithetical place, that virgin wilderness, from which all life has sprung.  O.K.  I will not do that again. But I will still go camping and I will still feel free of the city even though I have graduated to RV’s and find tenting to be the worst bet especially when I am in bear country. Yes, I do jog and can out run a bear. I have been made that scared by these gorgeous animals and I still donate to save the bear funds too. My point, here, is that I am not sure that I am as guilty as Cronon would have me. I have spent more summers than I will admit too (I hate telling people how old I am) going camping in the summer time. My favourite areas are mountains with lakes or wild rivers in the mountains. I do not need a campground, just a place to park and set up camp. I am quite at home for awhile. I am so used to knowing where I am in part from knowing how fauna and mosses grow in relation to trees and and the sun that really I have to be intoxicated to get lost. Perhaps Cronon would not mind if I up grade to tourist in his conception of the wilderness. I mean I am not as bad as some people who equate camping with bugs and the uncivilised.

True, I have brought civilisation with me in the form of an RV? I am ambivalent on this point where Cronon’s conception is concerned. But after reading Kyle Powers Whyte’s essay, “Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance,” I think…maybe…I am not that (un)civilised. Much of Whyte’s essay concerns itself with the concept of “collective continuance” so as to “describe the overall degree of adaptive capacity a society has when we take all its collective capacities into account, from food systems to gender systems. Collective capacities contribute to collective continuance because they consist of relationships that have certain qualities, two such qualities being trustworthiness and ecological redundancy” (3). While Whyte largely addresses what colonialism did by infringing upon Indigenous food systems as well as outlawing customs like the “Potlatch,” Whyte, nevertheless, makes clear that how we collect food, hunt food, and even distribute food has everything to do with who we are and not just how we sustain ourselves. Indigenous people(s) live in the wilderness, right? No. Some Indigenous persons tend to inhabit land and home the land just as much as urban dwellers do but often with a greater degree of reverence even if some of these populations are migratory. In short, home is home and how we procure, share, and maintain ourselves vis a vis food is a big part of what homes us.

Whyte takes matters to a spiritual, institutional and occupational level. He writes, “the ways the land and waters are cultivated also involve the creation and repetition of stories and ceremonies that endow the entwined human institutions and food systems with sacredness” (11). Whyte is speaking of ‘ecological redundancy’ here, where relationships are established with food sources that define one and one’s culture repeatedly. An example of such a food source would be salmon and taking up residence near water sources that provide an abundance of salmon. His point is that Indigenous populations often take up residence near food sources such as these and in turn they are homed by the salmon and all customs around procuring and sharing this food source. Given that this is the case, should I say that Indigenous people(s) live in the wilderness? No, clearly that would be a gross faux pas, but Whyte makes a point about custom that should not be overlooked. I may be Caucasian with a mixed heritage and clearly I indulge in camping, but maybe this is a custom, a way for me to come to know more about the world around me. Maybe, I am still a tourist in this but there is no chance I would not go and learn from Native inhabitants of the lands I visit about how to be there and take part in what is around me. In sum, I have never been to any wilderness that I know of. I am a tourist though and I am committed to continuing my education. Indigenous inhabitants with whom I might befriend or animal inhabitants that I always try to befriend before the run away or maybe it is just the trees and the mountains in the distance…I am quite at home here (there) and I know that I am away from the city. These journeys are my summer custom and it takes me away every time but never to the wilderness and always to a home away from home for a short time.

Tammy

Wilderness protection has always been a controversial and very broad issue. It not only includes environmental issues, but also ethical issues. The wilderness is considered a place where human civilization has not been exploited, and it is also a place not ruled by humans. It belongs to all the plants and animals in the natural world and is also considered our common property. The value of the wilderness is immeasurable, and at the same time, the wilderness also has unlimited possibilities. And the area of wilderness is much larger than that of human cities, because of the vastness of nature and the limitation of human exploitation. So according to Cronon’s idea, let people think that the wilderness is sublime and a very active guide. Therefore, people feel that the wilderness is sacred and has infinite power in the concept of consciousness. This is also the deepest core of what Cronon said, making the wilderness also have a profound influence on humans and nature. In fact, through Cronon’s text, we can intuitively feel Cronon’s love and admiration for the charm of the wilderness, and the many descriptions he used to make the wilderness so beautiful and moving. The wilderness feels beautiful and lonely. Because there are not too many traces of human life, everything is in the most primitive state. It allows humans to feel the appearance at the beginning of life and appreciate the spiritual guidance brought by the wilderness. But are these just people’s beautification and beautiful reveries?

In Cronon’s article, he clearly put forward his critical views, which aroused human thoughts. In fact, our approach somewhat escapes history and environmentalism, because we have not clearly distinguished the actual urban interests from the wilderness. Instead, we cannot choose between the two and want to possess both. Indeed, I think that human beings cannot give up the various benefits brought about by modern life and return to protecting the wilderness. This is also an ethical concept. The wilderness also teaches us many things, because human interests and wilderness may have this difference on many levels, so we should build a positive relationship, in an attitude of respect for the environment and responsible human behavior. It is also a symbol of the peaceful coexistence of the wilderness. So I feel that the convenience and progress of life brought about by modern human cities are not disrespect and pollution of the wilderness, but a sign that human civilization is always progressing. We can control pollution and reduce the impact on the wilderness. Respect for the wilderness and a sublime attitude to live in harmony with nature is also a kind of respect for the environment.

Works cited:   William Cronon. 1995. The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature. Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

https://www.williamcronon.net/writing/Trouble_with_Wilderness_Main.html

Among many other things, this year has brought public attention to Indigenous land disputes more than any other year that I’ve been alive.  From the protest coverage at Wet’suwet’en at the beginning of the year, to more recent confrontations at 1492 Landback Lane in Ontario and growing tensions in Nova Scotia regarding lobster fishing.  This ongoing unrest in Nova Scotia between the settler lobster fishermen and Mi’kmaq fishermen has been the center of many news stories over the past few weeks; It has erupted into violence and sabotage, by which treaty rights of the Mi’kmaq people are being contested by the settler fishermen. Arguments against setting of traps by the Mi’kmaq have been risen as “conservation” issues by the settler fishermen, but these claims have been debunked by researchers as described in this Huffington Post article. What settler fishermen are largely worried about, is diminishing lobster populations which will impact stock prices, and consequentially, their earnings. While Mi’kmaq fishermen also sell their catch, they have a different relationship with the area and the lobster.

Philosopher Kyle Powys Whyte writes in his essay Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance about the consequences of settler colonialism for Indigenous ecologies. Whyte describes the relationships that Indigenous groups have with foods such as salmon or rice as important, if not inherent, to their ability to maintain what he refers to as “collective continuance.” By this he means that there are practices and systems in place by Indigenous peoples that make up the fabric of their society, these he refers to as “collective capacities” or ecological systems. Woven together all of these collective capacities harboured by the group strengthen them and make them adaptive and resilient; this is their collective continuance. At the heart of his essay Whyte states that settler colonialism targets these relationships that Indigenous peoples have with their environment that in turn create collective capacities, therefore jeopardizing the collective continuance of the groups. This continuance is vital to the endurance of the culture and livelihood of a group.

In his example of the Karuk, indigenous to what is now Northern California and Oregon, Whyte illustrates that many of these collective capacities are, in fact, also extremely beneficial to the environment. Their knowledge of the land, tending to it, harvesting, and monitoring it as a part of their food system left the land in better condition. These practices and cultural capacities become diminished and all but destroyed as US settler colonialism restricts the Karuk’s ability to manage their own lands. These barriers put a lot at stake: food, traditional knowledge, cultural and tribal identity, and most importantly for the Karuk, basic human dignity.

For the Mi’kmaq, Whyte would consider their relationship with the lobster and their trapping as a system or ecology that leads to cultural continuance, and the fishermen who are tirelessly trying to undermine the Mi’kmaq’s right to fish for lobster as obviously the catalysts of settler colonialism, putting this collective capacity at risk of being destroyed. They are placing the relationship that has existed since time in memorial at stake, and once this relationship is broken, it may be nearly impossible to rekindle. Even if the Mi’kmaq were operating illegally by placing traps, even if there were legitimate concerns about the conservation of lobster stocks, even if the violent sabotage against the Mi’kmaq were not clear displays of racism and greed, I believe that Whyte would still argue, based on the perseverance of these crucial cultural relationships between the Mi’kmaq and the land, that the DFO should defend the Indigenous fishermen and furthermore, likely advocate for restrictions to be placed on commercial fisheries to ensure that these relationships the Mi’kmaq hold can flourish.

References

Bailey, M. (2020, October 27). Conservation Isn’t The Problem In Nova Scotia’s Lobster Dispute. But Racism Is. Retrieved October 27, 2020, from https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/nova-scotia-lobster-dispute-conservation_ca_5f96fc73c5b6e1e70762e5b2

Whyte, K. (2018), Part IV Food Justice and Social Justice. In Part IV Food Justice and Social Justice. In A. Barnhill, M. Budolfson, & T. Doggett (Eds.), Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance. The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics. 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199372263.001.0001

Kevin Michael DeLuca’s “A Wilderness Environmentalism Manifesto: Contesting the Infinite Self-Absorption of Humans” was a particularly interesting read and by far one of my favourites thus far. DeLuca explored the intersectionality of the environmental issue in a very critical way. DeLuca takes a fascinating position in terms of how we need to approach the issue of climate change. DeLuca presents the point that “[c]ulture is often the problem and should not be a trump card used to stop protecting species and ecosystems” (DeLuca, 31). This perspective is interesting in that it argues, in a way, against intersectionality.

DeLuca’s perspective in this paper explains that “[e]nvironmental protection often increases human suffering” (DeLuca, 34) and because of this, trying to balance environmental and human issues can sometimes prove to be impossible. DeLuca uses a number of examples to illustrate this point, such as the concern that “[w]hen the right of minorities to have jobs is the paramount concern, it becomes difficult to condemn jobs and work practices harmful to the environment” (DeLuca, 35). 

I find this perspective so interesting because of how critically it approaches the concepts of intersectionality. Typically, people consider human needs first and foremost as DeLuca explains but this proves to be problematic and often serves to inhibit any progress. DeLuca, using an environmentally focused lens, suggests that “[i]nstead of people first, it is wilderness first but with a recognition that caring for wilderness is caring for people” (DeLuca, 43). In the paper, DeLuca doesn’t suggest that the other aspects of intersectionality aren’t important and that other social justice issues aren’t as salient but presents that they should not be positioned against each other. 

DeLuca’s position outlines the tightly woven issue with attempting to dismantle oppression in that often when acting upon one method of oppression, one contributes to another. This issue can be seen with any social movement: from suffragettes omitting black women to the Pride movements antagonizing transexual people. These examples are very human-centric but DeLuca points out how the same issues apply to environmental justice. The issue raises the question of how we rank the need for relief from oppression. Should we as humans focus on human-centric issues? Or by focusing on the environment are we given the opportunity to still serve humanistic goals while also protecting the environment as DeLuca suggests. Or is there another potential option? One that acknowledges the cyclical nature of oppression and instead of suggesting that we can deal with it in any meaningful way, presents the need for a complete restructuring of discourse and society. 

Luke

DeLuca, K. (2007). A Wilderness Manifesto: Contesting the Infinite Self Absorption of Humans, Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to the Environmental Movement. MIT Press. 27-56.

Jamieson offers valid considerations to the debate of climate change in how to ethically respond to it. He posits three ethical principles that must be properly satisfied before he believes it is ethical to employ ICC (intentional climate change). These conditions for ICC Jamieson lays out are “the importance of democratic decision-making, the prohibition against irreversible environmental changes, and the significance of learning to live with nature” (Jamieson, 1996). 

As an environmentalist, I felt an affinity with the ecocentric ethical theories recently discussed in this class. I attempted to tackle Jamison’s logic through the understanding of ecocentrism and found all three of his conditions to be heavily anthropocentric.  

For his first condition for the acceptance of ICC Jamieson states that it must be done under a democratic decision making process. He fears that “a decision to undertake ICC would likely be made by the same people who are causing inadvertent climate change and have reaped most of the benefits from fossil-fuel driven industrialization: people in rich countries and their political, social, and economic leaders” (Jamieson, 1996). Jamieson argues here that poor countries must be allowed to collaborate and give consent to have their climate manipulated. This is a valid concern and is trying to ensure the maximization of utility across all peoples, but is not egalitarian in the ecocentric sense in that it does not take into consideration the interests of other, non-human, living things. Therefore it could be dismissed as simply overly anthropocentric. More, I believe that ecocentrists would unconditionally require something to be done about the current state of affairs. That something being ceasing harmful industrial activities, not manipulating the climate via science. They believe in the integrity of ecological systems, which are being jeopardized by human induced climate change, and believing in a universal rule of non-interference and respect for ecological systems as a whole, humans thus have an ethical obligation to cease this interference. This is a categorical duty and one that ecocentrists would not leave up to a democratic vote.

Jamieson’s second condition prior to undertaking ICC is a guarantee that it would not implement irreversible environmental changes. A holistic thinker may believe that irreversible changes are permissible, naturally occurring extinctions are normal processes of an ecosystem. One widespread, common sense argument against ICC rests on the idea that it is wrong for humans to interfere dramatically with fundamental natural processes. In reply, some would point out that humans are already interfering with fundamental natural processes (Jamieson, 1996). 

However, unlike natural extinctions, climate change is heavily influenced and escalated by human influence. I believe an ecocentrist would initially disagree with the need to interfere at all as with natural extinctions – if the ICC were to cause irreversible changes or not – because it is interfering with nature and the integrity of ecological systems and the interests of its living components. They would reverse this position with the understanding that climate change is now largely a human driven process. I think an ecocentrist would advocate non-interference by simply stopping the activities that are contributing to global warming, but after a tipping point is reached through negative feedback loops such as the melting of the polar ice, this would change. If irreversible climate changes are imminent from our industrial societies, then I believe an ecocentric theorist would agree that ecological interference to prevent it would be allowable – just as action is allowable to prevent the extinction of a living thing if the extinction was human caused.     

Lastly, Jamieson talks about learning to live with nature. “Many of our environmental problems flow from attempts to manipulate nature in order to make it conform to our desires” (Jamieson, 1996). Non-interference and respect for nature is something ecocentrists would agree with here. Jamieson goes on to say that some manipulations of nature, such as ICC, may be justified, and his attempt at justification I believe ecocentrists would disagree with. He brings up the metaphor of the Earth as a spaceship, with different species as rivets holding the craft together. In this way he is saying biodiversity is necessary, but only at a certain threshold, and until we get there extinctions of animals are of little concern because they do not yet threaten us or the spaceship yet. Jamieson says as we approach that threshold we have an obligation to act – via ICC – to prevent a crash. As mentioned above, I think ecocentrists would agree to interfering in an ecological system if only to reverse what damage we already caused. This however would be morally required to happen before reaching any biodiversity threshold. Ignoring extinctions until they threatened our own species would be too anthropocentric. All species would be considered equal by an ecocentrist, and all would require our moral consideration, not just the last ‘rivet’ before the spaceship falls apart. 

Jamieson, Dale. (1996). “Ethics and Intentional Climate Change”. Climate Change 33: 323-336.

Dale Jamieson explores the issues with geoengineering climate change. This was a popular discussion during the 1970’s and the 1980’s but since then that discussion has not nearly been as active. He describes the reawakening of this discussion based on the possibility of earth undergoing a greenhouse induced global warming and there needs to be some measures taken against this. In the paper Jamieson assesses the ethical acceptability of intentional climate change (ICC) He proposes a set of conditions that should be met for ICC to be morally permissible. However, he also says that those conditions are not met yet. Research on ICC should be continued based on certain conditions being met. He hopes to not be the last word on the ethics of ICC but the first word. He wants others to be stimulated to think through the ethics of ICC (Jamieson, 1996).

Jamieson outlines three ethical considerations that influence the permissibility of ICC. I will primarily deal with the first one for this piece. The first is the importance of democratic decision making. There is not a person on this planet who is not affected by climate. No matter where you are in the world it will have some impact on your life. Jamieson describes how poor people often aren’t included in major democratic decision-making processes. If ICC were to be used it would affect the poor just as much as the rich. “If the world belongs to anyone, it belongs to the poor just as much as it does the rich, and no decision to go forward with the ICC could be morally acceptable that did not in some way represent all the people from the world,” Jamieson says. It could be possible in principle to design a deliberative process that would prove to be just and include everyone. However, as Sachs 1993, says it would be difficult to do because it would have to be representative of all the people on earth and not just global middle class. People such as Rolston (1998) even think that other nonhuman things should be represented in the decision process. 

On the topic of poor people and people who live in poverty I think that they could end up being affected even more by climate change than the rich or the middle class. 

“We see climate as a magnifier, and in many cases a multiplier, of existing underlying causes of risk,” says Sarah Henly-Shepard, Mercy Corps Senior Advisor for Climate Change and Resilience.

Climate change is a root cause of conflict around the world because it leads to things such as food shortages, it threatens people’s livelihoods, and can displace entire populations. Some people who call the worlds poorest countries home are the most vulnerable. Examples of these countries include Haiti and Timor Leste. Three out of four people who live in poverty are reliant upon agricultural and natural resources to survive. As climate changes, it can become a matter of life and death for these people. More information can be found here https://www.mercycorps.org/blog/climate-change-poverty#who-affected-climate-change

Designing a process that could represent everyone’s interests fairly when it comes to the issue of ICC seems very difficult. I agree with Jamieson that the world belongs to everyone and climate change affects everyone. However, I think there are people who are at greater risk because their entire livelihood depends on the land. If they cannot grow their food, they will starve. It is not just a matter of being too hot or too cold, but once again I will say that it is a matter of life and death. 

There would need to be a way to represent poor people in a truly democratic decision about ICC

Resources used

https://link-springer-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/article/10.1007/BF00142580

https://www.mercycorps.org/blog/climate-change-poverty#who-affected-climate-change

Holmes Rolston in “What do we mean by the intrinsic value and integrity of plants and animals” describes, as implied, the inherent value of plants and animals within their ecosystems. Rolston explains that plants have intrinsic value no less than animals. He understands that people only focus on the value and condition of animals when they are subject to modification for human desire. However, plants are often overlooked. Plants, although functioning through different processes are of equal importance to the life-death cycle that exists in nature. To paraphrase, it isn’t the lion’s sharp teeth that will allow him to survive a drought, it will be the Bermuda grass that feeds the zebra which the lion preys upon that will ensure it’s survival (pg 4). Rolston provides strong and persuasive argumentation for acknowledging the value that plants have, consequentially begging the question, is genetic modification of plants and animals justifiable? Or to be precise does the genetic modification of plants and animals through human intervention compromise the innate integrity, autonomy, and value that plants and animals have naturally?

His conclusion is that it depends on the context. An example he uses is the American chestnut, it has been destroyed in North America due to a fungus that it is not immune to. However, the Chinese chestnut has a gene that grants it immunity to such fungus. As such it appears justifiable to be able to modify the American chestnut to become immune to the fungus and once again populate North America. To justify this he states “that an organism has been genetically modified does not ipso facto mean that its integrity has been compromised. The modified plant or animal might be a better-adapted fit than it was before. Species in the wild reach local adaptive peaks, but not necessarily optimal ones, and some transgenic modification might relocate a species on a higher adaptive peak.”(pg 5). As is the case with the American chestnut. This is furthered by the fact that genetic mixing occurs abundantly in nature, allowing for the relocation of species to new genetic peaks naturally.  However, it’s important to determine the limit of our reach, to do this we must ask ourselves “how far has the quality of life of the organism been reduced?” (pg 6). I believe a good example to consider would be dogs. Domesticated dogs are as abundant in number as they are in breed. Through generations of genetic manipulation and shuffling at the will of humans dogs have developed genetic traits that allow them to hunt bears, or herd sheep, things a feral dog probably wouldn’t be able to do naturally. But keeping Rolston in mind, would a domesticated dog have a lower value, or compromised integrity than a feral one? It’s apparent that domesticated dogs can be trained to fulfill a large number of roles, policing, assisting the bling, acting as therapy. However, it can be surmised that a domesticated dog in the wild, without human aid, would probably end up dead. This isn’t to say that all dogs would be incapable of sustaining themselves, but it’s understandable that many would be helpless. The largest cause of their helplessness being the lack of proper genetic material that allows dogs to best adapt to their environment. Be it, small snouts, muscle or bone atrophy, or decreased size humans have caused the adaptability of dogs to decrease. Intentionally or not, dogs no longer possess the genetic material that would allow them to adapt and live in an environment without human aid. This brings us back to Rolston who states, “tinkering in nature is in search of better adaptive fit, tinkering in genetic engineering is in search of more profits” (pg 7). Thus through the experimentation of cross-breeding, humans have created a species that in large cannot live without us. Although the quality of life of a dog can be argued to be better with safe housing, water, food, exercise. The fact remains that the natural ability of dogs has been manipulated such that they are bred for sale to make a profit, and must depend on people to survive. It’s clear that their natural autonomy and integrity have been disregarded through their continual forced breeding. As such I believe that when deciding to genetically shuffle or alter a species, plant or animal, we shouldn’t disregard their previous inherent autonomy and value. Rather than focus on the gains of domestication and genetic modification, we should also look at the cons to make the most informed decision that will not strip the value that living beings have.

There is good reason to be skeptical about the belief that scientific progress can fully address global issues of food insecurity and sustainability solely through technological growth and innovation. So-called “techno-fixes” are often understood by critics as short-sighted, morally deficient, and oftentimes dangerous because of the unforeseen harm they may cause. Still, some action must be taken presently to accommodate the needs of an ever-expanding human population, and technology has much to offer when human behaviour refuses to give way. This blog post will scrutinize both positions and argue for a middle ground that demonstrates there being no necessary conflict between the two.

            Techno-fixes attempt to “redefine, or ‘reframe,’ a problem that is fundamentally social in nature as a technological problem” (Scott 209), i.e., techno-fixes attempt to curb widespread social problems (such as food insecurity) by implementing technological solutions (such as genetically modifying crops to increase productivity and food supply). It is important to highlight that, though the term is often used by critics pejoratively, a techno-fix is not necessarily harmful or morally wrong, and technology can certainly be used as a pragmatic means of aiding, rather than undermining, the goal of collective survival. Techno-fixes are pernicious, however, when they attempt to reduce complex political, socioeconomic, and moral problems into solely scientific ones: hostile architecture (urban-design and architecture such as spiked surfaces designed to control human behavior in public spaces – often to deter the homeless) is a good example of a harmful techno-fix that treats a social problem (homelessness) as though it were simply a technological one, and not a multi-faceted issue caused by inequality. So, one must exercise healthy caution when science attempts to offer a solution that might only “address the symptoms and not the disease” (Scott 209), or when science believes it has solved a social problem it has only served to perpetuate.

            For these reasons, opponents of biotechnology tend to reject alleged techno-fixes such as genetically modified and genetically engineered food organisms as a proper solution to the problem of global food sustainability – accusing them as a harmful display of (primarily Western) human culture’s Promethean arrogance, in its goal to master the natural world, and as placing uncritical faith in the historical structure of Western scientific progress (Scott 210). Biotechnology is often criticized for presuming that humans are free to alter and shape non-human entities to satisfy primarily human interests. Some environmentalists like Mark Lynas have pushed back against anti-biotechnology movements by arguing that they are wrongfully prejudiced against genetic modification, based on unscientific claims of what is ‘natural’ (which, in the first place, as Lynas rightly points out, fallaciously conflate ‘natural’ with ‘right,’ ‘unnatural’ with ‘wrong’). Still, as discussed earlier, the concerns regarding techno-fixes cannot be reduced solely to whether they are natural or unnatural means of tackling a social problem. Insofar as techno-fixes can subtly undermine the need and call for social justice when they attempt to ‘repair’ a social issue through technology, much remains problematic. Certainly, even if genetic modification resulted in a vast increase in food supply by rendering crops more resistant to disease (granting these modifications to be morally permissible and there being no intrinsic wrong in artificially altering species), one still faces the problem of guaranteeing that these new gains can be distributed equitably among vulnerable populations, and that they do not, for example, fall largely into the hands of the privileged and the elite. This latter concern is a more profound reason why global hunger exists in the first place, and is primarily an economic, socio-political, and (as I would argue) moral problem that falls squarely outside the scope of genetic modification. There are certainly other worries as well in the potentially harmful cultural and scientific intervention of the West that needs to be imposed onto other territories to achieve this techno-fix. At best, it can only seem to buy us time.

            Still, global food insecurity and malnutrition will not wait for philosophers, politicians, and scientific authorities to dictate the best course of action, as these problems claim more and more lives every day. In this regard, opponents of biotechnology can appear to be idealistic purists — technological innovation can, at the very least, aid us in securing some success in reducing the amount of suffering while humans continue to prove themselves slow in conducting meaningful societal change. Part of the worry from opponents of biotechnological solutions seems to be that technological progress might be outpacing the rate at which humans develop their social and moral sensibilities, that technology will supersede the need to participate in social justice and instead foster a culture of moral mediocrity. The debate need not be reduced to this either/or. There is little reason to believe that the implementation of a techno-fix cannot instead magnify, rather than diminish, the need and collective call-to-action of addressing global problems like food insecurity through a moral and political lens. Rather, the presence of techno-fixes should constantly remind and expose us to there being deeper, underlying issues in these problems that need to be addressed, and that we cannot shirk responsibility through innovation. We can instead be more motivated to work toward building a better society because of the presence of these techno-fixes, and not despite of them.

Works Cited

Scott, Dane. “The Technological Fix Criticisms and the Agricultural Biotechnology Debate.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, vol. 24, no. 3, 2011, pp. 207-206. DOI: 10.1007/s10806-010-9253-7

~ John

In today’s society, there seems to be a “preference for solving problems with technology”¹. This preference leads to the development of a compound noun: technological fix. In Dane Scott’s paper, The Technological Fix Criticisms and the Agricultural Biotechnology Debate, he defines a technological fix as “an attempt to solve problems using technology that will ultimately prove to be counterproductive”¹. It is interesting to note that while the social bias of preferring technological solutions exists, the word “technological fix”, indicating an exact opposite impression, also exists. This paradox occurs because while technological fixes seem effective and practical at the moment, they ultimately make things worse in the long run¹. To explain how it is so, Scott analyzed both the philosophical and practical criticisms of technological fixes. To focus on the practical criticisms, these are his concerns regarding technological fixes: the inability to solve underlying problems, creating new problems, as well as being conservative of the present state¹. To better understand these criticisms, this blog post will use two example applications to test Scott’s analysis.

In his paper, Scott expressed his concerns for the future of “both [needing to] feed an additional 3 billion people over the next 50 years and reducing the environmental impacts of agriculture”¹. This is a concern that seems solvable by technological advancements. Anthony Trewavas, a biochemist (which Scott considered to be “representative of mainstream scientists working in this field”), advocated that agricultural biotechnology would be the key solution to the paradoxical problem mentioned above¹. But is it true that to harmonize such a difficult task, we must seek technology for help? In focusing on one solution, we can easily overlook other solutions. Let us shift our focus to the part of the problem concerning population growth. Perhaps it cannot be determined whether poverty causes population growth or vice versa², but nonetheless, an absolute correlation between the two suggests a potential concern that would not be addressed by a technological fix. We may easily overlook the problem of excessive birth or poverty, which would lead to an increasing population demand that our planet cannot keep up with. Here we see the conservative problem outlined by Scott, as we fail to acknowledge the underlying social issue that needs to be resolved, while having our attention directed towards a technological fix.

Scott’s analysis on technological fixes can also apply to climaterianism. Climaterianism advocates for vegetarianism in order to promote sustainability, among numerous reasons, including methane emission and water resource degradation. From this perspective arises the need to convince meat-lovers to become a vegetarian. One technological fix seems to be the development of synthetic animal products, which attempts to replace natural animal products such as meat, milk, and eggs for those who need these in their diet. On the surface, it seems that by making these replacement products, more people would be able to join the vegetarian side. However, in directing our attention towards these technological fixes, we can easily neglect the actual root problems. If we take a step back from the technology and examine the reasons that have led to climaterianism, we would see more solutions that could fix these concerns directly. Take the case of water degradation for instance, which is the result of mainly runoff fertilizer and manure from farms, leading to oxygen-deprived waters as a result of bacterial or algae growth³. Yes indeed, if we limit cattle consumption, we would limit manures, and in limiting manures, we could protect water sources from being contaminated. However, this thought process lies two flaws. One being that vegetarianism will not be able to solve the problem of fertilizer runoff, as plantation agriculture will continue to cause this problem. Possibly with worse impacts than before, after plants become the primary food source for all, while farmers attempt to increase crop yields. The other flaw then stems from the first one: it is not vegetarianism that can solve water contamination, but the farmers. Only the farmers can handle manure so it is used and distributed properly (as fertilizer or else), just as only the farmers can control the amount of fertilizer they apply to the crops to prevent excess. This underlying problem would not be recognized had we fixated only on technological fixes that could guarantee the adoption of climaterianism. These popularized technological solutions blind us from the actual, deeper problems that deserve attention, as concluded by Scott.

When we “reframe a social problem as a technological one”, we seem to have simplified the “complexity and unpredictability of human behavior”¹. But as Scott concluded, these technological fixes are rarely true solutions to a problem, environmental or social. The real cause is usually left untouched. While Alvin Weinberg claimed that technological fixes “can buy time until the problem can be dealt with on a deeper level”, Scott maintains that the conservative nature of technological fixes will only let the present state persist, instead of actually leading to deep solutions¹. Through the two examples, Scott’s conclusions are seen to be effective in seeking to understand a problem instead of seeking mere technological fixes.

¹ Scott, Dane. “The Technological Fix Criticisms and the Agricultural Biotechnology Debate.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 24, no. 3 (2010): 207–26. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-010-9253-7.

² Meadows, Donella. “Poverty Causes Population Growth Causes Poverty.” The Academy for Systems Change, July 24, 2013. http://donellameadows.org/archives/poverty-causes-population-growth-causes-poverty/.

³ National Geographic Society. “Dead Zone.” National Geographic Society, October 9, 2012. https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/dead-zone/.

GM foods have been controversial ever since they appeared. No matter from the food safety issues that people worry about, or from the ethical and moral aspects, the praise and criticism of GM food always exist. In today’s society, people’s demand for food is increasing, and food diversity is becoming more and more abundant. So for agricultural production, GM food may be a good thing for them. Because of the application of GM technology, not only can greatly increase crop yields, reduce the impact of pests and diseases on crop quality, but also reduce input costs. This is a very economical thing. But they may have overlooked the ethical level. Recalling the land ethics mentioned earlier, we must follow the laws of natural development and follow that the land and all creatures on the land have equal rights to life and all other equal rights. But is it reasonable to apply GM technology to the land? In other words, when the rights of land are slightly affected, will people choose the benefits of a bumper harvest or respect the land? It is undeniable that we cannot ignore all the benefits brought by GM food. I  agree with the author’s point of view that we need to use and develop GM technology responsibly to ensure that the impact of GM is positive most time. A good example is the production of environmentally friendly pigs studied in Canada. Because phosphorus is an important part of pork production, pigs are inseparable from a large amount of phosphorus for breeding and reproduction. Especially pig feed contains a large amount of phosphorus. When pigs excrete, a large amount of phosphorus-containing waste will be discharged into the soil, causing serious soil environmental pollution and causing the problem of soil eutrophication. Therefore, in order to solve difficult environmental problems, the Canadian research team used GM technology and planned to produce environmentally friendly pigs, which not only solved the problem of phosphorus pollution to the environment but also made humans eat healthier. Therefore, I believe that the existence of GM food has a certain degree of rationality. As people’s concepts and awareness continue to increase, gm technology has also improved, and the improvements are more in line with environmental ethics and land ethics. Because technology always serves mankind, mankind has the ability to make the world a better place.

Work cited:

Brad C.Joern, Alan Sutton. 2006. Phosphorus management in pork production. https://porkgateway.org/resource/phosphorus-management-in-pork-production

Gray Comstock. nd. Ethics and Genetically Modified Food. https://philpapers.org/archive/COMEAG

In “Ethics and Genetically Modified Foods” Gary Comstock engages with the intrinsic and extrinsic issues with the use of genetic modification or GMs. Comstock explores the intrinsic issues after finding that the extrinsic issues are not enough in themselves to oppose the use of GMs. While I fully agree with Comstock’s conclusions on the unconvincing nature of the intrinsic issues with GMs, I would argue that they too quickly dismissed the extrinsic issues that may cause concern in the adoption of GMs.

Comstock suggests that each country should put in place some form of organization in charge of research and oversight into the use of GMs. But this seems to put the burden onto countries as individuals rather than acknowledging their interconnectedness. It is no secret that historically countries have taken advantage of other countries to generate wealth for their people. With the implementation of GMs, we would likely see the same patterns emerge. While this still doesn’t create reasoning for why GMs are bad, this likely outcome should serve as a morally significant objection.

I suggest that GMs are extrinsically objectionable when looking at the three major ethical theories. In utilitarianism, we desire the greatest good for the greatest number of people. While GMs would create some benefit, it would also feed into social stratification and would be a tool to further marginalize groups of people. Comstock acknowledges that but chooses to find it not enough of a reason to ban GMs. While it’s impossible to truly figure out the specifics without widely accepting GMs, it is quite possible that the benefits would not outweigh the consequences. Virtue ethics would also be against such exploitative actions as prioritizing the gain of some over the pain of others would not be considered virtuous. Even with deontology, which would also likely be in favour of GMs in terms of autonomy would be opposed to the exploitation of those who find themselves less privileged.

One way to look at my objection of GMs in simpler terms is with an analogy. Take for example an individual that comes to your door asking to know where your friend is. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with telling this individual where your friend is, but if you were to know beyond of a shadow of a doubt that this individual was looking for your friend to harm them, then there is an issue with the consequences. This means what while GMs (or telling the individual where your friend is) holds no intrinsic harm, the extrinsic harms are so likely and great that they must be considered before any decisions can be made on the subject.

In this case, we should employ the precautionary principle. This principle states that if there is something of which we have very little scientific knowledge, we should proceed with caution and take the progress as slow as possible. I believe that this case demands us to employ this principle in order to assure that we are able to protect those not in a situation to protect themselves.

-Luke

Work cited:

Comstock, G. (2010). “Ethics and Genetically Modified Foods.” The Philosophy of Food: Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 122-139

Technology in agriculture and genetic modification are less understood than people think. Genetically modification to a range of methods (such as selection, hybridization, and induced mutation) used to alter the genetic composition of domesticated plants and animals to achieve a desired result [1]. This includes a wide range of plant breeding practices that have been practiced and continue to be practiced by farmers. Some of our most popular foods have been genetically modified over centuries to become what we know today. Carrots did not have their orange colour until the 18^th century and tomatoes previously were the size of marbles [1]. Genetic engineering, on the other hand, is a form of genetic modification that involves the intentional introduction of a targeted change in a plant, animal, or microbial gene sequence to achieve a specific result [1]. Unfortunately, in most of the conversations today about food production and technology, genetic modification and genetic engineering have been used interchangeably. With this, conversations about ethics and morality as it concerns genetic modification (particularly genetic engineering) have increased.

In his paper, Ethics and Genetically Modified Foods, Gary Comstock talks about the ethical conclusions people have concerning genetic modification (or genetic engineering based on what he describes) and how we can use applied ethics to examine those conclusions and their validity [2]. One thing he said that stood out to me is “in a worldwide context, the precautionary response of those facing food abundance in developed countries may lead us to be insensitive to the conditions of those in less fortunate situation”. This is an important way to look at any decisions that would have international effects. And I agree with Comstock on this, short-sightedness as it pertains to genetic modification and genetic engineering may have serious implications on developing countries.

Later in the paper, Comstock talks of 3 considerations and how it helped change his mind concerning genetic modification. The first consideration is based on human rights and this is the fact that people and countries should have the right to choose to adopt genetic modification and engineering technology. I agree with this consideration. Countries should be able to make this choice particularly for things like vitamin A-enriched rice or certain drought resistant crops. Giving countries these kinds of options may be what helps them fight hunger and starvation adequately.

The second consideration is utilitarian, and it is about weighing the potential benefits over harms of genetic engineering to consumers and the environment. This is an important consideration as we do not want to create further health and environmental issues as we are tackling some. As most of the harms are not yet known, supporting genetic modification and engineering would go against the precautionary principle which is a significant principle in the environmental community. This principle proposes caution and preventative action in the face of uncertainty [3]. There are different arguments surrounding this and personally I believe that sufficient caution and research have gone into this. The benefits outweigh the harms at this point.

The third consideration has to do with virtue ethics and the wisdom of encouraging discovery, innovation, and careful regulation of GM technology [2]. This is a question that individual countries should have the right to tackle. To me genetic modification would help solve certain environmental issues as well as issues involving access to food. Encouraging this would be an ethical decision.

Oseyi

References:

1. Edmisten, Keith. “What Is the Difference Between Genetically Modified Organisms and Genetically Engineered Organisms?” NC State Extension News, 2015, agbiotech.ces.ncsu.edu/q1-what-is-the-difference-between-genetically-modified-organisms-and-genetically-engineered-organisms-we-seem-to-use-the-terms-interchangeably/
2. Comstock, Gary. “Ethics and Genetically Modified Foods.” Food Ethics, 2010
3. Kriebel, D, et al. “The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science.” Environmental Health Perspectives, U.S. National Library of Medicine, Sept. 2001, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1240435/.

In Dane Scott’s “The Technological Fix Criticisms and the Agricultural Biotechnology Debate, ” the question of whether genetically modified food contributes to well being is raised. Scott raises the question within the context of instrumentalism wherein science is put to work on the premise that science is  primarily “‘an activity which produces knowledge with predication power and capacity for control’’’ (Scott 5). Scott’s concern following critiques of instrumental knowledge is that science is put to work to solve problems that are primarily social such that science must solve the very problems it has in part fostered. Scott uses the example of the “The Golden Rice Bowl Experiment” and he notes that putting vitamin A in rice did in fact go a long way towards addressing a malnutrition problem in highly economically deprived areas but that really the solution to nutrition is one of economics and social activism. On the level of logic, I could not agree more.  We need not look far back into history to see how World powers have influenced economic situations all over the world only to cause immense starvation and poverty. We still witness the nightmarish legacy of colonialism and imperialism in our day to day lives every time we pick up a newspaper. With that being said, just what answer does Scott have in mind for this part of the world. Malnutrition happens quickly and it can devastate whole populations in relatively short time periods.

On the other hand, like Scott, I agree that with moments of successful genetic modification like these, we have more than opened the door to something I am not at all sure of. Chiasmus. We have significantly modified all sorts of agricultural plants all over the earth. We do this, of course, in the name of science and we do do it to solve social problems we cannot solve. Whether we modify corn to increase profit yields only to negatively impact ecosystems that require the worms that we destroy in the process or we modify rice simply to cut back on methane and damage to the atmosphere, we do modify plants at genetic levels, and we do for all sorts of reasons. There is no question instrumentalism is a big part of genetic modification and it is often a band aid solution for much bigger social problems. I wonder though if this kind of thinking isn’t part of the larger social process though. Saving lives is important. Saving ecosystems is really important too. If we act instrumentally to save one or both even though we (as in economically and politically) are really the problems is that a bad thing?

I return to Kant again his categorical imperative to act for the beneficience of society and I agree that he left the plants out of this imperative and certainly that was not for the beneficience of society now that I think of this. Maybe he had eating disorders, I don’t know, but if he could rewrite his some of his thinking I am certain the plants would make it in there and so would ecosystems. Kant also wrote that the simplest approach was usually best from the point of view of making rational decisions quickly. Saving lives and appreciating nutritional needs may be only instrumental but there is a social, ethical side to this. A quick and immediate solution buys time to work on economic priorities as well as a plan to resource a population further. If there was thought put into how these rice plants in modified form thereby impacted the environment as well as saved human life…well that is to the beneficience of all (as in including the environment). Should that thought be there we are now instrumental, social, and ecologically more aware. Not bad.

On the flip side, I can hardly deny that genetic modifications of plants have done damage. Bananas are a genetically modified food, even an over cloned food. Whatever bananas were…we haven’t a clue now. Bananas are genetically degraded now nor will they be restored. We have very nearly used up this plant and food. When we consider how many people bananas help to feed yearly, the loss of this food source is serious. Genetically modifying this fruit was not to our advantage in the long term nor was it to its eco-regions. This time we have not acted for the beneficience for all even if this food source in the past (especially during the depression years) has saved more lives than we will ever count. Genetic modification was clearly instrumental and ultimately thoughtless with regard to subsequent damage to the plant species.

With these thoughts in mind, I am ambivalent but not entirely. I do not have an answer to a debate that pits instrumentalism against a need for social change. In fact, my thinking leans towards instrumentalism in service to larger agendas for not only social change but changes that secure and promote ecosystem health and well being. Ethical approaches help to think these issues through further even if we cannot solve the problems outright. A Kantian approach that centers upon ecosystems and our roles in them seems best to be. Banning genetic modification during the Rice Bowl Experiment would have killed more people than I dare count but this does not mean that we have the right radically alter our environments in the process. We really don’t know what we eat all the time. There are ingredients in food that aid human digestion processes and there are ingredients in food that aid animal digestion processes, and I am certain we do not know what it all is yet nor are we likely too. Therefore, we must consider the well being of all and not just ourselves but we should not be afraid to save life in the process.

Tammy

Scott, Dane. “The Technological Fix Criticisms and the Agricultural Biotechnology Debate.” J Agric Environ Ethics (2011) 24:207–226

THE PARADIGM OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION NEEDS TO BE CHANGED, BUT WILL IT CHANGE?

Reading Tim Folgar’s article titled The Next Green Revolution was interesting to me because the location in the article is a neighbouring country to the country from which my parents originated from, and I have visited Tanzania once. Although I did not grow up in a rural area, the rural area where my father’s family comes from and I visited regularly is heavily reliant on cassava, due to the climate which is not as favourable to other African staple crops like corn.  I truly understood what Juma meant in the article when he said cassava is everything.

I completely agree with what the proponents of a different vision of agriculture have to say about genetically modified crops and share the same sentiments-that the expensive genetically modified crops are a costly input into a broken system.[1] The way Monsanto does not allow farmers to save seeds for planting in the next season, but to only buy patented crops instead is not user-friendly for the poorest farmers, who can barely afford the costs of inputs. As the proponents of a different vision of agriculture state, it is a broken system, and it benefits those that already have abundant resources while restricting those that face financial constraints.  Although World Food Prize Laureate Hans Herren rightly states that the paradigm of the green revolution needs to be changed in ways such as finding means of deterring pests and increasing yield that are user-friendly for people like Juma, whether it will change in the direction Herren talks about is uncertain due to the interests that corporations like Monsanto have. While it might seem that their main interest is to enhance food security, profit and financial gain are their topmost priority.  Having genetically modified crops that are resistant to a pesticide created by the same company is a sure way to maximise profits, and if profits are being made there is no incentive to those making the profits to change the system. It is encouraging that there are people like Hans Herren who have the welfare of the poor at heart, even establishing a non-profit (Biovision) that is focused on Sub Saharan Africa[2], and rightly so because the levels of human suffering in some communities are unacceptable. When ending food insecurity becomes the topmost priority for everyone, perhaps change in the direction that Hans Herren and other proponents of a different agriculture have in mind-change that is more mindful of the environment, a farming system that deviates from the current heavy input method of agriculture can take place. It will be good for every living organism on the planet if methods of agriculture that do not pollute the environment and are easily accessible to farmers. The works of non-profits like the IRRI, though controversial to many are commendable because they seek to combat food insecurity without the monetary incentive big corporations have and should be part of the new green revolution, without throwing caution to the wind.

-Wongani

REFERENCES

Folger, Tim. The Next Green Revolution, October 2014. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/foodfeatures/green-revolution/

[1] Folger, Tim. The Next Green Revolution, October 2014. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/foodfeatures/green-revolution/

[2] https://www.biovision.ch/en/about-us/who-we-are/strategy/

Genetically modified food means transferring genes from other substances to other organisms (plants or animals), so it can provide farmers with more ideal biological characteristics on the crops and also solve the food crisis issues such as population explosion and smaller cultivated area. However, from the perspective of ethics, genetically modified food has not been fully developed, and the potential food safety issues have been widely discussed. I agree with Comstock’s statement on how to balance ethics and genetically modified food. The contents are multifaceted and complex. (Comstock, 2010)

Genetically modified food can be seen as an optional alternative for most people, especially those with high income or rich resources in developed countries. When two similar foods are put in front of them, for example, they are told that one is ordinary corn, and the other is genetically modified corn. Based on the uncertainty, they tend to choose to have ordinary corn. Since genetically modified food is an unreliable attempt for them, and people who can take the first step and try new things are only taking place a tiny proportion of the whole. It’s hard to condemn people’s choice of things, as it’s more likely a personal choice of foods. (Comstock, 2010)

As Comstock mentioned, there are two different ways of opposing transgene, extrinsic, and intrinsic. The external reason is the potential harm brought about by transgenic technology. But I prefer that even if something is harmful, we still need to weigh the pros and cons. If it brings more advantages than disadvantages, will people pursue interests and selectively forget its disadvantages? Comstock mainly advocates four intrinsic objections. The first three reasons have theological elements but not everyone will believe: “to engage in Ag biotechnology is to play God, to engage in ag biotech is to invent world-changing technology and to engage in ag biotech is illegitimately to cross species boundaries.” However, as a new type of agricultural biotechnology development, I don’t think it should be based on the consideration of theology, because theology is more of a soothing or mythological thought, just as Prometheus gave the fire to human beings, which is the ancient Greek myth, and the Chinese myth is that Nuwa created human beings. If people can feel the guide of God, why don’t they just pray to God to give us more abundant food resources and let the dry land grow crops? If this agricultural biotechnology can be arranged by God, many things can be taken over. Therefore, in essence, these theologies should not oppose or influence the development of new technologies. People should believe in the principle of self-sufficiency rather than live in the theological world. (Comstock, 2010)

For the fourth point: “to engage in Ag biotechnology is to commodity life” I have a dissenting opinion because when people discuss that we can’t treat living life as a commodity to be traded, we ignore another meaning that people give to this organism. When people use organisms such as crops and animals to trade, it also means social development and innovation. The invention of this new technology also gives infinite value to life. Although there is no sufficient reason to oppose transgenic technology in essence, I still think that there is no absolute answer to the thinking between ethics and transgenic technology. For example, we may bring food safety problems if we implement transgenic technology. But if we abandon genetically modified foods or this technology, we may miss a chance to rescue people living in food shortage countries. (Comstock, 2010) Secondly, genetically modified food also exists some disadvantages, for example, its instability may bring low income to farmers in the early stage of the experiment, the emergence of genetically modified organisms may also destroy the diversity of organisms and so forth. (2019) The relationship between ethics and the application of genetically modified foods are closely related, but there is again if there is a loss. I think the goal people should achieve is to maximize value while avoiding risks when weighing.

Reference:

Comstock, G. (2010). “Ethics and genetically modified foods.” In Food ethics. Springer, New York.

BioExploer. (2019). “6 Major Disadvantages of Genetically Modified Foods.” https://www.bioexplorer.net/disadvantages-of-genetically-modified-foods.html/

In ‘The Technological Fix Criticisms and the Agricultural Biotechnology Debate’ Dane Scott effectively explains various philosophical and practical critiques of the ‘technological fix’, and how these arguments have been applied to the agricultural biotechnology debate against genetically modified (GM) foods. Scott defines a ‘technological fix’ as “[…] the solution to a problem that results from reframing a social problem as a technological one [reducing] seemingly insurmountable social problems to manageable levels.” (Scott 209), Scott describes multiple practical oppositions to GM foods, the third of which resonates with me the most; “First, technological fixes do not solve problems and, second, they create new problems. The third criticism is that” (Scott 215) “technological fixes for the problems of intensive agriculture are designed to preserve the current technological system by fixing it, rather than looking for alternative systems. In some cases, it may be wiser to question that system itself; to ask, in effect, ‘Is the current system worth conserving?’” (Scott 219).

In this blog post I would like to expand upon the third practical criticism of the agricultural technological fixes as described by Scott, not to argue against the technology of GM foods themselves, but to argue against the systems that technology exists within. For example the analogy Mark Lynas presents in his talk at the 2013 Oxford Farming Conference ‘if you oppose the technology of genetic modification because it comes from a big corporation do you also oppose the wheel because it is sold by big auto companies?’ (paraphrased from Lynas), of course we don’t, but that does not mean we should not still oppose the excesses of Big Auto. I would argue that for ‘technological fixes’ to be useful and worthwhile they need to be reframed as technology to add to the human roster (like the wheel) and not as fixes at all. It is not right to be against GMs just because they are new tech, but it is important to criticize the systems treating this technology as a fix and what ideals that approach upholds.

I believe the main blockage that causes our inability to properly utilize technological advancements to end world hunger, for example, is that we make these advancements and immediately ask, ‘how can we exclude anyone else from using this technique/product without paying us first?’ I would be more in favour of technological advancements if their circulation were made more egalitarian in nature. Of course, patents are necessary to ensure that no dupes are made that compromise the effectiveness of whatever invention is in question, but, for example, as Tim Folger describes in his article ‘The Next Green Revolution’, patents also allow for the exploitation of farmers since their “[…] contract with Monsanto does not allow them to save seeds for planting; they must purchase its patented seeds each year” (Folger). This coupled with Scott’s explanation that “the costs of high-yield varieties and the technological input combined with the profits made from increased yields encourage[s] farmers to plant as much of their land as possible in the high yield [crops]. This decrease[s] the availability of a variety of foods and access to micronutrients [for the farmers]” (Scott 224). By forcing farmers to only plant one type of crop (both through legal means in the case of Monsanto and through profit motives) we limit their ability to feed themselves, and even their ability to grow varied crops and thus diversify their income, putting them in a precarious position. This example illustrates that while crops giving a higher yield and this advancement in technology in general is a good thing, the systems that distribute the technology still perpetuate and reproduce systems of inequality.

By framing advancements in technology as “fixes” we limit ourselves, by framing technology as something to be patented and sold we lose the ability to be truly helpful in society. As long as there is a profit motive in the fight to end world hunger, we choose not to end it.

• Renée

Sources:

Scott, Dane. “The Technological Fix Criticisms and the Agricultural Biotechnology Debate.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, vol. 24, no. 3, June 2011, pp. 207–226. EBSCOhost, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=phl&AN=PHL2170640&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

Lynas, Mark. “2013 Oxford Farming Conference”. Retrieved from Vimeo. https://vimeo.com/56745320

Folger, Tim. “The Next Green Revolution”. National Geographic Magazine. Retrieved from the National Geographic website. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/foodfeatures/green-revolution/

“The Technological Fix Criticisms and the Agricultural Biotechnology Debate” by Dane Scott, as the title suggests, examines the criticisms levied at the modern practice of solving problems of food and nutritional insecurity with novel inventions and techniques. To clarify, agricultural biotechnology encompasses all the tools humanity has crafted to alter living organisms to better suit human needs and ranges from cross-breeding to genetic engineering. The article frames the criticisms into two major categories, those that are philosophical in nature and those that are practical. Opponents of biotechnology on philosophical grounds decry the uncritical faith in the adoption of new technology to solve social problems rather than investing in social engineering to combat those same problems. Because science involves the breaking down of the world into its base components and restructuring natural phenomena into inputs, processes and outputs, it plays an integral roles in perpetuating humanity’s domination of nature. After all,  if a process can be understood, it can be manipulated to the benefit of humans. Through this anthropocentric (human-centric) lens, the inherent value of living organisms are easily ignored and reassigned based on its usefulness to human interest. This normalisation of the exploitation and domination of nature is considered both morally reprehensible and unjustifiable for opponent of biotechnology. Furthermore, because society operates on the paradigm of production, which assumes more production is always better, agricultural innovations trend towards becoming increasingly intensive and therefore environmental damaging and exploitative.

On the other hand, proponents of biotechnology point toward the two irreconcilable goals of ensuring food security for humanity and respecting the autonomy of nature. Since the agricultural revolution that enabled humanity’s transition from nomadic hunter-gatherers to fixed settler in communities, agricultural biotechnology in the form of selective and cross breeding has been used to improve harvests and resistance to diseases. It has become an integral part that allows society to function the way it has and for humanity to florish. Faced with these two opposing interests, the proponents claim the only way to satisfy both would be to generate a third option through the improvement of technology. The article rightly notes that this argument fails to address the underlying moral dilemma of unjust acts being committed towards nature and in fact would further exacerbate the problem as more unjust acts would be committed in hope of preventing future injustice. However, the physical reality of the situation of two irreconcilable interest also can not be dismissed. All things being equal, the interests of nature not to be dominated by humans itself can not overrule humanity’s interest in survival anymore than the other way around.

There are three paths that can be charted for the course of agricultural biotechnology: forwards, backwards and stationary. As previously discussed in the paragraph above, to continually invest in biotechnology would be to continually perpetual the domination and exploitation of nature for solutions that may or may not be effective in combating social problems. Even to halt the development of new technology and rely on current methods would still mean the continuation of the abuse of nature, if to a lesser degree. But suppose humanity decides to relinquish the tools it has thus far crafted, that would mean finding new solution to combat new problems that may arise, such as the sudden appearance of a virulent strain of disease that causes potatoes to rot and harvests to fail. A technological fix could be to produce a new breed of potatoes resistant to the disease, while some social solutions would be to plant other staple crops, import more food, attempt to contain the spread of the disease, move away, etc. In this case, a technological fix would be the simplest, most convenient to implement and cause the least societal disruption, whereas the social solutions require more thought, organisation, coordination and compliance. Yet even in this scenario, farms elsewhere will exist having crops altered by biotechnology, a clear symbol of the domination of nature that can not be reversed. No crop unaltered by human hand exist that is productive enough to sustain the current human population. None of these scenarios conclusively eliminate the philosophical dilemma of the exploitation of nature, though some alleviate it to some degree. Makes one wonder if it could ever be adequately resolved.

Work Cited

Scott, Dane. “The Technological Fix Criticisms and the Agricultural Biotechnology Debate.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, vol. 24, no. 3, June 2011, pp. 207–226. EBSCOhost, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=phl&AN=PHL2170640&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

Gary Comstock argues why he changed his mind to accept genetically modified crops in his article “Ethics and Genetically Modified Foods.”
Many people worry about genetically modified crops because of their potential threat to humans, animals, and entire ecosystems.
He calls these objections against GM crops because of “anticipated results” as Extrinsic objections. He argues that these potential threats can be controlled and avoided and should not be a reason to ban the technology. He also introduced other common complaints to GM crops like “To engage in ag biotech is to play God” and “To engage in ag biotech is to commodify life.” He refuted them for good reasons. At the end of the article, Comstock believes GM crops are morally acceptable If we use GM crops carefully and responsibly.

Genetic technology, like any technology invented by humans, is risky. In the project of scientific progress, we should make bold assumptions and be more careful to verify them. GM foods are a potential technology that could help people in many resource-poor areas gain better access to healthy and nutritious food. I agree with Comstock that we should not morally reject GM food if it is validated systematically and scientifically with the benefits outweigh the risks. But I can’t deny that the potential threat could be enormous. Before reading this article, I, like many others concerned about GM technology, was particularly sensitive to negative coverage. Fear of the unknown (or, to put it more positively, caution) is innate in humans. Throughout evolution, man has stood out from the crowd, not because he has strong limbs and sharp teeth, but because he has developed intelligence. Wisdom itself begins with the search for the unknown. Curiosity and caution about the unknown are ingrained in our genes. Comstock refers to this fear of unknown risk as a precautional response. A large part of his article is devoted to explaining how he thinks precautional response may affect public opinion on genetically modified foods. I agreed with the most about Comstock’s arguments that people’s reactions to GM crops in food abundance countries may affect people’s conditions where food is scarce. The public’s precautional response to GM food will cause bias and leads the public to believe rumors that have no scientific basis. The social backlash against GM crops could affect the development of GM technology in these developed countries. In developed countries, the cost of rejectingGM crops is relatively small compared to undeveloped countries(Advanced economic and agricultural strength allowed their citizens to have abundant food choices). Some developing countries may be in desperate need of GM technology, and their people may lack food or vitamins. Halting or delaying the development of GM technology would indeed harm their interests.
Comstock makes a very scary but possible assumption “freedom of speech may risk losing an opportunity to help some of the world’s most vulnerable.” Indeed, free speech does lead to the free spread of rumors, which is also one of the significant disadvantages of free speech. Therefore, I think the government and the public need to make appropriate free speech restrictions to reduce the destructive consequences of rumors. One might argue that such limits undermine the right to free speech, but as with GM technology and other technologies, freedom without limits leads to the direst results.

Now, My attitude to GM crops changed from Skeptical and conservative to cautious and optimistic. The reason for optimism is that gm foods have not yet been found to be harmful, despite widespread criticism. I am cautious because it is new, and societies need time to learn more about it and accept it. Further, there is no good or bad technology, just as gunpowder can make beautiful fireworks and cruel wars. Transgenic technology is now widely used in biopharmaceuticals. Since it is possible to make drugs, it is also possible to make drugs. It has nothing to do with technology, but with the people who use it. Only by accepting it can we make better use of it and let it benefit us.

– Dengnan

References
Comstock, G. (2010). Ethics and genetically modified foods. In Food ethics (pp. 49-66). Springer, New York, NY.

This blog post’s primary purpose is not to discuss the merits of being either pro-GMO or anti-GMO; instead, this blog will serve to highlight and critique the difficulties inaccessibility of the sciences that Lynas emphasized throughout his speech (Lynas 2013). Furthermore, this blog post will provide a basic overview of the debate surrounding genetic modification and introduce what genetically modified organisms are.

Genetically modified organisms or GMO’s are the results of highly complex biotechnologies that have the potential to revolutionize the agriculture industries (Hadfield 2000). To state in a simplified manner, the biotechnology regarding GMOs uses the manipulation of genetic material within an organism, such as a plant, resulting in the creation of advantageous traits. These favourable traits can range from increased resistance to pests or higher crop yields in the agriculture industry. The debate regarding GMO’s varies from the ethicality of using genetic modifications to the positive and negative health impacts related to GMO’s (Comstock). Proponents and opponents of genetic modification present strong fronts for their beliefs, raising valid concerns and purposes in using GMOs and biotechnology.

In his speech at the 2013 oxford farming conference, Mark Lynas opens up with his history in the controversial genetically modified organism (GMO) debate (Lynas 2013). The discussion regarding GMO’s is well established, with many individuals going to extremes to develop or diminish regulations. Lynas, now a notable supporter of GMO’s, reflects on his previous staunch support of the debate’s anti-GMO side. He calls his prior beliefs distinctly “anti-science” in that his understanding of the pro-GMO side, which he considers to be parallel to the scientific side of the debate, was limited in both academic and personal knowledge (Lynas 2013). Even with Lynas’ previous experiences within the science academia’s, a lack of accessibility highlights the barriers many individuals experience when dealing with scientific topics. Lynas described the lengthy process of educating himself on reading scientific papers and understanding what he was reading (Lynas 2013).

Barriers in academia and science have made accessibility difficult in developed countries, and almost impossible in developing countries (Davis & Walters 2011). Subscription cost and highly complex concepts and language make understanding academic journals almost impossible for any individual without a multifaceted understanding of the relevant topic (Davis & Walters 2011). Even with the introduction of resources available through libraries and open access documents, gaining the in-depth knowledge needed to understand scientific journals is difficult. Media presents an additional barrier to science, with both sides of the debate using various media forms to slander and diminish their opposition. Facebook groups rife with inaccuracies, news posts that purposefully mispresent the ongoing issue, and a demonization of the opposition all act as constraints to accessibility; examples such as the GMO debate highlight the difficulties in creating genuinely accessible academia without barriers to knowledge.

Fully understanding GMOs and the debate surrounding the controversial topic can change individuals’ beliefs on both the proponent and opponent side. In the case of Mark Lynas, an in-depth understanding of GMOs resulted in a shift in his stance. GMO’s are just one of many instances that highlight the difficulty in bridging the sciences with the political sphere.

Sources

Lynas, Mark. “Mark Lynas at 2013 Oxford Farming Conference.” Vimeo. Oxford Farming Conference, October 11, 2020. https://vimeo.com/56745320.

Hadfield, Linda. “The Debate over Genetically Modified Organisms: Scientific Uncertainty and Public Controversy.” Foresight 2, no. 3 (June 2000): 257–68. https://doi.org/10.1108/14636680010802663.

Nelson, Gerald C. “Introduction .” Essay. In Genetically Modified Organism in Agriculture: Economics and Politics, 3–6. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2001.

Davis, Philip M, and William H Walters. “The Impact of Free Access to the Scientific Literature: a Review of Recent Research.” Journal of the Medical Library Association : JMLA 99, no. 3 (July 2011): 208–17. https://doi.org/10.3163/1536-5050.99.3.008.

Comstock, Gary. “Ethics and Genetically Modified Foods.” Food Ethics, 2010, 49–66. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5765-8_4.

The development of technology has revolutionized our society. From the internet that connects individuals globally, to medical innovations that save lives, technology is often perceived as the solution to all problems.  Genetic modification, a branch of biotechnology, is viewed by many as the solution to world hunger. This technology could possibly eradicate food insecurities. With genetic modifications that increase yield, eliminate the need for pesticides, and make crops resistant to climate changes, biotechnology could solve all agricultural problems. However, the reality of the situation is not so easy. There are fallacies related to using technologies to solve every problem that arises. Dane Scott highlights both philosophical and practical criticisms of a technological fix mindset in his paper about biotechnology (Scott 2010). This paper will be using the criticisms Scott presents in terms of the agricultural sector.

Scott presents a multidimensional discussion on the criticisms regarding the concept of “technological fix” concerning the agricultural industry (Scott 2011). A technological fix is a term used to describe the common ideology that technology has the capability to solve all problems, whether it be within the agricultural sector or external. Scott divides the criticism into two distinct categories, the first being philosophical and the second being practical. While both are essential to understanding the full range of objections regarding the technological fix, this paper will apply the practical criticisms to agricultural examples.

This first practical criticism Scott puts forth regards the actual inability within technology to solve the problem at hand. The development of Roundup Ready crops enabled the agricultural sector to freely use herbicides that previously would have harmed the crops (Folger 2014). Instead of the problem being damage to crops by weeds and invasive plants, genetically modified crops shifted the problem to pollution due to increased herbicide use (Scott 2011). These technological fixes focus almost singularly on solving one issue, while potentially creating or exasperating many others. The environment is an extremely complex web, with a vast amount of interconnecting parts.

The second practical criticism focuses on the cyclical nature of using technology to fix problems used by technological advancements (Scott 2011). As genetically modified crops evolve to become resistant to pests, the same pests may, in time, overcome the resistance. In the case of Bacillus thuringiensis corn, more commonly called Bt corn, genetic modifications were made to increase the crop’s resistance to corn rootworms. However, the evidence is now showing this resistance is diminishing (Folger 2014). This example illuminates how, despite technology solving pests’ previous problems, a new problem arises from using the same technology.

The third practical criticisms highlight the lack of concern and regard for underlying conditions regarding the technological fix ideology (Scott 2011). To assume that a genetically modified crop is the solution to end world hunger deals more accurately with the concepts put forth by the third criticism. Increased yields while abating the issue fail to deal with the systematic problem of food insecurity. Nobody is denying the agricultural success the comes from the genetic modification of crops; increased yields, pest resistance, drought tolerance are all characteristics that are important in maintaining the world’s food output. However, none of the genetic modifications deal specifically with the issue of accessing food.

There is no doubt that technology has its place within society. There are a vast number of benefits that can only be provided through technological advancements. However, the idea the technology is the solution to all problems presents many fallacies. Technology is not the only solution to our problems, nor is it always the best suited. The question that remains focuses on the limits of using technology to solve problems. At what point does technology itself become the problem?

Sources

Folger, Tim. The Next Green Revolution, October 2014. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/foodfeatures/green-revolution/.

Scott, Dane. “The Technological Fix Criticisms and the Agricultural Biotechnology Debate.” Agricultural & Environmental Ethics 24 (2011): 207–26. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-010-9253-7.