Despite past attempts to legally protect environmental rights in Canada, we have yet to see any legislation recognizing the right of all people to live in a healthy environment. Although it wasn’t passed, the proposed Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights (Bill C-438) offers an interesting peek at what environmental rights legislation might look like in Canada. One section of the Bill stuck out to me for its potential ethical implications – Section 19, titled “No action for remedial conduct” (Bill C-438 2019).

While most of Bill C-438 outlines the protective legal actions that an individual can take against environmentally harmful practices, Section 19 describes when such actions cannot be taken. In brief, it says that one cannot take protective action against a given environmentally harmful conduct, if said conduct was done to prevent or reverse damage to “human, animal or plant life or health,” or in the interest of public security, humanitarian needs, peacekeeping, or defending members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Bill C-438 2019). These conditions are valid so long as the alleged conduct was also “reasonable and consistent with public safety” (Bill C-438 2019).

Yet these criteria, which allow potential environmental harm, leave plenty of room for interpretation and ethical uncertainty. To what point, for example, can we act in a way that helps one part of the environment while damaging another? How do we determine when it is justifiable to harm the environment in the interest of public security? Doesn’t environmental degradation itself pose a threat to public safety?

In his opinion piece in Policy Options, Emmett Macfarlane (2014) points out that enshrining environmental rights in the Constitution places responsibility on the Courts to answer such questions as the ones I’ve just raised. Macfarlane insists that judges are not the best suited to answer questions dealing with various economic and social dimensions. I would also argue that rulings on these questions would be subject to each judge’s ethical leanings, whether those leanings are conscious or not.

For example, how would an ecocentrist, a biocentrist, and an animal rights theorist each assess the implications of a conduct that harms one species while generally benefiting the surrounding environment? This might arise if, for instance, a conservation agency decided to eliminate an invasive species for the health of a whole ecosystem. Under Section 19, so long as this process is “reasonable and consistent with public safety,” no one could take legal action against it for the harm it does to one species.

This might get varied responses from ecocentrists, who value whole ecosystems over individual life forms. Most ecocentrists would then support the removal of an invasive species. However, if that species were to go extinct, this would raise concerns for ecocentrists like Rolston (1985), who believe we owe moral duties to whole species as an evolutionary unit.

Biocentrists like Paul Taylor (1981), on the other hand, view each individual life form as intrinsically valuable. So, killing individuals of an invasive species would not be justifiable, even if this was done to save the surrounding ecosystem. A slightly more nuanced biocentrist like Robin Attfield, on the other hand, might be able to justify killing an invasive species if it was lower in terms of moral hierarchy than other individuals in the ecosystem. For example, Attfield (1987) believes that we owe more moral obligation to animal species than we do to plants.

Finally, an animal rights theorist like Peter Singer (1974) would absolutely not support killing or harming animals for the betterment of an ecosystem. If the invasive species were a plant, however, then animal rights theorists likely wouldn’t see a problem with its elimination, especially if it would lead to animal flourishing.

My short review of these various ethical responses highlights the open-endedness of Bill C-438, Section 19. Regardless of whether the judges viewing these cases would consider them in these ethical terms, the vague language in this section of the bill raises some important questions for environmental ethicists. If a law like Bill C-438 is ever passed in Canada, I think a careful ethical review would be in order.

-Mary

 

References

Attfield, Robin. 1987. “Biocentrism, Moral Standing and Moral Significance.” Philosophica 39(1): 47-58. https://www.philosophica.ugent.be/wp-content/uploads/fulltexts/39-5.pdf.

 BILL C-438: An Act to enact the Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights and to make related amendments to other Acts. 2019. https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-438/first-reading.

Macfarlane, Emmett. 2014. “Parliament, not the courts, should decide.” https://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/second-regard/boyd-macfarlane/

Rolston, Holmes. 1985. “Duties to Endangered Species.” BioScience 35 (11): 718-726. https://sites.google.com/a/rams.colostate.edu/rolston-csu-website/environmental-ethics/ee-chbk/duties-edangered-species-biosci-a-pdf.

Singer, Peter. 1974. “All Animals Are Equal.” Philosophic Exchange 5(1): 103-116. https://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol5/iss1/6/?utm_source=digitalcommons.brockport.edu%2Fphil_ex%2Fvol5%2Fiss1%2F6&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages.

Taylor, Paul W. 1981. “The Ethics of Respect for Nature.” Environmental Ethics (3):197-218. https://www-pdcnet-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/collection/authorizedshow?id=enviroethics_1981_0003_0003_0197_0218&file_type=pdf.

 

This week in Environmental Ethics, we are discussing the issue of “de-extinction,” the technological revival of a species, as a conservation strategy. As Ronald Sandler explains, the process of de-extinction involves “reconstructing close approximations of the extinct species’ genomes based on information found in preserved DNA…and on genetic information from close living relatives” (2013, 355).

In his essay, “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species,” Sandler provides an in-depth analysis of ethical considerations regarding the technological revival of extinct species like the Passenger Pigeon and the Ivory-billed Woodpecker (2013). These include ecological concerns, the problematic nature of “technofixes,” and biocentric arguments for creating or restoring intrinsic value held by extinct forms of life.

Although Sandler explores several important ethical concerns to explain why de-extinction is not currently a viable conservation strategy, I believe he fails to address the concerns regarding instrumental use of animals for human achievement, making his arguments largely anthropocentric.

Sandler provides solid reasoning for his objections to de-extinction as a conservation strategy. First, he explains that the re-creation of extinct species will not necessarily re-establish the value they once held. In particular, he raises an important point regarding the ecological impacts of re-introducing a long-gone species. For instance, there is the fact that the environment has since evolved to exist without the niche once held by that species, such that reintroducing them would not restore lost ecological relationships and may even cause suffering to reintroduced individuals (Sandler 2013, 356).

Sandler further explains that viewing de-extinction as a “conservation last resort” is a techno-fix, leaving the root causes of extinction unaddressed (2013, 357). Current conservation strategies, on the other hand, do aim to prevent the causes of extinction by “mitigating, managing, and documenting loss” (Sandler 2013, 357). Therefore, the uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of de-extinction for conservation, and its potential to cause harm to individual members of species by introducing them into an environment that can no longer support them, are reasons enough to avoid its implementation as a conservation strategy.

Despite his conclusion that de-extinction should not be used for conservation, Sandler considers how it could create value as a scientific and technological advancement, without explaining who would benefit from this scientific value (2013, 356).

In this case, it is humans, of course, who have the most to gain from scientific advancement, seeing as Sandler has dismissed de-extinction as a conservation strategy. Having explained the reasons why de-extinction would not benefit ecosystems, species, or individual members of species, the ensuing argument for the value of technological innovation is ultimately anthropocentric. Sandler even explains how “Many revived species will be intended for research and exhibition, not release,” indicating that they will only be brought into existence for human use and/or enjoyment (2013, 358).

The treatment of non-human life as instrumental to human enjoyment is even clearer in Sandler’s acknowledgement that “It is polar bears roaming the arctic, salmon spawning in the rivers, and Passenger Pigeons in mass migration that people value,” beyond simply the species’ genetic preservation (2013, 257). Therefore, even when advocating for conservation, Sandler still promotes an anthropocentric view of preserving species for the value they bring to humans. Even more concerning is Sandler’s prioritization of charismatic megafauna like polar bears, indicating the possibility that de-extinction for conservation may not be used equally for smaller species that have equal or greater ecological significance.

Overall, I agree with Sandler’s stance that there is not enough ethical justification or scientific evidence for de-extinction to be an effective conservation strategy. However, I think Sandler leaves out an important ethical consideration that non-human life should be valued intrinsically, rather than for its role in human advancement. Therefore, I do not support Sandler’s stance that de-extinction is valuable as a technological achievement, if that achievement only serves human knowledge and excludes ecological priorities.

-Mary

Reference:

Sandler, Ronald. 2013. “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species.” Environmental Ethics 28(2): 354-350. https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1111/cobi.12198.

 

 

 

This week in Environmental Ethics, we read a piece titled “A Wilderness Environmentalism Manifesto: Contesting the Infinite Self-Absorption of Humans” by Kevin Michael De Luca (2007). De Luca argues that by focusing on social issues, the environmental justice movement detracts from environmental concerns due to an anthropocentric prioritization of human needs (2007, 29). Although De Luca raises some good points about the value of nature beyond its use to humans, the majority of his chapter can only be described as ecofascist. Despite De Luca’s recognition that humans are part of nature, I believe his claim that environmental justice is anthropocentric actually reinforces a human-nature dichotomy. Furthermore, De Luca’s flippant tone regarding human rights and social needs reinforce the ecofascist character of his writing.

Before getting further into De Luca’s writing, let me first define eco-fascism. Oxford’s Lexico dictionary defines it as “radical environmentalism of a type perceived as excessive, intolerant, or authoritarian,” (2020) while the Oxford Dictionary of Environment and Conservation describes it as environmentalism regardless of “personal wishes, preferences, or needs” (2007). Although the term is used in different ways, I understand eco-fascism to be the prioritization of the environment above any concern for social needs or human rights. As I will soon discuss, I believe true concern for the environment should always encompass social concerns. These issues are not separate.

De Luca is critical that “Environmental justice activists have redefined ‘environment’ to focus on humans” (2007, 29). To prove his point, De Luca points to organizations like the Sierra Club and Greenpeace, who have incorporated social and environmental sustainability in their slogans. Although he praises the Sierra Club’s valuable work, De Luca cautions that “Their move to adopt the principles of environmental justice at the expense of a focus on wilderness…is a grievous error” (2007, 46). Instead, De Luca argues that too much concern with cultural preservation and social sustainability is anthropocentric, claiming that “Putting humans first dilutes the focus and efforts of environmental groups” (2007, 45).

These claims are a serious mischaracterization of environmental justice, first and foremost because environmental justice does not claim to put humans above all else. Rather, environmental justice acknowledges that all humans, in all our diversity, are part of nature. As Environmental Justice Canada lays out, all humans deserve equal protection from environmental harms, and have equal rights to live in a healthy environment. In other words, environmental justice acknowledges that humans are equal to each other, not that humans are above other species or aspects of nature. Although De Luca emphasizes that humans are part of nature, his claim that environmentalism must prioritize “wilderness” instead of social justice actually reinforces the anthropocentric hierarchy that he tries to dismantle (2007, 30). Instead, it’s important to see that environmental justice is social justice, and vice versa.

This prioritization of wilderness above humans approaches the realm of eco-fascism when it implies that human rights and environmental concerns are unrelated. Several of the examples De Luca uses to support his arguments fail to recognize the root of the environmental problem at hand, which is often the fact that basic human needs aren’t met in the first place.

A key example is De Luca’s description of a restaurant serving prized wildlife as food. He condones how the environmental group WildAid raided the restaurant at gunpoint and “[did] not concern itself with the young teenage girls working as waitresses and prostitutes” (2007, 45). Although De Luca calls this a “brutal choice,” he concludes that “If environmental protection depends on eradicating prostitution, we may as well all go buy SUVs and retire to the beach,” completely failing to examine why young girls may become sex workers in the first place (2007, 45).

Although sex work is dignified work, and some people may simply choose it as their job, there are of course situations where it is a person’s only means to survive. In the case that De Luca describes, the eradication of forced sex work in wildlife restaurants would absolutely reduce environmental harms. Why? Because people who engage in sex work out of necessity, rather than choice, do so because they do not have access to basic needs. If the social problems of poverty, income inequality, and access to jobs were first addressed, then people would not have to work in an industry that thrives on killing endangered wildlife. Raiding a restaurant at gunpoint to save animals does not prevent employees from seeking similar jobs elsewhere out of necessity. The only sustainable solution to this wildlife restaurant, then, is to address social needs in tandem with environmental concerns.

There is a lot to unpack in De Luca’s chapter, and very little space to do so. Although De Luca is correct in his stance that humans are not above nature, his attack on environmental justice and social concerns are severely misguided. Rather than dismantling the human vs. nature dichotomy, I believe his disregard for social justice in protecting the environment actually reinforces a separation between humans and nature, rendering many of his arguments ecofascist. If we are to truly protect the environment, we must protect all of its components, which includes both human and non-human entities.

-Mary

Reference:

De Luca, Kevin Michael. 2007. “A Wilderness Environmentalism Manifesto: Contesting the Infinite Self-Absorption of Humans.” In Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to the Environmental Movement, edited by Ronald Sandler and Phaedra C. Pezzullo, 27-55. Cambridge: MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2781.003.0005.

In his article titled “A New Global Warming Strategy: How Environmentalists are Overlooking Vegetarianism as the Most Effective Tool Against Climate Change in Our Lifetimes,” Noam Mohr presents a markedly climatarian perspective (2005). Though Mohr doesn’t actually use the term “climatarian,” he supports climatarianism’s main idea that a vegetarian diet reduces one’s environmental footprint. Mohr provides relevant data behind the environmental impact of animal agriculture, especially in regard to methane production. In my opinion, however, he also minimizes the importance of reducing carbon dioxide emissions while ignoring harmful effects of aerosols. Here I will explore some of these points, in addition to examining Mohr’s claims through biocentric and ecocentric frameworks.

In supporting his position, Mohr provides some scientific background outlining the climate impacts of raising livestock. He explains, for example, that in comparison to other greenhouse gases, methane contributes disproportionately to global warming (Mohr 2005, 2). Seeing as the primary contributor to methane production is animal agriculture, it’s clear why a person would become vegetarian for environmental reasons. Methane is, as Mohr specifies, a form of carbon 21 times more potent than carbon dioxide (2005, 2). Given its production through livestock digestive processes and farm animal waste, there’s a strong case for reducing meat consumption as method of climate change mitigation (Mohr 2005, 2).

Yet Mohr proposes that we should shift our focus from CO2 emissions reduction to methane reduction by vegetarianism. Though, as Mohr explains, carbon dioxide is not the only, nor the most powerful contributor to global warming, he also states that “aerosols actually have a cooling effect on global temperatures, and the magnitude of this cooling approximately cancels out the warming effect of CO2,” since aerosols are often released alongside CO2 (2005, 1). This statement is concerning in several ways, not the least of which is lack of consideration for the global ecosystem.

From both an ecocentric and biocentric perspective, Mohr’s claim that vegetarianism is the best way to fight climate change dismisses the importance of interacting environmental factors. While biocentrism and ecocentrism differ in their definition of the morally considerable entity, both ethical frameworks acknowledge the importance of ecological interactions in advancing the good of that entity. In the case of biocentrism, ecological interactions are seen as a web supporting the flourishing of individual living beings (Taylor 1981, 209). Ecocentrists, meanwhile, maintain that the ecosystem itself is what we should consider when making ethical decisions. In both cases, a holistic consideration of interacting ecological factors is necessary.

Since climate change affects the entire global ecosystem, it is imperative to examine interactions between its contributing factors. For example, though the aerosols often produced alongside carbon dioxide do indeed have a short-term cooling effect on the earth’s surface, they are not evenly spread out, meaning some regions will experience warming effects while others may not (NASA 2010). Moreover, aerosols can produce negative impacts in the form of black carbon, which speeds the melting of ice caps (NASA 2010).

In other words, although carbon dioxide is certainly not the only greenhouse gas, nor the most threatening one, efforts to reduce its emissions should not be ignored in favour of promoting vegetarianism. Both strategies should work together, along with a plethora of others, to address climate change.

So: is vegetarianism the solution to climate change? In my opinion, there is no catch-all “most effective tool” to solve climate change. I think most biocentrists and ecocentrists would agree, given the importance of ecological interactions in valuing life and ecosystems. Therefore, a variety of solutions that consider these interactions is necessary. A vegetarian diet is certainly one effective way to reduce environmental footprints, but it should be accompanied by a combination of efforts that consider the global ecosystem and its interacting components.

-Mary

References:

Mohr, Noam. 2005. “A New Global Warming Strategy: How Environmentalists are OverlookingVegetarianism as the Most Effective Tool Against Climate Change in Our Lifetimes.” EarthSave International, August, 2005. http://www.earthsave.org/news/earthsave_global_warming_report.pdf.

Taylor, Paul. 1981. “The Ethics of Respect for Nature.” Environmental Ethics. 3: 197-218. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/97bd/6dee0cea03c2bdba21efa4176c316938892b.pdf.

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration). 2010. “Aerosols and Incoming Sunlight (Direct Effects).” Updated November 2, 2010. https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/Aerosols/page3.php#:~:text=Aerosols%20can%20have%20a%20major%20impact%20on%20climate%20when%20they%20scatter%20light.&text=In%20addition%20to%20scattering%20or,and%20produce%20a%20warming%20effect.

Ecocentrism is a philosophical worldview that holistically values ecological systems as morally considerable entities, meaning that humans have ethical responsibilities towards them[1].

This week, we read two contrasting pieces regarding ecocentrism. In an excerpt from A Sand County Almanac, Aldo Leopold writes about “The Land Ethic,” which holds humans responsible towards living communities of animals, plants, insects, and all biota interacting on the land[2]. In a critique of Leopold’s work, Chaone Mallory discusses the contradictions between Leopold’s writing and his love of hunting through an ecofeminist lens[3].

Before exploring Mallory’s critique, it’s important to first understand Leopold’s claims. Leopold’s land ethic rests on the value of communities, and the role individuals play in community well-being. As humans already consider themselves citizens of their own communities, Leopold argues, this mindset must simply be extended to the biotic community, which “changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it”[4]. He posits two mentalities, groups A and B, as opposing each other in terms of “ecological conscience”[5]. Group A continues to manage nature and view it as a commodity for human use, while Group B looks beyond nature’s usefulness to humans and considers human impacts on living interactions.

While Leopold’s land ethic has been praised by many conservationists as ecocentric, in her 2001 paper Mallory considers how Leopold’s passion for hunting supports human domination of nature, contrary to ecocentrism.  Mallory uses ecofeminism, the view that exploitation of nature is linked to the oppression of women, as a framework of analysis in her writing. Although Leopold presents hunting as an activity bringing him closer to nature, Mallory considers how hunting for the positive experience of connecting to land ultimately uses wildlife for the satisfaction of humans. Mallory further argues how Leopold’s vivid descriptions of hunting as a process of pursuit mirror male pursuit and objectification of women.

In my opinion, Mallory presents valid critiques of Leopold’s work, especially because Leopold makes conflicting claims. For example, in “The Land Ethic,” Leopold states that greater violence leads to greater destruction and interruption of ecological processes[6]. Yet simultaneously, he openly advocates violence through hunting as a positive way of interacting with nature.

In addition to Mallory’s points, I’d like to offer my own critique of Leopold’s suggestions for enacting a land ethic. Although I believe humans should value ecosystems and care for them accordingly, Leopold suggests that this should be done by placing more responsibility on the “private owner” of the land[7]. The issue I see is that the ownership and privatization of land directly allows for human domination over it. If, as Leopold says, we are equal citizens of a biological community, then we should not be able to “own” another citizen, any more than humans should own other humans. For this reason, I find Leopold’s positioning of private landowners as the optimal ecological stewards to be contradictory.

Having offered my thoughts on Leopold’s work, I will now discuss a critique of Mallory’s paper. While Mallory presents a strong analysis of “The Land Ethic” in contrast with Leopold’s hunting habits, she identifies the main problem with hunting to be “the type and degree of damage done to natural systems…that is unrelated to a human being’s biological need to survive.”[8] Mallory is careful to state that her critique of Leopold’s hunting relates to his privilege as a male settler hunting for sport, but she does not clarify her position on hunting that does support one’s need to survive. This is relevant in climates that don’t produce enough plant sustenance year-round for human survival. Although through globalization many of us now have access to plant-based food year-round in grocery stores, food insecurity is a major issue in isolated communities and some have found that hunting supports healthier nutrition while valuing ecosystems (see this article in The Narwhal). Given her strong opposition to Leopold’s hunting for pleasure, I think that Mallory could have strengthened her analysis by providing her thoughts on alternative approaches to hunting in the context of ecocentrism.

Overall, reading both of these authors was an interesting way to learn about varying perspectives on ecocentrism. In particular, I appreciate Mallory’s perspective that although Leopold is a pioneer of ecocentrism, many of his readers fail to see the contradictions in his writing. Meanwhile, both authors offer important perspectives on caring for land. Leopold’s valuing of ecological communities is necessary in order for humans to see ourselves as biological citizens, while Mallory’s ecofeminist critique of sport hunting explores human attitudes of domination. While I think an exploration of subsistence hunting would have enriched Mallory’s writing, both of these pieces were fascinating introductions to ecocentrism.

-By Mary

 

[1] “Glossary of Terms in Environmental Philosophy,” University of Wisconsin Oshkosh, updated September 20, 2010 , https://www.uwosh.edu/facstaff/barnhill/490-docs/thinking/glossary.

[2] Aldo Leopold, “The Land Ethic,” in A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), http://www.neohasid.org/pdf/landethic.pdf.

[3] Chaone Mallory, “Acts of Objectification and the Repudiation of Dominance: Leopold, Ecofeminism, and the Ecological Narrative,” Ethics and the Environment 6, no. 2 (2001): 85, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40339013.

[4] Leopold, “The Land Ethic,” 1.

[5] Leopold, “The Land Ethic,” 2.

[6] Leopold, “The Land Ethic,” 4.

[7] Leopold, “The Land Ethic,” 3.

[8] Mallory, “Acts of Objectification,” 76.