Environmental rights cause more and more attention in many countries nowadays. Same with Canada, people desire to live in a state where the environment is guaranteed, at least, it makes people feel safe. In fact, the ethics contained in environmental rights are not difficult to understand. The so-called environmental rights mean that people live in clean air, the air quality meets standards, and the drinking water is not polluted. And our food, meat, and vegetables, etc., are not contaminated and can be eaten with confidence. This is caring about everyone’s most basic living conditions. However, the population covered is also very wide. Environmental rights include not only the environmental quality of modern humans but also our descendants. However, since the rapid development of industrialization and rapid economic development, people have often sacrificed the natural environment to meet the interests of economic development. People have begun to use large amounts of coal, fossil fuels, etc., and emit carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases regardless of the consequence, thus, causing global warming and climate change. In addition, the pollutants discharged in the water have gradually reduced the area of ​​water available for people to drink and caused a large number of aquatic life to die or become extinct. Isn’t this a very disappointing thing?

In fact, I am deeply impressed by this matter. In China, the city where I live has a severe haze every winter. Haze has now become a catastrophic weather phenomenon and often appears in weather forecasts. The main cause is the burning of coal for heating in winter, as well as automobile exhaust, industrial emissions, construction dust, garbage incineration, and many other acts that harm air quality. For a long time, people can only wear masks, and homes install air purifiers to protect the most basic air quality. This has also caused many elderly and young children to suffer from cardiovascular or respiratory diseases in winter. Therefore, many people have been deprived of their environmental rights, even though this is our reluctance. Because the environment is a public resource, no one has the right to deliberately manipulate it, and everyone should have a fair environmental right. So I think it is necessary to protect Canadians’ environmental rights through the Constitution’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

And I also agree with David Suzuki’s point of view that ensuring the people’s environmental rights is not to restrict the development of industry and cause economic retreat, but to ensure that the government always regards the people’s health and well-being as the original intention of all actions, and also to make the government and many companies operating in Canada are always moving to maintain the highest standards. Moreover, action to ensure environmental rights have indirectly inspired many Canadian companies to innovate or adopt green technology and advocate other corporate transformations, which is conducive to the further optimization of the social structure and the upgrading of the industrial chain. On the other hand, by protecting the environmental rights of human beings, the medical pressure caused by the Canadian medical system in response to environmental problems can be reduced, and the people will become healthier and healthier. Therefore,  to ensure people’s environmental rights become legal, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.

work cited:

Baike.”Fog and haze.” (2020). Retrieved from https://baike.baidu.com/item/fogandhaze/731704?fr=aladdin

Suzuki, David. “Canada Has to Join the Environmental Rights Movement.” Huffington Post. Nov. 5, 2014. Retrieved from https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/david-suzuki/environmental-rights_b_6103258.html?utm_hp_ref=ca-right-to-a-healthy-environment

The push for federal recognition for environmental rights is gaining traction. And this traction is much needed. In 5 provinces and territories, there is already some form of legislature protecting environmental rights (Boyd & Macfarlane, 2014). In 2011, the Canadian parliament came close to passing Bill C-469, the Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights, which would have been a tremendous breakthrough in that aspect. With the existence of local and provincial legislature and calls for federal legislature concerning environmental rights, it is necessary to look at the reasons why we need federal legislation on environmental rights and protections. We also need to look at another country that is doing well in this area to see what would be protected and the ethical issues surrounding a charter right to a healthy environment.

According to David Boyd, there are six reasons why Canada should modernize its constitution to include the right to live in a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Two of these reasons stood out to me the most, the fact that ‘Canada’s poor environmental record inflicts a high cost on human health and wellbeing’ and also that ‘environmental rights and responsibilities have been a cornerstone of Aboriginal legal systems for millennia’(Boyd & Macfarlane, 2014). I found the first reason I mentioned interesting because it highlights the fact that Canada’s poor track record in environmental issues has had adverse effects on the quality of life that its residents are living. Even though this reason is pretty anthropocentric, it drives home the consequences of inaction concerning environmental rights. The second reason is interesting to be because it rightfully acknowledges the fact that Indigenous communities have recognized the need to care for and protect the environment. Boyd is conscious of the fact that Indigenous communities have always recognized the fact that ‘the earth’s sentience creates corresponding rights and obligations for both humans and nature’ (Boyd & Macfarlane, 2014). This knowledge from indigenous communities embraces a more holistic and ecocentric view when compared to the previously mentioned reason.

In response to Boyd, Emmett Macfarlane talks about the issues involved in allowing the courts to be the ones who make decisions concerning environmental issues as this is what a charter right would do. Macfarlane is a proponent for policy changes as opposed to what Boyd is suggesting. Macfarlane references Boyd, who calls for the constitutionalizing of environmental rights which would force governments to do the right thing as it relates to policy. Macfarlane is critical of this as he notes that other positive rights such as welfare and housing that other countries have entrenched in their constitution have been far from successful. Concerning this point, I agree with Boyd. While it is necessary to acknowledge the failures of governments in addressing issues that are enshrined as rights in their constitutions, it is also necessary to recognize countries that have been successful at this and understand why they have been successful. I am aware that leaving decisions like this to the courts and judges would be difficult as we would still be giving humans control over what is considered important and worthy of value and moral consideration and what isn’t. However, effective policy changes in conjunction with a constitutional amendment would be the way to go.

Norway is a good example of a country that is getting it right. Norway, like Canada, is a wealthy country with a major oil and gas industry. However, unlike Canada, Norway has strong environmental laws and is one of the leading countries in environmental performance indicators. Norway has been successful at this due to a combination of legislature and policy, and this is what I believe Canada should try to emulate.

Boyd and Macfarlane both bring up important points concerning environmental rights. As I mentioned earlier, my views are more in line with Boyd as I believe that a constitutional amendment would be a first step in environmental reform. That said, it would not be sufficient as solid policy reform would be necessary to ensure that proper action is taken.

–      Oseyi

References:

Boyd, D. R., & Macfarlane, E. (2014). Should environmental rights be in the constitution? Retrieved December 02, 2020, from https://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/second-regard/boyd-macfarlane/

Along with people’s increasing awareness of environmental protection, more and more nations take action in improving their environment with policies, rules, and laws. However, Canada seems to hold a hesitant attitude to legalize people’s rights to a healthy stable environment. This paper aims to prove why Canadians should have a charter right to a healthy environment and support the decision of using civil laws to protect people’s rights and the environment. Canadians should have a charter right to a healthy environment because of the serious impact of the environment on people’s health, examples or warnings set from other nations, and the fundamental basis of the Canadian Constitution.

First, Canadians have a moral right to live in a healthy environment because the pollution can directly influence their living situations and cause diseases like cancers. Boyd argues that “widespread alarm about the dire effects of pollution had spawned an environmental movement that considered the protection of clean air, clean water and a healthy environment not just a desire, but a fundamental right” (Boyd and Macfarlane “Should”). Without clean water and air, people can easily become sick. The serious pollution can even increase the risk of cancers. Thus, people have the moral right to protect their own health by demanding a healthy living environment.

Second, examples of other nations have proven the necessity of protecting the environment and the effectiveness of using laws, which pushes Canada to make more effort in order to catch up with the global context. As is talked in the video, “more than 100 nations around the world recognize their citizens’ human right to the healthy environment” (“A Tale” 1:47). There has been a consensus reached in the global range in relation to the importance of a healthy environment for human rights. In order to protect citizens’ rights to a healthy environment, the most effective strategy is strong environmental laws. Norway is the positive example of how laws can help solve environmental issues and protect people’s rights. Brazil is a negative example of how neglecting the risk of pollution will damage people’s health. Canada should learn from other nations. So far, Canada only ranked 24^th out of 25 nations in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, which indicates that the nation falls behind other developed nations in environmental protection (Boyd and Macfarlane “Should”). Canada doesn’t have a special situation that discourages it from learning from nations like Norway to benefit citizens by protecting the environment with laws.

Third, even though there might be opposition to the legitimacy due to concerns about political instability and the damage in the industrialization, this right echoes with the basis of the Canadian Constitution that benefits citizens and protects their rights. Suzuki argues that “It’s not about hindering industry; it’s about ensuring that companies operating in Canada as well as our governments, maintain the highest standards and that human health and well-being are always the priority” (“Canada”). There might be an opposition that doesn’t believe that people’s right to live in a healthy environment should be protected by laws. However, the fundamental basis of the Canadian Constitution is to protect citizens’ benefits and interests. According to Bill C-438, “Canadians have an individual and collective responsibility to protect the environment for the benefit of present and future generations” (“Bill”). There is nothing wrong or contradictory to legalize this right because it matches the Constitution well. The purpose is to legalize people’s right to a healthy environment in the Constitution’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms so that the government has to protect the environment and people’s health according to the law.

Thus, people’s right to live in a healthy stable environment should be protected by civil law. It is the most effective way to protect people’s interests and health. Various examples from other nations have proven the effectiveness of using civil laws to protect this moral right. Canada should learn from other nations and make more effort in the environmental protection with a firm attitude.

-Kaize

References:

“A Tale of Two Valleys.” Class Video.

“Bill C-438.” Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights. Parliament of Canada.

Boyd, David, and Emmett Macfarlane. “Should environmental rights be in the constitution?” Policy Opinions. Mar. 3, 2014.

Suzuki, David. “Canada Has to Join the Environmental Rights Movement.” HuffPost Canada. Nov. 5, 2014.

With the ongoing climate crisis, there is much talk about formalizing environmental rights for citizens. About 110 countries have legal documentation to guarantee the right to a healthy environment for its citizens. Canada, however, has not yet done such an action.  Hence, the question is asked: should Canada guarantee environmental rights to Canadians? If so, why? In this short blog post, I will support the right of living in a healthy and stable environment which should be protected by civil law.

Firstly, studies have shown that countries that guarantee their citizens a right to a healthy environment are quick to reduce their greenhouse gases and air pollution. Moreover, they provide better and quicker access to safe drinking water and sanitation.  As a country that is increasing its greenhouse gas emissions and has Indigenous communities that still don’t have access to clean drinking water, we need a swifter response on tackling these issues. The climate crisis is real, and its effects are no longer just seen in developing nations. Additionally, protecting the environment by setting higher industry standards is ultimately protecting not only human health but also the economy. Robust environmental protection inspires innovation and reduces health care costs for citizens and governments. Hence, there are multiple benefits in establishing environmental legislation.

Second, failing to establish the right to a healthy environment is a major injustice against Indigenous populations. This is not just because their communities have limited to no access to clean drinking water. Rather, it is mainly because many Indigenous communities have a religious connection to the land and water. Hence, deteriorated environments affect the mental and physical health of Indigenous peoples, but it also infringes upon their religious right to uphold their religious duties. Additionally, in order to proceed with reconciliation, this religious right should be protected by consulting Indigenous populations to incorporate Indigenous law into the legal system. One of my professors was from New Zealand and he states that the Māori people of New Zealand played a vital role in academic, political, and social systems. This is a sign of respect and humanity. Canada has continued to ignore Indigenous issues but does have aims to advance reconciliation. Protecting the right to a healthy environment will surely achieve this advancement.

An argument one can bring forward against the right to a healthy environment is that Canadian provinces such as the Yukon or Ontario already have environmental legislations present. Do we still need to have this right embedded in our constitution? The answer is still affirmative. The laws established by the provinces are weak politically and symbolically. Hence, we need to have a stronger legislative force to establish this right such as the federal government. We can see this example when the United Conservative Party came into power in Alberta and removed the New Democratic Party’s carbon tax. However, the Trudeau government slapped it back on to Alberta when issuing the federal carbon tax. Additionally, besides the strength behind constitutional power,  the constitution of a country reflects its citizens cherished ideals and morals. Hence, it is not only politically important but also symbolically. Having this right in our constitution gives Canadians the full power to hold governments and industries responsible if they ever infringe upon our right to a healthy and clean environment.

In the article “Canada Has to Join the Environmental Rights Movement,” David Suzuki holds the opinion that Canada should join the environmental rights movement and establishes a Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights in Parliament to make the federal government protect the environment for its citizens’ health. Throughout the article, he emphasizes the possibility of making such a law, the benefit of launching this movement, and the challenge that Canada faces about the environmental issue. This paper agrees with David Suzuki’s opinion that Canada should make laws to force the government to protect citizens’ right to live in a healthy environment.

It is ethical to protect people’s health by protecting their living environment. If the environment deteriorates, people’s health will be influenced directly. Suzuki argues that “we can’t live and be well without clean air and water, nutritious food and the numerous services that diverse and vibrant natural environments provide” (“Canada”). To some degree, environmental pollution can be regarded as a chronic poison to kill people. In a polluted environment, people are easier to become sick and get diseases like cancers. Thus, people have the right to protect their health by demanding a safe and healthy living environment. From the moral aspect, the government has the responsibility for protecting the environment for peoples’ health as long as the environment can influence people’s health.

Besides, this legalization should be supported because Canada also faces a serious environmental threat like most of the other nations in the world. Suzuki points out that the environmental issue in Canada has been serious enough as there are more than 1,000 effective drinking-water advisories, and half of the population “lives in areas where air quality reaches dangerous levels of toxicity” (Suzuki “Canada”). These alerts cannot be ignored. Before the problem has been too serious about being solved, the government should take action in time to control the pollution. The law is used to make the government pay enough attention to their inherent responsibility. Even without the law, the government still has the responsibility to protect the environment and benefit citizens’ health. The law is simply used to make the government pay enough attention and make it easy for citizens to maintain their rights and monitor the government’s behaviours.

However, some people might oppose that environmental protection means a discouragement of industrialization development, which will hinder economic development. However, environmental issues are crucial to people’s health and well-being, which should be prioritized to their economic status. People’s lives are much more valuable than money. Environmental protection doesn’t mean to protect people’s health in the current society. It also means to protect the health of future generations. If people in the current era seriously pollute the environment, then future generations have to suffer equal health threats. The long-term benefit of environmental protection is more significant than the purely economic value. Besides, environmental protection can also help boost economic development as “evidence shows strong environmental protection can benefit the economy by spurring innovation and competitiveness and reducing health-care costs” (Suzuki “Canada”). In essence, environmental protection is not contradictory to the development of industrialization. Moreover, this law can help industrialization develop on a sustainable and environment-friendly basis.

Therefore, I personally think Canada should take immediate action to join the environmental rights movement for its citizens’ health and rights. It is a moral responsibility that the Canadian government should shoulder. Faced with current environmental threats, Canada should learn from other nations to use effective laws to protect people’s health and create a system that supports people’s right to live in a safe and healthy environment.

-Linfeng Xie

Works Cited

Suzuki, David. “Canada Has to Join the Environmental Rights Movement.” Huffington Post. Nov. 5, 2014. Retrieved from https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/david-suzuki/environmental-rights_b_6103258.html?utm_hp_ref=ca-right-to-a-healthy-environment

Many countries have begun to introduce a variety of laws to include the right to a healthy environment, but will these laws be successful in protecting their citizens against climate change and global pollutant? It’s widely known that ecosystems have no boundaries, rivers flow across countries, air circulates globally, and organisms travel across borders. Pollutants, similar to ecosystems, have no regard for state boundaries, and as such, should be considered at a global scale. It is essential to consider how a state could protect its citizen’s right to a healthy environment if environmental degradation is occurring outside of its boundaries? This blog will be applying the Canada’s lack of a right to a healthy environment to the discourse surrounding why it is crucial for an internationally accepted protection of a healthy environment.

Canada is one of the few countries that lack a right to a healthy environment in the charter of freedoms (Suzuki 2014). Despite the lack of a right to a healthy environment, Canadians continue to face health repercussions caused by various pollutants (Brinker 2017). With many drinking advisories and continued health concerns caused by poor environmental quality, why hasn’t Canada introduced a right to a healthy environment? Canada is not the only country lacking in the right to a healthy environment; there are dozens of states that have so far failed to protect its citizens.

Why does it matter if another country introduces the legal right to a healthy environment? Pollutants travel globally, and the repercussions of environmental degradation occur both locally, regionally, and globally. An anthropogenic forest fire at a local scale causes ecological degradation, but the smoke from the fire can spread throughout many countries causing increased health concerns at larger scales. How can a state protect its citizen’s right to a healthy environment if environmental degradation and pollution are occurring outside state boundaries? The answer is an internationally accepted right to a healthy environment. Countries must come together to determine what a healthy environment consists of and how to protect it. This is especially important in developing countries that are often disproportionately affected by the repercussions of environmental degradation (Unprecedented Impacts of Climate Change 2019). Within Canada, minority groups are also disproportionately impacted by the consequences of environmental degradation; many indigenous communities experience health concerns related to pollutants at increased rates (Brinker 2017).

The need for an international right to healthy living is further supported by various ethical theories. To an ecocentrist, the ecosystem and every abiotic and biotic organism found within are morally significant (Rolston 1985). From this perspective, the right to a healthy environment is ethically essential in the duty of protecting both humans and the environment. Similarly, biocentrism argues that every living being is morally considerable, and as such, there is a moral imperative to protect not only humans from environmental degradation but all biotic organisms (Taylor 2011). Introducing the right to a healthy environment is only the first step in protecting people and the environment.

Without international acceptance and commitment to a universal right to a healthy environment, people globally will continue to experience the negative impact caused by pollutants and environmental degradation (Unprecedented Impacts of Climate Change 2019). Canada is one of a dozen countries that has failed to implement a right to a healthy environment, despite the ongoing need (Suzuki 2014). There is an ethical obligation, not only to every person but to the environment, to introduce laws protecting people’s right to a healthy environment.

Brinker, Coleman. “Your Right to Live in a Healthy Environment: Phantom or Reality?” Centre for Constitutional Studies. University of Alberta Faculty of Law, August 4, 2017. https://ualawccsprod.srv.ualberta.ca/2017/08/your-right-to-live-in-a-healthy-environment-phantom-or-reality/.

Suzuki, David. “Canada Has to Join the Environmental Rights Movement.” HuffPost Canada. HuffPost Canada, January 5, 2015. https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/david-suzuki/environmental-rights_b_6103258.html?utm_hp_ref=ca-right-to-a-healthy-environment.

Rolston, Holmes. “Duties to Endangered Species.” BioScience 35, no. 11 (December 1985): 718–26. https://doi.org/10.2307/1310053.

Taylor, Paul W. “The Ethics of Respect for Nature.” Essay. In Respect for Nature: a Theory of Environmental Ethics, 197–218. Princeton Univ Pr, 2011.

“Unprecedented Impacts of Climate Change Disproportionately Burdening Developing Countries, Delegate Stresses, as Second Committee Concludes General Debate | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases,” October 8, 2019. https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gaef3516.doc.htm.

The idea of creating a clean environment within Canada has been increasingly discussed in the last 3 decades. Currently, we have not assigned the right to live in a healthy environment in our constitution, even though many in our current government administration champion the idea of becoming ecologically sustainable. David Boyd and Emmett Macfarlane make separate arguments on the most effective way to achieve the goal of healthy environment for Canadians. While I agree with the arguments made by Boyd to amend the constitution to include the right to a healthy environment, Macfarlane does pose an intriguing point relevant to the ethicality of imposing such a right through a constitutional amendment rather than the democratic system of the court of law. I will be analyzing arguments made by David Boyd and Emmett Macfarlane and finally, provide my insight to this topic and which of the arguments I am more inclined to support.

David Boyd holds the stance that the right to a clean environment should be enshrined in the Canadian constitution. He argues that while a law can provide some mitigation in the environmental destruction, it is not as solid of a document as the constitution, as it is considered the strongest of all laws and the law in which all others must be consistent with. Boyd argues that current methods do not rightfully protect the environment or Canadian citizens. This is apparent because we currently do not have the right to a clean environment in the constitution and currently regulate it through weaker laws, and as a result we are currently ranked 15^th out of 17 countries with regards to the comprehensive index of environmental performance indicators. Finally, Boyd provides insight to the successes of Norway, ranked 2^nd out of 17 countries, and has the right to a clean environment enshrined in their constitution since 1992. Boyd does not believe that this would solve all our problems instantaneously, but it would provide a solid base to prioritize environmental sustainability in the eyes of Canadians.

Emmett Macfarlane disagrees with Boyd on the idea that environmental rights should be put in the constitution but shares a belief that something needs to be done regarding the state of our environment. The prominent argument made by Macfarlane is that enshrining these rights in the constitution moves the power of decision-making from politicians and the government into the eyes of the court system. Macfarlane vehemently argues against a constitutional amendment on the opinion that judges do not have the legitimacy or competency to interpret environmental policy issues. This opinion is based on the intricate nature of such issues and the various disciplines required to successfully interpret the ecological, economic, and judicial aspects of environmental issues. Once a right is enshrined in the constitution, the ability to debate and compromise is lost as well.

I am inclined to disagree with Emmett Macfarlane. Instead of discussing what points made by Boyd I agree with (all of them), I will talk about a few of the arguments made by Macfarlane that lead me to disagree. Although I am unsure of the competency of judges regarding making informed decisions on environmental issues, petitioning the government to crack down on environmental issues is not an effective way to approach a sustainable Canada. This is the world we are currently living in and it has allowed us to destroy the Canadian environment in the interest of development. Secondly, I do not believe making compromises and debating over a clean environment is needed. If a group of peoples health is being deteriorated by industrial  or environmentally destructive activities, there should be no exception made on behalf of the effected group, and all responsibility and consequences should be placed on the party at fault. If we would like the achieve the goal of a healthy environment, we cannot make exceptions and the right to a clean environment must be enshrined into our constitution.

Source –

Source: Boyd, D. R. & MacFarlane, E. (2014). Should environmental rights be in the constitution? Policy Options.

Environmental rights protect the right to a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment for human beings. Over 100 countries around the world, from France to Argentina, have incorporated environmental rights into their constitution. Canada is not one of these countries. In the following essay I will outline some of the arguments for and against having environmental rights in our constitution, and argue we should consider this strategy to protect both people and nature. 

The first argument in favour of this debate is that environmental rights guarantee further environmental protection. As David Boyd indicates, “constitutional environmental rights and responsibilities are a catalyst for stronger environmental laws.” (1) Aside from protecting nature, these rights would also protect people. As framed by Ecojustice Canada in “A Tale of Two Valleys” (2), human well being depends on the health of the natural setting that surrounds us, whether is the water that we drink, the air that we breathe, or the soil in which we grow food. In this line of thought, the recognition of environmental rights gives individuals and communities a chance to fight on legal grounds for a safe, clean environment. Boyd’s and Ecojustice Canada’s arguments are mostly centered around safeguarding the interests of human beings, but incorporating environmental rights in the constitution could also advance the interest of animals, plants, and ecosystems.

On the other hand, the arguments against environmental rights point out that constitutional rights aren’t the best way to prevent the degradation of nature and human health. In “Parliament, not the courts, should decide” (1), Emmett MacFarlane argues that the court system isn’t well equipped to solve environmental problems because the climate crisis demands greater public participation and debate. In his words, “rather than mobilizing for constitutional change, environmentalists should focus their energies on convincing governments, political parties and the public to commit to the pursuit of policies that will ensure environmental protection.” MacFrarlane’s second argument is that environmental rights would add to the inflationary call for the expansion of rights such as social welfare rights, property rights and animal rights. 

With regards to this last argument, the case of Whanganui River in New Zealand (3) gives an interesting example of the expansion of rights to non-human entities. Here, a river was granted legal personhood after decades of conflict between settlers and indigenous communities, who recognized the river as paramount to their lives and the wellbeing of the whole ecosystem. Around the world, there are similar examples where lakes, mountain ranges, or animal species are granted legal rights. Unlike MacFarlane, I consider this to be a positive achievement, especially in a time of global ecological crisis. Granting environmental rights to human beings, or personhood rights to non-human entities recognizes that the wellbeing of people and natural ecosystems is interconnected. This understanding is rooted in ecocentrism, an ethical framework that sees ecosystems as entities deserving moral considerability. From this approach, it is evident that human societies cannot prosper without the stability of the natural environment. 

Currently, our economic system prioritizes profits and economic growth over social and environmental stability. In this context, environmental rights are an important step towards considering the good of ecosystems in themselves, not just as functions of anthropogenic interests. In the words of Aldo Leopold, “a system of conservation based solely on economic self interest assumes falsely that the economic parts of the biotic system will function without the uneconomic parts” (4). 

Taking MacFrarlane’s position into account, it is important to realize that solely incorporating environmental rights into our constitution isn’t going to provide the necessary social change to tackle the environmental crisis. However, it is a good place to start. It signals that the government does care about the interests of people and nature beyond immediate economic or political benefit. As framed in BILL C-438 of the House of Commons of Canada (5), environmental rights would provide a balanced environment for all, which means “an environment of a quality that protects human and cultural dignity and human health and well-being and in which essential ecological processes are preserved for their own sake, as well as for the benefit of present and future generations.” This holistic approach of recognizing the value of ecosystems in themselves is related to the ecocentrist ethical framework of Aldo Leopold, who sees ecosystems (the Land) as a collective organism whose integrity and stability should be preserved. 

In conclusion, environmental rights should be recognized in the constitution of Canada because they would guarantee greater environmental protection and give people the opportunity to demand a clean, safe environment in which to live. Granting personhood rights to non-human entities such as rivers and mountains can also improve the living conditions for humans and non-humans across the country. At the same time, it is important to keep open the channels of public debate and participation on this issue, so that the courts aren’t the only responsables of regulating environmental protection. Lastly, environmental rights (specially as framed in Bill C-438) are a good opportunity to recognize the good of ecosystems in themselves, which makes this policy favorable from both an anthropocentric and an ecocentric framework. 

~Monica

References:

1. David R. Boyd, E. M. (n.d.). Should environmental rights be in the constitution? 3 March 2014. Retrieved from https://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/second-regard/boyd-macfarlane/
2. Ecojustice Canada (2012). “A Tale of Two Valleys”. Retrieved from https://youtu.be/g1m1k8uCsa0
3. David Freid (2018) The River Is Me. MEL Films. https://vimeo.com/288119812
4. Aldo Leopold (1948). “The Land Ethic” from A Sand County Almanac. http://www.neohasid.org/pdf/landethic.pdf
5. House of Commons of Canada (2019). Bill C-438. An Act to enact the Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights and to make related amendments to other Acts. First Session, 42th Parliament, 64-65-66-67-68 Elizabeth II, 2015-2016-2017-2018-2019

At the foundation of our modern legal and judicial system is the belief in Rights of Man to which all human beings are entitled. Because humans are rational, self-aware and autonomous beings, Kantians would argue, they are inherently valuable and worthy of respect to their dignity. To protect this dignity, universal human rights are adopted to outline the necessary conditions for humans to lead a dignified life. Of course, we must be alive and healthy to lead a dignified life, which is why, though some rights may vary from location to location, human health is always prioritised. Increasingly, we are coming to the realisation that the environment in which we live in is a major component of our health and is not nearly as protected as other components such as food and water. Instead, the environment is designated as public space. What follows is this space being used and polluted by some more than others and to the detriment of us all. Is it any wonder that some would argue for new and more stringent laws to protect the environment which they perceive as an extension to their health and well-being?

An article entitled, “Should environmental rights be in the constitution?” features two parts. In the first, David Boyd argues for the entrenchment of our environmental rights in the Constitution to empower the courts to prosecute environmental crimes, compel citizens and corporations to behave more responsibly and more. After all, constitutional rights are harder to dismiss for the sake of expediency or convenience. However, the second part of the article is a rebuttal by Emmett Macfarlane who doubts the effectiveness of this strategy. He notes that many countries struggle to fulfill the promises of even more crucial constitutional rights, so that alone guarantees nothing. It would also shift the moral dilemmas of society from the political sphere where there can be discourse, to the judicial sphere where there is only arbitration.

Being a person largely ignorant and unfamiliar with the intricacies and subtle manoeuvring of courts and politics, I struggle to provide an informed commentary. Articles such as the one above only garner feelings of confusion and inadequacy. Like Macfarlane, I am left questioning the protections guaranteed by constitutional rights and the potential damage caused by lack of public debate to resolve moral dilemmas. At the same time, I am sceptical that the political system would consistently champion environmental causes, without it turning into just another partisan issue to rally for or against as a show of party loyalty. While constitutions tend to be more stable and longer-lived than political parties, would it still be able to safeguard environmental concerns from waxing and waning with the shifting of political tides? And on and on my questions continue with no answers to be found.

I suspect I am not the only one facing this problem. Evidence of the limits of human knowledge and attention are omnipresent and our collective ignorance has always been a barrier to make rational, informed decisions. Though we may agree that environmental concerns about important and necessary to a dignified life, we seem to disagree about most everything else. These disagreements range from the philosophical, such as whether the environment is inherently value regardless of its usefulness to humans, to the practical, such as whether an increase of 1^oC in global temperature is really that bad. While it is easy to prescribe education and information as a cure to ignorance, the reality is more complicated. Who would you say is more dangerous, a person who knows nothing or a person who knows just enough to think they know everything? If the simple answers and easy solutions were readily available, environmental issues would not be such a contentious dilemma. It seems that all I can add to this debate is a remainder to be open to new information, be sceptical of its source and try to understand the limits of your ignorance and that of others.

Keisey

Works Cited

Boyd, D. R., & Macfarlane, E. (2014, March 3). Should environmental rights be in the constitution? Retrieved November 30, 2020, from https://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/second-regard/boyd-macfarlane/

“More than 1,000 drinking-water advisories are in effect in Canada at any time, many of them in First Nations communities. More than half of us live in areas where air quality reaches dangerous levels of toxicity. And from Grassy Narrows and Sarnia’s Chemical Valley in Ontario to Fort Chipewyan, Alberta, people are being poisoned because industrial interests and profits are prioritized over their right to live healthy lives.” (Huffington Post)

This quote, written by Senior Editor of the David Suzuki Foundation, Ian Hanington, might cause some raised eyebrows; how is it that the government of Canada let these widespread, toxic environmental situations happen in the first place? Is it not written in Section 7 of the Candian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that, “…everyone in Canada has, ‘the right to life, liberty and security of the person…'”? (Brinker) Technicially, Canadian citizens do have this right, however there is no expansion of rights that would include the right to a healthy environment specifically at the moment. (Macfarlane)

In 2011, Bill C-469 (the Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights) was the closest Canada ever came to producing a right to a healthy environment with “unanimous support of the opposition party” (Boyd) but still did not get passed as a law by the Canadian Constitution. So even with the unanimous support of the opposition party, the leaders of the government of Canada still are not concerned about expanding the rights of their people that would ensure their health is protected from all the pollution that they allow within their borders. When will the government address this threat of basic well-being?

As a passionate environmentalist, I think that having a right to live in a healthy environment should be considered as one of our basic needs (such as food, water, shelter) as human beings since the environment as a whole (plants, animals, water, earth, etc) provides us with these crucial basic needs for survival. Yet we can see from the article cited above from the Huffington Post, that unessential industrial interests and profits are placed above the importance of what we need to survive on this country that is being so thoroughly damaged. Of course, it can be argued that Canada is not among the leaders that contribute the most to polluting the world, yet it should not exempt the Canadian government from protecting its citizens from pollution that might hinder their right to life, liberty, and security.

Taking examples from abroad, Coleman Brinker notes how the Dutch recognize that, “…[it] was the government’s constitutional duty to protect and improve the living environment and to maintain the country in a ‘habitable state'” in his article “Your Right to Live in a Healthy Environment: Phantom or Reality?” I find it interesting, to say the least, that the Dutch government considers themselves responsible for the living environment for their citizens and the Candian government does not; what exactly makes these two countries so different where the protection of the people and the environment are not significant enough to pass a bill that would allow all Canadians the right to a healthy environment?

I think the main concern of the government of Canada, as stated above, is industrial interests and the profits that they produce. In my opinion, the economy as a whole is very necessary and crucial to the success of our country, (such as the contribution to lowering unemployment)  however I argue that adopting the right to a healthy environment should be placed above the importance of the economy, as I mentioned that the environment provides us humans with the necessities to live. Therefore, the government should make our environment/health/rights/well-being a priority first and foremost, not their wallets.

Overall, this position that the government of Canada holds on not establishing the right to a healthy environment is not just anthropocentric (regarding humankind as the most important aspect of existence) that would disregard the environment and its non-human beings, but avaricious to the point of denying all Canadian citizens their right to life, liberty, and security.

-Melissa

Works Cited:

(Ian Hanington): https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/david-suzuki/environmental-rights_b_6103258.html?utm_hp_ref=ca-right-to-a-healthy-environment

(Coleman Brinker): https://ualawccsprod.srv.ualberta.ca/2017/08/your-right-to-live-in-a-healthy-environment-phantom-or-reality/

(David Boyd and Emmett Macfarlane):

Should environmental rights be in the constitution?

Bill C-438 is “an act to enact the Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights and to make related amendments to other Acts” (House of Commons of Canada, p1). This act is to ensure that Canadians have both individual and collective right to have a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. It focuses on our responsibility to protect the environment. Also, how does the ecosystem impact us and future generations’ well-being? Furthermore, this act would require public engagement to protect the environment. Thus, it suggests that every people have the right to access information about this act and participate in the decision-making process (House of Commons of Canada).

In “Enshrine our right to clean air and water in the Constitution,” Boyd argued that having a healthy and ecologically balanced environment should be our fundamental right. According to the environment could negatively impact human health. As most of the resources, such as water which is contaminated by the industries. Thus, we owe a duty to protect the environment. And it could eliminate the risk of illness and death by access to clean resources. Additionally, Boyd has put the Constitution beyond any other laws by claimed that it is the highest and strongest law. The federal government is the highest level of government proposed. So that the provincial and territorial governments will implement the law. It could operate throughout the whole nation. Then, applied to the real world, countries with green constitutions have a smaller ecological footprint. And it could reduce air pollution ten times faster than in Canada (Boyd).

Nonetheless, Macfarlane has rejected Boyd’s argument by claiming that if you cannot convince the government, political parties, and the public to commit to existing strong environmental policies. It is unlikely governments would commit to entrenching rights in the Constitution. We need their engagements to protect and take responsibility for the environment. If they cannot commit to that, it is unknown that fundamental rights would be the appropriate solution to environmental issues.  Canada faces many critical policy problems, such as an aging population and poverty (Macfarlane). And the aging population and poor people did not have their right to well-being. How can we prioritize environmental rights above all these people who suffer from the issue of aging and poverty in Canada? Besides to ensure people’s engagement to the right. We need substantial provincial consent to ensure people’s participation. However, we are uncertain that the provincial and territorial governments will follow the Constitution. The Constitution may not be the most effective tool to deal with the environmental problem. Moreover, for countries with green constitutions. It is unclear whether we have a fundamental right is meaningful as these countries have different records on the environment. No way we could compare Canada with other countries that have green constitutions until we can clarify that.

In my opinion, I would agree with Macfarlane’s opinion on we should get a commitment to existing environmental policies before we consider the human right to the environment since the court system is more complicated than political debates. And there are many political issues under the court system so, challenging for the public to engage with it. Although, Bill C-438 suggests that people would have access to the information and decision-making process. It is doubtful whether the aging population and other marginalized groups have a voice in court. I would oppose Macfarlane’s idea that there are significant policy problems other than environmental issues. So, we should consider the complexity in the system before we own the right to the environment. However, the environment did impact our lives, especially the vulnerable population in our society include the aging population. Because their immune system is not as good as young people, they are defenseless to diseases. The environmental issues would significantly impact their well-being and health. Also, poor people suffer the most under the impact of the environment. Since they lack access to resources and infrastructures, they do not have the same capacity as wealthy and powerful people to deal with the changes. Subsequently, these policy problems in Canada are interrelated to the environment.

Ruoxin

References

House of Commons of Canada. “BILL C-438: An Act to enact the Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights and to make related amendments to other Acts.” 2019.

Boyd R., David and Macfarlane, Emmett. “Should environmental rights be in the constitution?” 2014.

Many will agree that Canada needs to do more about our lackluster environmental laws. Boyd, in his piece ‘Enshrine our right to clear air and water in the Constitution’, points out that countries with constitutionalized environmental rights appear to have greater success in environmental protection. I agree with Boyd in that constitutional recognition of a healthy environment is something that we as Canadians must strive for. Boyd lists three possibilities for achieving this: “direct amendment of the Constitution, litigation resulting in a court decision that there is an implicit right to a healthy environment in section 7 of the Charter (which states the right to life, liberty and security of the person), or judicial reference resulting in a court decision that there is an implicit right to a healthy environment in section 7” (2014). It is my opinion that as cumbersome as a constitutional amendment may be it is more realistic than attaining a guaranteed constitutional right to a clean environment via judicial interpretation of section 7. 

As Boyd mentions, there is currently a case before the courts arguing that a refinery in their community is causing pollution which is putting their health in jeopardy (2014). This in turn, they argue, violates their section 7 right to life, liberty and security of person. This will not be successful in court. There is a reason polluting industries are not all being sued up and down town endlessly. This is because even if we were to operate under a judicial interpretation that any action that could threaten your life on any scale was unconstitutional under section 7, it would still be near impossible to prove. Even if you develop a cancer and feel it is a result of living in a polluted community from a nearby refinery it is hard to articulate in court that you developed the illness as a direct cause of industry. The sun gives cancer, how can you confirm in court that your cancer is a result of the pollution and not something else? Pollution is obviously harmful to human health, it therefore seems obvious then that it is violating our section 7 charter right, but to quote Trump: ‘sounds good, doesn’t work’. It is too much of a legal challenge to prove that a life threatening condition was caused directly and exclusively from industrial pollution. Thus legal challenges are not the answer for securing environmental rights. I believe that, as messy as it will be, we have to fight to open the constitution to change if we want to get serious about protecting our air and water.

I also find flaws in the idea that section 35 dealing with Aboriginal rights could be used to secure environmental rights. This would guarantee clean air and water but for only a fraction of the population. “The environment is a cornerstone of [Aboriginal] rights, given that the content of Aboriginal rights is intrinsically tied to the land and to traditional customs and activities like hunting and fishing” (Boyd, 2014). This line of reasoning also seems arbitrary to me. Hunting and fishing is ancestral to every culture. More, culture is fluid so I don’t see why Aboriginal culture would be seen as fixed in time, while every other peoples cultures remain fluid and ergo would not be privileged to the environmental rights being sought as an addon to section 35. I think if we are to have environmental rights it must be for all Canadians, new and old, and not just for a certain demographic, so again I believe the only course of action is to open the constitution. 

David R. Boyd, E. M. (n.d.). Should environmental rights be in the constitution? 3 March 2014. Retrieved from https://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/second-regard/boyd-macfarlane/

After learning about the different perspectives on anti-extinction technology last week, we will focus on Canada’s environmental rights debate this week. Although there is still academic disagreement on whether environmental rights are a basic human right or a fundamental constitutional right, an increasing number of countries are incorporating environmental rights into their constitutional texts.

There are now many voices arguing that Canada should also actively incorporate environmental rights into its constitution. David Boyd critics that Canada’s environmental problems have caused many health consequences for Canadians. Using Norway as an example, David counters voices that question whether the inclusion of environmental rights in the constitution will make a real difference. In fact, Norway has recognized the people’s right to the environment in its constitution since 1992, and the strong environmental laws based on the constitution have generated good economic and ecological benefits for the country. He pointed out that the move to constitutionalize environmental rights would not undermine national unity but rather contribute to reconciliation with indigenous peoples. 

Emmett Macfarlane holds a different opinion on this. He agreed that Canada has substantial environmental issues that need to be addressed, but enshrining environmental rights in the constitution may not be an appropriate solution at this time. He notes that “entrenching rights effectively transfers the decision-making authority to the courts.” However, it is questionable “whether judges have either the legitimacy or the competence to delve into the relevant policy issues. “It would be very challenging to add a broad right to a healthy environment to the charter because it requires substantial provincial consent. He believes that the key to solving environmental problems lies in the effective realization of governments’ political commitment to environmental policies.

As a fundamental law, the constitution provides the legal basis for the state’s activities and citizens. I believe that incorporating environmental rights into the constitution is the only way to improve the environmental legal system. In the context of the environmental crisis, environmental rights have become the premise and basis for the existence of the right to life, the right to development, and other human rights. Environmental pollution and destruction can seriously undermine or threaten existing human rights, and if environmental rights, which are the foundation of all basic human rights, are not brought into constitutional focus, other human rights will be left unprotected. Take the “Flammable water” case as an example. While there is no conclusive evidence linking groundwater contamination to hydraulic fracturing in the oil and gas industry, even with evidence, it is difficult for victims to win lawsuits against energy giants. Without the support of environmental rights, the best possible outcome would be a large payout, but the oil industry would not stop using this technology, which can be very profitable. 

Aldo Leopold, a representative of the ecocentrists, proposed an idea with many similarities with environmental rights. Recognizing the value of the environment and the land itself and actively protecting the stability and prosperity of the environment as a whole is beneficial to human well-being and other members of the eco-community.

In conclusion, I believe that the Canadian Constitution should recognize the environmental rights of its citizens. As living creatures, humans cannot survive without clean water, atmosphere, soil, and other environmental elements. Thus, humans should see ourself as a member of the natural community, where the moral community’s scope needs to be expanded to include humans and nature itself. While the mere act of amending the constitution does not directly address environmental issues, it is an indispensable start.

-Dengnan Chen

References:

1. David R. Boyd, E. M. (n.d.). Should environmental rights be in the constitution? 3 March 2014. Retrieved from https://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/second-regard/boyd-macfarlane/
2. Aldo Leopold (1948). “The Land Ethic” from A Sand County Almanac. http://www.neohasid.org/pdf/landethic.pdf

Despite past attempts to legally protect environmental rights in Canada, we have yet to see any legislation recognizing the right of all people to live in a healthy environment. Although it wasn’t passed, the proposed Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights (Bill C-438) offers an interesting peek at what environmental rights legislation might look like in Canada. One section of the Bill stuck out to me for its potential ethical implications – Section 19, titled “No action for remedial conduct” (Bill C-438 2019).

While most of Bill C-438 outlines the protective legal actions that an individual can take against environmentally harmful practices, Section 19 describes when such actions cannot be taken. In brief, it says that one cannot take protective action against a given environmentally harmful conduct, if said conduct was done to prevent or reverse damage to “human, animal or plant life or health,” or in the interest of public security, humanitarian needs, peacekeeping, or defending members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Bill C-438 2019). These conditions are valid so long as the alleged conduct was also “reasonable and consistent with public safety” (Bill C-438 2019).

Yet these criteria, which allow potential environmental harm, leave plenty of room for interpretation and ethical uncertainty. To what point, for example, can we act in a way that helps one part of the environment while damaging another? How do we determine when it is justifiable to harm the environment in the interest of public security? Doesn’t environmental degradation itself pose a threat to public safety?

In his opinion piece in Policy Options, Emmett Macfarlane (2014) points out that enshrining environmental rights in the Constitution places responsibility on the Courts to answer such questions as the ones I’ve just raised. Macfarlane insists that judges are not the best suited to answer questions dealing with various economic and social dimensions. I would also argue that rulings on these questions would be subject to each judge’s ethical leanings, whether those leanings are conscious or not.

For example, how would an ecocentrist, a biocentrist, and an animal rights theorist each assess the implications of a conduct that harms one species while generally benefiting the surrounding environment? This might arise if, for instance, a conservation agency decided to eliminate an invasive species for the health of a whole ecosystem. Under Section 19, so long as this process is “reasonable and consistent with public safety,” no one could take legal action against it for the harm it does to one species.

This might get varied responses from ecocentrists, who value whole ecosystems over individual life forms. Most ecocentrists would then support the removal of an invasive species. However, if that species were to go extinct, this would raise concerns for ecocentrists like Rolston (1985), who believe we owe moral duties to whole species as an evolutionary unit.

Biocentrists like Paul Taylor (1981), on the other hand, view each individual life form as intrinsically valuable. So, killing individuals of an invasive species would not be justifiable, even if this was done to save the surrounding ecosystem. A slightly more nuanced biocentrist like Robin Attfield, on the other hand, might be able to justify killing an invasive species if it was lower in terms of moral hierarchy than other individuals in the ecosystem. For example, Attfield (1987) believes that we owe more moral obligation to animal species than we do to plants.

Finally, an animal rights theorist like Peter Singer (1974) would absolutely not support killing or harming animals for the betterment of an ecosystem. If the invasive species were a plant, however, then animal rights theorists likely wouldn’t see a problem with its elimination, especially if it would lead to animal flourishing.

My short review of these various ethical responses highlights the open-endedness of Bill C-438, Section 19. Regardless of whether the judges viewing these cases would consider them in these ethical terms, the vague language in this section of the bill raises some important questions for environmental ethicists. If a law like Bill C-438 is ever passed in Canada, I think a careful ethical review would be in order.

-Mary

References

Attfield, Robin. 1987. “Biocentrism, Moral Standing and Moral Significance.” Philosophica 39(1): 47-58. https://www.philosophica.ugent.be/wp-content/uploads/fulltexts/39-5.pdf.

 BILL C-438: An Act to enact the Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights and to make related amendments to other Acts. 2019. https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-438/first-reading.

Macfarlane, Emmett. 2014. “Parliament, not the courts, should decide.” https://policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/second-regard/boyd-macfarlane/

Rolston, Holmes. 1985. “Duties to Endangered Species.” BioScience 35 (11): 718-726. https://sites.google.com/a/rams.colostate.edu/rolston-csu-website/environmental-ethics/ee-chbk/duties-edangered-species-biosci-a-pdf.

Singer, Peter. 1974. “All Animals Are Equal.” Philosophic Exchange 5(1): 103-116. https://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol5/iss1/6/?utm_source=digitalcommons.brockport.edu%2Fphil_ex%2Fvol5%2Fiss1%2F6&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages.

Taylor, Paul W. 1981. “The Ethics of Respect for Nature.” Environmental Ethics (3):197-218. https://www-pdcnet-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/collection/authorizedshow?id=enviroethics_1981_0003_0003_0197_0218&file_type=pdf.

David Suzuki in his report advocated that Canada should establish an environmental bill to protect people’s living environments. David thought that Canadian people had the moral right to enjoy a healthy environment. So his suggestion was moral. In the current world, more and more countries regard the right of citizens to enjoy a healthy living environment as one of the civil rights. The citizen’s right to enjoy a good environment is the right to live and develop in a healthy, comfortable and beautiful environment. The environmental right is a new concept of right arising from the crisis of the human environment, which is the legalization of moral rights and due rights. It is also the combination of collective rights and individual rights, and the high unity of rights and obligations. In the social relationship of environment, each subject of this right not only enjoys and utilizes the environment but also undertakes the obligation not to cause damage to the environment enjoyed and utilized by other subjects. This belongs to the category of moral obligation. Human existence cannot break this moral principle.

The suggestion of establishing the related law to protect humans’ right to live in a healthy environment is moral for the whole society. David’s idea is reasonable that “progress is possible when enough people recognize its necessity and come together to make it happen” (Suzuki 2015). His words reflect a reality that human beings as a whole need to cooperate to protect the environment, and the premise of realizing this national consciousness is to turn environmental rights into the rights of every citizen. In this report, he proposes the Canadian government to join the environmental plan. The reason is that many countries in the world have been actively promoting the strategy of a healthy environment. If Canadians want to achieve sustainable development, the Canadian government also needs to make a moral decision. So David Suzuki’s idea is in line with the common moral requirement of the whole humans society.

I also support David’s suggestion because the environment is closely related to the living conditions of human beings. In modern industrial society, human social activities have caused serious damage to the environment. Air pollution, water pollution, climate change and other issues have caused serious threats to humans’ health. If humans’ right to subsistence cannot be guaranteed, then other social development and progress will lose their basic significance. Therefore, it is a good decision to add environmental rights to civil rights. For example, some industries engage in the production which causes environmental damage for their own economic interests, such as the arbitrary emission of chemical wastewater, which is not in line with moral values. Because they destroy the living environment of the surrounding residents, at the same time, in a broad sense, they are also destroying their own living environment, because human beings live on the same earth. Therefore, if we can establish laws to protect people’s living environment, it will be beneficial to all mankind. Obviously, it is not an easy thing to achieve this goal because it also requires the society and the government to pay more costs and improve the regulatory force. For Canada, the author’s idea will also receive different feedbacks from different parties. However, in the face of the harsh reality of environmental pollution and destruction, people gradually realize that the environmental right, such as breathing fresh air, has been harmed and deprived, and seriously endangers the survival and development of human beings. Therefore, people put forward the requirements of citizens’ environmental rights in order to strive for a clean and good living environment. It has become an important part of social morality and reminds humans to care about their living environment.

Work Cited

Suzuki, David. (2015) “Canada Has to Join the Environmental Rights Movement”. Huffpost.

https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/david-suzuki/environmental-rights_b_6103258.html?utm_hp_ref=ca-right-to-a-healthy-environment.

De-extinction is a relatively new conversation in environmental circles. Previously, extinction was seen as the end for a species, with no way for that species to return (this is still the general and popular view in the general public). De-extinction has given environmentalists and conservationists a way to possibly reverse this. De-extinction is the general term that is used to describe the process of reviving previously extinct species using genetics and synthetic biology. This process could be used to revive species that have been extinct for several decades or even millennia (Sandler). As this is being discussed more, it is essential to discuss the ethicality surround such technology and whether it would be used as a tool to absolve human guilt for previously destructive actions (which stems from an anthropocentric view) or in other ways.

Ronald Sandler in his paper, The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species, talks about the concept of de-extinction and the ethical considerations surrounding this concept. The first point he brings up is the concept of restorative justice for species such as the passenger pigeon and thylacine which went extinct due to anthropogenic causes such as habitat destruction and hunting (Sandler). This point resonated with me the most in the ethical arguments for de-extinction because I am a strong believer in restorative justice in other areas of life and found that logic sound. However, as I thought about it a bit more, I realized that while it is a good starting point, it would not be sufficient response to the issue that led to the extinction of these species in the first place. If the scientists and researchers are successful in reviving the passenger pigeons or thylacine, what are the chances that they would not go extinct again or be endangered? I asked myself this because while improvements have been made in regulating hunting and protection of endangered species, we are not here yet as it concerns habitat conservation. Many species are endangered and on the verge of extinction today, and I am concerned that we may not yet have fully addressed the reasons for their extinction. 

What stood out to me in this point though, was the fact that Sandler says that species and ecosystems lack ‘interests and welfares distinct from the individuals that constitute and populate them’ and that for this reason, there is no ethical responsibility grounded in restorative justice to engage in restorative justice (Sandler). I would have to disagree with Sandler on this point from an ecocentric point of view. Looking at this through the lens of ecocentrism, de-extinction would be trying to revive species that were once a part of an ecosystem. And trying to repair an ecosystem that had previously been disrupted due to anthropocentric causes would be an ethical responsibility well-grounded in the idea of restorative justice to that ecosystem. 

Further into the paper, Sandler discusses ethical arguments against de-extinction and the point that stood out the most to me was the fact that de-extinction, as it is presented now, is a form of luxury conservation and a technological fix (Sandler). I agree with Sandler on this and the fact that de-extinction does not fully address any pressing ecological or social problems (Sandler). As I mentioned earlier in this post, it presently seems to be a way to absolve human guilt and concern without dealing too much with the root issue which is human behaviour. De-extinction as technology is not inherently problematic and could be beneficial in repairing disrupted ecosystems. However, a lot more work concerning human behaviours and attitudes will be required before this can happen effectively. 

– Oseyi

Sources:

1. Sandler, R. (2014). The ethics of reviving long extinct species. Conservation Biology, 28(2), 354-360.

In “Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” by Ronald Sandler, various arguments are presented both in favour of and against the de-extinction of animals. The article’s numerous arguments supporting de-extinction research provide a clear picture of de-extinction’s limitations. I will be looking at some of these arguments and expand on them to further state it’s shortcomings.

Sandler states “Deep de‐extinction may offer an optimistic and creative research agenda in comparison with what some see as the current primary conservation biology activities” (Donlan et al. 2006; Brand 2013; Novak 2013 as cited in Sandler 2013). This argument presents de-extinction technology as an easy way out compared to traditional mitigation and maintenance efforts. However, this raises the question of why traditional methods are incapable of “offering optimistic and creative research methods”. It could be stated that de-extinction brings forth a new way of understanding and tackling environmental problems; along with the numerous scientific advancements the field would generate. However, this creates the idea that people should give up on traditional methods because they lack novelty and instead focus on de-extinction research. But novelty in no way indicates that de-extinction is as effective as traditional methods. Researching de-extinction technology is significantly easier than completely re-structuring the world’s consumption, waste management, and environmental protection systems. Yet, time and time again, case studies show that traditional methods are effective and are capable of generating long term environmental sustainability with proper implementation. So, rather than ponder on the capabilities of a relatively young branch of science, we should do all we can to prevent further environmental degradation where possible. As Sandler stated, ” deep de‐extinction is not itself a significant species conservation strategy because it does not prevent species from going extinct. Nor does it address the causes of extinction.” Humans need to solve the problem at its core rather than looking for temporary solutions or deceiving themselves in the potential that de-extinction projects have. Firms and countries alike should work together to make traditional efforts more practical and easily applicable rather than funding the unknown potential of an expensive scientific innovation.

Another argument Sandler uses to support de-extinction technology is: “many people would find it wondrous and awesome to see a living ivory‐billed woodpecker, thylacine, or mammoth, even if only in a zoo or wildlife park.” Sandler makes the previous statement as a support for the value that de-extinction can create for people as such it is likely Sandler did not intend to imply that humans would bring back extinct species for the sole purpose of human satisfaction. However, assuming de-extinction to be possible, it’s likely that companies and countries alike would attempt to profit off of the created animals as much as possible. Which begs the question: is the resurrection of species for human pleasure ethical? I would argue that it’s not. Given that such animals would have less intrinsic value compared to their original ancestors because they did not evolve into existence. Creating these animals for the sole purpose of profit would only further strip them of any value they have left. Since animals gain value from their interconnectedness with their environment, an animal with no environment to become interdependent on would become meaningless.

An additional argument used to support de-extinction technology is its ability to be used as a last resort, specifically: “If all other conservation efforts for a species fail, then at least the species’ DNA can be preserved so that it can be revived later when the threats to it are mitigated, habitat is reestablished, or it will be useful to us.” But this argument assumes that it’ll be physically possible to reestablish the environment using previously extinct species when nothing else works. Realistically, assuming Sandler is right about de-extinction’s ability to be used as a last resort, it’s likely that when such a time comes the environment will already be irreparable. If a large number of species were to go extinct then the earth would likely be in a position where supporting life, let alone large numbers, would be close to impossible. At which point, the chance of ever reestablishing habitats and environments after they have been completely destroyed isn’t feasible. De-extinction isn’t a good last resort because it only works so long as an environment exists that can support the animals we will introduce into it. But if such an environment doesn’t exist or is on the verge of collapse, de-extinction technology becomes useless. Society needs to use the current strategies developed to combat environmental destruction and develop long term sustainability. Ignoring the problem and suddenly reviving numerous species because of environmental degradation is not the answer. Like Sandler later states: “What would be problematic is using de‐extinction in lieu of alternative approaches.”

Lastly, Sandler takes a utilitarian perspective in his comparison of animal welfare: “Compared with the number of animals already used in research (estimated to be 10–25 million/year in the United States alone) and in animal agriculture (estimated to be 56 billion land animals/year globally), conservation cloning (let alone deep de‐extinction) does not pose a special or very large animal welfare problem.” The argument applies a bias against small groups when compared to larger ones. I found myself asking why the intense suffering of a few is considered less than the suffering of the many? If a small village were to be hit by a tornado and all of the people were to die, would we say that their suffering is less compared to if an earthquake had destroyed New York City killing everyone. The average person wouldn’t make such a claim, so why is it justified to make the same claim with animals? People accept that in either case, the deaths of any number of people is a horrible thing, yet we count and compare animals’ lives as if they were nothing more than statistical figures, all the while disregarding their worth and value. By the logic of Sandler’s argument, it follows that we should disregard the elderly and sick, and focus on the young, middle-aged and healthy since they make up a larger proportion of the population. It’s a radical claim, rather we should not disregard the suffering experiences of a set of people nor animals simply due to their lack of numbers.

First of all, I would like to distinguish deep de-extinction from cloning. It means revive species that been extinct decades ago rather than more recent species. (355) Although a similar technique uses in both situations, the value and purpose of these two are different. In “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species,” Ronald Sandler argues that deep de-extinction is not intrinsically problematic but not so urgent or more ethically important compare to other conservation measures and concerns. (359) According to Sandler’s article, I will discuss the duty that humans have to make up their past the concerns associate with deep de-extinction. Then, I would explain Sandler’s idea about deep de-extinction is mainly techno-science oriented instead of conservation-oriented.

Human interruption is the major cause for species extinction, and intrinsic values associated with species are independently from humans. Some people would argue that some species are non-scient. And since they are no longer exist, they would not have feelings or interests in bringing back to life. However, every species has its values, and we as humans should respect that. If humans are the cause of their extinction, even they do not have interests or feelings. It is our responsibility to help restore their lives as they have the right to live. Therefore, we could use deep de-extinction as a tool to reintroduce into the environment. However, it is almost impossible to send these revive species back to their habitat. Since they were “born” in a lab setting and their habitats are different from the past. Also, even we use deep de-extinction to bring them back, many of them will use for research and exhibition instead of release. (358) In this way, to solve people’s concern for ecology and human health. While these “new-born” species would lose their intrinsic value as well as ecological value. They were not in the ecosystem means they cannot contribute to the environment. In the end, they would become subjects people use to study and display rather than species who deserve our respects. Hence, humans still own duty for the extinct species since their life cannot restore by deep de-extinction.

Deep de-extinction could create scientific and even economic value for the extinct species, but it cannot restore their intrinsic and ecological value. Additionally, it is not a critical species conservation strategy due to it cannot prevent extinction or address the cause of extinction. (357) To achieve the deep de-extinction would require advanced technology, intelligent researchers, and human-made habitat for the species. It need support from the government and companies to keep this program running. However, these supporters care less about conservation than getting profit. And these researchers need to convince them to invest. Therefore, despite the unpredictable risk associate with release these species, they need them to make profits. Although these technologies can contribute to other conservation methods, it is not urgent for de-extinction. To achieve conservation, we would need people to realize the cause of these extinctions and prevent them in the future. Moreover, the conservation approach to the currently endangered species is more significant. They are alive and would impact the ecosystem and other species around them. The consequence of losing them is far more severe than bring back the species that we already a lost long time ago.

In conclusion, I would agree with Sandler’s argument on it is that urgent to achieve de-extinction. And there are more substantial conservation methods we could consider rather than develop new technology.

Ruoxin

Reference:

Sandler, Ronald. “The Ethics of Reviving Long extinct species.” Conservation Biology, 2013.

After study with the  specific analysis of the potential crisis leading to the extinction of homing pigeons, the concept of de-extinction was introduced by Kasperbauer. In fact, the idea of resuming extinction has existed for a long time, because since the rapid development of mankind, the environmental pollution and ecological damage caused by industrialization have become more and more serious, and this effect has accelerated the extinction and disappearance of species. This is a painful thing for human beings and the natural world. If conditions permit, the idea of resuming extinction is not impossible. However, whether the moral ethics and environmental ethics contained in it are in line with the status quo of survival is complicated. And far-reaching thinking content. Kasperbauer pointed out that he focused on the extinction value. The development of de-extinction technology has not yet reached a reliable realization.

So when Kasperbauer uses biotechnology, the idea that the genome is combined with the embryo and develops sounds effective, but the result is that there are genetic differences between the extinct species and the previously extinct species, and their offspring are 80% similar- 90% (2017). In fact, this shows that there is still a lot of room for the complete restoration of extinction. The reason may be the developmental environment or genetic changes. So in this case, the resulting situation is unpredictable. And how do we choose the species to return to extinction? How do we consider whether a species is worthy of restoration? First, consider the impact on the ecological environment, and secondly, are human interests? Is the current ecological environment suitable for extinct species? Should it be abandoned if it has nothing to do with human interests or species that cannot satisfy human interests? This is one of the profound issues that are very complex and contains ethics. Therefore, we assume that the restoration of extinction can be achieved. Taking into account that the reproduction of ancient biological embryos requires specific development occasions, and the physiological structure of modern organisms and ancient organisms have obvious differences when people want to use modern organisms to breed ancient biological embryos, it is very difficult. Moreover, there are huge differences between the current ecological environment of the earth and ancient times. Therefore, even if the ancient species is restored, if the environment suitable for the survival of this species cannot be reconstructed, the survival rate of this species is difficult to guarantee (2018).

Kasperbauer pointed out the five challenges of de-extinction, these are also our concerns. I want to explain two of the challenges. The first is that there may still be reasons for the extinction of species in the current living conditions. We cannot know whether the reasons leading to species extinction are eradicated, because of the complexity of the reasons, and the reasons for existence are likely to accumulate and evolve over time and have become or diverge into more potential causes of extinction. Therefore, if we do not completely eradicate the root cause of the existential threat to extinct species, then even if we resurrect them, the survival rate will be difficult to guarantee. The second challenge is related to the invasion. Kasperbauer proposed that people can genetically modify extinct species to make them less aggressive, but more friendly(2017). I think this challenge is unethical. I think it is not advisable if we can modify the genes of extinct species to be what we want. Because every species, no matter what attributes it is, is given by nature and conforms to the laws of nature. Human beings have no right to change the genes of any species, even if it is of great benefit to the interests of mankind, this is against ethics. So this is a very worthy question.

Although de-extinction technology is still immature, I think it can still help human beings make up for the extinction caused by their own faults. It is also a feasible idea to restore the diversity of the ecological environment. Therefore, when we measure whether this technology should be widely used, I hope that it can continue to progress in accordance with the changes of the times and the progress of human thinking while avoiding the survival threats brought by the restoration of extinction to species and humans, which is the most meaningful.

work cited:

Kasperbauer, T.J. (2017). Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction. Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20(1): 1-14.

Zhihu. (2018). Could we use DNA technology to realize de-extinction? https://www.zhihu.com/question/304934951

In Ronald Sandler’s “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” the question of the moral permissibility of bringing back extinct species is addressed. Sandler explores the reasons in favour of their revival first; justice, the establishment of lost value, creative value, and serving as a conservational last resort. Sandler also engages with arguments against revival, these being the unnaturalness of it, animal welfare concerns, ecological and health concerns and the issue of hubris. Sandler takes a mostly anthropocentric approach in grappling with the issues. 

Sandler provides very salient points in favour of reviving long extinct species but ultimately concludes that there are more pressing issues to be prioritized such as “efforts to conserve existing species and that the ecological, animal welfare, conservation, legal, and health concerns”. I completely agree with this position based on concern for existing animals and the extinct species. 

The argument is pretty straight forward for why existing species should be prioritized but I’ll still briefly address them. Firstly there is an ongoing threat to animals in existence that doesn’t exist for already extinct species. Animals that are alive today have to compete to survive whereas there is no danger presented to already extinct animals (it’s not like you can go double extinct). One could argue that the longer a species goes without existence the less prepared to deal with existence they will be when they return. This opposition holds some merit but realistically, barring catastrophic disaster, there is no way that the environment will change enough for a species to be completely unable to adapt to their environment, especially with the aid of scientists. Additionally, there is an important distinction made by Sandler to centre the discussion around long-extinct species. Specifying that the species have been extinct for a long time already suggests that whatever concerns might arise from the resurfacing of the species are not of significant concern. For these reasons, this argument doesn’t sway my perspective.  

On the other hand, in the case of the extinct species, we might assume that to not exist is bad. However, I would argue that this is not the case. To adopt an epicurean view; existence is the absence of pain which is good and an absence of pleasure which is neither nor bad. This suggests that not existing is, at very least, a neutral endeavour. There are numerous ways to object to this position of course and in this application, the most salient would be that individuals are missing out when they do not exist, therefore not existing is bad on the deprivation account. While there is merit to this perspective from our perspective as existing but if one was to not exist, there would be nobody to be deprived of experiences. 

At the centre of my perspective is still agreement. Just as Sandler outlines in their paper, there is nothing wrong with reviving long-extinct species. However, we should focus on species that are currently in existence and how we can protect them, the ecosystems and the health of the planet. Once we have dealt with those concerns, the question of bringing back extinct species can be re-examined.

– Luke

Work Cited:

Sandler, R. (2014), The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species. Conservation Biology, 28: 354-360. https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1111/cobi.12198

As an animal lover myself, I am fascinated by all the different animals and the little intrinsic differences they have between them: each species is unique and valuable on its own. Because of this, extinction is a sad word to me, as it means that every single member of an unique animal species disappears forever from this planet. Extinction due to natural causes are perhaps more acceptable, such as the mammoths and dinosaurs. But when it comes to extinction with some or more anthropogenic causes, I experience frustration with the human race and the destruction it has done to the planet. When I first came across the concept of de-extinction, it seemed absolutely wonderful. De-extinction is “accomplished by reconstructing close approximations of the extinct species’ genomes based on information found in preserved DNA and on genetic information from close living relatives.” ¹ It seems that being able to bring back the species that we have forced into extinction is a matter of justice, an effort of making amends for our past wrongs. Ronald Sandler, however, does not agree with this belief. He takes a generally negative view on the matter of de-extinction, remaining only slightly open to its development when it does not compromise “ethically important things.” ¹ When it comes to justice, he denies this claim, explaining that while individual animals are alive, the species as a whole is not alive, and therefore does not deserve moral considerations. Further, Sandler puts more emphasis on reparations and rehabilitation, rather than a restorative approach. Which means that it is more important to “reform our practices and institutions so as to minimize future extinctions.” ¹ Sandler’s arguments makes it apparent that even though we may feel compelled to fix our mistakes through de-extinction, it is difficult to justify such an urge of justice. I began to think if there are more concerns that I have overlooked.

While Sandler discusses that revived species could have some value to them (thought different from before they went extinct),¹ he overlooks the possibility that de-extinction could render all species’ intrinsic value worthless. While animals’ ecological and instrumental values could remain relatively the same, something intrinsic is undoubtedly lost when biotechnologies are capable of modifying an entire species. In modifying the genes of a species, gene-drive technologies have already undermined much of that value. But with de-extinction, we would be creating an entire species with pieces of DNA invisible to the naked eye, nearly “out of thin air”. This thought is terrifying. If we could easily make our own species, then how valuable would that make all animal species that existed from evolution, who took existence on their own? The respect that we have for nature’s creations would decrease drastically if we are capable of doing the same thing. Sandler expresses a similar concern that conservationist efforts would likely be threatened as resources are diverted,¹ but I think this loss of value concerns beyond the endangered species that need our protection. When we are capable of personalizing and creating species to our hearts’ desires, all that has been made by nature becomes a lot less valuable, as we can easily do the same thing. Sandler addresses this issue of hubris in his paper, in defending that proponents of de‐extinction often “emphasize the value of species and are motivated at least in part by wonder and a sense of responsibility toward extinct species”. As well, he explains that responsibly pursuing de-extinction will not be problematic, including concerns for ecological sensitivity and compassion for the animals involved. I agree entirely with his views. Where I diverge from his opinions is my concern for the reaction from the public. It is reasonable to think that proponents of de-extinction, motivated by science and responsibility, will not take a hubristic attitude towards the natural world. However, such experts cannot prevent a decline of animals’ intrinsic value in the eyes of the public. When something becomes more easily attainable, its value usually decreases. This remains an important concern of mine.

Perhaps my most significant concern is the unstoppable nature of new technology. It seems that we can address many ethical concerns with new technology, allowing more cautious measures to be taken when it comes to their implementation and development. Nonetheless, we don’t seem to be able to halt their development, no matter how much fear is attributed to them. Artificial intelligence is one such technology in which many individuals acknowledge their potential threats to us humans. Still, as Arend Hintze, an expert of AI comments, AI will continue to be developed despite these fears.² Sandler also points out that de-extinction creates value in being a “tremendous scientific and technological achievement” when achieved. How likely is it that we will cease pursuing such an achievement? That is, perhaps, the most terrifying part about technologies. We may be able to contribute to this debate in bringing up more issues to be addressed, but the development and study of this technology will continue to proceed, against all odds.

References

¹ Sandler, Ronald. “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species.” Conservation Biology 28, no. 2 (2014): 354–60. https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.12198.

² Hintze, Arend. “What an Artificial Intelligence Researcher Fears about AI.” 11 Nov. 2019, theconversation.com/what-an-artificial-intelligence-researcher-fears-about-ai-78655.

In Sandler’s The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species the question of deep de-extinction (the revival of long extinct species as opposed to recently extinct species) has its ethically for and against arguments explored, followed by Sandler’s take on DDE.

I: Sandler’s Arguments for and Against Deep De-Extinction (DDE)

The ethical arguments Sandler explores in favor of DDE are the justice, lost value, creation of value, and last resort arguments. First, the justice argument states that some species considered for DDE went extinct due to humans, meaning we ‘owe’ them their revival (355). However, considering species broadly do not have interests to be impeded (355) nor are the specific individuals around anymore, justice in the restorative sense gives no ethical duty to develop DDE. Second, the lost value arguments states species are valuable ecologically, instrumentally, and intrinsically (356) so their revival restores ‘worldly’ value. Sandler counters this, as a species’ value is “relational and context sensitive, [DDE] alone is insufficient to reestablish it.” (356). For example, a revived mammoth lost its natural habitat, its niche is non-existent, and intrinsically (as DDE hybridizes DNA of revived species) is a ‘new’ creature. Resultingly, lost value gives no ethical duty to develop DDE. Third, the creating value argument holds that “even if [DDE] cannot replace lost values, it may nevertheless create value.” (356). It is true many would like to see a live mammoth or extinct flora as spectacle, further the biotech behind DDE is a massive leap in technology anyway. Though interesting, Sandler recognizes creating value is not necessarily ethically bound to developing DDE for extinct species’ revival. Fourthly, the last resort argument concludes that should conservation efforts fail, DDE insures species revival later (357). Though, Sandler notes that this neither prevents nor fixes the causes of extinction (357) and may take the focus on preserving DNA rather than species in their natural context. Broadly, none of these pro-DDE arguments give an ethical duty to develop DDE. The creation of value is intriguing, but not ethically bound.

The ethical arguments Sandler explores opposed to DDE are the unnatural, animal welfare, eco/health concerns, and hubristic arguments. To begin, the unnatural argument fits those same people who object to other genetic altering technologies as it creates new hybrid organisms (357). Sandler opposes this as hybrids exist in nature, and human agriculture has been just a slower process of ‘gene altering’ anyway (357). While Sandler thinks GMOs should be labelled to respect other’s beliefs (357), this does not ethically forbid developing DDE. Following, the animal welfare argument states DDE cloning may result in genetic abnormalities, so animal suffering is possible (358). But Sandler adds DDE research will have the same oversight as any other research/conservation practice (358) so is not a new ethical debate, rather one already under a watchful eye, so again DDE is not necessarily ethically forbidden. Next, the eco/health concerns argument carries that DDE species may be released or escape, leading to unknown injuries to ecosystems and humans (358). However, “many revived species will be intended for research and exhibition, not release” (358) and that it is equally unknown if a revived species may really benefit its new environment. Lastly, the hubristic argument claims humans are ‘playing God’ and researchers overestimate their control over biotechnology, treat the symptoms and not the causes of extinction (358), and treat living things as things for humanity to design (359). Sandler states that DDE is more of a neutral tool and might be used hubristically if to redesign nature as humanity desires but can be used properly if held under careful oversight and respect (359). Once again, DDE is not necessarily ethically prohibited so long as it is used responsibly.

With the pro and anti DDE arguments established, Sandler concludes that DDE should be held as ‘Luxury Conservation’. DDE does not solve the causes or responsibilities of past mistakes, there is no ethical incentive to develop DDE nor ethically prohibit it (359). “[DDE] is fine to pursue if people want so long as it does not interfere with or compromise ethically important things” so can is ‘luxury conservation’ (359). Sandler concludes that DDE is a luxury, and so long as it does not take resources or focus on more pressing conservation efforts, so long as it is not abused simply because humanity can, and that it is used with respect and an understanding of its luxurious status (likely very expensive to clone) there is nothing inherently wrong or duty bound in developing DDE, rather it is ‘extra’; a fascinating potential not required of anyone to achieve.

II: Application

Consider the case of reviving a Woolly Mammoth. The poor things were likely hunted to extinction by our ancestors but considering their natural context is gone and so are the humans that killed them, humanity presently is neither obligated to revive nor keep them extinct. Absolutely, a live mammoth would be a spectacle and a symbol of our biotechnical prowess, but nothing more as it would likely require humans to sustain it in an artificial habitat. The arguments provided above do not necessarily forbid nor incentivize the revival of the woolly mammoth. It would be cool, but unnecessary, much like a luxury! Further, DDE may give some peace regarding hyper important species such as pollinators. I absolutely think present conservation efforts must be pursued to their extreme before DDE is considered, yet DDE can provide relief knowing that if humanity does screw up the conservation of a mass pollinator species, such as bees, there is a potential for more chances to clean up our act.

III: Question for Sandler

What are the implications of borderline cloning biotechnology? The creating value section discusses the potential for technological progress for the sake of progress in DDE in a kind of throw away manner (understandably, the scope of Sandler’s exploration is regarding animal cloning). Yet I feel the first question that will be asked after a form of animal cloning has been developed is “can and should we clone a human?”. I do not feel like this is entirely off the point, as humans are made of the same building blocks DDE would use to hypothetically revive long dead organisms. Human cloning is a logical application of this technology, and I would like to know if Sandler considered the aftermath of DDE tech in this direction.

Sources:

Ronald Sandler. The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species. Conservation Biology Vol. 28 No. 2 354-360 (2013) Society for Conservation Biology DOI: 10.1111/cobi.12198

This week in Philosophy 355 we are discussing the topic of de-extinction as a method for conservation. De-extinction is a novel conservation technology heavily influenced by cloning; however, it is defined by T.J. Kasperbauer as “the process of reviving genetically extinct species” (2017, pg. 1).

Since many extinctions are catalyzed by humans, proponents of this technology argue that de-extinction is a good idea for various ethical reasons such as: restoring justice, reestablishing lost value, creating value, and that it is a conservation last-resort (Sandler 2013). However, those who are in opposition to the technology are in disagreement due to it being unnatural, along with concerns about animal welfare, the potential ecological and human health impacts, and it is essentially a way of “playing God” with nature (Sandler, 2013, pg. 357). This blog post will examine the debate of de-extinction through an ecocentric philosophical ethical theory standpoint using Holmes Rolston’s viewpoints to drive the discussion as to whether this technology is unnatural or not.  

As mentioned, Rolston is an ecocentrist — a philosophical ethical theory that extends moral considerability to all things (no matter if they are sentient or not) and species as wholes while rejecting anthropocentrism (the view where only humans are assigned moral value). In his paper, Rolston speaks a lot about the importance of species and how species lineages have gone through natural selection in which valuable traits are chosen to help the organism, and therefore the species adapt and sustain life. Rolston responds to the claim that artificial selection (where humans interfere in natural selection by choosing desired traits of the organism) for de-extinction  is “unnatural” where he rebuttals and claims that “most of our cultural activities are unnatural in the sense that they are not found in wild spontaneous nature” (2002, pg. 10). Furthermore, according to Rolston, this genetic manipulation of the organism’s DNA is no more unnatural than that of plant breeding, where we use artificial selection to genetically alter more favourable and lucrative plants for consumption (2002). Rolston concludes his rebuttal in saying that as long as those who are manipulating or artificially selecting things that are found in nature are to go about it in a respectful way that appreciates and acknowledges the intrinsic value typical to natural selection, then it is okay to continue (2002). 

In my personal opinion, I really agree with Rolston’s critique on those who think de-extinction is unnatural. I feel as though a lot of people do not realize how frequent it is to artificially select traits or modify DNA sequences for common things such as the crops we eat. Furthermore, in response to his concluding statement, I think that it is important for everyone to value the intrinsic worth of all life on Earth when going about daily life or performing these novel de-extinction experiments. While it is a new technology and many of the workings have to be sorted out in order for those who are wary of it to subscribe to it, I think that it is very interesting and it has the potential to be a great conservation tool. I look forward to seeing this technology progress in the future. 

-Ashley 

References:

Kasperbauer, T.J. (2017). Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction. Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20(1): 1-14.

Rolston, H. (2002). What do we mean by the intrinsic value and integrity of plants and animals? Department of Philosophy, Colorado State University. 5-11. https://mountainscholar.org.  

Sandler, R. (2013). The Ethics of Reviving Long Lost Extinct Species. Department of Philosophy, Northeastern University. 354-360. https://conbio-onlinelibrary-wiley-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca.

The topic of this week’s readings was that of de-extinction, a burgeoning technology which combines our knowledge of ecosystems, genealogy, and the extinction process with our knowledge of cloning and genetic modification. This technology would enable us to effectively “bring back” species both from the brink of extinction as well as back through history.

In his ‘Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species’ Ron Sandler specifies between recently extinct species and ones that have not been around for a long time, calling these latter projects ‘deep de-extinction’, and focusses his paper on these. Sandler goes over some objections to this technology, namely “that it is unnatural; that it could cause animal suffering; that it could be ecologically problematic or detrimental to human health; and that it is hubristic or akin to playing God” (Sandler 4). He also discusses arguments that favour de-extinction efforts, “that it is a matter of justice; that it would reestablish lost value; that it would create new value; and that we need it as a conservation last resort” (2). Sandler concludes that these are valid considerations and that ultimately “de-extinction is in many respects a luxury. It is fine to pursue if people want, so long as it does not interfere with or compromise ethically important things” (6).

I enjoyed Sandler’s paper, agreeing with his thoughtful analysis of both sides of the issue, but found myself in disagreement with his conclusion. I do not believe that de-extinction, especially deep de-extinction is “fine” to pursue on the whim of humans for luxurious hobbyist purposes.

For me there are many unknowable risks (or perhaps these are simply unknowns to me, someone who is scientifically illiterate): Animals exist within an eco-system. If we bring back long-dead species, they may not have the appropriate habitat or food available. Additionally, they could be competition for whatever species have moved into their place in the ecosystem, putting them at risk. How will they learn the behaviours needed for survival in their new environment?

Quite often these animals are only brought back for study and are not released into the wild, which Sandler defends by saying there are many animals who live in lab conditions and that “the animal welfare concerns [raised] do not significantly differentiate it from many other research and conservation practices involving animals” (5) concluding that deep de-extinction should not be abandoned due to this. However at this point I am forced to wonder; if we are not bringing these animals back to release them into the wild, to fill some ecological gap, for what purpose would we be pursuing this? If the animals are destined to live in a lab, other than our own vanity and desire to play with science, what benefit does deep de-extinction bring? And especially what benefits does it bring that actually outweigh the possibility for suffering? My opinion is that there is very little value.

As a result of the above concerns I was refreshed to watch Stanley Temple’s Tedx talk. Temple argues that de-extinction should be pursued with the utmost caution, but helped enlighten me to some areas in which the technology can be used in cases of more recently extinct species who went extinct as a result of their habitats being eroded but now those habitats are thriving, or when they went extinct due to extreme hunting, but now we are better at preventing out of control hunting like that today, especially through the use of ecological reserves and the like.

The most promising case to me though was the cases he described in which an ‘evolutionary bottleneck’ has occurred. This happens when a species is so endangered that there are so few members left that cloning and other de-extinction technologies can be used promote greater genetic diversity and healthy reproduction.

So this is the main way in which I agree with Sandler: de-extinction is best used as a conservational last resort (4), in tandem with other conservation efforts to promote the other factors that are affecting that species’ ability to thrive. When a species is on the brink of extinction and we are actively working to conserve that species’ habitat so we know it will have a context in which to thrive, I argue that de-extinction technologies can and in fact should be used to promote biodiversity and to prevent the unknown impacts that losing that animal could have on its ecosystem. However, I believe there are too many unknowns about long extinct species, and bringing them back just to live in a scientifically studied context is just not worth the potential harms to the animals.

• Renée

Sources

Sandler, Ronald. (2013) ‘The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species’ Conservation Biology, Volume 28, No. 2, (pp 354–360). Boston MA. Available at:

https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1111/cobi.12198

Temple, Stanley. (2013) ‘De-extinction: a game-changer for conservation biology’. TedxDeExtinction Talk. Available at:

https://reviverestore.org/events/tedxdeextinction/de-extinction-a-game-changer-for-conservation-biology/

This week in PHIL 355, we shift our attention to issues concerning de-extinction as a form of conservation. According to T.J. Kasperbauer, reviving previously extinct species has the potential to preserve biodiversity, restore diminished ecosystems and undo previous harm caused by humans (2017, pg. 1). Throughout his paper, he focuses specifically on the de-extinction for the passenger pigeon and identifies five critical challenges affiliated with its pursuit.

When evaluating the means of pursuing de-extinction of passenger pigeons, Kasperbauer argues that humans have a duty to consider the morally-relevant interests of individual members of the species and subsequently not inflict pain and suffering upon them (2017, pg. 5). Because a species as a whole cannot experience pain or pleasure, he argues that there is no need to consider their interests when re-introducing a species back into existence (Kasperbauer, 2017).

I found this challenge particularly interesting because it works directly in opposition to the beliefs of many Eco-centrists. Unlike Kasperbauer, Holmes Rolston argues that morally-considerable interests should be extended to species as a whole since individual members would seize to exist without the evolutionary process put forward by its species (1985).

This got me thinking: When considering the impact of de-extinction processes from a utilitarian point of view, is it enough to only take into consideration the morally-relevant interests of individual members of a species? Should the relevant interests of the species as a whole be considered as well?

In the article, Kasperbauer argues that many sentient’s believe that the initial threats of predation will subsequently generate an enormous amount of suffering for individual members of a species (2017). This, he argues, illegitimatizes the idea that we should consider the interests of species as a whole first and foremost simply because de-extinction allows the species to thrive.

In my opinion, I would argue against this and believe that we should foremost consider the interests of species as a whole when considering the impacts of de-extinction.

Firstly, it is important to bear in mind that evolution happens at the species rather than the individual level (Rolston, 1985). As such, individual members of a species will only exist if they are constituents of a lineage that pass on their genes. In the case of passenger pigeons, the perpetuation of their existence depends upon a very large minimum colony size in order to reproduce successfully (Kasperbauer, 2017). The process of de-extinction would thus impose significant initial challenge and suffering for the species as a whole, whereas individual members may succeed in reproduction and not experience a significant degree of suffering.

Even when evaluating the risk of de-extinction to groups outside of the newly introduced species, we do not do so on an individual basis. Rather, we evaluate the risks associated with the re-introduction of a new species on the pain and suffering it could potentially inflict on species and ecosystems as wholes.

So why would we assess the risks of the newly introduced species any differently?

For example, consider the risk of invasion that may stem from the re-introduction of Passenger Pigeons. Because they tend to travel in flocks and may very well move beyond their native ecosystem, these pigeons would conflict with other native animals that have come to rely on the food resources and other ecosystem services in their surrounding habitats (Kasperbauer, 2017, pg. 4). This has the potential to disrupt the functioning of entire ecosystems through means of biodiversity loss, which would affect entire species whom of which depend on the services provided by other species (not individuals) to ensure their survival. As a result, the pain and suffering inflicted on species as wholes must be considered.

Moreover, the de-extinction of a potentially invasive animal could afflict significant pain and suffering towards the human population by imposing significant threats to ecosystem productivity. Although the magnitude and severity of threat may vary across regions and countries, the disruption of ecosystems through biodiversity loss is a major threat to the human species as a whole. It is through the richness of our biodiversity that perpetuates functioning ecosystems that serves as a kind of life support for humans- supplying our global population with oxygen, clean air and life that would seize to exist without it. While the potential loss of biodiversity from de-extinction may imminently impact more vulnerable regions over others, its true impact effects the human species as a whole.

All in all, I believe that it is more important to take into consideration the interests of species as wholes when evaluating the impacts of de-extinction.

Work Cited:

Kasperbauer, T. (2017). ‘Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction’, In Ethics, Policy & Environment.

Rolston, H. (1985). ‘Duties to Endangered Species’, In BioScience.

This blog post will be examining the ethical analysis for de-extinction by Sandler in his paper “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” in the context of passenger pigeons (Sandler 2014). Sandler presents a multi-dimensional overview of the ethical considerations of de-extinction, considering both proponent and opponent arguments. The idea of de-extinction remains a highly controversial topic with many different perspectives dictating the science’s future. Passenger pigeons are an avian species that went extinct in the 1914’s as a direct result of anthropogenic causes, primarily overhunting (Kasperbauer 2017). The species of passenger pigeons have been considered one that could be a possible candidate of de-extinction due to their close relations to living species, the quantity of available DNA, and there perceive value.

Sandler’s first argument deals with the restorative justice owed by humans to species that have gone extinct as a result of anthropogenic means (Sandler 2014). Sandler argues that despite the extinction of a species resulting from human activity, de-extinction would not be justifiable. The argument against the ethical ideal focuses on that a species cannot be awarded restorative justice. There is no moral obligation to the species. As all individual organisms are extinct, then there remains no obligation towards restoration. In the case of passenger pigeons, this argument remains true; not only would re-establishing the species provide no justice to the historical organisms as they would remain dead. Their extinct organisms DNA would be used meaning the “new” species also would not be the same as the historic (Kasperbauer 2017). As the technology stands, the de-extinction process would create a close replication of the historical passenger pigeon, but not an exact copy. Furthermore, passenger pigeons’ de-extinction wouldn’t negate the previous causes of the species extinctions; overhunting. Without an increase in regulations regarding the hunting of the species, the de-extinction of passenger pigeons would not even meet the criteria of reparation and rehabilitation justice (Sandler 2014)

Both the second and third arguments examine how the value of the species and organisms would impact the ethical consideration of de-extinction (Sandler 2014). The three central values mentioned by Sandler are a species ecological value, instrumental value, and their intrinsic value, another value that wasn’t discussed explicitly by Sandler is a species existence value (Kasperbauer 2017). Considering passenger pigeons, their ecological value and instrumental value are relatively similar; the value resides in the species ability to spread the seeds of nut-bearing trees. Considering that the region where passenger pigeons were previously located is now more densely populated, the significance of the species ecological and instrumental value is minimal. The passenger pigeons’ intrinsic value would also be considerably different, as the species itself is not the same as the distinct historical form. A species’ existence value is another essential factor to consider; passenger pigeons have a unique history and could be regarded as valued merely for the ability to see one, the wondrous value (Sandler 2014). The value of passenger pigeons as a species would be considerably more minimal if they were brought back negating the purpose of de-extinction, as a way to create or re-establish the species historical value.

The last argument presented by Sandler pertains to the viability of de-extinction as a last resort technology. When no other conservation and environmental management strategies have been effective in mitigating a species’ extinction, then at least the DNA can be preserved (Sandler 2014). In the case of passenger pigeons, the practicality of de-extinction as a last resort is minimal; there is a requirement in population size for the continued survival of the species, which would be costly and time-consuming to implement. Furthermore, de-extinction does nothing to actually deal with the anthropogenic factor in their historic extinction. There is no point in using de-extinction technologies if the cause of extinction is not dealt with; reintroducing an extinct species in the historic environment with no changes will likely result in a repeat extinction. The case stands that if no other conservation efforts have been useful, then there is little practical use in de-extinction as the results will remain the same. If passenger pigeons were reintroduced, they would likely still be considered pests and overhunted until extinction for the second time (Kasperbauer 2017).

By examining passenger pigeons’ case, it’s easy to see that the moral considerability of de-extinction is reliant on many contingent factors. Restorative justice is inadmissible to extinct species, but reparation is possible if regulations are put in place to limit the amount of overhunting. There is only limited value of de-extinction passenger pigeons, especially in their historical regions but, there is a possibility to create value in new ecosystems, as a new species remains. Conservation focus must not be entirely on de-extinction, but instead on mitigating climate change, habitat degradation, and pollution otherwise history will be repeated (Sandler 2014). There are many possibilities of future research in the field of de-extinction, morality must be considered at every step.

Sources

T.J. Kasperbauer (2017) Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction, Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20:1, 1-14, DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

R. Sandler (2014) The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species, 28:2, 354-360, DOI: 10.1111/cobi.12198

De-extinction is a peculiar topic. I never thought I’d have to consider the ethics of resurrecting the genetic line of a lost species, but science continues to surprise and scare me with its possibilities. On one hand, several immediate moral objections against this technology immediately come to mind, many of which T.J. Kasperbauer more thoroughly discusses in his paper (from which this blog post draws to inform its content). On the other hand, I would love to see a living woolly mammoth. My mom probably would, too. And I don’t think it’s too controversial an opinion to believe that many people have their own ‘woolly mammoths,’ i.e., their own personal preferences of species that they would love and appreciate to see in-person (perhaps constituting an ethical problem in itself, for those insensitive and foolish enough to hold captive dangerous animals in their backyard, primarily for these creatures’ exotic status). Still, the satisfaction of my preferences, nor of those of any human, should not serve as the chief basis of justifying de-extinction; on the contrary, there better be good, defensible reasons for bringing back species that have gone extinct, many of whom have died out in the first place due to human arrogance and moral negligence.

I will ignore for now the objection that these scientific developments are unnatural, or that they are another reprehensible human attempt of achieving mastery over nature. I admit I do believe there’s something fundamentally disturbing about so intimately manipulating genes – I think there’s some wisdom to be found in Shelley’s Frankenstein, alongside other pertinent science fiction cautioning us against zombifying life – but I’m willing to set aside my feelings for the sake of considering whether there are ecological benefits to de-extinction, as well as individual benefits for the animals and plants themselves. One obvious reason for pursuing this technology is the potential good it offers to eco-systems that would benefit from the re-introduction of extinct species (Kasperbauer 3). These animals and plants could provide critical functions that regulate and work towards the health of an eco-system, such as deterring pests, or acting as predators, or serving as prey themselves. Insofar as de-extinction offers a means of providing these vital roles that other species (or other forms of technology) may not be able to fulfill, the potential benefits do seem valuable. Of course, we’d still have to consider the individual suffering entailed by bringing these animals into existence,¹ but if we are holistic eco-centrists who endorse the value of species and their genetic lines over individuals, as espoused by Rolston,² then this objection appears less grave. Kasperbauer does point out, however, that the original cause of extinction for many of these animals still exists, as with hunting practices (4), and de-extinction doesn’t address these other separate moral (and indeed, political) dimensions that are, in themselves, matters of ethical debate. We certainly wouldn’t want to revive an animal species solely to create more targets for a crossbow, and I think in this conversation regarding de-extinction, we should take more seriously the question of whether we humans are even ready for this kind of power and technology.

I’m inclined to believe otherwise. And I don’t see it as unwarranted cynicism due to past human failures. I do firmly believe that science holds so much wondrous potential to affirm our proper relationship to the natural world, to restore so much that has been lost, and to discover what good can yet be done for our eco-community. So, perhaps in the future I wouldn’t have to be as worried as I am whenever new and powerful scientific developments are on the horizon. I think such caution is justifiable now, however. At present, humankind appears to me to be at the precipice of a drastic ideological shift in how we ought to view our relationship to the natural word, relative to the existential threats (of climate change, of massive pollution, of plastic, of other environmental problems) to ourselves and to the plants and animals with whom we live. I do fear that de-extinction carries with it a real moral hazard to become complacent and morally deficient with how we treat species at present. After all, if reviving these animals in the future always remains a possibility, why worry about their continued existence in the present? Why not defer responsibility to the future, especially during this time when we humans are already playing with our own potential extinction? This line of thinking seriously worries me, and I think it should worry anyone who wouldn’t normally give a second thought about the ethics of de-extinction. Certainly, I don’t think this technology necessarily entails this type of outcome; nor do I believe that this technology, which, by itself, has much value in other areas of scientific research, is morally impermissible despite its potential for abuse. Still, I think there is much prudence in withholding my desire to see a woolly mammoth, until the day I know it will arrive in a safer and more responsible world.

Footnotes

¹ Plants involve a more complex discussion since they lack sentience, and it is being debated whether their lack of sentence entails a lack of interests that can be violated, or if this objection can apply to them.

² Rolston discusses this topic extensively in his paper.

Works Cited

Kasperbauer, T.J. “Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction.” Ethics, Policy & Environment, vol. 20, no. 1, 2017, pp. 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

~ John

This blog post draws on “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” by Ronald Sandler. 

Upon reading this title, my brain immediately jumps to Steven Spielberg’s Jurassic Park. However, I had to remind myself that this was about the ethics of reviving extinct species, not about the possible ramifications of doing such a thing. Sandler does conclude that the reasons for de-extinction are ethically problematic (355). De-extinction does not address the causes for extinction, nor does it promote the prevention of extinction of other species (355). Therefore, it could have unforeseeable negative ramifications towards conservation efforts. Sadly, Sandler decides that we can’t find it ethically acceptable to have dinosaurs walk the earth again until we address issues of human health, animal welfare, and legitimate political and ecological concerns (355). Despite my sadness about not being able to pet a Triceratops anytime soon, I do agree that this idea is not ethically sound until the anthropocentric reasons for extinction are addressed in an adequate way.

Sandler does address several ethical arguments in favour of de-extinction, for example that of justice (355). Species that went extinct due to anthropogenic reasons such as habitat destruction or hunting may be owed de-extinction (355). But Sandler decides to walk away from this argument and instead argues that it is impossible to harm a species – as species do not have aims distinct from the individual organisms making up a species (355). But Holmes Rolston would take offense to this idea because of his holism approach. Rolston prompts his readers to think of species as genetic lifelines, and millions of years of effort taken by individual organisms to create an entity (722). Rolston and holism require us to therefore think of the duties we may owe to species, or even to ecosystems that we are endangering (725). To me, Sandler’s logic therefore is flawed in saying that species can’t be owed justice.

If we continue to use Rolston to address justice that we may owe species that experienced extinction due to human causes, he would most likely agree that these species should be brought back – provided that their reintroduction would not be to the detriment of ecosystems. The reintroduction of wolves into Yellowstone National Park bodes well for this concept of de-extinction for the benefit of an ecosystem (Tori 2020). There was a 70 year gap between when wolves were completely eradicated and reintroduced, and yet the ecosystems are now thriving once more (Tori 2020). The initial removal of the species caused several negative effects on other animals and plants, and even the rivers of Yellowstone National Park (Tori 2020). The reintroduction of wolves means that now the elk population is under control and preventing overgrazing (Tori 2020). So as long as we are willing to accept that we owe a species justice, we can have a hope that their re-introduction could be good for other species.

Despite my disagreement with Sandler over this specific moral reasoning for not going through with de-extinction, I do agree with him that it is outweighed by animal welfare. Animal welfare concerns are a reason that Sandler cites under the reasons for not permitting de-extinction (358). Sandler talks about the issues with cloning that cause health defects and abnormalities in both surrogates and in offspring (358). These issues, combined with how little we can be sure we know about species we are pulling from deep extinction, could cause suffering in the beings that are produced from this process. Sandler cites Singer to tell us that animals are morally considerable, and therefore their suffering is ethically significant (358). Our lack of knowledge about how effective our current de-extinction methods can be requires us to pause any efforts towards this. Rolston would also most likely agree that we should not attempt to revive a species if further harm is going to be done to it. This is a larger argument to consider as well; is it ethically permissible to bring back a species if humans are only going to exploit them once more?

It is not ethically permissible to bring long extinct species back given our current capacity to do so. Further, I want to argue that the only species we should consider bringing back are ones who experienced extinction for solely anthropogenic reasons. The species who were made extinct by humans are the animals who are owed justice, and therefore should be eligible for de-extinction. Which means I do not ever get my triceratops, whether or not we become sure that we can bring them back without harming them. Sandler’s general conclusion about reviving long extinct species is correct. The reasons to pursue de-extinction are currently outweighed by the reasons to not undergo such a thing.

~Suzanah

Peglar, Tori. “1995 Reintroduction of Wolves in Yellowstone.” My Yellowstone Park, 30 June 2020, www.yellowstonepark.com/park/yellowstone-wolves-reintroduction.

Sandler, R. “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species”. Conservation Biology, 28: 354-360, 18 March 2014. https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1111/cobi.12198

Rolston, Holmes. “Duties to Endangered Species.” BioScience, vol. 35, no. 11, 1985, pp. 718–726. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1310053.

This week we are discussing de-extinction, a topic that is very fascinating to me because it is actually very good news for us to be resurrecting extinct creatures. Climate change, human exploitation, and habitat destruction are wreaking havoc on life on Earth. Living organisms adapt to the harsh environment and they reproduce or die out over time, but nowadays, with the increase of human activities, thousands of species go extinct every year. Therefore, the recovery of extinct organisms has become a subject of research for many scientists. In fact, with the advancement of technology, this impossibility has become a reality. But the emergence of this technology inevitably raises many questions that we should consider, namely, is it ethical? Today’s blog will briefly analyze this technology through Kasperbauer‘s article.

First of all, what is de-extinction? Kasperbauer stated that “‘De-extinction’ refers to the process of reviving previously extinct species, discussed most recently in the context of advances in synthetic biology.” (2017) That is, by first sequencing the DNA of the extinct species and then inserting their DNA into the denucleated oocyte of a close relative and then into the embryo for development (2017). Kasperbauer mentioned that “an optimistic estimate predicts that the genes of the extinct species will not be identical to those of the previously extinct species. offspring will be 80-90% similar”. (2017) This means that our recovered organism is optimistically close to the previous life form and its offspring can be mostly similar to the previous organism. Therefore, this means that we are not yet able to get a fully de-extinction organism.

So, let’s think about some of the problems we face and how we should deal with them once we can fully recover an intact extinct organism. I think its emergence could bring some degree of benefit to our ecosystem. The rigorous Kasperbauer also identifies five key challenges of de-extinction, which means that if it is indeed feasible, we need to address these challenges first to protect our existing ecosystem. The challenge for de-extinction is that, for many species, the original cause of extinction still exists.” (2017) It means that we first need to Verify that the main cause of the threat in the environmental community has been removed or reduced. So if we don’t solve the problem, even if we recover it, it’s going to be endangered in a similar way. The second point is “invasiveness”, which I understand to mean that when a new species enters an ecosystem, it causes an imbalance in the ecosystem, i.e., it takes away resources from similar species (2017). (2017) This means that the invasion will cause problems for other species. The third point is that it is still about “invasion”, which means that if we resurrect organisms that are vulnerable to extinction, we can genetically modify them to be less aggressive. The fact that this means they are less likely to survive means even more that this so-called de-distinction may be short-lived for them. The fourth point that I think is worth considering is that even if we bring back extinct species, it will be difficult to mimic the ecosystems in which they once lived. I believe the author is more interested in conveying to us the difficulty of this project. Because a single species can be produced when we have the technology to do so, but over time our ecosystems have become very different from what they were before. So, the question that comes to mind is, will we be able to bring it back to Earth in a way that will create a good environment for it to live in and not affect the habitat of other organisms? The last and most important challenge that Kasperbauer brings to us here is that “it seems to entail significant suffering for sentient individual animals.” (2017) Here I think that in fact, the evolution of organisms is about reproducing offspring, and perhaps we don’t know if they want to be de-extinct or not. considering the suffering of sentient animals is something we morally need to give them respect. However, if it really can bring more good than bad to the ecosystem, I think the suffering is worth it.

In general, I do find that De-extinction seems to be a good technology for our lives. Perhaps it will also allow us to compensate for our impact on the environment. I personally would support it if it could really “rejuvenate” the ecosystem. At the same time, we need to remain cautious, even if it brings us psychological comfort. But we also need to consider whether this compensation is really what they (extinct species) want it to be.

Work cited：

T. J. Kasperbauer (2017) Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction, Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20:1, 1-14, DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

-Linfeng Xie