This blog post draws on “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” by Ronald Sandler.
Upon reading this title, my brain immediately jumps to Steven Spielberg’s Jurassic Park. However, I had to remind myself that this was about the ethics of reviving extinct species, not about the possible ramifications of doing such a thing. Sandler does conclude that the reasons for de-extinction are ethically problematic (355). De-extinction does not address the causes for extinction, nor does it promote the prevention of extinction of other species (355). Therefore, it could have unforeseeable negative ramifications towards conservation efforts. Sadly, Sandler decides that we can’t find it ethically acceptable to have dinosaurs walk the earth again until we address issues of human health, animal welfare, and legitimate political and ecological concerns (355). Despite my sadness about not being able to pet a Triceratops anytime soon, I do agree that this idea is not ethically sound until the anthropocentric reasons for extinction are addressed in an adequate way.
Sandler does address several ethical arguments in favour of de-extinction, for example that of justice (355). Species that went extinct due to anthropogenic reasons such as habitat destruction or hunting may be owed de-extinction (355). But Sandler decides to walk away from this argument and instead argues that it is impossible to harm a species – as species do not have aims distinct from the individual organisms making up a species (355). But Holmes Rolston would take offense to this idea because of his holism approach. Rolston prompts his readers to think of species as genetic lifelines, and millions of years of effort taken by individual organisms to create an entity (722). Rolston and holism require us to therefore think of the duties we may owe to species, or even to ecosystems that we are endangering (725). To me, Sandler’s logic therefore is flawed in saying that species can’t be owed justice.
If we continue to use Rolston to address justice that we may owe species that experienced extinction due to human causes, he would most likely agree that these species should be brought back – provided that their reintroduction would not be to the detriment of ecosystems. The reintroduction of wolves into Yellowstone National Park bodes well for this concept of de-extinction for the benefit of an ecosystem (Tori 2020). There was a 70 year gap between when wolves were completely eradicated and reintroduced, and yet the ecosystems are now thriving once more (Tori 2020). The initial removal of the species caused several negative effects on other animals and plants, and even the rivers of Yellowstone National Park (Tori 2020). The reintroduction of wolves means that now the elk population is under control and preventing overgrazing (Tori 2020). So as long as we are willing to accept that we owe a species justice, we can have a hope that their re-introduction could be good for other species.
Despite my disagreement with Sandler over this specific moral reasoning for not going through with de-extinction, I do agree with him that it is outweighed by animal welfare. Animal welfare concerns are a reason that Sandler cites under the reasons for not permitting de-extinction (358). Sandler talks about the issues with cloning that cause health defects and abnormalities in both surrogates and in offspring (358). These issues, combined with how little we can be sure we know about species we are pulling from deep extinction, could cause suffering in the beings that are produced from this process. Sandler cites Singer to tell us that animals are morally considerable, and therefore their suffering is ethically significant (358). Our lack of knowledge about how effective our current de-extinction methods can be requires us to pause any efforts towards this. Rolston would also most likely agree that we should not attempt to revive a species if further harm is going to be done to it. This is a larger argument to consider as well; is it ethically permissible to bring back a species if humans are only going to exploit them once more?
It is not ethically permissible to bring long extinct species back given our current capacity to do so. Further, I want to argue that the only species we should consider bringing back are ones who experienced extinction for solely anthropogenic reasons. The species who were made extinct by humans are the animals who are owed justice, and therefore should be eligible for de-extinction. Which means I do not ever get my triceratops, whether or not we become sure that we can bring them back without harming them. Sandler’s general conclusion about reviving long extinct species is correct. The reasons to pursue de-extinction are currently outweighed by the reasons to not undergo such a thing.
~Suzanah
Peglar, Tori. “1995 Reintroduction of Wolves in Yellowstone.” My Yellowstone Park, 30 June 2020, www.yellowstonepark.com/park/yellowstone-wolves-reintroduction.
Sandler, R. “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species”. Conservation Biology, 28: 354-360, 18 March 2014. https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1111/cobi.12198
Rolston, Holmes. “Duties to Endangered Species.” BioScience, vol. 35, no. 11, 1985, pp. 718–726. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1310053.