On the Potential Moral Hazard of De-Extinction

De-extinction is a peculiar topic. I never thought I’d have to consider the ethics of resurrecting the genetic line of a lost species, but science continues to surprise and scare me with its possibilities. On one hand, several immediate moral objections against this technology immediately come to mind, many of which T.J. Kasperbauer more thoroughly discusses in his paper (from which this blog post draws to inform its content). On the other hand, I would love to see a living woolly mammoth. My mom probably would, too. And I don’t think it’s too controversial an opinion to believe that many people have their own ‘woolly mammoths,’ i.e., their own personal preferences of species that they would love and appreciate to see in-person (perhaps constituting an ethical problem in itself, for those insensitive and foolish enough to hold captive dangerous animals in their backyard, primarily for these creatures’ exotic status). Still, the satisfaction of my preferences, nor of those of any human, should not serve as the chief basis of justifying de-extinction; on the contrary, there better be good, defensible reasons for bringing back species that have gone extinct, many of whom have died out in the first place due to human arrogance and moral negligence.

I will ignore for now the objection that these scientific developments are unnatural, or that they are another reprehensible human attempt of achieving mastery over nature. I admit I do believe there’s something fundamentally disturbing about so intimately manipulating genes – I think there’s some wisdom to be found in Shelley’s Frankenstein, alongside other pertinent science fiction cautioning us against zombifying life – but I’m willing to set aside my feelings for the sake of considering whether there are ecological benefits to de-extinction, as well as individual benefits for the animals and plants themselves. One obvious reason for pursuing this technology is the potential good it offers to eco-systems that would benefit from the re-introduction of extinct species (Kasperbauer 3). These animals and plants could provide critical functions that regulate and work towards the health of an eco-system, such as deterring pests, or acting as predators, or serving as prey themselves. Insofar as de-extinction offers a means of providing these vital roles that other species (or other forms of technology) may not be able to fulfill, the potential benefits do seem valuable. Of course, we’d still have to consider the individual suffering entailed by bringing these animals into existence,1 but if we are holistic eco-centrists who endorse the value of species and their genetic lines over individuals, as espoused by Rolston,2 then this objection appears less grave. Kasperbauer does point out, however, that the original cause of extinction for many of these animals still exists, as with hunting practices (4), and de-extinction doesn’t address these other separate moral (and indeed, political) dimensions that are, in themselves, matters of ethical debate. We certainly wouldn’t want to revive an animal species solely to create more targets for a crossbow, and I think in this conversation regarding de-extinction, we should take more seriously the question of whether we humans are even ready for this kind of power and technology.

I’m inclined to believe otherwise. And I don’t see it as unwarranted cynicism due to past human failures. I do firmly believe that science holds so much wondrous potential to affirm our proper relationship to the natural world, to restore so much that has been lost, and to discover what good can yet be done for our eco-community. So, perhaps in the future I wouldn’t have to be as worried as I am whenever new and powerful scientific developments are on the horizon. I think such caution is justifiable now, however. At present, humankind appears to me to be at the precipice of a drastic ideological shift in how we ought to view our relationship to the natural word, relative to the existential threats (of climate change, of massive pollution, of plastic, of other environmental problems) to ourselves and to the plants and animals with whom we live. I do fear that de-extinction carries with it a real moral hazard to become complacent and morally deficient with how we treat species at present. After all, if reviving these animals in the future always remains a possibility, why worry about their continued existence in the present? Why not defer responsibility to the future, especially during this time when we humans are already playing with our own potential extinction? This line of thinking seriously worries me, and I think it should worry anyone who wouldn’t normally give a second thought about the ethics of de-extinction. Certainly, I don’t think this technology necessarily entails this type of outcome; nor do I believe that this technology, which, by itself, has much value in other areas of scientific research, is morally impermissible despite its potential for abuse. Still, I think there is much prudence in withholding my desire to see a woolly mammoth, until the day I know it will arrive in a safer and more responsible world.

Footnotes

1 Plants involve a more complex discussion since they lack sentience, and it is being debated whether their lack of sentence entails a lack of interests that can be violated, or if this objection can apply to them.

2 Rolston discusses this topic extensively in his paper.

Works Cited

Kasperbauer, T.J. “Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction.” Ethics, Policy & Environment, vol. 20, no. 1, 2017, pp. 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

~ John

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