In this short blog post, I will analyze the endangered Algonquin wolves in Ontario due to changes in the Endangered Species Act under the lens of Rolston’s “Duties to Endangered Species” article.

It seems as though the government of Ontario and its citizens have little to no care for the Algonquin wolves. Bill 108 passed by the conservative government elongated the time frame to create recommendations on how to protect the wolves and compromised their habitat protection (Rutledge). It also allowed the environment minister to bypass legal protection calling for the Algonquin wolves whenever convenient (Rutledge). With relaxed hunting laws and little strategies to preserve this species, Algonquin wolves are endangered since less than a thousand mature wolves remain (Rutledge).

The Ontario government’s Bill 108 largely ignores the scientific community (Rutledge). In her article, Rutledge goes on to mention that, just like decisions made about COVID-19, saving Algonquin wolves should rely on independent research. This means all voices should be heard, but science should prevail (Rutledge). However, I believe when it comes to saving species, scientific knowledge isn’t enough. We need biological ethics to preserve species (Rolston, 718). If we establish these biological ethics, hopefully, we won’t even need to tire scientists in providing research to government officials or the public. Biological ethics will be an especially useful argument against governments that reject scientific data.

Simply said, humans regard other species as ‘stock’ (Rolston, 718).  Humans often protect valuable species or artifacts not because we have duties to the species, but because we have duties to “ourselves [and to the] duties of prudence and education” (Rolston, 719). At the end of the day, humans treat species as either resource of consumption, study material, or entertainment (Rolston, 720). In this case, Algonquin wolf hunting is merely for entertainment since nobody eats the wolves (Rutledge). However, Ontarians need to realize that the extinction of the wolves is not just going to affect their loss of entertainment, but it will result in the murder and insensitivity of forms of life and its systems (Rolston, 720). We need this “principled responsibility to the biospheric Earth” to instill change in our behavior (Rolston, 720). If scientific knowledge about the effects of killing Algonquin wolves is insufficient, then wolves still shouldn’t be killed because of biological ethics. This thinking is lacking in the government of Ontario as they allow the merciless hunting and trapping of Algonquin wolves in the wide unprotected lands (Rutledge). Most protected areas are patchy and are separated by large amounts of unprotected lands where wolves are bound to travel to (Rutledge). In that travel process, many are killed (Rutledge). Based on these relaxed laws, I would say that the patchy protected areas are merely a façade to trick citizens into thinking the government is playing an active role in preserving the Algonquin wolves.

Rutledge says wolves “nurture our spirit’ and improve our well-boing by “just being there” as humans admire “untamed and untouched wilderness”. This view might be slightly anthropogenic as it states that Algonquin wolves shouldn’t be hunted because of the intrinsic values they provide to humans. However, species need to be objectively present in the system (Rolston, 721). There reproduction and changes in gene poll provide evidence of their existence (Rolston, 721). Consequently, their existence alone provides us comfort (Rutledge). This may form a reciprocal contract between Algonquin wolves and humans in which humans don’t hunt the wolves and the wolves exist to provide us with well-being. However, people argue that contracts can be only with “reflective rational agents” (Rolston, 722). Regardless, even if wolves are not rational agents, can’t speak, and are powerless, we have a duty to protect them (Rolston, 722). Thus, even if we can’t form reciprocal contracts with species, we need to avoid harming them (Rolston, 722). We need to instill these biological ethics to shift away from the anthropogenic thinking of humans valuing everything “relative to [their] utility” (Rolston, 726). If we establish this thinking, we may not even need scientific research to stop the hunting and extinction of Algonquin wolves in Ontario.

Samar

Sources:

Rutledge, Linda. “The Erosion of Ontario’s Endangered Species Act Threatens Iconic Algonquin Wolf.” The Conversation, 9 Aug. 2020, theconversation.com/the-erosion-of-ontarios-endangered-species-act-threatens-iconic-algonquin-wolf-142805.

Rolston, Holmes III. “Duties to Endangered Species,” BioScience 35(1985):718-726.　 Special issue on biological conservation. Reprinted variously.

In “Duties to Endangered Species”, Rolston argues for a mixture of biology and ethics that will produce an ethic sufficient for preserving species. Though he states that there are ethics that exist with the outcome of protecting species that are threatened, these ethics have humans at their centre, not the endangered species themselves. Rolston outlines this to emphasize the lack of ‘interspecific altruism’ (720). By this concept he means to expand the duties humans have to species themselves, as opposed to the preservation of species for the purposes of human exploitation and enjoyment. The latter represents duties to humans, not duties to species. This is an important concept to grasp, as the centre of Rolston’s argument is that species should be valued for their own existence, not that of human usefulness.

I agree with Rolston that humans must expand past their limited intraspecific altruism to an interspecific version (720). However, from a policy standpoint which Rolston sometimes mentions, what difference does this truly make. Humans have already created a legal standard for when they will choose to lawfully protect animals. These laws however are often not sufficient for protecting the animals, but I cannot see humans advancing past legal protections. Rolston also cites barriers to his proposed line of thinking, stating that there are scientific considerations that surpass ethical ones (720). 

Rolston seems to support the existence of ‘species’ as a concept, but cites Darwin to state that ‘species’ as a categorical tool often draws lines arbitrarily between two species that may be slightly different. Species therefore, Rolston follows, are merely inventions. Rolston follows this line of reasoning only to state that not only scientifically, but historically, ‘species’ as a concept is a useful term in order to be logically correct about orientating what life falls into what categories (721). Rolston focuses on this clash between ethical thinking of ‘life should be respected because it is life’, and the scientific purposes of utilizing categories. From here Rolston takes a very interesting argumentative stance, that humans ought to respect and consider the genetic lifelines that exist and persist over millions of years of evolution. This, to me, begins to form a more usable logic for ascribing duties to species that are not humans. By this sort of roundabout explanation, Rolston seems to want to stress to us that ‘species’ as a term is useful not to create hierarchical importance of different species, but to highlight that respecting current members of a species is akin to respecting the species as it existed in the past and present. 

So how do we form an ethical connection with species that are not our own? We cannot create contracts with endangered species to ensure reciprocal duties and rights as prevailing theories of justice would have us make, as Rolston mentions (722). However we as individuals still have duties to others who cannot communicate with us in the same way the majority of the population can. We do not forsake those who hold less power than we do in the ethical sense, so why can this not extend to other forms of human life, as Rolston proposes in his easiest conclusion (722). But my argument here is that though we extend the same moral value to those who are powerless, we do not ascribe them the same rights in a legal sense. In this same way, we can respect life on the basis of life, but we may still destroy their habitats, or reduce their food supply, or any number of things that are outcomes of not giving species the same rights as our own.

Though Rolston provides many useful arguments on behalf of ascribing moral worth to other species, I do not see how it would pan out in a practical way. We ought not to harm other species, but to what extent? Species are easily endangered when humans are utilizing their fragile ecosystems for our own purposes. It is prudent to note here that Rolston holds that a species is inseparable from its environment, which implies that any harm we do to an ecosystem is direct harm to a species itself. Though we should not harm species, is it correct to say we cannot utilize resources located in the environments of every species? How should we survive if we cannot drink the water that the fish live in? If we cannot separate species from their environments, we cannot survive as a species ourselves. Therefore, though I can support his ethical standpoint, I cannot advocate for his mixture of ethics and biological science. So though Rolston provides many interesting ethical features, I cannot say definitively that his ethical argument is complete.

~Suzanah

Rolston, Holmes. “Duties to Endangered Species,” BioScience 35(1985):718-726

As Leopold wrote this paper in 1948, it is safe to say a great deal has changed since it was written, but a lot has also surprisingly remained unchanged. Leopold’s article on “The Land Ethic” made me ponder what Land Ethics is today and how it contributes to the world’s state. While I agree with most of what he says, I believe some points can be argued.

Growing up in Canada, I feel that a great deal of effort has been placed towards conservation efforts and pollution; however, reading this article makes me question many of the motives surrounding these changes. A lot of what I see relates the same mindset observed by Leopold. Our communities still share many of the same ideological traits that people displayed in the early 1900s regarding selfishness. I agree with many of Leopold’s issues regarding people’s idea of land ethics being heavily based around economics rather than being a member of the land. Many of the changes I witness daily take advantage of “economic importance”, at least at the consumer level from what I can see as an average consumer. A modern day example is the price of plastic bags at a store. To encourage people to use reusable bags instead of the single use plastic bags stores provide, companies have started charging for bags. Although this does cut a small fraction of plastic bag usage, the consumer does not always have an eco-friendly mindset pushing them to remember their bags. More often, it is because they would instead rather save their money. People do not see the value in spending 5 cents on a plastic bag when they can either carry the item or bring their bag. However, my argument is that because this is a money based mindset, does that make it wrong? I agree that from an individuals’ ethical standpoint, one can view it as unethical to the land. However, I think it is essential to look at the big picture. Although that individual cares more about saving money, what matters is that they are still unknowingly doing something better for the land. Is it possible for a person to practice ethics unknowingly? Is a question that comes to mind as I think about this. Using an event that Leopold references; even though the only reason songbirds were put on the agenda was for economic reasons, it is good that people were at least able to recognize the issue at all, even if for selfish reasons. Is making everyone understand correct Land Ethics necessary to get the people to comply and change habits for the good of the land? Thinking from this point of view makes me question further what exactly is land ethics.

Another argument I would like to bring up is Leopold’s view on the education method. He says, “is it certain that only the volume of education needs stepping up? Is something lacking in the content as well?” He addresses this for a short paragraph before moving on to farmers without fully addressing the issue of education.  I believe both the volume and content need to step up significantly. To say that the volume needs to be stepped up is directly related to increased content as well. So yes, there needs to be more education, and of course, it must be quality education. I believe the teaching standards in the 1900s must be much different from now but applying the same ideology anyways; I agree that we need more education on the environment and how we connect to it. I believe education and physically exposing children to the land are critical factors that will help current and future generations develop an attachment to the land. I don’t think Leopold stresses this enough. He quickly moves on to a new topic before thoroughly discussing the importance of education in the first place.  If people were to be taught from an early age about earth’s mechanisms and why we should care about it, we could raise individuals to care about the planet. Education is also vital for older generations that can be delivered through the internet, TV, or books. Hopefully, through education, the concept of land ethics can be cultivated to a point where the community can agree that we should care about an endangered species not for economic value but because of the connection we share as fellow members of the land. This is already beginning to trickle into our society as there is a rising number of people fighting for animal rights or working to restore habitats. There are those that are still driven by economic greed. Yet, if we can manage them through laws and regulations such as carbon tax, putting prices on single use plastics,  regulating hunting and fishing, we can lessen their impact.

It would be challenging to get all of humanity on the same page regarding what should make up Land Ethics as everyone has their own experiences that influence the way they see the world. It would be ideal but challenging.

In “the Land Ethic” Aldo Leopold puts forth a communitarian eco-centric view. He argues that our ethical duties extend beyond duties to other humans and even beyond duties to other beings. He proposes that we all adopt a land ethic that enlarges the bounds of our ethical duties to “include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.” This is a very broad scope of ethical theory which he expounds to directly oppose the common view that the environment, the biosphere, or, as he calls it, ‘the land’, are valuable only for the economic benefits they can potentially provide. He is basically opposing the view that the environment is only instrumentally good. But is there more value in the environment than just instrumental value and are Leopold’s arguments to prove such value effective? Are they persuasive enough to convince the masses and induce them to make the changes that both Leopold and I would agree are much needed in the world today? Are they even necessary to induce changes or would an instrumental argument suffice? Though Leopold and I agree that conservation of the environment is an important goal, we disagree over what makes this goal important. I believe that the environment is only instrumentally valuable, but not just for humans – it is instrumentally valuable for all beings who deserve moral consideration.

In “All Animals are Equal” Peter Singer builds the case that sentience, the ability to feel pleasure or pain, is the criteria to determine whose interests should be considered in moral decision making. In his paper, Singer develops this conclusion by offering several analogies. He argues that, since we would consider the well-being of infants, mentally-disabled people, and those who have suffered debilitating injuries, we must also consider the well-being of sentient animals because it is clear that there is no reasonably material difference between the two groups (Singer spends a great deal of time aptly defending this stance from objections in his paper, but, for the purposes of this blog post, I will assume that this stance holds up to any rebuttals without reiterating Singer’s responses). So, it is the ability to experience pleasure and pain that determines who deserves moral consideration. These analogies that Singer puts forth are much more coherent and acceptable than those put forth by Leopold.

Leopold compares an ecosystem to a community. He argues that we have duties to our community beyond self interest such as improving schools and roads, and that these duties stem from our being a part of this interconnected system. He posits that the same logic requires us to have duties to ‘the land’ that go beyond our self interest because, like a community, ‘the land’ is an interconnected system which we are a part of. This analogy is much vaguer than the ones presented by Singer and I do not believe it fully holds up. Do we have duties to our communities simply for the sake of benefiting the community or does benefiting the community provide instrumental value? The examples of duties Leopold provides offer instrumental value to the individual members of the community. Community members benefit from improved roads and better schooling. It is right to benefit the community because the community provides instrumental value, not because the community deserves its own moral consideration. This logic can be expanded to the environment. We have duties to the environment to take conservation seriously because the environment is an eco-community that has instrumental value for its members. This is a stronger justification for conservation that I feel would be more successful at convincing a wide audience.

Leopold would object to the instrumental theory and argue that valuing ‘the land’ instrumentally is already common practise and is proven to be ineffective at inducing the levels of conservation required. Leopold would be mistaken, however, because he uses a too limited definition of instrumental value. He focuses primarily on economic benefits, whether the land is profitable. But there are more considerations when determining instrumental value than the potential for profits. Maintaining thriving and healthy ecosystems create scenic locations which can yield a great deal of enjoyment in several ways. Furthermore, the instrumental value derived from upholding our duties to ‘the land’ is increased even further when Singer’s determination of who deserves moral consideration is factored in. If all sentient life deserves moral consideration, then it is not just the instrumental value of ‘the land’ towards humans that is considered, but also the instrumental value towards all sentient animals affected by ‘the land’ as well. We have a duty towards the environment because it will benefit a bounty of organisms who also deserve moral consideration. These ecosystems are these animals’ habitats and destroying them would be a huge disregard for their moral worth. Having duties towards ‘the land’ for its instrumental benefits is a more plausible, accessible, and persuasive theory than the one put forward by Leopold.

References:

Leopold, A. (1948). “The Land Ethic”. A Sand County Almanac: part 3, essay 4. Retrieved from http://www.neohasid.org/pdf/landethic.pdf

Singer, P. (1974). “All Animals are Equal”. Philosophic Exchange: volume 5, number 1, article 6. Retrieved from https://eclass.srv.ualberta.ca/pluginfile.php/6160284/mod_resource/content/2/All%20Animals%20Are%20Equal.pdf

As for the assigned article, this week was “Duties to Endangered Species,” it was the last one part in A Sand County Almanac, written by the author Aldo Leopold. I think the main reason why this article was selected as a required assigned article is that it is indeed the most representative article in this book. The main problem facing the book ” A Sand County Almanac” is the problem of the human development model. In other words, since the industrial revolution, human development with science as the main direction has caused and caused all the problems caused by the change in attitude towards nature, which has resulted in reflections on this development model. There are many aspects reflected in the book, mainly because the ways that primitive humans recognize nature are different from the ways that modern humans know nature. Modern humans mainly learn about nature in schools. The primitive way is nature itself to educate humans. To put it simply, nature educates human beings in a love of nature, and this sentiment can produce a worldview based on the whole of nature, which in turn produces a demand for the protection of the whole of nature. Therefore, the land ethics code is generally regarded as an environmental theory based on holism. one good example he gave to us in “The Ecological Conscience” is that but when the state promulgated some policies to help farmers, they also need to take some responsibilities, but they are selective in fulfilling their responsibilities, that is, just do What’s best for you.
“The land ethic as a product of social evolution ”he mentioned. I agree with his point of view. It is precise with the advancement of technology that people are gradually ignoring respect for the natural world. People usually have respect for every member of the community, and of course respect for the community itself. The role of conqueror does not last forever, because it is ethically unfeasible. Therefore, incorporating the land as a whole into the collective concept is only to facilitate people to protect nature rationally. Finally, I’m glad that the author mentioned here that the composition and feedback adjustment methods of each ecosystem are different because the environmental differences caused by various factors will make the environmental protection methods required by different regions different. Imitate blindly. When technology continues to develop, we should develop in a sustainable direction. Because as a part of the earth, we have the responsibility to protect our living environment through our knowledge.
Maybe one day when we break the limit that the earth can withstand, we will inevitably be affected. Besides, I personally it is great thinking but there is no doubt that we can not able to use it purely. For example, we have to change our food chain servicer from feeding to. nowaday we cultivate animals to feed us. when we use the item from the natural world to feed us is also the way to make our cultivate animals lose their role in the food chain.

word cited：The Land Ethic ,Aldo Leopold, from A Sand County Almanac, 1948

Leopold’s Views

Ethics can be understood as that which sustains cooperation for a mutual continued existence. Leopold presents two sides of the same ethical ‘coin’: “an ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence” (§ 2) as well as “philosophically, is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct” (§ 2). These definitions present Leopold’s understanding of ethics as a system by members permit and ban certain actions that conflict with a mutual continued existence. Much how murder is prohibited in a society to allow its members to continue their life in comfort, ethics sets these boundaries and provides ‘ought to’ and ‘ought not’ modes of action that assist in sustaining a fulfilling existence for all.

Complex ethics arise as its domain extends to include more members in a cooperative continued existence. “The first ethics dealt with the relation between individuals…later accretions dealt with the relation between the individual and society” (§ 2). By this, Leopold states that ethics between the first two humans who decided to cooperate may have been simple (you and me versus the world, and a simple handshake). As human groups began to turn to massive cities and wield resources and power unimaginable to the first humans, complex law codes, courts, who is owed what, and why this person must pay more taxes than another (if at all) display ethic’s rising complexity as its domain grew from human to human, to human to society.

The next step in the extension of ethics is to include the individual in relation to the whole environment. A “land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include…the land” (§ 3) and members of the ecosystem it contributes to. These ecosystems too work to ensure a continued existence and share a collective instinct to move to this goal: plants are typically consumed first which provide the energy for the various chains of energy that course (not exclusively) through bugs, prey, and predators, who then decompose back into the soil (§ 6). This reveals ecosystems to be a complex entity with countless moving parts, members, and factors that include both biotic and abiotic members (sun, soil) that contribute to a cooperative continued existence.

As of now, the relation of the individual to the environment is that of economic benefit and not a cooperation. Leopold provides an example of this in the eroded topsoil of Wisconsin in the 1930s where farmers were urged to use pro-environmental practices which were quickly abandoned after the bare minimum was done, for a minimum length of time, an shaped around the best short term economic yield the farmer could reach (§ 5). As well in the drawing of the threatened songbird as economic issue of insect populations rising dramatically, when in fact the songbird was just adored (§ 5). These examples illustrate the fact that human’s value (some) members of the environment as means to their economic ends. This flies in the face of the land ethic Leopold advocates which would value members of the environment in the same manner a human is: with the right to continue in their own existence.

Humans and Nature Living in Harmony

A land ethic bestows benefits like those praised in a human to human, and human to society relation. Much how two can make a hunt easier or a society provides specialized services thus access to a higher quality of life, including the environment (and all its abiotic and biotic parts) in our ethics presents benefits that our current relation to  the environment does not allow. Cleaner air, lands protected from soil erosion, and sustenance can be taken in a sustainable manner without the industrial slaughter of farm animals, hunting for sport, or stripping a forest of trees and farmland of nutrients in a sudden harmful manner. Our anxieties of global warming and the deaths of many species would be quelled with a respect for nature in itself, and in return for a sustainable lifestyle (at the cost of a few readily available luxuries) humans would not have to worry about one day losing the cushy way of life most of modern humanity enjoys. This does not prohibit meats or agriculture altogether, for example, but only means to alter the scale and process to continue human existence in tandem with maintaining a stability our fellow citizens of the environment are also entitled to for their own sake.

Critique

While Leopold’s argument for a land ethic are compelling, how exactly a practical plan of bringing it to reality seems incredibly overlooked. Is it possible to convince a public to adopt a land ethic despite the threat of long-term extinction? Humanity has a reputation of waiting till the last quarter before fixing its problems (political disputes, war, updating laws) and I am sad to say that the environment may only be considered when, for example, farming begins to dry up or cattle and game begin to disappear. Our nations are fed by massive scale food and fuel projects that require years of commitment to reverse, and I fear the average joe will overlook this issue until it knocks at the door unless a more practical angle is explored, and even then, do we still have the time to save a planet in the symbiotic manner Leopold advocates? We have been polluting for centuries and it seems now a sudden cessation of our mechanisms is required to bring the end of the environmental crisis, but is this enough to convince humanity?

A proper land ethic requires international cooperation. Humanity cannot even do this for each other, so convincing the population would seem to follow an international agreement potentially ages away. Think of oceans, the atmosphere, and animals which migrate through international borders. The environmental crisis is an international crisis that is being bogged down by intranational politics relative to every nation in the world, all at different stages in their belief of a land ethic (if any).

Despite these issues in executing Leopold’s land ethics, this should not undercut the importance of a respect for the earth that houses us all. It has been a long time since humanity has been all at the mercy of nature like in the ancient past, but we must remember that our absence does not absolve us of our citizenship to nature, and this should inspire a care for the environment for itself that still has us messily entwined in its circuit of living things.

Source:

Aldo Leopold. The Land Ethic. A County Almanac (1948) http://www.neohasid.org/pdf/landethic.pdf

This week, After I read the Land Ethic, I noticed that it is a novel topic. Because very few people will focus on protecting the land and a new word, “egocentrism.” The basis of the egocentrism is that ecology reveals that humans and other members of nature have both diachronic and synchronic relationship, and they are part of the life system. Therefore, we should consider the ecosystem as a whole, rather than separating the individual in which the parent is contained. Unlike most modern moral theories, which focus on individual rights or interests, ecocentrism is a holistic or totalitarian approach. It judges the moral value of human behaviour based on its impact on the environment. The main problem faced by ecocentrists is how to coordinate the interests of the environment with each of us’s rights and interests. The idea is a research perspective of environmental ethics. It proposes that the central issue of environmental ethics should be the ecosystem or biological community itself or its sub-systems, rather than the individual members it includes. In response to the controversy of ecocentrism, the modern approach defended anthropocentric values on the one hand, and on the other hand, reflected on the inherent defects of modern anthropocentric values. In Leopold’s view, the anthropocentrism value itself is not a problem, because any species is always centred on its own interests. At the same time, the ultimate goal of the ecological movement is to protect the overall and long-term interests of mankind (Leopold 2). It denies and abandons the anthropocentrism values, and the ecological movement will lose its inherent power and cannot continue. Therefore, what needs to be reflected and criticized is not the anthropocentric values itself, but the modern anthropocentric values. In their view, the problem with the values of modern anthropocentrism is that it regards any requirements of human perceptual desires as reasonable and should be satisfied, which leads to the abuse of nature and ecological crisis. Therefore, it must treat modern anthropocentrism. Values are transformed, transforming what it calls “perceptual desire” into “rational desire”, so as to avoid abuse of nature and ecological crisis.

In the article Land ethnic, the ecological crisis has become a global environmental problem therefore proposed the idea that land health is one of the evaluating factors on the ethnicity of land usage. It is mainly manifested in the destruction and exhaustion of natural resources and the pollution and deterioration of the ecological environment, such as air pollution, water pollution, deforestation and vegetation reduction, soil erosion and desertification, garbage flooding, biological extinction, energy shortage, acid rain pollution, earth warming, ozone layer destruction and so on. The increasing severity of the ecological crisis has aroused our unprecedented attention to environmental issues, which has led to a global environmental movement.

All in all, through the establishment of new values, ecologism turns the overcoming of the disadvantages of the existing industrial civilization into the creation of an ecological civilization. I think ecologism is a kind of philosophy first, and then a type of politics. Ecologism is essentially an environmental value, which requires us to truly transcend the value of ourselves or local interests to respect and maintain the interests of nature and the whole. I also believe that ecologism is a kind of ecological consciousness and a kind of earth consciousness. It is a kind of heart treasure to the blue planet we live in. As most of us in the 21st century gradually recognize and accept the new ecological values, the image of we as the guardian and perfecter will surely replace the image of the conqueror and exploiter. The relationship between us and nature will move towards a new situation of harmony and unity.

Yunxiang

Works Cited

Leopold, Aldo. The land ethic. na, 1948.

Ecocentrism is a philosophical worldview that holistically values ecological systems as morally considerable entities, meaning that humans have ethical responsibilities towards them[1].

This week, we read two contrasting pieces regarding ecocentrism. In an excerpt from A Sand County Almanac, Aldo Leopold writes about “The Land Ethic,” which holds humans responsible towards living communities of animals, plants, insects, and all biota interacting on the land[2]. In a critique of Leopold’s work, Chaone Mallory discusses the contradictions between Leopold’s writing and his love of hunting through an ecofeminist lens[3].

Before exploring Mallory’s critique, it’s important to first understand Leopold’s claims. Leopold’s land ethic rests on the value of communities, and the role individuals play in community well-being. As humans already consider themselves citizens of their own communities, Leopold argues, this mindset must simply be extended to the biotic community, which “changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it”[4]. He posits two mentalities, groups A and B, as opposing each other in terms of “ecological conscience”[5]. Group A continues to manage nature and view it as a commodity for human use, while Group B looks beyond nature’s usefulness to humans and considers human impacts on living interactions.

While Leopold’s land ethic has been praised by many conservationists as ecocentric, in her 2001 paper Mallory considers how Leopold’s passion for hunting supports human domination of nature, contrary to ecocentrism.  Mallory uses ecofeminism, the view that exploitation of nature is linked to the oppression of women, as a framework of analysis in her writing. Although Leopold presents hunting as an activity bringing him closer to nature, Mallory considers how hunting for the positive experience of connecting to land ultimately uses wildlife for the satisfaction of humans. Mallory further argues how Leopold’s vivid descriptions of hunting as a process of pursuit mirror male pursuit and objectification of women.

In my opinion, Mallory presents valid critiques of Leopold’s work, especially because Leopold makes conflicting claims. For example, in “The Land Ethic,” Leopold states that greater violence leads to greater destruction and interruption of ecological processes[6]. Yet simultaneously, he openly advocates violence through hunting as a positive way of interacting with nature.

In addition to Mallory’s points, I’d like to offer my own critique of Leopold’s suggestions for enacting a land ethic. Although I believe humans should value ecosystems and care for them accordingly, Leopold suggests that this should be done by placing more responsibility on the “private owner” of the land[7]. The issue I see is that the ownership and privatization of land directly allows for human domination over it. If, as Leopold says, we are equal citizens of a biological community, then we should not be able to “own” another citizen, any more than humans should own other humans. For this reason, I find Leopold’s positioning of private landowners as the optimal ecological stewards to be contradictory.

Having offered my thoughts on Leopold’s work, I will now discuss a critique of Mallory’s paper. While Mallory presents a strong analysis of “The Land Ethic” in contrast with Leopold’s hunting habits, she identifies the main problem with hunting to be “the type and degree of damage done to natural systems…that is unrelated to a human being’s biological need to survive.”[8] Mallory is careful to state that her critique of Leopold’s hunting relates to his privilege as a male settler hunting for sport, but she does not clarify her position on hunting that does support one’s need to survive. This is relevant in climates that don’t produce enough plant sustenance year-round for human survival. Although through globalization many of us now have access to plant-based food year-round in grocery stores, food insecurity is a major issue in isolated communities and some have found that hunting supports healthier nutrition while valuing ecosystems (see this article in The Narwhal). Given her strong opposition to Leopold’s hunting for pleasure, I think that Mallory could have strengthened her analysis by providing her thoughts on alternative approaches to hunting in the context of ecocentrism.

Overall, reading both of these authors was an interesting way to learn about varying perspectives on ecocentrism. In particular, I appreciate Mallory’s perspective that although Leopold is a pioneer of ecocentrism, many of his readers fail to see the contradictions in his writing. Meanwhile, both authors offer important perspectives on caring for land. Leopold’s valuing of ecological communities is necessary in order for humans to see ourselves as biological citizens, while Mallory’s ecofeminist critique of sport hunting explores human attitudes of domination. While I think an exploration of subsistence hunting would have enriched Mallory’s writing, both of these pieces were fascinating introductions to ecocentrism.

-By Mary

[1] “Glossary of Terms in Environmental Philosophy,” University of Wisconsin Oshkosh, updated September 20, 2010 , https://www.uwosh.edu/facstaff/barnhill/490-docs/thinking/glossary.

[2] Aldo Leopold, “The Land Ethic,” in A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), http://www.neohasid.org/pdf/landethic.pdf.

[3] Chaone Mallory, “Acts of Objectification and the Repudiation of Dominance: Leopold, Ecofeminism, and the Ecological Narrative,” Ethics and the Environment 6, no. 2 (2001): 85, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40339013.

[4] Leopold, “The Land Ethic,” 1.

[5] Leopold, “The Land Ethic,” 2.

[6] Leopold, “The Land Ethic,” 4.

[7] Leopold, “The Land Ethic,” 3.

[8] Mallory, “Acts of Objectification,” 76.

One of the required readings assigned this week was “Duties to Endangered Species,” written by Holmes Rolston III. In this article, he focuses heavily on our duty as human beings to protect a given species as opposed to a given individual organism. While he mentions most living things supply humans with goods and services, he emphasizes his idea that the true reason we feel we are obligated to protect endangered species is because of the evolutionary path it took to exist today, along with its educational benefits. In other words, we have a moral duty to protect species for the materials they provide, but primarily for the education of people in the future. In Rolston’s own words, “It is not form (species) as mere morphology, but the formative (speciating) process that humans ought to preserve” (722). While I find no issue with the majority of this article, there is one concern I have with this premise.

For argument’s sake, let us say scientists are able to resurrect a species from millions of years ago using preserved eggs. This could be, for example, an ancient lizard from around the Paleozoic era. Should this “new” species be permitted to live out its new life in a natural environment, or should it be forced to undergo multiple experiments in a laboratory? Since the species did not survive natural selection, does that mean it does not deserve to live freely? There is no argument to be made that this newly resurrected species would not provide educational benefits, so should it be closely monitored or are we morally obligated to set some individuals loose because of this importance?

A person with similar views to Rolston may argue that the lizard could potentially harm extant species, justifying its life in captivity, harm, or potential re-extinction. Rolston argues that a person’s moral duty to protect any species can be taken away when the species is causing much more harm than good, overall. However, if, hypothetically, these scientists could prove that the lizard could live out its life without causing any significant damage, would that mean we are morally obligated to set them free?

If it were up to me, in this scenario, I would argue for the release of the majority but keep a significant number of individuals in a humane enclosure in order to study their behaviour as well as anatomy after death. However, a person who happens to agree with Rolston may argue that the lineage of this lizard has been cut short by nature many years ago, so it should remain extinct. Beyond this, Rolston states an extinction caused by human involvement is “offensive [to]…the forces producing them” (720). Because of this, he may argue the resurrection of such a species by humans is equally outrageous.

In conclusion, I would say Rolston would argue we have no moral duty to protect a resurrected species beyond a decent life in captivity. If he did argue for its protection, it would be purely for its educational benefits alone. This is because, ultimately, according to Rolston, “It is not endangered species but an endangered human future that is of concern” (719) which, of course, includes the future of scientific studies led by humans.

Leah

Works cited:

Rolston, Holmes. “Duties to Endangered Species.” BioScience, vol. 35, no. 11, 1985, pp. 718–726., doi:10.2307/1310053.

This week in Philosophy 355, we begin to analyze another type of non-anthropocentric critique known as Ecocentrism. Unlike Biocentrists, who limit moral considerability to individual living things, Ecocentrists seek to extend this considerability to ecosystems, biotic communities and species as wholes. This is typically achieved through the guidance of the Land-ethic principle, which suggests that a thing is right in-so-far as it preserves the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community (Leopold, 7).

When comparing the works of both Aldo Leopold and Robin Attfield, we can recognize three areas in which they disagree: 1) The moral standing of individuals within a community, 2) the degree of significance pertaining to living things, and 3) the value of the ecosystem separate from human profit. While this new ethical principle appears to be progressive in its wide-range of inclusivity, we can tell through comparison that the Land-Ethic principle in fact appropriates the idea of sacrificing human life for the betterment of a greater good.

The first area of disagreement between Attfield and Leopold would be in regards to the moral standings of human beings within a community. In The Land Ethic, Aldo Leopold suggests that the human individual is a member of a community with interdependent parts (1). If we consider ourselves to be part of a greater ecological community, in accordance to the Land-ethic principle, then we have duties to support, protect and take risks for our communities just as we would our social networks (Welchman, 2020, UofA eclass).

By contrast, Attfield suggests that we can identify moral standing within individual creatures in themselves as opposed to their relevance to a specific system (1). This can be done by calculating the total number of interests a being may possess, which are not dependent on their relationships to another given species within the community (Welchman, 2020, UofA eclass).

Through defining the moral standing of a human in accordance to their communal ties, Leopold ultimately suggests that interdependency overrides individuality. If this is the case, individual rights (i.e. the right to live) once possessed by humans could justifiably be stripped or sacrificed if they interfere with communal ties or strength.

A second area of dispute between the two would be in relation to the significance placed on living things. Biocentrists argue that beings with more morally considerable kinds of interests and abilities (i.e. rational autonomy and sentience) merit a higher degree of moral considerability (Welchman, 2020, UofA eclass). When summing up the total of interests between species, individuals with these interests will always take precedence over those without. This is why, according to Attfield, nonliving entities such as rocks lack a good in their own right and can therefore not be harmed (1).

In contrast, Leopold suggests that human life in-and-out of itself is sustained through non-living entities. He depicts the ecosystem as a pyramid compromised of many layers, all of which depend on a foundational soil base to support the food chain of life (Leopold, 4). As a result, a higher degree of moral considerability should be given to non-living entities because living things would seize to exist without them.

Certain agricultural practices, such as intensive cultivation or harvesting, break up and typically destroy the natural structure of soil. If a greater amount of moral considerability should be prioritized for non-living things, than Leopold would justify human starvation in order to protect these foundational, non-living entities.

The final area of disagreement between Attfield and Leopold would be their positions on how valuable the ecosystem is separate from human profit. Typically speaking, biocentrists tend to view individual creatures separate form the value they possess in the systems that support human life (Attfield, 1). In Biocentrism Talk, Attfield states that:

“… Environmental ethic can value the good of all living creatures (present and

future) by taking seriously the impacts of our behaviour upon them, without either

making them all of equal significance (as some other writers do) or prioritising the

good of systems over the value of individuals, as if the good of systems were valuable in itself.”  (2)

Leopold would dispute the statement above, specifically the idea that the ecological system is not intrinsically valuable. In The Land Ethic, Leopold argues that much of the appreciation society has for the land is dependent upon the economic value it possesses (3). If one area of the ecosystem is threatened but invaluable profitably, then there is not much concern for its preservation. In order to overcome our own self-interest, we need to start concerning ourselves with the interdependent nature of the land and that its simply not a collection of stuff we manage to generate for ourselves (Welchman, 2020, UofA eclass).

The ecosystem’s natural processes in themselves do in fact maintain human life. While it is important to protect and preserve the land that contributes to these processes, it does go without saying that human practices upon economically valuable land (i.e. those used for agriculture practices) also help to sustain our existence. Without them, the human species of today would suffer as we would not be able to support the needs and lives of our inevitably growing population.

Although the Land-Ethic principle promotes an extended communal tie from soil to human, it often unintentionally invalidates human life through its effort to do so.

-Deanne

Work Cited:

Attfield, Robin. ‘Biocentrism Talk’.

Leopold, Aldo. (1948). ‘The Land Ethic’, in A Sound Country Almanac.

The mean of Leopold’s land community concept is “The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land” (Leopold,1). And also, land ethics is turning human roles from conquerors of the land to a citizen of the community which means humans need to respect to the other citizen and respect to the community (Leopold,1). Land ethics recognizes the significance of the existence of nature, but do humans really respect these natural things? Do we love the soil, water, plants and animals, as mentioned in Leopold’s article? The answer is no because anthropocentrism and community conqueror behaviour are destroying the community. The conqueror’s ecological concept was to see the ecosystem as something that could help them increase their own interests. Overgrazing, agriculture, building houses and so on have brought economic development to humans. But destruction naturally causes the degradation of plants and soil. Such degradation has led to the degradation of animal populations that depend on them. Egoism always puts the interests first and does not treat other creatures equally. They only want the maximum interests to themselves; they ignore the interests of the community.  The current social situation is that Leopold’s concept of land community is still progressing slowly.

Is it really useful to strengthen education on land conservation? Leopold mentioned that the content of education is actually ” It defines no right or wrong, assigns no obligation, calls for no sacrifice, implies no change in the current philosophy of values ” and “In respect of land-use, it urges only enlightened self-interest”(Leopold,2). When the government takes measures, such as asking farmers to take measures to protect their land within five years, the government will give corresponding compensation in terms of machinery or other aspects. But when the measure ended five years later, no farmers would consciously protect their land. For farmers, the immediate interests are the best, so they will not change their values, they just want to explore more land to do agriculture and make their lives better. But planting more is also destroying more forests, which also brings us global warming problems. If a human does not change their beliefs and values, the concept of equal respect for biology will not be formed.

As mentioned in Leopold’s article, the land pyramid is based on the soil. This pyramid is also a food chain. Up there are plants, insects, birds, animals and so on, and then the top. The conqueror placed himself at the top and could do whatever he wanted. But the pyramid is one layer linked to another, and finally back to the soil. Pyramids are fluid, and it can be strengthened or weakened by constant biological changes. If humans cut down excessively, the birds will have no habitat, which may lead to the extinction of birds. It will cause bird predators to have no food because predators do not eat what birds eat. So the food chain will break into an unbalanced state. Whether the land can adapt to the new food chain is still unknown. But are humans really at the top of the pyramid? The conqueror also depends on land to develop. If the foundation of the pyramid is destroyed, how can the conqueror develop?

Based on my understanding, there is nothing wrong with the pursuit of human interests, but the actions of conquerors have harmed the natural environment. Now humans are experiencing global warming, rising water levels, water pollution and so on. The origin cause of these problems is the conqueror’s overexploitation and disrespect for nature. The pursuit of interests always makes people lost and unable to think rationally, which makes the conquerors unable to stop their steps and then reflect on the impact of their actions on the community. I think they have an obligation to respect and treat any organism in the biosphere equally and protect the integrity of the biological chain. Instead of turning natural resources into their own interests. We can’t think of ourselves as the top of the food chain just because we have the ability to create and develop. The relationship between humans and any living creature is complementary. No species can be separated from the environment, all need the support of the environment, including people.

Yiyang

Works Cited:

Leopold Aldo. (1948). The Land Ethic.

http://www.neohasid.org/pdf/landethic.pdf

Robin Attfield in “Biocentrism Talk” writes that “a biocentric stance is a life-centered one. It rejects the view that humanity alone matters in ethics, and accepts the moral standing of (at least) all living creatures” (1).  Attfield, upon defining biocentrism, then explains that biocentrism can apply to all sorts of species from flora/fauna to sophisticated mamals like whales and dolphins. Biocentrism, because of its emphasis on valuing “the good of all living creatures” over and above humans while considering at all times the impact of human behaviour on nonhuman creatures, is thus an a consequentialist ethic. He notes finally that biocentrism despite being consequentialist is also Kantian from the point of view that the beneficience of all species is in sight but with the difference that this is not a contractarian theory in which the utilitarian motive shines through with a consideration of the right of all species to that of happiness Attfield is interesting on this point because he has juxtaposed beneficience and well being of a species against that of the equality and happiness of all species. However, I wonder what beneficience looks like so I will trace his logic through with an eye towards the beneficience of ecosystems.

From an anti-anthropocentric point of view, I liked Attfield’s notion of biocentrism since he suggests that ecosystems containing many species may well have priorities over and above that of one species’ happiness. But I was left to wonder how a biocentric point of view would help us to define priority in an ecosystem of many species. Attfield notes that one way to define priority would be to consider a species rights in terms of self-defence and thus in terms of the harms that species is up against. In this sense biocentrism is further defined as a consequentialist ethic in that right of consideration goes to those who need it most. Last but not least Attfield then says if we pursue a consequentialist agenda then we must finally give way to the idea that all species are indeed equal and must be equally considered where harm is concerned. If we do pursue such an ethical valuation then the final conclusion is that we must all become vegetarian since one species’ rights cannot prevail over that of others as all are harmed if we elevate some species rights over that of others. I liked Attfield up until that moment. This takes me back to the issue of an ecosystem and I can’t but concede that in an ecosystem all species have equal rights, at least in theory, but real life and environmental issues dictate that some species rights must take priority over others to preserve the better part of the balance of the system. Some members of a species will die and their deaths may well enable others of the same and different species to live. On, the other hand, as I said agenda is everything here. Decisions can not always be left to mother nature because we lose the lives of all sorts of species everyday and needlessly. We cannot de-extinct those that we lose except in only a few rare cases. So, while biocentrism is at least a bit more hopeful as far as addressing the ills of the environment in its egalitarian and consequentialist approach, a generalist ethic concerned with beneficience that makes a claim for consequentialism and egalitarianism will not be enough without a notion of priority when life is held in the balance.

One of the readings for this week was “The land Ethic,” by Aldo Leopold from a Sand County Almanac written in 1948. Leopold outlines the ethical sequence. He defines philosophical ethics as a differentiation between social conduct and non social conduct. He describes how people view the land as property and people have a view of the land as something which is economical (Leopold, page 1). He describes how in order for an ethical relation to land to exist people first need to love respect and admire the land for its value. Value has to go beyond economical value. 

Throughout history, people have looked to the land to find some sort of resource. Although the movie is rife with historical inaccuracies, I remember the song “Mine,” from Pocahontas (https://youtu.be/DSfYrPdTKVA). Governor Ratcliffe is obsessed with digging up the land to find gold and make himself rich. When we look to our modern day, especially in the province of Alberta, people value the resource of black gold, or oil. People are willing to destroy entire ecosystems in order to make a profit. I think the fact that so many people in Alberta rely on the oil field to keep a roof over their heads and put food on the table, it can be hard to look past the economic benefits and look towards valuing the land. Leopold also describes colonial migration and the battles over the cane lands. These battles took place because the lands eventually grew bluegrass which was quite valuable. 

In historical times people had a direct connection to the land but this reading describes how we are becoming further separated from the land. He demonstrates that when we are out of the city and away from our technology; we experience boredom. So many things around us are synthetic. These include substitutes for wood, leather, and wool. The substitutes have become preferable to the original. He says that people have outgrown the land (Leopold page 6). 

He goes into what I think is a very important point, and that is an ecological comprehension of the land. In order to have ecological comprehension, one needs to be educated about important matters of ecology. Formal education may not be enough in this case. I am in my final year of university and for my degree it was not necessary to receive much training concerning ecology. Leopold also makes the point that this training can come from other courses such as geography, botany, agronomy, history or economics (Leopold, page 6).I agree with him the ecological training is scarce. 

I think in order for people to care more about ecology, they have to have training in some form. I think it is difficult for people to care about matters which they cannot comprehend. When people read books by philosophers such as Leopold they begin to think about matters which they might never had thought of before. On environmental health news they have an article called  Building a library of American environmental classics: Part One. One of the books mentioned is Marjory Stoneman Douglas’s book The Everglades: River of Grass. This book made Americans reconsider their views on the everglades. Her writing made the everglades be viewed in a positive light as an ecological treasure, and not just a swamp full of bugs and gators.  (https://www.ehn.org/top-environmental-books-part-1-2647584261.html?rebelltitem=1#rebelltitem1)

In conclusion, I think the more we learn about ecosystems the more we will have cause to care for them, and have the desire to extend ethical views to further protect them.. Leopold says (page 6) the evolution of a land ethic is an intellectual and an emotional process.

We have a responsibility to learn as much as we possibly can and do everything we can to protect the land and natural resources around us. 

As a black person myself, I found the article by Aph Ko titled ‘3 Reasons Black Folks Don’t Join the Animal Rights Movement – And Why We Should’ to be intriguing. I knew that my approach to this blog would be to test the author’s views by applying it to a case of my own choosing.

Although I was born in Edmonton, from the age of five I grew up in a tiny Sub-Saharan African country. To be very honest, all the main animal conservationists were white people. Being an animal advocate was considered to be a “white people thing,” or in the local language, “za azungu.”

I personally found it interesting that the black people in the country I grew up in and the black people in the US have the same sentiments. I think one of the biggest reasons why black people think that way is not because we do not want to care about animals, but because we are overwhelmed by some unique problems. For example, at one point Western countries withheld aid from the country I was in, and a shortage of basic necessities such as medication and car fuel followed. People were queueing at gas stations from as early as 3AM till later in the evening. By the time one got the fuel, advocating for animals would be the last thing on one’s mind. White people were never on the queues as they could afford to send their employees. In addition, where I grew up, many people reared their own chickens or quails, or bought live chickens. When buying the chickens, everyone chose the chickens that seemed the healthiest, and so for most sellers it was particularly important that the chickens were well taken care of. Industrial scale animal exploitation such as electrocuting birds to lay eggs is unheard of. The chickens were not overcrowded and beaten in the manner depicted in the Meet your Meat video. That was despicable and I could not stomach the video.

I cannot speak for the black people who struggle to find food, lack money for education or shelter in the country I grew up in. In dire poverty, one’s survival is the priority. I know that those problems consume them, and for the poorest, having chicken or beef for dinner is a luxury. Many of those people are unaware of how badly animals are treated in certain societies. However, for those of us who are privileged to have the basic necessities of life and are aware of the cruelty animals face, there is no excuse. I strongly agree with the following statements by Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson: the idea that the treatment of animals could be invoked to support Western superiority is puzzling, given that the West is responsible for inventing and then diffusing the techniques of industrial‐scale animal exploitation, whereas many non‐Western societies have historically had more respectful relations with animals. Respect for animals is clearly not the exclusive property of any one race, culture, or civilization—and certainly not the West. (Kymlicka and Donaldson, 2014).

To sum it up, we all ought to care for animals. It should be a natural instinct.

RERERENCES

Ko, A. (2015), 3 Reasons Black Folks Don’t Join the Animal Rights Movement – And Why We Should. https://everydayfeminism.com/2015/09/black-folks-animal-rights-mvmt/

Kymlicka, W. and Donaldson, S. (2014), Animal Rights, Multiculturalism, and the Left. J Soc Philos, 45: 116-135. doi:10.1111/josp.12047

“A biocentric stance is a life-centered one. It rejects the view that humanity alone matters in ethics, and accepts the moral standing of (at least) all living creatures” (Attfield 1). Man has always considered himself superior to all other creatures. But, after all, man is only one of many animals. Even if human beings wear clothes and live in houses, they are still equal to other creatures.

In the real sense, people came to the earth only a few tens of thousands of years, and modern people only a few hundred years. But humanity has gradually opened up a new world through labor, technological manufacturing, and cultural innovation. In this world, human beings are, in a sense, above everything else. The interests of other creatures are sacrificed for the interests of humanity. For example, to build houses, people will cut down a lot of trees. To open up farmland, man has driven a large number of animals out of the forest. Some of the actions of human beings are trampling on other creatures. But there is one thing that all human beings should understand: all things are equal.

Before the birth of man, there were a large number of animals and plants on the earth. If we had to say who is the master of the planet, it would be the oldest living plant. But nowadays, people do not respect plants very much. If humans still feel guilty about eating animals, they rarely feel guilty about eating plants. The existence of vegetarians, to some extent, represents the human contempt for plant life. When talking about life, people will mention their good friends, relatives and even their dog, but no one will mention the grass.

But, paradoxically, as radical egalitarians do, if humans do not eat plants to respect them and uphold the belief that they are equal to them, humans are likely to starve to death. Therefore, in my opinion, the concept of life center means that human beings should respect and protect the rights and interests of plants based on the minimum protection of their own needs. For example, to grow food, people will destroy a lot of forests. Suppose everyone can save food and reduce unnecessary waste. In that case, people worldwide will save a considerable amount of food every year, and eventually, a large number of forests will be protected from being cut down.

All things are created equal. Many people often say that only human beings can speak the language and have a culture. But who has proved that there is no verbal communication between animals and plants? Just because humans do not understand animals and plants’ language does not mean they do not have language. I once heard a Wolf howl one night in rural China, and soon another crowd of wolves came to the place. If there is no verbal communication between wolves, they will never come together.

In a word, do not solidify everything with human thinking. Everything in the world may not be fair, but every human should defend relative fairness.

Kaize

Work Cited:

Robin Attfield. “Biocentrism Talk.” 1.

The intergovernmental panel on climate change (or IPCC for short) released in 2018 a special report [1] on the importance of keeping global warming below 1.5 ºC to prevent irreversible change to the climate system. This report and countless other scientific evidence [2][3] point towards a disturbing truth: current anthropocentric greenhouse gas emissions are warming the climate at an unsustainable rate. Since the industrial revolution of the mid XVIII century, the average temperature of the planet has increased by roughly 1ºC, and if current trends continue, we will see an increase in temperature of at least 3ºC by the end of the century. But why should we care about global warming? Why is it an important issue for human kind? And is it significant beyond human interests?

So far in the course we have considered two types of moral frameworks: anthropocentrism (human-centered ethics) and biocentrism (life-centrism ethics). From an anthropocentric view, climate change will have (and indeed is already having) serious impacts on human societies. From rising sea levels to water shortages and food insecurity, people around the world are going to live with the detrimental ramifications of modern industry. However, nowadays most people seem to prefer to carry on with business as usual because facing global warming is both uncomfortable and demanding. Fossil-fuel-driven-economy provides immense value for human kind. From transportation and electricity to petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals, energy-dense fuels have allowed unprecedented growth and the advancement of a highly interconnected world economy. So if we only consider short-term human interests, tackling global warming doesn’t seem such a pressing issue.

However, if we take into consideration the wellbeing of other species, the urgency to address the climate emergency becomes increasingly evident. We have shared the planet with other living organisms for thousands of years, and our actions are rapidly changing their environment.  According to the IPBES Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services [4], “around 1 million animal and plant species are now threatened with extinction […] more than ever before in human history.” Biocentrism rejects the view that humanity alone matters in ethics, and holds the position that all living creatures have an intrinsic good of their own. Intrinsic good refers to the value of a thing in itself, independent of external relationships. For instance, we might find a forest useful to extract timber, but if we consider its intrinsic value, its usefulness can’t be a reason to destroy it. A biocentric philosophy encompases a broader range of creatures that we should consider when thinking about climate change, and it reminds us that our actions have serious consequences beyond our own existence. A position put forward by Robin Attfield argues that what matters about animals is their capacity to be harmed or benefited. In his talk on Biocentrism [5], Attfield highlights the importance of protecting other species’ habitat as well as ours, and sees with worry global warming for driving species into extinction at ever increasing rates. Attfield is a utilitarian, which means his ultimate goal is to maximize happiness and minimize pain. In classical utilitarianism, actions are judged by their consequences on the satisfaction of human preferences, and these preferences are given the same weight by the principle of equal consideration. However, when this principle is extended to non-human beings, Attfield makes the remark that sentient or rational beings might have more interests than non-sentient, non-rational beings. This view might be problematic when dealing with climate change issues because it reaffirms, in a way, human superiority over other creatures.

The deontological philosopher Paul Taylor puts forward an alternative biocentric viewpoint [6]. According to Taylor, humans should assume an attitude of respect for nature, an attitude rooted in the good of all living beings and their inherent worth. Taylor wholeheartedly rejects the idea of human superiority over other animal and plant species, and calls for a change in mentality that allows us to see ourselves as co-inhabitants of the planet. This biocentric outlook on nature is based on an “understanding of earth’s natural ecosystems as a complex web of interconnected elements” (Taylor, 1981), which results in the knowledge that the wellbeing of the earth’s ecosystems is essential to both human and non-human species. 

In dealing with climate change, I consider the attitude of respect for nature an ideal limiting condition of every person’s freedom of action (just like Kant’s principle of respect for persons is a limiting condition in classical deontological philosophy). If we take into account the intrinsic value of every bird, elefant, and oak tree, human’s boundless exploitation of the natural environment comes out to be irrational. If we stop thinking about nature as useful to us, and start recognizing the value it embodies in itself, the acidification of the oceans, burning of the rainforests, and deterioration of wild environments comes out to be utterly immoral. But this does not mean humans are evil. It mostly means we are ignorant of the interconnectedness of the earth’s ecosystems, and the profound implications that nearly every aspect of our life has on the planet.

References:

1. IPCC. Global Warming of 1.5 ºC. https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/.
2. “Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate Is Warming.” NASA. January 21, 2020 https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/.
3. “United in Science 2020.” World Meteorological Organization. September 11, 2020. https://public.wmo.int/en/resources/united_in_science. 
4. “UN Report: Nature’s Dangerous Decline ‘Unprecedented’; Species Extinction Rates ‘Accelerating’ – United Nations Sustainable Development.” United Nations. https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/05/nature-decline-unprecedented-report/.
5. Robin Attfield. Biocentrism Talk. Cardiff University
6. Paul W. Taylor. The Ethics of Respect for Nature. 1981.

In Robin Attfield’s Biocentrism Talk, essential to understanding his message is that moral consideration for all life is required to bring about benefits (and prevent more harm) for all lifeforms across the globe.

Attfield’s Views

Biocentrism can be defined as a moral philosophy centered around all life, not just human life. Biocentrism “rejects the view that humanity alone matters in ethics, and accepts the moral standing of (at least) all things.” (§ 1). It is also stated that moral consideration is not given to abiotic things as they lack an intrinsic good for themselves, excluded from help or harm (§ 5). This presents a basic definition of biocentrism as (of course) life focused, all life, and excludes only those things which do not have a good they work towards. A plant works towards fruit, a bear to hunt, a human to press on. All work to preserve this good to themselves and are then alive. A rock or cloud exist as is and will have no consideration if crushed or blown away, they simply are then, are not.

Biocentrism may give priority to some life, but values all life, period. “Creatures with more sophisticated capacities such as dolphins and gorillas” may be prioritized over a shrub or fungus for instance (§ 7). This does not mean that the shrub and fungus are worthless, explained in Attfield’s use of a thought experiment from Donald Scherer in 1982 (§ 9 as described in text). Examine the following planets: a barren planet (‘Lifeless’), a planet populated with plant life (‘Flora’), and a planet populated with animal and plant life (‘Fauna’). Lifeless may be overlooked but both Flora and Fauna are cherished for hosting life, no matter what form. From these points Attfield makes clear that biocentrism can place certain lifeforms over others in consideration, but all lifeforms are ultimately considered.

Biocentrism allows for global crises to be taken with urgency due to a more global moral responsibility. The potential harm of global warming affects the ‘flourishing of a life form’ in all living things, not just humanity (§15). Urgency then to reduce atmospheric carbon dioxide levels draw consideration from lifeforms all over the world, not just anthropomorphic and not just human (§ 18). If this perspective is considered in other spheres, such as in ‘should we demolish a rainforest’ or ‘should we dump in the oceans’ it will not be limited to the effects on humans who typically overlook such things (being so far removed from that part of the world, and they from us) but extend to considering ‘a lost rain forest or polluted reef impedes the good of so many other lifeforms’ and this perspective is what Attfield believes must be adopted, to understand that a change in philosophies can so drastically change the appearance of a issue thought meaningless or not important enough in other outlooks.

Applications

A value of responsibility to life forms globally places greater urgency to a solution that may be postponed otherwise. Human focused thought allows for laziness. In the case of global warming it feels as though ‘we can live on, and if things got really bad, we would figure something out’. Whether true or not, a solution is put off in favor of what appears to be more important (pick any number of incentives that halt ecological protections, ex. Expanding industry over preservations), but if the issue were to consider how many species are lost with many more to be in danger soon, the threat of betraying our fellow lifeforms to extinction fuels a duty to assist in their preservation.

Critique

An issue I had with Attfield’s thoughts on biocentrism is the implications of prioritization of certain lifeforms over others. This is not to say that some prioritizing is not proper, to save a dog from immediate suffering seems right over helping a maple tree that would require attention over a few years. However, does this mean pine forests being destroyed by mountain pine beetles should be put on que regarding first saving the panda? What about the beetle itself? It only means to promote its own good by ravaging (incidentally, it means no evil) so many forests, which we still value for themselves. Is vilifying one life form proper to save another, especially to the case where the pine trees do not seem able to defend themselves on the scale of attack the beetles have displayed in far western Canada? Another thought when considering Attfield’s ideas on prioritizing certain lifeforms would be the issue of quantity and quality. Quality in the sense of sophistication of mental capacities, not that it is superior to another less sophisticated lifeform. Imagine the countless trees destroyed by forestry, mountain pine beetles, fires, etc. and look to a (seemingly) more sophisticated animal like the panda. Is the number of tress enough to overtake the que simpler life forms are put behind relative to a qualitatively higher lifeform but with quantitively less members in danger? Such a question is not addressed by Attfield but seems to be of major importance. The honey bee is a fairly simple species compared to the gorilla, yet the honey bee does more for the community of life forms (pollination) than a gorilla does, further that there are many more ‘units’ of life in danger with the threatening of honey bees (as all life is considered) despite the gorilla exhibiting tool use and complex social behaviours. One could argue the bee’s eusocial quality in this same manner to a ‘lone’ bug like the butterfly.

In conclusion, I believe Attfield has a good thought in humanity adopting a more biocentric view when it comes to what should be morally considered in solving a problem. With a little more development I think it would appeal to many individuals and hopefully inspire many more to extend their moral considerations to all our fellow earthlings.

Jaden

Works Cited:

Robin Attfield. Biocentrism Talk. https://eclass.srv.ualberta.ca/pluginfile.php/6160295/mod_resource/content/1/attfield_biocentrismtalk.pdf

This week in Philosophy 355 we began to study theories which reject traditional anthropocentric theories. Historically  anthropocentric theories were those theories which valued the morals and experiences of only human beings, and these theories did not include the moral values of non-human animals (Welchman, 2020, UofA eclass).

One reading which we covered was Tom Regan’s “The Case for Animal Rights”. Regan is of course opposed to anthropocentric theories and puts forth his own views and philosophical ideas. His view is based on Kantian deontological ethics.  Regan revised Kant’s view and he thought Kant was correct that rationally autonomous beings have a right to respect for their autonomy, but as experiencing subjects of lives we also have a right to respect (Welchman, 2020, 16).  

Regan critiques anthropocentric theories; he also provides critiques of non-anthropocentric theories and points out their flaws. This blog post will explore these critiques to non-anthropocentric theories including contractarianism, virtue ethics, and utilitarianism. 

The first theory which Regan is opposed to is Contractarianism. This philosophical view is one which is described by Hobbes or Rawls. Whether it is described by one philosopher or the other its fundamental ideas systematically denies that we have direct duties to those human beings who do not have a sense of justice (Welchman, 2020,11). People who can understand a moral contract have their rights covered directly, and they are protected by the contract. The individuals who cannot understand and not sign the contract lack the direct rights. This would include and leave groups such as young children vulnerable. However, here comes the caveat. Children in most circumstances have parents who love and protect them. The children will then be protected by the contract because their parents wish for them to be protected.(Regan, 1983,2-3).

Animals can also not understand, nor can they sign contracts. However, there are animals such as companion animals, and people care about them dearly. The animals that people care about still lack rights but will be protected because people have sentimental interests toward them. For example, if a woman is walking by you with her dog, you should not kick the dog because you would upset the woman. Contractarianism doesn’t care about the dog (Welchman, 2020, Unpublished UofA lectures).

On this matter there are plenty of other animals that people don’t care about. There are farm animals and animals in laboratories who people don’t concern themselves with. These animals still suffer and just because people are not immediately concerned with the suffering, this does not mean the suffering does not matter and therefore Regan is opposed to the view.(Regan, 1983, 2-3). 

Another view Regan is opposed to is Virtue ethics because there is no guarantee that a kind act is a right act. This brings up the idea of humane slaughter. There has been a lot of work done by people such as Temple Grandin to make the slaughter of cows easier on the cows. However, just because it is less painful and frightening, does not mean that it is morally right. Regan describes how a little more straw, a little more spaces, and some companionship will not eliminate the basic wrong that is attached to our views of treating animals as resources. Making farm conditions more humane or kind is not enough, according to Regan. Virtue ethicists would be fully in support of making farming conditions more humane, but Regan thinks this is not good enough. The only way to make things better for the animals is the total dissolution of animal agriculture (Regan, 1983,1).

The final theory which will be discussed is utilitarianism.Regan describes how people often think the theory that we seem to be searching for in terms of helping the animals is Utilitarianism.Utilitarians accept two main principles. The first is equality and that everyone’s interests count. The second principle is accepting the act of utility and doing what will bring about the best balance of satisfaction and frustration for everyone who is affected by the outcome (Regan, 1983, 4).

This sounds like it would be a good theory, but the reason Regan opposes it is because individuals have no value with utilitarianism. The following analogy makes this point more comprehensible. A cup contains different liquids. Sometimes the liquids are sweet, bitter, or a combination of both. The sweeter the liquids are the better, and the more bitter the liquids the worse. The cup or container does not have value. In utilitarianism, individuals are the cps. What goes into us matters. Our feelings of satisfaction matter, and our feelings of frustration have a negative value (Regan, 1983, 5)

Another analogy shows further issues with utilitarianism. Regan describes the case of Aunt Bea. She is a cranky rich old lady, and no one loves her. If I was to kill her, I could donate her money to a children’s hospital. This would benefit more people than her staying alive. It should be perfectly acceptable as a utilitarian. Utilitarianism prioritizes what makes the most people feel happy, and it can completely devalue the life of the individuals (Regan, 1983, 5).

Regan provides sound critiques of these theories, and his own view seems to be the best to protect the animals. If I was choose to a philosopher to advocate on behalf of the animals I would choose Regan. I think the above theories especially contractarianism and utilitarianism have deeply rooted flaws and they would need to undergo significant revisal to adequately advocate for the rights of animals. Regan’s views seem to  be the most in line with ethical vegan views. His views advocate for the complete abolition of forms of animal cruelty, and this is why I favour it in comparison to the other non-antropocentric theories. . Which philosophical theory do you think is best for the animals?

~Shantel

One of the readings we were assigned to read this week was Peter Singer’s “All Animals are Equal.” (Singer, Peter (1974) “All Animals Are Equal,” Philosophic Exchange: Vol. 5: No. 1, Article 6.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol5/iss1/6)

He argued in favour of  equal rights for all sentient beings(beings who can experience pleasure/pain such as animals and human beings) where there would be non-maleficence treatment towards them (unlike the treatment of present-day farm animals, testing on animals, etc.). He also brings up the fact that the majority of human beings are speciesists, where certain species’ interests are held above other species’ interests (for example, the general treatment of dogs as pets is significantly better than a factory farm hen) despite the fact that all of us are equal in sentience.

With this information  at hand, which normative ethical theory would Singer approve of in the context of “All Animals are Equal?” The four theories that were mentioned last week were: Consequentialism, Deontology, Contractarianism, and Virtue Ethics.

First, the ethical theory of Utilitarianism (Consequentialism) satisfies Singer and his argument on behalf of all animals, for he has issues with the current treatment of a lot of animals on this planet. However, it seems that human happiness is too much of a focus with this ethical theory in particular, as the term egalitarian is noted under the Utilitarianism outline without the mention of animals (Welchman, Introduction to Utilitarianism Slides, 4). Yet, the impartiality and the idea of consequences of the first principle on Utilitarianism does seem to fit the basic criteria of what Singer is trying to argue: everyone who has preferences wants their preferences met…so since everyone’s preference is to not be harmed, should this not apply to animals as well? Since the satisfaction of factory farm animals’ preferences in not wanting to be harmed would have been violated, would there not be consequences for the ones causing and contributing to their harm?

Second, the ethical theory of Deontology would not fair well in the context of “All Animals are Equal” because of its focus on respecting the autonomy of other people; this could be an argument against animal equality rights, as Kant states that only people reflecting “personhood” qualities should be respected in addition to their (autonomous) acts. (Welchman, Kant’s Deontological Ethics of Respect, 10)

Third, the ethical theory of Contractarianism would also not fair well. With Contractarianism, there are no universal principles, and that cooperation is the foundation for common rules to “limit the destruction.” (Welchman, Introducing Contractarianism and Virtue Ethics, 2) Also according to this theory, there is no right or wrong before the cooperating between indivudals to make common laws. Based off this logic, there seems to be a focus on the individual, rather than the collective; if all individuals agree that factory farming is a good way to benefit from it financially, then the needs/lives of the animals are disregarded…this would be viewed from the perspective of Contractarians as good.

Lastly, the ethical theory of Virtue Ethics would not be the strongest theory to uphold the argument in favour of the equality of all animals. While the second and third principles provide some reasonable points, the first principle is weak in that it is not impartial to everyone’s conduct because only individuals with good character do not need moral rules applied to them. (Welchman, Introducing Contractarianism and Virtue Ethics, 10) While a person might have good character initially, that does not mean that he/she will uphold their virtues for their entire life, as there are many life experiences that could create bad character. Also, the notion of “good character” does not mean they are against the treatment of animals that are experimented on for their individual needs. Based off of this reasoning, these individuals with “good character” get a free pass from moral laws.

By: Melissa