In Sandler’s The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species the question of deep de-extinction (the revival of long extinct species as opposed to recently extinct species) has its ethically for and against arguments explored, followed by Sandler’s take on DDE.

I: Sandler’s Arguments for and Against Deep De-Extinction (DDE)

The ethical arguments Sandler explores in favor of DDE are the justice, lost value, creation of value, and last resort arguments. First, the justice argument states that some species considered for DDE went extinct due to humans, meaning we ‘owe’ them their revival (355). However, considering species broadly do not have interests to be impeded (355) nor are the specific individuals around anymore, justice in the restorative sense gives no ethical duty to develop DDE. Second, the lost value arguments states species are valuable ecologically, instrumentally, and intrinsically (356) so their revival restores ‘worldly’ value. Sandler counters this, as a species’ value is “relational and context sensitive, [DDE] alone is insufficient to reestablish it.” (356). For example, a revived mammoth lost its natural habitat, its niche is non-existent, and intrinsically (as DDE hybridizes DNA of revived species) is a ‘new’ creature. Resultingly, lost value gives no ethical duty to develop DDE. Third, the creating value argument holds that “even if [DDE] cannot replace lost values, it may nevertheless create value.” (356). It is true many would like to see a live mammoth or extinct flora as spectacle, further the biotech behind DDE is a massive leap in technology anyway. Though interesting, Sandler recognizes creating value is not necessarily ethically bound to developing DDE for extinct species’ revival. Fourthly, the last resort argument concludes that should conservation efforts fail, DDE insures species revival later (357). Though, Sandler notes that this neither prevents nor fixes the causes of extinction (357) and may take the focus on preserving DNA rather than species in their natural context. Broadly, none of these pro-DDE arguments give an ethical duty to develop DDE. The creation of value is intriguing, but not ethically bound.

The ethical arguments Sandler explores opposed to DDE are the unnatural, animal welfare, eco/health concerns, and hubristic arguments. To begin, the unnatural argument fits those same people who object to other genetic altering technologies as it creates new hybrid organisms (357). Sandler opposes this as hybrids exist in nature, and human agriculture has been just a slower process of ‘gene altering’ anyway (357). While Sandler thinks GMOs should be labelled to respect other’s beliefs (357), this does not ethically forbid developing DDE. Following, the animal welfare argument states DDE cloning may result in genetic abnormalities, so animal suffering is possible (358). But Sandler adds DDE research will have the same oversight as any other research/conservation practice (358) so is not a new ethical debate, rather one already under a watchful eye, so again DDE is not necessarily ethically forbidden. Next, the eco/health concerns argument carries that DDE species may be released or escape, leading to unknown injuries to ecosystems and humans (358). However, “many revived species will be intended for research and exhibition, not release” (358) and that it is equally unknown if a revived species may really benefit its new environment. Lastly, the hubristic argument claims humans are ‘playing God’ and researchers overestimate their control over biotechnology, treat the symptoms and not the causes of extinction (358), and treat living things as things for humanity to design (359). Sandler states that DDE is more of a neutral tool and might be used hubristically if to redesign nature as humanity desires but can be used properly if held under careful oversight and respect (359). Once again, DDE is not necessarily ethically prohibited so long as it is used responsibly.

With the pro and anti DDE arguments established, Sandler concludes that DDE should be held as ‘Luxury Conservation’. DDE does not solve the causes or responsibilities of past mistakes, there is no ethical incentive to develop DDE nor ethically prohibit it (359). “[DDE] is fine to pursue if people want so long as it does not interfere with or compromise ethically important things” so can is ‘luxury conservation’ (359). Sandler concludes that DDE is a luxury, and so long as it does not take resources or focus on more pressing conservation efforts, so long as it is not abused simply because humanity can, and that it is used with respect and an understanding of its luxurious status (likely very expensive to clone) there is nothing inherently wrong or duty bound in developing DDE, rather it is ‘extra’; a fascinating potential not required of anyone to achieve.

II: Application

Consider the case of reviving a Woolly Mammoth. The poor things were likely hunted to extinction by our ancestors but considering their natural context is gone and so are the humans that killed them, humanity presently is neither obligated to revive nor keep them extinct. Absolutely, a live mammoth would be a spectacle and a symbol of our biotechnical prowess, but nothing more as it would likely require humans to sustain it in an artificial habitat. The arguments provided above do not necessarily forbid nor incentivize the revival of the woolly mammoth. It would be cool, but unnecessary, much like a luxury! Further, DDE may give some peace regarding hyper important species such as pollinators. I absolutely think present conservation efforts must be pursued to their extreme before DDE is considered, yet DDE can provide relief knowing that if humanity does screw up the conservation of a mass pollinator species, such as bees, there is a potential for more chances to clean up our act.

III: Question for Sandler

What are the implications of borderline cloning biotechnology? The creating value section discusses the potential for technological progress for the sake of progress in DDE in a kind of throw away manner (understandably, the scope of Sandler’s exploration is regarding animal cloning). Yet I feel the first question that will be asked after a form of animal cloning has been developed is “can and should we clone a human?”. I do not feel like this is entirely off the point, as humans are made of the same building blocks DDE would use to hypothetically revive long dead organisms. Human cloning is a logical application of this technology, and I would like to know if Sandler considered the aftermath of DDE tech in this direction.

Sources:

Ronald Sandler. The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species. Conservation Biology Vol. 28 No. 2 354-360 (2013) Society for Conservation Biology DOI: 10.1111/cobi.12198

In Gerald Harrison and Julia Tanner’s Better Not to Have Children, procreation is shown to be without moral ground, and humanity must consider its cessation entirely to stop the harm it causes to the earth and life generally.

I: Harrison and Tanner’s Views

Humans are harmful. Humanity is the most destructive lifeform on earth, so a solution would be to remove said destructive force (113). Further, that humanity is responsible for the largest era of mass extinctions displays human demise as a net benefit to nature (115). Humans are harmful to their surroundings and life across the planet. Wherever humans settle, the environment is typically destroyed. Pollution has warmed the planet at a dangerous rate causing extinctions to other species. The potential for nuclear annihilation also seems to conclude that human existence is an unwelcome danger to anything nearby. Morally, why would one desire to bring such a hurtful creature into existence?

Procreation is neither beneficial to the child or parent. Even if one’s life appears good, the final harm will eventually come in death, so “it may be better never to have lived at all, than to have lived and died” (117). As for parents, surveys have shown most parents regret having children while feeling no happier for having them (119) and that since in the west children do not usually care for elderly parents “the childless are more financially secure and in better health” (120). Children are thrust into a world they may not want or even enjoy (to starve, slavery, war). Parents are similarly mostly harmed by having children in failing to find ‘fulfillment’ and becoming financially unstable. Neither child nor parent is necessarily benefitted from procreation. A life of misery or eventual disappointment in losing a good life is net negative compared to never being born, which leaves suffering at a sterile zero.

Procreation is a gamble. An individual life may be good or horrendous, the parent does not suffer this new life, and procreation ignores the harm humanity already causes (119). Procreation assumes “future generations will behave responsibly” (114). There is no saying with certainty that bringing another life into this world is a good. That child may be born to suffer, a choice their parents made on their behalf knowing well that humans are incredibly hurtful to the environment, animals, and each other. It also cannot be guaranteed that the next generation will not just double down on pollution and war. Considering the progress of technology (our nuclear bombs and weapons have become more powerful and efficient), it is likely that the next world war would be the annihilation of much of earth’s life cradling potential. Overall, the choice to bring another child into the world is not made with certainty but with hope. Considering the harm humans cause the earth, animals, and each other, the more certain answer is a great amount of harm would cease if humans were gone.

This does not advocate a mass suicide nor war of extinction. “Only those who exist, did exist, or will exist, can have rights” (114). A living thing already born, has rights that cannot be violated. Harrison and Tanner advocate that humanity should let itself become extinct by not creating the next generation. A thing that does not exist cannot be harmed or violated in their rights as they are a non-entity. The ‘will exist’ above is a bit unclear. It is more likely Harrison and Tanner meant in cases where an embryo or unborn thing will be existing shortly has moral consideration (discussion). While this begs the question of ‘where does life begin?’ and the ethics of terminating a pregnancy, the fact that such things are not discussed in their paper indicates this as a foothold for potential debate, and to defend technically ‘unborn’ lives from being completely overlooked for moral consideration.

II: Application

Procreation oversteps humanity’s appetite for certainty. To justify something in the sciences empiric proof must be founded in rigorous testing of hypotheses. Those closest to their demise, those who have lived the longest lives, and people generally do not agree on life being good or bad: uncertainty is even disputed. A scientific answer to the meaning of life as of now would come from anecdotes, opinions, and lies. Consider the arts and philosophy which rely on logical argument and proofs to make an assertion. Broadly, philosophy asks the universal ‘why?’ be it ethics, understanding, or what is. In thousands of years of ethical systems and logical arguments asserting various understandings of the universe no absolute definitive answer can be given to life being good or bad. Why then if life cannot be proven so readily ‘good’ is it so assumed that bringing another life into such an existence is even morally proper? Following this line of thinking, Harrison and Tanner have ground in stating that procreation itself must be considered, especially given humanity’s tendency to cause suffering.

III: Reflection

One can justify the cessation of life entirely. There is no harm in not bringing a life into existence. One could end suffering by preventing all procreation. No lifeform is harmed according to Harrison and Tanner as only non-entities are prevented from existing. If it is the morally correct thing for humans to stop the suffering they cause, what of the suffering that exists in nature? Humans will be gone, but volcanos will still engulf forests, lions will eat baby elephants, and a cataclysm can still occur. There is no guarantee that life is good so a solution would be to cease the ‘gamble’ all together. If there is nothing to suffer then suffering vanishes.

This logic is where Harrison and Tanner’s thought falls short. It reduces life down to an equation of net suffering/happiness. Happiness cannot be guaranteed, but humanity can stop all suffering by preventing the next generation of life. This is a kind of utilitarian-nihilism that answers the question of harm by preventing the agent of experience. Logically, this is true: I cannot experience suffering if I was never born. Humanity will kill nothing, only prevent potential ‘I’s or anything that can suffer. It prevents questions by turning experience off. Human harm is a massive issue, but destroying the chalkboard is not the solution we should strive for.

As much as life is not guaranteed to be great, it is not necessarily bad. A net account of experiences fails to understand a single good experience can outshine a sea of bad ones.

Sources:

Gerald Harrison and Julia Tanner. Better not to Have Children. From ‘Think Spring’ (2013) pg. 113-121

I: Mohr’s Views

Carbon dioxide emissions are wrongfully the focus of most anti-global warming initiatives. Legislation focuses on “raising fuel economy standards, capping [carbon dioxide] emissions from power plants, and investing in alternative energy sources” (pg. 1). Mohr also reveals that though humanity produces carbon dioxide more than all other greenhouse gasses, non-CO₂ emissions have the strongest warming effects (pg.1). This illustrates Mohr’s notion that CO₂ is wrongfully the focus of anti-warming initiatives. Mohr is not saying that CO₂ is harmless, only that there are gasses more harmful. Focus should be placed on the most harmful element of global warming, rather than the most abundant for the most immediate results.

Methane has the most powerful warming effect of all the greenhouse gasses. “Methane is 21 times more powerful a greenhouse gas than CO₂” (pg. 2) and though CO₂ in the atmosphere has risen by almost a third since pre-industrial earth, “methane has more than doubled” (pg. 2). Mohr also includes the fact that natural methane production is magnified by the warming effect of human methane productions (decay of certain organic matters) which are already producing “one and a half times as much as all natural sources” (pg. 2).  This reveals methane as the largest cause of global warming of the greenhouse gasses, and its production is leagues greater than natural sources. Methane ought to be the focus of reducing greenhouse emissions, considering its larger (relative to natural) presence and power to retain heat in the atmosphere compared to CO₂.

Methane primarily comes from animal agriculture. While methane is also made from the energy sector “the number one source worldwide is animal agriculture” (pg. 2), mostly a product of digestion in cattle (85%) as well as stores of animal waste in “lagoons” (15%) (pg. 2). That 100 million tons of methane is produced annually from animal agriculture (pg. 2) highlights methane above other gasses the largest cause of global warming The reaction to massive methane production is to question its massive producer for alternatives to the animal product industry, reducing (or halting) methane production.

Reducing animal agriculture industry will combat global warming most effectively; widely adopting a vegetarian diet would see huge results. Mohr adds that methane dissipates in the atmosphere after approx. eight years, while CO₂ requires up to a century (pg. 3). As well, the obstacle of fighting CO₂ emissions means to fight energy giants and effect cars and factories, which are very difficult to convince public and private interest against (pg. 3). Regarding an alternative to animal agriculture, hypothetically it could be done today with only the decision to eat greens over meats across the public. It is clear the reduction (or dissolution) of the animal product industry (meat, milk, etc.) would immediately cut a gargantuan production of an incredibly harmful greenhouse gas. An absent animal agriculture can be replaced with a larger plant centered agriculture, thus adopting a vegetarian diet across the public would combat global warming in a noticeable capacity.

II: Application

A vegetarian diet may bring an enlarged food surplus and healthy atmosphere, only at the cost of meat. Imagine the tons of fuel, land, water, and food, put into maintaining any number of farm animals. This massive array of resources if focused on corn, wheat, etc. could lower the cost of food considerably and feed a massive amount of people (even across the world). This food otherwise is fed to animals to produce a smaller volume of animal products. Animal cruelty would cut back tremendously, and the environment would be noticeably safer in a lifetime (recall the short cycling out of methane). Economically, incentives would be created to satisfy the human craving for meat in plant-based alternatives which may bring commercial success to sustain all sorts of new plant-based industries.

The only thing sacrificed (broadly) seems to be meat and other products. There is a deep craving for meat in some humans. It seemed sustainable when living in smaller collectives where meat was a semi-rare luxury. Presently in the western world, it is possible to acquire any number of animal products with the literal push of a button. This craving is costly to the environment, and while some career carnivores will have to sit on their instincts, it is to the benefit of what is our only home. The question of steaks everyday or a healthy planet must be considered. As shown earlier, the incentive to produce plant-based meat alternatives can draw momentum from this craving. It is not as though meat-like products will disappear forever from humanity’s diet, only that it must cooperate with a sustainable earth.

III: Concerns

What is to be done with the ‘leftovers’ of the animal agricultural industry? Mohr had stated earlier the relative ease of reducing methane in animal agriculture versus reducing CO₂ which involves combating energy, cars, etc. While no doubt deconstructing the animal agricultural industry seems easier than deconstructing the energy sector, there are some pressing issues worth considering. A small issue would be those whose lives have depended on animal agriculture. A solution would be to perhaps give these people priority in setting up plant alternative farms (subsidies, aid) considering their way of life is essentially being outlawed. Larger questions remain, however.

There are presumably tens of millions of living things: Cattle, chickens, pigs, etc. that must either be slaughtered without reproduction, or be ‘put somewhere’. What is humanity to do with all these animals? Introducing them into nature is a whole other ethical question, but is killing millions of them without the intent of repopulating them an ‘ok’ thing to do? Humanity has not always been the kindest overlords to cattle, but this seems to be a whole new titan of a question. If the answer is a necessary killing, so be it, but is this a proper way to treat a population of animals we exploited in their birth to begin with? Humanity is the one who bred these beasts to be milk, meat, egg, etc. producing machines for our advantage. The last generation may be slaughtered as ‘the last wave of meat products’, but this is to admit outright these animals as products that we are done with. A sizeable opposition to this will have strong opinions.

IV: Conclusion

Ultimately, Mohr gives a (hypothetically) practical solution to one of humanity’s most dire problems. Considering the heating power of methane and the easier task of dismantling the animal agricultural versus combating energy and transportation, humanity only needs to ask itself if meat is worth all the effort delivered in its production. With the advent of meat alternatives and an ever-growing environmental issue, meat is losing looking more and more the compromise to a sustainable existence.

Sources: Noam Mohr. A New Global Warming Strategy: How Environmentalists are Overlooking Vegetarianism as the Most Effective Tool Against Climate Change in Our Lifetimes. From EarthSave International. (2005) http://www.earthsave.org/news/earthsave_global_warming_report.pdf

Leopold’s Views

Ethics can be understood as that which sustains cooperation for a mutual continued existence. Leopold presents two sides of the same ethical ‘coin’: “an ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence” (§ 2) as well as “philosophically, is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct” (§ 2). These definitions present Leopold’s understanding of ethics as a system by members permit and ban certain actions that conflict with a mutual continued existence. Much how murder is prohibited in a society to allow its members to continue their life in comfort, ethics sets these boundaries and provides ‘ought to’ and ‘ought not’ modes of action that assist in sustaining a fulfilling existence for all.

Complex ethics arise as its domain extends to include more members in a cooperative continued existence. “The first ethics dealt with the relation between individuals…later accretions dealt with the relation between the individual and society” (§ 2). By this, Leopold states that ethics between the first two humans who decided to cooperate may have been simple (you and me versus the world, and a simple handshake). As human groups began to turn to massive cities and wield resources and power unimaginable to the first humans, complex law codes, courts, who is owed what, and why this person must pay more taxes than another (if at all) display ethic’s rising complexity as its domain grew from human to human, to human to society.

The next step in the extension of ethics is to include the individual in relation to the whole environment. A “land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include…the land” (§ 3) and members of the ecosystem it contributes to. These ecosystems too work to ensure a continued existence and share a collective instinct to move to this goal: plants are typically consumed first which provide the energy for the various chains of energy that course (not exclusively) through bugs, prey, and predators, who then decompose back into the soil (§ 6). This reveals ecosystems to be a complex entity with countless moving parts, members, and factors that include both biotic and abiotic members (sun, soil) that contribute to a cooperative continued existence.

As of now, the relation of the individual to the environment is that of economic benefit and not a cooperation. Leopold provides an example of this in the eroded topsoil of Wisconsin in the 1930s where farmers were urged to use pro-environmental practices which were quickly abandoned after the bare minimum was done, for a minimum length of time, an shaped around the best short term economic yield the farmer could reach (§ 5). As well in the drawing of the threatened songbird as economic issue of insect populations rising dramatically, when in fact the songbird was just adored (§ 5). These examples illustrate the fact that human’s value (some) members of the environment as means to their economic ends. This flies in the face of the land ethic Leopold advocates which would value members of the environment in the same manner a human is: with the right to continue in their own existence.

Humans and Nature Living in Harmony

A land ethic bestows benefits like those praised in a human to human, and human to society relation. Much how two can make a hunt easier or a society provides specialized services thus access to a higher quality of life, including the environment (and all its abiotic and biotic parts) in our ethics presents benefits that our current relation to  the environment does not allow. Cleaner air, lands protected from soil erosion, and sustenance can be taken in a sustainable manner without the industrial slaughter of farm animals, hunting for sport, or stripping a forest of trees and farmland of nutrients in a sudden harmful manner. Our anxieties of global warming and the deaths of many species would be quelled with a respect for nature in itself, and in return for a sustainable lifestyle (at the cost of a few readily available luxuries) humans would not have to worry about one day losing the cushy way of life most of modern humanity enjoys. This does not prohibit meats or agriculture altogether, for example, but only means to alter the scale and process to continue human existence in tandem with maintaining a stability our fellow citizens of the environment are also entitled to for their own sake.

Critique

While Leopold’s argument for a land ethic are compelling, how exactly a practical plan of bringing it to reality seems incredibly overlooked. Is it possible to convince a public to adopt a land ethic despite the threat of long-term extinction? Humanity has a reputation of waiting till the last quarter before fixing its problems (political disputes, war, updating laws) and I am sad to say that the environment may only be considered when, for example, farming begins to dry up or cattle and game begin to disappear. Our nations are fed by massive scale food and fuel projects that require years of commitment to reverse, and I fear the average joe will overlook this issue until it knocks at the door unless a more practical angle is explored, and even then, do we still have the time to save a planet in the symbiotic manner Leopold advocates? We have been polluting for centuries and it seems now a sudden cessation of our mechanisms is required to bring the end of the environmental crisis, but is this enough to convince humanity?

A proper land ethic requires international cooperation. Humanity cannot even do this for each other, so convincing the population would seem to follow an international agreement potentially ages away. Think of oceans, the atmosphere, and animals which migrate through international borders. The environmental crisis is an international crisis that is being bogged down by intranational politics relative to every nation in the world, all at different stages in their belief of a land ethic (if any).

Despite these issues in executing Leopold’s land ethics, this should not undercut the importance of a respect for the earth that houses us all. It has been a long time since humanity has been all at the mercy of nature like in the ancient past, but we must remember that our absence does not absolve us of our citizenship to nature, and this should inspire a care for the environment for itself that still has us messily entwined in its circuit of living things.

Source:

Aldo Leopold. The Land Ethic. A County Almanac (1948) http://www.neohasid.org/pdf/landethic.pdf

In Robin Attfield’s Biocentrism Talk, essential to understanding his message is that moral consideration for all life is required to bring about benefits (and prevent more harm) for all lifeforms across the globe.

Attfield’s Views

Biocentrism can be defined as a moral philosophy centered around all life, not just human life. Biocentrism “rejects the view that humanity alone matters in ethics, and accepts the moral standing of (at least) all things.” (§ 1). It is also stated that moral consideration is not given to abiotic things as they lack an intrinsic good for themselves, excluded from help or harm (§ 5). This presents a basic definition of biocentrism as (of course) life focused, all life, and excludes only those things which do not have a good they work towards. A plant works towards fruit, a bear to hunt, a human to press on. All work to preserve this good to themselves and are then alive. A rock or cloud exist as is and will have no consideration if crushed or blown away, they simply are then, are not.

Biocentrism may give priority to some life, but values all life, period. “Creatures with more sophisticated capacities such as dolphins and gorillas” may be prioritized over a shrub or fungus for instance (§ 7). This does not mean that the shrub and fungus are worthless, explained in Attfield’s use of a thought experiment from Donald Scherer in 1982 (§ 9 as described in text). Examine the following planets: a barren planet (‘Lifeless’), a planet populated with plant life (‘Flora’), and a planet populated with animal and plant life (‘Fauna’). Lifeless may be overlooked but both Flora and Fauna are cherished for hosting life, no matter what form. From these points Attfield makes clear that biocentrism can place certain lifeforms over others in consideration, but all lifeforms are ultimately considered.

Biocentrism allows for global crises to be taken with urgency due to a more global moral responsibility. The potential harm of global warming affects the ‘flourishing of a life form’ in all living things, not just humanity (§15). Urgency then to reduce atmospheric carbon dioxide levels draw consideration from lifeforms all over the world, not just anthropomorphic and not just human (§ 18). If this perspective is considered in other spheres, such as in ‘should we demolish a rainforest’ or ‘should we dump in the oceans’ it will not be limited to the effects on humans who typically overlook such things (being so far removed from that part of the world, and they from us) but extend to considering ‘a lost rain forest or polluted reef impedes the good of so many other lifeforms’ and this perspective is what Attfield believes must be adopted, to understand that a change in philosophies can so drastically change the appearance of a issue thought meaningless or not important enough in other outlooks.

Applications

A value of responsibility to life forms globally places greater urgency to a solution that may be postponed otherwise. Human focused thought allows for laziness. In the case of global warming it feels as though ‘we can live on, and if things got really bad, we would figure something out’. Whether true or not, a solution is put off in favor of what appears to be more important (pick any number of incentives that halt ecological protections, ex. Expanding industry over preservations), but if the issue were to consider how many species are lost with many more to be in danger soon, the threat of betraying our fellow lifeforms to extinction fuels a duty to assist in their preservation.

Critique

An issue I had with Attfield’s thoughts on biocentrism is the implications of prioritization of certain lifeforms over others. This is not to say that some prioritizing is not proper, to save a dog from immediate suffering seems right over helping a maple tree that would require attention over a few years. However, does this mean pine forests being destroyed by mountain pine beetles should be put on que regarding first saving the panda? What about the beetle itself? It only means to promote its own good by ravaging (incidentally, it means no evil) so many forests, which we still value for themselves. Is vilifying one life form proper to save another, especially to the case where the pine trees do not seem able to defend themselves on the scale of attack the beetles have displayed in far western Canada? Another thought when considering Attfield’s ideas on prioritizing certain lifeforms would be the issue of quantity and quality. Quality in the sense of sophistication of mental capacities, not that it is superior to another less sophisticated lifeform. Imagine the countless trees destroyed by forestry, mountain pine beetles, fires, etc. and look to a (seemingly) more sophisticated animal like the panda. Is the number of tress enough to overtake the que simpler life forms are put behind relative to a qualitatively higher lifeform but with quantitively less members in danger? Such a question is not addressed by Attfield but seems to be of major importance. The honey bee is a fairly simple species compared to the gorilla, yet the honey bee does more for the community of life forms (pollination) than a gorilla does, further that there are many more ‘units’ of life in danger with the threatening of honey bees (as all life is considered) despite the gorilla exhibiting tool use and complex social behaviours. One could argue the bee’s eusocial quality in this same manner to a ‘lone’ bug like the butterfly.

In conclusion, I believe Attfield has a good thought in humanity adopting a more biocentric view when it comes to what should be morally considered in solving a problem. With a little more development I think it would appeal to many individuals and hopefully inspire many more to extend their moral considerations to all our fellow earthlings.

Jaden

Works Cited:

Robin Attfield. Biocentrism Talk. https://eclass.srv.ualberta.ca/pluginfile.php/6160295/mod_resource/content/1/attfield_biocentrismtalk.pdf