In Sandler’s The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species the question of deep de-extinction (the revival of long extinct species as opposed to recently extinct species) has its ethically for and against arguments explored, followed by Sandler’s take on DDE.

I: Sandler’s Arguments for and Against Deep De-Extinction (DDE)

The ethical arguments Sandler explores in favor of DDE are the justice, lost value, creation of value, and last resort arguments. First, the justice argument states that some species considered for DDE went extinct due to humans, meaning we ‘owe’ them their revival (355). However, considering species broadly do not have interests to be impeded (355) nor are the specific individuals around anymore, justice in the restorative sense gives no ethical duty to develop DDE. Second, the lost value arguments states species are valuable ecologically, instrumentally, and intrinsically (356) so their revival restores ‘worldly’ value. Sandler counters this, as a species’ value is “relational and context sensitive, [DDE] alone is insufficient to reestablish it.” (356). For example, a revived mammoth lost its natural habitat, its niche is non-existent, and intrinsically (as DDE hybridizes DNA of revived species) is a ‘new’ creature. Resultingly, lost value gives no ethical duty to develop DDE. Third, the creating value argument holds that “even if [DDE] cannot replace lost values, it may nevertheless create value.” (356). It is true many would like to see a live mammoth or extinct flora as spectacle, further the biotech behind DDE is a massive leap in technology anyway. Though interesting, Sandler recognizes creating value is not necessarily ethically bound to developing DDE for extinct species’ revival. Fourthly, the last resort argument concludes that should conservation efforts fail, DDE insures species revival later (357). Though, Sandler notes that this neither prevents nor fixes the causes of extinction (357) and may take the focus on preserving DNA rather than species in their natural context. Broadly, none of these pro-DDE arguments give an ethical duty to develop DDE. The creation of value is intriguing, but not ethically bound.

The ethical arguments Sandler explores opposed to DDE are the unnatural, animal welfare, eco/health concerns, and hubristic arguments. To begin, the unnatural argument fits those same people who object to other genetic altering technologies as it creates new hybrid organisms (357). Sandler opposes this as hybrids exist in nature, and human agriculture has been just a slower process of ‘gene altering’ anyway (357). While Sandler thinks GMOs should be labelled to respect other’s beliefs (357), this does not ethically forbid developing DDE. Following, the animal welfare argument states DDE cloning may result in genetic abnormalities, so animal suffering is possible (358). But Sandler adds DDE research will have the same oversight as any other research/conservation practice (358) so is not a new ethical debate, rather one already under a watchful eye, so again DDE is not necessarily ethically forbidden. Next, the eco/health concerns argument carries that DDE species may be released or escape, leading to unknown injuries to ecosystems and humans (358). However, “many revived species will be intended for research and exhibition, not release” (358) and that it is equally unknown if a revived species may really benefit its new environment. Lastly, the hubristic argument claims humans are ‘playing God’ and researchers overestimate their control over biotechnology, treat the symptoms and not the causes of extinction (358), and treat living things as things for humanity to design (359). Sandler states that DDE is more of a neutral tool and might be used hubristically if to redesign nature as humanity desires but can be used properly if held under careful oversight and respect (359). Once again, DDE is not necessarily ethically prohibited so long as it is used responsibly.

With the pro and anti DDE arguments established, Sandler concludes that DDE should be held as ‘Luxury Conservation’. DDE does not solve the causes or responsibilities of past mistakes, there is no ethical incentive to develop DDE nor ethically prohibit it (359). “[DDE] is fine to pursue if people want so long as it does not interfere with or compromise ethically important things” so can is ‘luxury conservation’ (359). Sandler concludes that DDE is a luxury, and so long as it does not take resources or focus on more pressing conservation efforts, so long as it is not abused simply because humanity can, and that it is used with respect and an understanding of its luxurious status (likely very expensive to clone) there is nothing inherently wrong or duty bound in developing DDE, rather it is ‘extra’; a fascinating potential not required of anyone to achieve.

II: Application

Consider the case of reviving a Woolly Mammoth. The poor things were likely hunted to extinction by our ancestors but considering their natural context is gone and so are the humans that killed them, humanity presently is neither obligated to revive nor keep them extinct. Absolutely, a live mammoth would be a spectacle and a symbol of our biotechnical prowess, but nothing more as it would likely require humans to sustain it in an artificial habitat. The arguments provided above do not necessarily forbid nor incentivize the revival of the woolly mammoth. It would be cool, but unnecessary, much like a luxury! Further, DDE may give some peace regarding hyper important species such as pollinators. I absolutely think present conservation efforts must be pursued to their extreme before DDE is considered, yet DDE can provide relief knowing that if humanity does screw up the conservation of a mass pollinator species, such as bees, there is a potential for more chances to clean up our act.

III: Question for Sandler

What are the implications of borderline cloning biotechnology? The creating value section discusses the potential for technological progress for the sake of progress in DDE in a kind of throw away manner (understandably, the scope of Sandler’s exploration is regarding animal cloning). Yet I feel the first question that will be asked after a form of animal cloning has been developed is “can and should we clone a human?”. I do not feel like this is entirely off the point, as humans are made of the same building blocks DDE would use to hypothetically revive long dead organisms. Human cloning is a logical application of this technology, and I would like to know if Sandler considered the aftermath of DDE tech in this direction.

Sources:

Ronald Sandler. The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species. Conservation Biology Vol. 28 No. 2 354-360 (2013) Society for Conservation Biology DOI: 10.1111/cobi.12198