This week in Philosophy 355, we begin to analyze another type of non-anthropocentric critique known as Ecocentrism. Unlike Biocentrists, who limit moral considerability to individual living things, Ecocentrists seek to extend this considerability to ecosystems, biotic communities and species as wholes. This is typically achieved through the guidance of the Land-ethic principle, which suggests that a thing is right in-so-far as it preserves the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community (Leopold, 7).

When comparing the works of both Aldo Leopold and Robin Attfield, we can recognize three areas in which they disagree: 1) The moral standing of individuals within a community, 2) the degree of significance pertaining to living things, and 3) the value of the ecosystem separate from human profit. While this new ethical principle appears to be progressive in its wide-range of inclusivity, we can tell through comparison that the Land-Ethic principle in fact appropriates the idea of sacrificing human life for the betterment of a greater good.

The first area of disagreement between Attfield and Leopold would be in regards to the moral standings of human beings within a community. In The Land Ethic, Aldo Leopold suggests that the human individual is a member of a community with interdependent parts (1). If we consider ourselves to be part of a greater ecological community, in accordance to the Land-ethic principle, then we have duties to support, protect and take risks for our communities just as we would our social networks (Welchman, 2020, UofA eclass).

By contrast, Attfield suggests that we can identify moral standing within individual creatures in themselves as opposed to their relevance to a specific system (1). This can be done by calculating the total number of interests a being may possess, which are not dependent on their relationships to another given species within the community (Welchman, 2020, UofA eclass).

Through defining the moral standing of a human in accordance to their communal ties, Leopold ultimately suggests that interdependency overrides individuality. If this is the case, individual rights (i.e. the right to live) once possessed by humans could justifiably be stripped or sacrificed if they interfere with communal ties or strength.

A second area of dispute between the two would be in relation to the significance placed on living things. Biocentrists argue that beings with more morally considerable kinds of interests and abilities (i.e. rational autonomy and sentience) merit a higher degree of moral considerability (Welchman, 2020, UofA eclass). When summing up the total of interests between species, individuals with these interests will always take precedence over those without. This is why, according to Attfield, nonliving entities such as rocks lack a good in their own right and can therefore not be harmed (1).

In contrast, Leopold suggests that human life in-and-out of itself is sustained through non-living entities. He depicts the ecosystem as a pyramid compromised of many layers, all of which depend on a foundational soil base to support the food chain of life (Leopold, 4). As a result, a higher degree of moral considerability should be given to non-living entities because living things would seize to exist without them.

Certain agricultural practices, such as intensive cultivation or harvesting, break up and typically destroy the natural structure of soil. If a greater amount of moral considerability should be prioritized for non-living things, than Leopold would justify human starvation in order to protect these foundational, non-living entities.

The final area of disagreement between Attfield and Leopold would be their positions on how valuable the ecosystem is separate from human profit. Typically speaking, biocentrists tend to view individual creatures separate form the value they possess in the systems that support human life (Attfield, 1). In Biocentrism Talk, Attfield states that:

 

“… Environmental ethic can value the good of all living creatures (present and

future) by taking seriously the impacts of our behaviour upon them, without either

making them all of equal significance (as some other writers do) or prioritising the

good of systems over the value of individuals, as if the good of systems were valuable in itself.”  (2)

 

Leopold would dispute the statement above, specifically the idea that the ecological system is not intrinsically valuable. In The Land Ethic, Leopold argues that much of the appreciation society has for the land is dependent upon the economic value it possesses (3). If one area of the ecosystem is threatened but invaluable profitably, then there is not much concern for its preservation. In order to overcome our own self-interest, we need to start concerning ourselves with the interdependent nature of the land and that its simply not a collection of stuff we manage to generate for ourselves (Welchman, 2020, UofA eclass).

The ecosystem’s natural processes in themselves do in fact maintain human life. While it is important to protect and preserve the land that contributes to these processes, it does go without saying that human practices upon economically valuable land (i.e. those used for agriculture practices) also help to sustain our existence. Without them, the human species of today would suffer as we would not be able to support the needs and lives of our inevitably growing population.

Although the Land-Ethic principle promotes an extended communal tie from soil to human, it often unintentionally invalidates human life through its effort to do so.

-Deanne

Work Cited:

Attfield, Robin. ‘Biocentrism Talk’.

Leopold, Aldo. (1948). ‘The Land Ethic’, in A Sound Country Almanac.