This week in PHIL 355, we shift our attention to issues concerning de-extinction as a form of conservation. According to T.J. Kasperbauer, reviving previously extinct species has the potential to preserve biodiversity, restore diminished ecosystems and undo previous harm caused by humans (2017, pg. 1). Throughout his paper, he focuses specifically on the de-extinction for the passenger pigeon and identifies five critical challenges affiliated with its pursuit.

When evaluating the means of pursuing de-extinction of passenger pigeons, Kasperbauer argues that humans have a duty to consider the morally-relevant interests of individual members of the species and subsequently not inflict pain and suffering upon them (2017, pg. 5). Because a species as a whole cannot experience pain or pleasure, he argues that there is no need to consider their interests when re-introducing a species back into existence (Kasperbauer, 2017).

I found this challenge particularly interesting because it works directly in opposition to the beliefs of many Eco-centrists. Unlike Kasperbauer, Holmes Rolston argues that morally-considerable interests should be extended to species as a whole since individual members would seize to exist without the evolutionary process put forward by its species (1985).

This got me thinking: When considering the impact of de-extinction processes from a utilitarian point of view, is it enough to only take into consideration the morally-relevant interests of individual members of a species? Should the relevant interests of the species as a whole be considered as well?

In the article, Kasperbauer argues that many sentient’s believe that the initial threats of predation will subsequently generate an enormous amount of suffering for individual members of a species (2017). This, he argues, illegitimatizes the idea that we should consider the interests of species as a whole first and foremost simply because de-extinction allows the species to thrive.

In my opinion, I would argue against this and believe that we should foremost consider the interests of species as a whole when considering the impacts of de-extinction.

Firstly, it is important to bear in mind that evolution happens at the species rather than the individual level (Rolston, 1985). As such, individual members of a species will only exist if they are constituents of a lineage that pass on their genes. In the case of passenger pigeons, the perpetuation of their existence depends upon a very large minimum colony size in order to reproduce successfully (Kasperbauer, 2017). The process of de-extinction would thus impose significant initial challenge and suffering for the species as a whole, whereas individual members may succeed in reproduction and not experience a significant degree of suffering.

Even when evaluating the risk of de-extinction to groups outside of the newly introduced species, we do not do so on an individual basis. Rather, we evaluate the risks associated with the re-introduction of a new species on the pain and suffering it could potentially inflict on species and ecosystems as wholes.

So why would we assess the risks of the newly introduced species any differently?

For example, consider the risk of invasion that may stem from the re-introduction of Passenger Pigeons. Because they tend to travel in flocks and may very well move beyond their native ecosystem, these pigeons would conflict with other native animals that have come to rely on the food resources and other ecosystem services in their surrounding habitats (Kasperbauer, 2017, pg. 4). This has the potential to disrupt the functioning of entire ecosystems through means of biodiversity loss, which would affect entire species whom of which depend on the services provided by other species (not individuals) to ensure their survival. As a result, the pain and suffering inflicted on species as wholes must be considered.

Moreover, the de-extinction of a potentially invasive animal could afflict significant pain and suffering towards the human population by imposing significant threats to ecosystem productivity. Although the magnitude and severity of threat may vary across regions and countries, the disruption of ecosystems through biodiversity loss is a major threat to the human species as a whole. It is through the richness of our biodiversity that perpetuates functioning ecosystems that serves as a kind of life support for humans- supplying our global population with oxygen, clean air and life that would seize to exist without it. While the potential loss of biodiversity from de-extinction may imminently impact more vulnerable regions over others, its true impact effects the human species as a whole.

 

All in all, I believe that it is more important to take into consideration the interests of species as wholes when evaluating the impacts of de-extinction.

 

Work Cited:

Kasperbauer, T. (2017). ‘Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction’, In Ethics, Policy & Environment.

Rolston, H. (1985). ‘Duties to Endangered Species’, In BioScience.

This week in Philosophy 355, we shift to the ethical issues regarding practices of both procreation and overconsumption. The correlation and primary concern between the two practices involves the idea that modern day procreation will contribute significantly to our already overpopulated planet. The associated consequence of choosing to have kids, particularly in the Western part of the globe where unsustainable and over consumptive lifestyles are practiced, will inevitably result in a higher degree of environmental damage and the deterioration of our planet.

This week’s reading by Thomas Young suggests that overconsumption and procreation are of moral equivalence. If we condemn voluntary unsustainable environmental practices on an individual basis, then we ought to do the same for parents who voluntarily chose to have children that will engage in these practices as well. While he does not argue against anyone having children or eliminating the human species as a whole, Young offers a solution in that countries who have very substantial environmental footprints (i.e. Canada and the U.S) should stop procreating for a few generations in order to help restore the planets health (Young, 2001). A weaker argument put forward by Young states that it would be deemed acceptable to have a single child, permitted the total environmental footprint of the family with the child would be of equal measure to the footprint the couple would have had prior to procreating (Young, 2001).

Although there was no environmental basis for the implementation of the One-Child policy in China, I will draw a correlation between Young’s ideas and said policy to demonstrate the social challenges associated with legal efforts to reduce population size.

In efforts to reduce population growth in China, the Family Planning Program was introduced in the 1980’s. The one-child policy, which has since been modified to the one-son-two child policy in some rural areas, is a central theme of guidelines introduced by the central government in efforts to control growing population levels in China (Jimmerson, 1990).

According to Young, some of the motives behind reproduction often involve cultural expectations (2001). As a result, it would be important to consider how the enactment of such laws in North America would be affected by said culture. Do Western countries still possess inherent cultural beliefs that prefer one gender over another? How would the desire for certain demographics or characteristics shape the way people respond to the law?

A shortfall of recorded female births in China in comparison to the biological norm emerged in the early 1980’s, creating a skewed sex ratio among young children (Jimmerson, 1990). The average statistics put the ratio of births at 108.5:100 in favour of males, with the internationally accepted norm of western demographers as 106:100 (Jimmerson, 1990). In 1981, ratio figures also indicated that approximately 230,000 female babies had been “lost” that year (Jimmerson, 1990).

These trends coincide was the prevailing patrilineal kinship system still prevalent in China today. It continues to be easier to abandon a female child because they do not bear on lineage matters involving issues of property or inheritance. In contrast to girls, sons are permanent members of their family and a major source of support for their families (Johnson, 1998). These disproportionate ratios demonstrate how influential social and cultural norms may affect our response to these laws.

To what extent would American Culture shape the outcome of one-child policies? Would the prioritization of our planets health by reducing population growth subsequently result in deeper inequities among different gender, ethnical or racial groups? If these laws were to be enacted in North America, I am curious as to whether or not we would see the re-emergence of a eugenics movement. Since American Culture typically prides itself with being the ‘best of the best’, I do not think it would unreasonable to assume that many would be in support of selective breeding to ensure that their deduced population would possess traits deemed ‘desirable’ and ‘fit’.

Since individual freedom is also such a large influence of American Culture, I am curious as to how Westernized countries would respond to the repercussions associated with the violation of these laws. In China for example, the failure to abide by these restrictions could result in over-quota fines including a year’s worth of wage cuts, with-drawl of grain allowance or deduction in land allocated from household to farm (Jimmerson, 1990).

How would a country like the United States respond to such legal repercussions? Even if the consequences of failing to abide by the law are not identical to that of China, I do believe that North American’s would interpret such a policy and its consequences to be a violation of their individual freedom. When American’s feel as though their rights are being violated, they tend to retaliate in such a way that may be of harm to the source of their violation (In this case, planet earth). I am curious then as to whether or not the effort to reduce population size through these policies would therefore backfire on the environment, consequently leaving it in a worse off condition than before.

Work Cited:

Julia Jimmerson, “Female Infanticide in China: An examination of cultural and legal norms,” Pacific Basin Law Journal 8, no.47 (1990).

Kay Johnson, Huang Banghan, and Wang Liyao, “Infant Abandonment and Adoption in China,” The Population Council 24, no. 3 (September 1998).

Young, Thomas. “Overconsumption and Procreation: Are they Morally Equivalent,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 18, no. 2 (2001).

This week in PHIL 355, we shift to practical issues concerning both Conservation and Reconciliation.

In ‘Food Sovereignty, Justice and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance’, Kyle Powys Whyte discusses how colonial settlement has interfered with the collective self-determination of Indigenous Peoples via the disruption of their food systems. Through the violation of Treaty Rights, U.S. settlers have engaged in practices such as intensive agriculture and urban development that have subsequently degraded the habitats of Treaty protected plants and animals, including salmon (Whyte, para. 13).

According to Whyte, the failure to appropriately conserve particular foods bares a significant impact on the collective continuance and self-determination of Indigenous Peoples (2018). Through traditional practices associated with particular food and food systems, Indigenous people are able to sustain traditional knowledge, cultural identity and self-respect (Whyte, para. 63). The degradation of habitats associated with these practices thus not only interfere with diet and food supply, but also provides less opportunities for social activities and traditional ceremonies that help in the preservation of their cultural identity (Whyte, para. 64).

One aspect of the reading that I found particularly striking was the importance for Indigenous Peoples to conserve particular foods for the purpose of reincarnation. According to this belief, members of particular tribe view salmon and humans as mutually responsible for sustaining one another overtime (Whyte, para. 25). The killing of salmon is therefore not necessarily seen as a means to an end, but rather an act of transformation that is necessary in order to honour the mutual respect, responsibility and accountability in the relationship between the two parties. (Whyte, para. 25).

This raises the question: Is it ethically justifiable for Indigenous people to be hunting salmon and other wildlife in order to preserve their spiritual connections associated with them? Does it make a difference whether or not they are conserving the wildlife and hunting these animals at sustainable rates?

To answer the first question, I would argue in favour of Indigenous hunting practices for reasons of spiritual connectivity. In accordance to the Land-Ethic Principe brought forward by Aldo Leopold, humans have to start thinking of themselves as interdependent members of a biotic community (1948). While Western settlers tend to hold a dichotomist view between people and the environment, Indigenous populations believe that people and animals are both physically and spiritually interrelated. Through their long and complex relationship with the land, hunting is a form of expression of both their sovereignty and unity between the natural and spiritual environment. Hunting therefore not only serves to permit these populations to achieve and maintain food security, but also provides a way for these people to connect to their spiritual values and beliefs.

For reasons of this spiritual connectivity, I believe that Indigenous populations have a greater incentive to conserve and hunt at sustainable rates. Unlike commercial hunters that accumulate their prey until populations are depleted, Indigenous populations engage in sustainable hunting in order to ensure a healthy dynamic between animals and the communities. This approach reflects Leopold’s idea of eco-communitarianism, which suggests that we owe duties to ecological communities (as wholes) upon which our social communities and lives as people depend upon (1948). The importance of ensuring eco-communitarianism is reflected in the article through the role of titleholders of potlach ceremonies, whom of which would have their positions stripped if their knowledge capacity was so insufficient in-so-far as they were giving beyond what was ecologically sustained (Whyte, 2018).

In addition to reasons of spiritual connectivity and sustainable practices, I would also argue that Indigenous hunting practices are justifiable because they are conducted as a means for survival. According to Whyte, food injustice occurs when one group systemically dominates another through their interactions with one another in local and global food systems (para. 2). While colonial settlers have impacted indigenous food systems by depleting local resources through natural resource development, their forced resettlement to isolated reserves have also had significant negative impact on their relationship with global food systems.

In the North, food prices are substantially higher due to shipping and transportation costs to these remote communities. When colonial settlers thus deplete these food resources through expansion, they subsequently force Indigenous populations to purchase commercial goods and services at extremely high prices. Hunting often involves a collective component where animals are shared amongst the community and distributed to individuals who are too poor to feed themselves. If members of these communities were unable to hunt and thereby forced to depend on commercial foods, many of them would consequently starve. As a result, subsistence hunting is justified for these communities because their interdependency to the land and connections offered through these practices is essential for their survival.

Leopold, Aldo. (1948). “The Land Ethic” in A Sand County Almanac.

Whyte, Kyle Powys. (2018). “Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance.” In The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics.

This week in Philosophy 355, we shift our concentration from non-anthropocentric critiques to the practical issue of Climaterianism. Here, the fundamental concerns are the ways in which human activities may contribute to global warming and their subsequent impact on climate change. One of the greatest contributions to this phenomenon involves intensive animal agriculture, which degrades environmental resources and releases greenhouse gases like methane that are more strenuous to the Earth’s well-being than Carbon Dioxide (Welchman, 2020, UofA eclass). While this is the case, methane gas remains in earth’s atmosphere for significantly less time than CO2 and Climaterians thus argue that we can protect our global environment by adopting dietary practices that reject intensive agricultural processes (i.e. through plant-based diets).

One of the ways to advocate for the adoption of plant-based diets is by drawing a correlation between the oppression of animals via agricultural processes and the oppression of other marginalized groups. In Kymblicka and Donaldson’s ‘Animals Rights, Multiculturalism, and the Left’ and Carol J. Adam’s ‘Ecofeminism and the Eating of Animals’, both authors argue that there is a discrepancy between the leftist’s groups fighting against oppression and the seeming indifference of these same groups towards violence against animals. This may stem out of fear that the advocation of animal rights will end up undermining the struggles of other disadvantage groups, which is something that both authors strongly challenge. In order to overcome the oppression of all ontological beings, we must begin to reconsider the relationship we have with animals through our dietary practices.

Both authors argue that advocating for animal rights will not displace attention from other oppressed groups. According to Kymblicka and Donaldson, highlighting a new form of injustice actually does the opposite and serves to strengthen the salience of injustice altogether (119). It may also help illuminate interconnected ideologies of domination, which are used to underwrite oppression in many domains of life (Kymlicka and Donaldson, 119).

One example of this is the connection drawn by ecofeminists between the domination of women and that of nature (Adams, 127). Historically speaking, women and the earth have been treated merely as means to an end by the dominant members of society. The two have been exploited, controlled and discredited of their inherit value in order to satisfy the preferences of their oppressors. If ecofeminists are able to draw a correlation between gender and nature on the basis of this exploitation, then why is it so troubling to do the same for animals (who themselves are a part of said nature)? it is morally inconsistent and absolutely contradicting for ecofeminists to ignore the exploitation of animals through agricultural processes because they serve as a satisfaction to the means of their end.

Both authors also contest that failing to acknowledge an animals right to live via our dietary practices may contribute to deepened inequalities among marginalized groups. Species Narcissism, the idea that human life is superior to that other animals, operates at the expense of oppressed groups (Kymlicka and Donaldson, 120). Kymblicka and Donaldson argue that the more species narcissism is used to make concrete distinctions between the two groups, the more justifiable it is for oppressors to dehumanize marginalized groups (120). If groups fighting against oppression wish to have their interests met and values considered, then they must acknowledge that animals (as an oppressed group) also possess valued traits and emotions that are of equal consideration.

Adams argues that eco-feminists have failed as a group to consider what it means to be a being (129). Because the animals are in a state of death upon consumption and communication is absent, we often fail to remember that animals are independent entities (Adams, 136). Just as woman and other oppressed groups adopt submissive roles and are often censored by the dominant members of the social hierarchy, animals are incapable of contesting their fate and the end result is exploitation with irreversible damage. Both authors thus reiterate that when marginalized groups fail to consider this through their eating practices, it enables oppressors to justify the mistreatment of their behaviour as well.

Lastly, the failure to acknowledge animal rights through diet is inconsistent with the fight of marginalized groups against their established natural roles in society. According to Kymlicka and Donaldson, many of these roles can be culturally constructed. For example, dominant societal groups have often justified their power over minorities by structuring the subsequent cultural practices of these groups as ‘backward’ or ‘barbaric’ (Kymlicka and Donaldson, 121).  This ethnocentric mindset has often served to legitimatize the idea that certain marginalized groups are irresponsible and ill-equipped to handle positions of power, which has prevented them from rising up the social hierarchy. Adams argues that the same may go for women, whose subordination to man is often regarded as being their ‘natural’ position in society (135).

Just as women’s subordination to men is often seen as natural and inevitable, Adams argues that meat has been culturally constructed to appear so as well. Through various means of socialization, eating meat has been rationalized as a natural and necessary means of human life.  The subsequent abuse and exploitation of animals associated with meat production is therefore legitimatized by preserving the harmony and natural ways of earth life.  If Feminists and other marginalized groups operate to challenge their pre-determined positions in society, then it is morally inconsistent of them to eat animals on the basis of this same principle.

In conclusion, adopting a plant-based diet may serve to strengthen the fight of oppression amongst all disadvantaged groups.

 

– Deanne

 

Work Cited:

 

Adams, Carol J. (1991). “Ecofeminism and the Eating of Animals’, in Hypatia.

Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson. (2014). “Animal Rights, Multiculturalism, and the Left”, in Journal of Social Psychology.

This week in Philosophy 355, we begin to analyze another type of non-anthropocentric critique known as Ecocentrism. Unlike Biocentrists, who limit moral considerability to individual living things, Ecocentrists seek to extend this considerability to ecosystems, biotic communities and species as wholes. This is typically achieved through the guidance of the Land-ethic principle, which suggests that a thing is right in-so-far as it preserves the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community (Leopold, 7).

When comparing the works of both Aldo Leopold and Robin Attfield, we can recognize three areas in which they disagree: 1) The moral standing of individuals within a community, 2) the degree of significance pertaining to living things, and 3) the value of the ecosystem separate from human profit. While this new ethical principle appears to be progressive in its wide-range of inclusivity, we can tell through comparison that the Land-Ethic principle in fact appropriates the idea of sacrificing human life for the betterment of a greater good.

The first area of disagreement between Attfield and Leopold would be in regards to the moral standings of human beings within a community. In The Land Ethic, Aldo Leopold suggests that the human individual is a member of a community with interdependent parts (1). If we consider ourselves to be part of a greater ecological community, in accordance to the Land-ethic principle, then we have duties to support, protect and take risks for our communities just as we would our social networks (Welchman, 2020, UofA eclass).

By contrast, Attfield suggests that we can identify moral standing within individual creatures in themselves as opposed to their relevance to a specific system (1). This can be done by calculating the total number of interests a being may possess, which are not dependent on their relationships to another given species within the community (Welchman, 2020, UofA eclass).

Through defining the moral standing of a human in accordance to their communal ties, Leopold ultimately suggests that interdependency overrides individuality. If this is the case, individual rights (i.e. the right to live) once possessed by humans could justifiably be stripped or sacrificed if they interfere with communal ties or strength.

A second area of dispute between the two would be in relation to the significance placed on living things. Biocentrists argue that beings with more morally considerable kinds of interests and abilities (i.e. rational autonomy and sentience) merit a higher degree of moral considerability (Welchman, 2020, UofA eclass). When summing up the total of interests between species, individuals with these interests will always take precedence over those without. This is why, according to Attfield, nonliving entities such as rocks lack a good in their own right and can therefore not be harmed (1).

In contrast, Leopold suggests that human life in-and-out of itself is sustained through non-living entities. He depicts the ecosystem as a pyramid compromised of many layers, all of which depend on a foundational soil base to support the food chain of life (Leopold, 4). As a result, a higher degree of moral considerability should be given to non-living entities because living things would seize to exist without them.

Certain agricultural practices, such as intensive cultivation or harvesting, break up and typically destroy the natural structure of soil. If a greater amount of moral considerability should be prioritized for non-living things, than Leopold would justify human starvation in order to protect these foundational, non-living entities.

The final area of disagreement between Attfield and Leopold would be their positions on how valuable the ecosystem is separate from human profit. Typically speaking, biocentrists tend to view individual creatures separate form the value they possess in the systems that support human life (Attfield, 1). In Biocentrism Talk, Attfield states that:

 

“… Environmental ethic can value the good of all living creatures (present and

future) by taking seriously the impacts of our behaviour upon them, without either

making them all of equal significance (as some other writers do) or prioritising the

good of systems over the value of individuals, as if the good of systems were valuable in itself.”  (2)

 

Leopold would dispute the statement above, specifically the idea that the ecological system is not intrinsically valuable. In The Land Ethic, Leopold argues that much of the appreciation society has for the land is dependent upon the economic value it possesses (3). If one area of the ecosystem is threatened but invaluable profitably, then there is not much concern for its preservation. In order to overcome our own self-interest, we need to start concerning ourselves with the interdependent nature of the land and that its simply not a collection of stuff we manage to generate for ourselves (Welchman, 2020, UofA eclass).

The ecosystem’s natural processes in themselves do in fact maintain human life. While it is important to protect and preserve the land that contributes to these processes, it does go without saying that human practices upon economically valuable land (i.e. those used for agriculture practices) also help to sustain our existence. Without them, the human species of today would suffer as we would not be able to support the needs and lives of our inevitably growing population.

Although the Land-Ethic principle promotes an extended communal tie from soil to human, it often unintentionally invalidates human life through its effort to do so.

-Deanne

Work Cited:

Attfield, Robin. ‘Biocentrism Talk’.

Leopold, Aldo. (1948). ‘The Land Ethic’, in A Sound Country Almanac.