This week in PHIL 355, we shift our attention to issues concerning de-extinction as a form of conservation. According to T.J. Kasperbauer, reviving previously extinct species has the potential to preserve biodiversity, restore diminished ecosystems and undo previous harm caused by humans (2017, pg. 1). Throughout his paper, he focuses specifically on the de-extinction for the passenger pigeon and identifies five critical challenges affiliated with its pursuit.

When evaluating the means of pursuing de-extinction of passenger pigeons, Kasperbauer argues that humans have a duty to consider the morally-relevant interests of individual members of the species and subsequently not inflict pain and suffering upon them (2017, pg. 5). Because a species as a whole cannot experience pain or pleasure, he argues that there is no need to consider their interests when re-introducing a species back into existence (Kasperbauer, 2017).

I found this challenge particularly interesting because it works directly in opposition to the beliefs of many Eco-centrists. Unlike Kasperbauer, Holmes Rolston argues that morally-considerable interests should be extended to species as a whole since individual members would seize to exist without the evolutionary process put forward by its species (1985).

This got me thinking: When considering the impact of de-extinction processes from a utilitarian point of view, is it enough to only take into consideration the morally-relevant interests of individual members of a species? Should the relevant interests of the species as a whole be considered as well?

In the article, Kasperbauer argues that many sentient’s believe that the initial threats of predation will subsequently generate an enormous amount of suffering for individual members of a species (2017). This, he argues, illegitimatizes the idea that we should consider the interests of species as a whole first and foremost simply because de-extinction allows the species to thrive.

In my opinion, I would argue against this and believe that we should foremost consider the interests of species as a whole when considering the impacts of de-extinction.

Firstly, it is important to bear in mind that evolution happens at the species rather than the individual level (Rolston, 1985). As such, individual members of a species will only exist if they are constituents of a lineage that pass on their genes. In the case of passenger pigeons, the perpetuation of their existence depends upon a very large minimum colony size in order to reproduce successfully (Kasperbauer, 2017). The process of de-extinction would thus impose significant initial challenge and suffering for the species as a whole, whereas individual members may succeed in reproduction and not experience a significant degree of suffering.

Even when evaluating the risk of de-extinction to groups outside of the newly introduced species, we do not do so on an individual basis. Rather, we evaluate the risks associated with the re-introduction of a new species on the pain and suffering it could potentially inflict on species and ecosystems as wholes.

So why would we assess the risks of the newly introduced species any differently?

For example, consider the risk of invasion that may stem from the re-introduction of Passenger Pigeons. Because they tend to travel in flocks and may very well move beyond their native ecosystem, these pigeons would conflict with other native animals that have come to rely on the food resources and other ecosystem services in their surrounding habitats (Kasperbauer, 2017, pg. 4). This has the potential to disrupt the functioning of entire ecosystems through means of biodiversity loss, which would affect entire species whom of which depend on the services provided by other species (not individuals) to ensure their survival. As a result, the pain and suffering inflicted on species as wholes must be considered.

Moreover, the de-extinction of a potentially invasive animal could afflict significant pain and suffering towards the human population by imposing significant threats to ecosystem productivity. Although the magnitude and severity of threat may vary across regions and countries, the disruption of ecosystems through biodiversity loss is a major threat to the human species as a whole. It is through the richness of our biodiversity that perpetuates functioning ecosystems that serves as a kind of life support for humans- supplying our global population with oxygen, clean air and life that would seize to exist without it. While the potential loss of biodiversity from de-extinction may imminently impact more vulnerable regions over others, its true impact effects the human species as a whole.

 

All in all, I believe that it is more important to take into consideration the interests of species as wholes when evaluating the impacts of de-extinction.

 

Work Cited:

Kasperbauer, T. (2017). ‘Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction’, In Ethics, Policy & Environment.

Rolston, H. (1985). ‘Duties to Endangered Species’, In BioScience.