One of the required readings assigned this week was “Duties to Endangered Species,” written by Holmes Rolston III. In this article, he focuses heavily on our duty as human beings to protect a given species as opposed to a given individual organism. While he mentions most living things supply humans with goods and services, he emphasizes his idea that the true reason we feel we are obligated to protect endangered species is because of the evolutionary path it took to exist today, along with its educational benefits. In other words, we have a moral duty to protect species for the materials they provide, but primarily for the education of people in the future. In Rolston’s own words, “It is not form (species) as mere morphology, but the formative (speciating) process that humans ought to preserve” (722). While I find no issue with the majority of this article, there is one concern I have with this premise.

For argument’s sake, let us say scientists are able to resurrect a species from millions of years ago using preserved eggs. This could be, for example, an ancient lizard from around the Paleozoic era. Should this “new” species be permitted to live out its new life in a natural environment, or should it be forced to undergo multiple experiments in a laboratory? Since the species did not survive natural selection, does that mean it does not deserve to live freely? There is no argument to be made that this newly resurrected species would not provide educational benefits, so should it be closely monitored or are we morally obligated to set some individuals loose because of this importance?

A person with similar views to Rolston may argue that the lizard could potentially harm extant species, justifying its life in captivity, harm, or potential re-extinction. Rolston argues that a person’s moral duty to protect any species can be taken away when the species is causing much more harm than good, overall. However, if, hypothetically, these scientists could prove that the lizard could live out its life without causing any significant damage, would that mean we are morally obligated to set them free?

If it were up to me, in this scenario, I would argue for the release of the majority but keep a significant number of individuals in a humane enclosure in order to study their behaviour as well as anatomy after death. However, a person who happens to agree with Rolston may argue that the lineage of this lizard has been cut short by nature many years ago, so it should remain extinct. Beyond this, Rolston states an extinction caused by human involvement is “offensive [to]…the forces producing them” (720). Because of this, he may argue the resurrection of such a species by humans is equally outrageous.

In conclusion, I would say Rolston would argue we have no moral duty to protect a resurrected species beyond a decent life in captivity. If he did argue for its protection, it would be purely for its educational benefits alone. This is because, ultimately, according to Rolston, “It is not endangered species but an endangered human future that is of concern” (719) which, of course, includes the future of scientific studies led by humans.

 

Leah

Works cited:

Rolston, Holmes. “Duties to Endangered Species.” BioScience, vol. 35, no. 11, 1985, pp. 718–726., doi:10.2307/1310053.