One of the required readings for this week was “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species,” written by Ronald Sandler. In this paper, he gives several reasons for why a person may argue for or against using cloning to reverse the extinction of a species. Ultimately, he concludes with the thought that there is no strong justification for using what he calls “deep de-extinction” to revive a species, but there is also no strong justification to completely put it out of the question. Therefore, cloning could be responsibly used to revive specific species, but it must not be the one and only method of conservation we should use (359). In fact, Sandler argues deep de-extinction ought not to be the first conservation method we should entertain. There are many reasons for this, but the central idea is that it does not protect a species from extinction; it can only bring them back after the fact (357). I will use this blog post as an opportunity to analyze why this is the case. 

First off, we have an ethical responsibility to prevent future species extinction due to human activity (Sandler 357). Because of this, modern conservation methods must be developed in an attempt to save a species at risk of extinction. One of the ways we could hypothetically conserve a species is through deep de-extinction, where the species is revived through cloning techniques. However, as stated previously, that does not prevent the initial extinction. And, if the species went extinct in the first place, who is to say the environmental and/or anthropogenic pressures for its extinction have also disappeared? It is entirely possible that the resurrection of a species would also result in its re-extinction. 

One of the worries behind using this method is that it will create the idea that we do not need to develop conservation methods. If we can simply bring a species back, why should we go to extraordinary lengths to prevent the initial extinction in the first place? Again, if the species went extinct in the first place, it will go extinct again if we do not incorporate rehabilitation efforts after we revive the species (Sandler, 355-356). I am willing to argue that these rehabilitation efforts are similar to, if not the same as, the conservation methods we ought to use before the extinction event. For example, if a species went extinct due to hunting by humans, we could either incorporate laws to prevent species extinction beforehand, or we could invest a large sum of money into reviving the species through controversial methods. If we decide to revive the species instead of conserving it, we would still need to introduce laws and policies to prevent the hunting of that species anyway, just at a later date. Therefore, we need to develop conservation or rehabilitation methods regardless of if we use deep de-extinction. 

Ultimately, the successful revival of a species would need to involve some form of a rehabilitation method. These methods will look the same as (or be very similar to) the conservation methods one would use to prevent a species extinction in the first place. Thus, while I do not see any particularly enticing ethical reason to reject the use of cloning to resurrect a species, its use is ultimately redundant. Of course, there are cases where a species could be revived to be kept in captivity, but that is not the topic I have been discussing in this blog post. I am merely commenting on the use of deep de-extinction to resurrect a species for reintegration into our modern ecosystems. 

 

– Leah

 

Works cited

Sandler, Ronald. “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species.” Conservation Biology, vol. 28, no. 2, 2014, pp. 354–360., doi:10.1111/cobi.12198. 

One of the readings assigned this week was “Better Not to Have Children” written by Dr. Gerald Harrison and Dr. Julia Tanner. In this paper, they offer some extreme views on procreation, or rather, lack thereof. They offer the opinion that human reproduction in itself not morally permissible; that the act of having children is wrong altogether (113). This point of view on reproduction in the human species is known as anti-natalism. Harrison and Tanner admit that their point of view on the topic is somewhat rare and more troublesome to except given how society normally views procreation as a normal aspect of our lifecycle (120). They point out that most people would have a low overall happiness level (if happiness could be quantified), and therefore we should not subject risk our children to such a life (116-117). Who are we to say we ought to produce offspring that will live a life of pain and sorrow? We cannot morally allow this, especially since we cannot gain consent from the children before they are born, according to Harrison and Tanner (117). These points, among many, are why they argue the human race should stop reproducing altogether, eventually putting an end to our existence. 

While Harrison and Tanner’s views on procreation are extreme, one can argue they hold some ground. However, they admit that the topic of suicide is a bit of a grey area (114). They say that “self-sacrifice is beyond any plausible limit there may be,” (114), however, they do not give a specific reason for this. Since they argue that life forces a negative happiness level on most people, should that not be enough of a reason to allow an individual to commit suicide (according to Harrison and Tanner’s arguments). If we ought to prevent new individuals from being harmed via not having children, then should we not allow individuals currently being harmed to escape? 

Even if one were to argue that the only reason we should stop reproducing is because of the environment, the topic of autonomously ending one’s own life needs to be addressed properly. Humans are objectively causing major harm to our planet and many believe we are to blame for the mass extinction we are currently living through (Harrison and Tanner 115). Therefore, we should not have children to prevent further damage to the Earth. However, if the human race is going to end eventually anyway (due to the lack of children), then does that make suicide morally permissible? While Harrison and Tanner state suicide ought not to be considered, their assertions seem to say otherwise. 

Before I conclude this blog post, I would like to mention that I do not view suicide as an action worthy of promotion or acceptance. Rather, I am arguing that Harrison and Tanner’s arguments seem to be in support of self-sacrifice (or, at least, making it permissible). I believe in order to firmly conclude that the human race should stop procreating, a stable opinion and justification on suicide must be made. 

– Leah

 

Works cited

Harrison, G., and Tanner, J. “Better Not to Have Children.” Think, 35(11), pp. 113-121., doi: 10.1017/S1477175610000436

One of the readings assigned this week was “Ethics and Genetically Modifies Foods,” written by Gary Comstock. In this article, Comstock states various reasons why a person may argue for or against the production of genetically modified foods. All of these reasons he says can generally be placed into one of four intrinsic categories: playing God, inventing technology with the potential to change the world as we know it, neglecting to respect the individuality of a species, and objectifying the living (6). Comstock is debatably able to negate the arguments presented in each of these four categories. I, however, am hung up on the last, which Comstock writes as “To engage in ag[ricultural] biotech is to commodify life” (8).

To be specific, Comstock mentions that genetically modifying our food for the purpose of higher nutritional value would be to reduce it down to an object to be used by humans (8). This would mean that living beings (other than humans) serve no other purpose than to sustain us. He mentions, however, that this principle could be applied to many components of our everyday use of agriculture (8). Is the breeding of animals (such as chicken and cows) for the sole purpose of slaughtering them for food also reductionism? Comstock seems to believe this is reason enough to claim the “commodify life” argument as invalid, as do I. However, I would like to present a separate reason as to why this logic is unsound.

While Comstock focuses on applying this principle to all agricultural practices, I would like to argue that genetic modification does not necessarily reduce the value of living organisms. Although many genetically modified organisms are altered for sustenance purposes, there are some cases where they are not. For example, in the article, “Use of Bioluminescence for Detection of Genetically Engineered Microorganisms Released into the Environment,” written by Shaw, Dane, Geiger, and Kloepper, a bacterium was modified to track its spread through the environment. A strain of the bacteria Xanthomonas campestris pv. campestris was genetically modified to bioluminesce, or glow (267). This bacterium is known for causing black rot in certain plants, such as cabbages (268). Using this method, researchers were able to test the bacterium’s perseverance as well as the spread of its infection (269-270). In my opinion, it is difficult to claim that this study is immoral under any of the four categories mentioned above, save for possibly religious grounds.

One could claim this study was playing God, which could be reason to object the genetic modification of any organism, including bacteria. However, I would like to reiterate the need for a universal reason to reject genetically modified products. Certainly, not everyone believes in the same God as everyone else (if they believe in a God at all), therefore I contest that the “playing God” argument is not sound.

One may claim that this type of scientific study is merely permissible. It is only the genetic modifications on food for the sole purpose of nourishment that should be off-limits. However, if a person would like to argue against the use of genetically modifying technology, they must be able to state that all genetic modification is immoral, including its use in scientific discoveries (in my opinion). Furthermore, the results of this study may assist in finding a solution for this black rot infestation, which would benefit both the plant and those that eat it. In other words, there seems to be no disadvantage to the use of genetic modification in this study for plants or humans.

 

Leah

 

Works cited

Comstock, Gary. “Ethics and Genetically Modified Foods.” Food Ethics, 2010, pp. 1–20., doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-5765-8_4.

Shaw, Joe J., Dane F., Geiger D., KloepperJ. W. “Use of Bioluminescence for Detection of Genetically Engineered Microorganisms Released into the Environment.” Applied and Environmental Microbiology, vol. 58, no. 1, 1992, pp. 267–273., doi:10.1128/aem.58.1.267-273.1992.

One of the required readings assigned this week was “Duties to Endangered Species,” written by Holmes Rolston III. In this article, he focuses heavily on our duty as human beings to protect a given species as opposed to a given individual organism. While he mentions most living things supply humans with goods and services, he emphasizes his idea that the true reason we feel we are obligated to protect endangered species is because of the evolutionary path it took to exist today, along with its educational benefits. In other words, we have a moral duty to protect species for the materials they provide, but primarily for the education of people in the future. In Rolston’s own words, “It is not form (species) as mere morphology, but the formative (speciating) process that humans ought to preserve” (722). While I find no issue with the majority of this article, there is one concern I have with this premise.

For argument’s sake, let us say scientists are able to resurrect a species from millions of years ago using preserved eggs. This could be, for example, an ancient lizard from around the Paleozoic era. Should this “new” species be permitted to live out its new life in a natural environment, or should it be forced to undergo multiple experiments in a laboratory? Since the species did not survive natural selection, does that mean it does not deserve to live freely? There is no argument to be made that this newly resurrected species would not provide educational benefits, so should it be closely monitored or are we morally obligated to set some individuals loose because of this importance?

A person with similar views to Rolston may argue that the lizard could potentially harm extant species, justifying its life in captivity, harm, or potential re-extinction. Rolston argues that a person’s moral duty to protect any species can be taken away when the species is causing much more harm than good, overall. However, if, hypothetically, these scientists could prove that the lizard could live out its life without causing any significant damage, would that mean we are morally obligated to set them free?

If it were up to me, in this scenario, I would argue for the release of the majority but keep a significant number of individuals in a humane enclosure in order to study their behaviour as well as anatomy after death. However, a person who happens to agree with Rolston may argue that the lineage of this lizard has been cut short by nature many years ago, so it should remain extinct. Beyond this, Rolston states an extinction caused by human involvement is “offensive [to]…the forces producing them” (720). Because of this, he may argue the resurrection of such a species by humans is equally outrageous.

In conclusion, I would say Rolston would argue we have no moral duty to protect a resurrected species beyond a decent life in captivity. If he did argue for its protection, it would be purely for its educational benefits alone. This is because, ultimately, according to Rolston, “It is not endangered species but an endangered human future that is of concern” (719) which, of course, includes the future of scientific studies led by humans.

 

Leah

Works cited:

Rolston, Holmes. “Duties to Endangered Species.” BioScience, vol. 35, no. 11, 1985, pp. 718–726., doi:10.2307/1310053.