One of the required readings for this week was “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species,” written by Ronald Sandler. In this paper, he gives several reasons for why a person may argue for or against using cloning to reverse the extinction of a species. Ultimately, he concludes with the thought that there is no strong justification for using what he calls “deep de-extinction” to revive a species, but there is also no strong justification to completely put it out of the question. Therefore, cloning could be responsibly used to revive specific species, but it must not be the one and only method of conservation we should use (359). In fact, Sandler argues deep de-extinction ought not to be the first conservation method we should entertain. There are many reasons for this, but the central idea is that it does not protect a species from extinction; it can only bring them back after the fact (357). I will use this blog post as an opportunity to analyze why this is the case. 

First off, we have an ethical responsibility to prevent future species extinction due to human activity (Sandler 357). Because of this, modern conservation methods must be developed in an attempt to save a species at risk of extinction. One of the ways we could hypothetically conserve a species is through deep de-extinction, where the species is revived through cloning techniques. However, as stated previously, that does not prevent the initial extinction. And, if the species went extinct in the first place, who is to say the environmental and/or anthropogenic pressures for its extinction have also disappeared? It is entirely possible that the resurrection of a species would also result in its re-extinction. 

One of the worries behind using this method is that it will create the idea that we do not need to develop conservation methods. If we can simply bring a species back, why should we go to extraordinary lengths to prevent the initial extinction in the first place? Again, if the species went extinct in the first place, it will go extinct again if we do not incorporate rehabilitation efforts after we revive the species (Sandler, 355-356). I am willing to argue that these rehabilitation efforts are similar to, if not the same as, the conservation methods we ought to use before the extinction event. For example, if a species went extinct due to hunting by humans, we could either incorporate laws to prevent species extinction beforehand, or we could invest a large sum of money into reviving the species through controversial methods. If we decide to revive the species instead of conserving it, we would still need to introduce laws and policies to prevent the hunting of that species anyway, just at a later date. Therefore, we need to develop conservation or rehabilitation methods regardless of if we use deep de-extinction. 

Ultimately, the successful revival of a species would need to involve some form of a rehabilitation method. These methods will look the same as (or be very similar to) the conservation methods one would use to prevent a species extinction in the first place. Thus, while I do not see any particularly enticing ethical reason to reject the use of cloning to resurrect a species, its use is ultimately redundant. Of course, there are cases where a species could be revived to be kept in captivity, but that is not the topic I have been discussing in this blog post. I am merely commenting on the use of deep de-extinction to resurrect a species for reintegration into our modern ecosystems. 

 

– Leah

 

Works cited

Sandler, Ronald. “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species.” Conservation Biology, vol. 28, no. 2, 2014, pp. 354–360., doi:10.1111/cobi.12198.