In “the Land Ethic” Aldo Leopold puts forth a communitarian eco-centric view. He argues that our ethical duties extend beyond duties to other humans and even beyond duties to other beings. He proposes that we all adopt a land ethic that enlarges the bounds of our ethical duties to “include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.” This is a very broad scope of ethical theory which he expounds to directly oppose the common view that the environment, the biosphere, or, as he calls it, ‘the land’, are valuable only for the economic benefits they can potentially provide. He is basically opposing the view that the environment is only instrumentally good. But is there more value in the environment than just instrumental value and are Leopold’s arguments to prove such value effective? Are they persuasive enough to convince the masses and induce them to make the changes that both Leopold and I would agree are much needed in the world today? Are they even necessary to induce changes or would an instrumental argument suffice? Though Leopold and I agree that conservation of the environment is an important goal, we disagree over what makes this goal important. I believe that the environment is only instrumentally valuable, but not just for humans – it is instrumentally valuable for all beings who deserve moral consideration.

In “All Animals are Equal” Peter Singer builds the case that sentience, the ability to feel pleasure or pain, is the criteria to determine whose interests should be considered in moral decision making. In his paper, Singer develops this conclusion by offering several analogies. He argues that, since we would consider the well-being of infants, mentally-disabled people, and those who have suffered debilitating injuries, we must also consider the well-being of sentient animals because it is clear that there is no reasonably material difference between the two groups (Singer spends a great deal of time aptly defending this stance from objections in his paper, but, for the purposes of this blog post, I will assume that this stance holds up to any rebuttals without reiterating Singer’s responses). So, it is the ability to experience pleasure and pain that determines who deserves moral consideration. These analogies that Singer puts forth are much more coherent and acceptable than those put forth by Leopold.

Leopold compares an ecosystem to a community. He argues that we have duties to our community beyond self interest such as improving schools and roads, and that these duties stem from our being a part of this interconnected system. He posits that the same logic requires us to have duties to ‘the land’ that go beyond our self interest because, like a community, ‘the land’ is an interconnected system which we are a part of. This analogy is much vaguer than the ones presented by Singer and I do not believe it fully holds up. Do we have duties to our communities simply for the sake of benefiting the community or does benefiting the community provide instrumental value? The examples of duties Leopold provides offer instrumental value to the individual members of the community. Community members benefit from improved roads and better schooling. It is right to benefit the community because the community provides instrumental value, not because the community deserves its own moral consideration. This logic can be expanded to the environment. We have duties to the environment to take conservation seriously because the environment is an eco-community that has instrumental value for its members. This is a stronger justification for conservation that I feel would be more successful at convincing a wide audience.

Leopold would object to the instrumental theory and argue that valuing ‘the land’ instrumentally is already common practise and is proven to be ineffective at inducing the levels of conservation required. Leopold would be mistaken, however, because he uses a too limited definition of instrumental value. He focuses primarily on economic benefits, whether the land is profitable. But there are more considerations when determining instrumental value than the potential for profits. Maintaining thriving and healthy ecosystems create scenic locations which can yield a great deal of enjoyment in several ways. Furthermore, the instrumental value derived from upholding our duties to ‘the land’ is increased even further when Singer’s determination of who deserves moral consideration is factored in. If all sentient life deserves moral consideration, then it is not just the instrumental value of ‘the land’ towards humans that is considered, but also the instrumental value towards all sentient animals affected by ‘the land’ as well. We have a duty towards the environment because it will benefit a bounty of organisms who also deserve moral consideration. These ecosystems are these animals’ habitats and destroying them would be a huge disregard for their moral worth. Having duties towards ‘the land’ for its instrumental benefits is a more plausible, accessible, and persuasive theory than the one put forward by Leopold.

 

References:

Leopold, A. (1948). “The Land Ethic”. A Sand County Almanac: part 3, essay 4. Retrieved from http://www.neohasid.org/pdf/landethic.pdf

Singer, P. (1974). “All Animals are Equal”. Philosophic Exchange: volume 5, number 1, article 6. Retrieved from https://eclass.srv.ualberta.ca/pluginfile.php/6160284/mod_resource/content/2/All%20Animals%20Are%20Equal.pdf