Mosquitoes suck; literally and figuratively. Is the world better without them? They swarm and they bite causing irritating allergic reactions that itch for days. Beyond that, they also pose serious health risks, particularly in developing countries. Mosquitoes can carry deadly diseases such as malaria which they can pass on to humans. These diseases kill thousands of people and are an extreme burden on society. Mosquitoes are fatal, harmful, and annoying. It would be great if they just did not exist.

There might be a means to eliminate mosquitoes. A technology called gene drives has the potential to wipe out mosquitoes. Scientists would swap out a gene in some mosquitoes and add a gene drive. The gene drive serves to make the swapped gene dominant. This means that the gene would always be passed down to the offspring of the modified mosquito. The gene would also be dominant in the offspring so it would be passed down to the offspring’s offspring and continue all the way down the line. The gene would prevent offspring from being female. As it is passed down and spread throughout the population, mosquitoes would become mostly male and eventually be unable to reproduce due to a lack of female partners. Gene drives could potentially make mosquitoes go extinct.

The prospect of gene drives eradicating mosquitoes brings with it many ethical considerations. In his paper Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies, Jonathan Pugh discusses the ethical issues of gene drives. Pugh responds to two main objections to gene drives. One objection is that using gene drive technologies to make a species go extinct involves an unacceptable degree of hubris. I will not go into detail about how Pugh responds to this objection in this post. The other objection is that driving an animal to extinction goes against the ‘sanctity of life’ and is immoral. Pugh responds to this by denying the ‘sanctity of life’ argument and instead invoking Sentientistism to determine whether the lives of the mosquitoes should be considered. Sentientism is the belief that only those living things that possess sentience have a considerable degree of moral significance. Sentience is an organism’s awareness of its own being. Whether the organism has interests that can be fulfilled. Sentience is usually referred to simply as the ability to experience pleasure or pain. If something has moral significance, then its welfare should be considered in moral decisions. So, Sentientism states that only those organisms who can experience pleasure and pain or have interests should be considered when making moral decisions (Singer). Pugh argues that mosquitoes nor the mosquito species possess sentience. So, they should not be considered. Pugh believes eradicating the mosquitoes with gene drives is not an immoral course of action.

Pugh is not, however, gung-ho about gene drives. He does believe that caution and skepticism should be directed towards the technology. He calls it an ‘epistemic humility’. Because there might be harmful unforeseen consequences to gene drives, Pugh argues that humans should be patient and diligent in their testing of gene drives to try to prevent negative outcomes. The remainder of this blog post will acknowledge that caveat but assume that all consequences of gene drives are known and that they will work exactly as intended. I adopt this assumption so that gene drives can be assessed on purely ethical terms.

There is an ethical theory called Eco-centric Holism that would disagree with Pugh’s Sentientist appraisal of the mosquito species. Eco-centric Holists believe that it is not just sentient life, or even the lives of all living organisms that should be morally considered. They believe that ecosystems of living and non-living entities should be considered morally in their entirety. It is the whole system with all its individual parts that has value to be considered. They also consider species as a whole in moral decisions. They believe there is a moral obligation to preserve species and prevent extinction (Rolston). The justifications and arguments supporting Eco-centric Holism are beyond the scope of this post. All that is important is the understanding that they value entire species. So, they would value the entire species of mosquitoes and want to preserve them. Eco-centric Holists would not agree with Pugh about gene drives.

Even if the entire mosquito species has value as the Eco-centric Holists say, that does not mean we cannot use gene drives. If the mosquito species has value, does that value outweigh the benefits of killing off the species? So many lives can be saved if mosquitoes were eliminated. You can still value the mosquito species and permit the use of gene drives. The loss of that species would be a regrettable cost of preventing human deaths from illnesses such as malaria. There are also applications of gene drives that do not wipe out the entire mosquito species. Gene drives can be used to target only a specific genus of mosquito. There are only three types of mosquitoes that spread diseases to people (Pugh). A gene drive could wipe those types out while other types survive. The entire mosquito species would not be erased from the planet. Gene drives can also target specific areas. The spread of diseases by mosquitoes mostly affects developing nations. The gene drive could eliminate mosquitoes in those areas to save lives but not be used to eliminate mosquitoes in areas where these illnesses are not as big of a problem. An Eco-centric Holist does not necessarily need to be completely against using gene drives on mosquitoes.

Kenny

References:

Pugh J. (2016). “Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies”. Med Ethics: volume 42, pp. 578-581. Retrieved from https://eclass.srv.ualberta.ca/pluginfile.php/6160359/mod_resource/content/1/Pugh%20Driven%20to%20Extinction%20the%20Ethics%20of%20Eradicating%20Mosquitos%20with%20Gene%20Drive%20Technologies.pdf

Rolston H. (1985). “Duties to Endangered Species”. BioScience: volume 35, pp. 718-726. Retrieved from https://sites.google.com/a/rams.colostate.edu/rolston-csu-website/environmental-ethics/ee-chbk/duties-edangered-species-biosci-a-pdf

Singer, P. (1974). “All Animals are Equal”. Philosophic Exchange: volume 5, number 1, article 6. Retrieved from https://eclass.srv.ualberta.ca/pluginfile.php/6160284/mod_resource/content/2/All%20Animals%20Are%20Equal.pdf

 

Anti-Natalism is a very depressing concept in the field of environmental ethics. It is essentially the argument that we should stop having children or at least limit the number of children we have. Environmentalists supporting Anti-Natalism cite the ecologically harmful amount of consumption caused by bringing another person into this world as the reason to limit procreation. In “Is There a Moral Obligation to Limit Family Size” Scott Wisor addresses and objects to the Anti-Natalist argument. He makes one objection that suggests that the Anti-Natalism argument is self-defeating. This blog post will seek to explain Wisor’s position and analyze that objection.

Wisor begins his essay by explaining the version of the Anti-Natalist argument he is objecting to. This argument is as follows: People have a moral obligation not to cause environmental destruction. People in affluent nations tend to consume at a level that causes a great deal of environmental destruction. When affluent families have children, those children also consume at a level that causes environmental destruction. Having children increases environmental destruction in affluent nations. So, affluent families should not have children or should limit the number of children they have to prevent environmental destruction (Wisor, 2009).

To Wisor, that argument is an example of a call for consumer-driven activism which he believes is a wholly ineffective means of addressing an issue. He gives several reasons why placing the onus on consumers to produce change is a bad strategy. He first argues that consumers lack the knowledge and understanding of issues or lack the motivation to gain such a knowledge. This would prevent them from being fully aware of the environmental costs behind their actions. Next, he argues that, even when someone is aware of an issue and tries to act in a beneficial manner, they still have moments of weakness and contribute to the issue. An environmentalist may throw out a can rather than recycle it if there are no recycling bins nearby. Wisor also points out that there are people who just do not care about the issues and will never choose to act in a way that helps alleviate the issues. Wisor’s final problem with consumer-driven activism is that he believes it relieves the pressure on the governments to make the necessary policy changes. Wisor believes that we would be better off with governments enacting policy to solve these issues. He believes Anti-Natalism is just another mistaken call for consumer-driven activism (Wisor, 2009).

After discussing his issues with consumer-driven activism, Wisor gives a very interesting objection to Anti-Natalism. He suggests that the Anti-Natal argument is self-defeating because it naturally reduces the population proportion of people who agree with it. Only people who are already environmentally conscious or sensitive would be likely to be Anti-Natalists. Therefore, people who do not care for the environment would continue to have multiple children. Assuming that parents tend to pass on their beliefs to their children at least to some extent, fewer children will have environmental awareness passed on to them because the environmentally aware people will be having fewer children. Those who are indifferent to environmental issues will continue having children and will pass on this indifference to their children as well. As a result, the proportion of the population who care about the environment will become significantly smaller while the proportion of those who are indifferent to the environment will become larger. This makes the argument self-defeating because, as more people agree with it, fewer people will be born who would agree with it. Wisor argues that the effect of reducing the proportion of environmentalists in the population will cause more harm to the environment than the benefit of having fewer children (Wisor, 2009).

This objection has problems. The assumption that parents pass down their beliefs to the extent that Wisor posits is dubious. Especially when it comes to environmental issues. Parents do have an influence on their children’s beliefs. The parents’ beliefs are the first beliefs these children meet. But, eventually, they encounter a wide variety of beliefs and, as the children grow, they build their own unique identities and choose what beliefs to hold. These beliefs may or may not align with their parents’. The history of the human race suggests that they often do not. If people just aligned their views with those of their parents, then cultural change should be non-existent. There would be no civil rights, same-sex marriage would be taboo, capital punishment would be common, and healthcare would still be private. These changes have occurred in Canada. They have occurred because children have adopted separate beliefs from their parents. The climate change movement is predominantly a youth movement in 2020. These youths are standing up for their beliefs directly against the beliefs of the past. People can change their beliefs at any time in their life. They are not locked into the beliefs of their upbringing. An environmentally indifferent family may have a child who grows up to be a champion of environmental issues. That child may even convince its parents to adopt its beliefs. Beliefs are not these pre-determined things. This idea that parents passing environmental conscientiousness onto their children is of the utmost importance for the environmental movement just does not hold up. Anti-Natalism does not harm environmental awareness in this way and it is not a self-defeating argument.

-Kenny

 

References:

Wisor, S. (2009, Summer/Fall). “Is There a Moral Obligation to Limit Family Size”. Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly: volume 29, no. ¾, 26-31. Retrieved from https://eclass.srv.ualberta.ca/pluginfile.php/6533406/mod_resource/content/1/Wisor%20Is%20there%20a%20moral%20obligation%20to%20limit%20family%20size.pdf

What is a techno-fix? It is a surprisingly controversial phrase that has conjured skepticism and trepidation when uttered. Simply put, a techno-fix is a technological solution to a problem. There are many examples throughout history such as the cell phone for long distance communication, the airplane for intercontinental travel or even the wheel for basic transport. Why does such a mundane phrase have this controversy around it?

Dane Scott’s paper “The Technological Fix Criticisms and the Agricultural Biotechnology Debate” seeks to lay out the debate over techno-fixes. He maintains a neutral tone throughout the paper with the goal of accurately showing all sides of the argument. He reveals both philosophical and practical critiques as well as philosophical and practical arguments in favor of techno-fixes. This blog post will focus on the philosophical considerations of techno-fixes.

Scott outlines several philosophical thoughts against techno-fixes. All stem from what Scott describes as “reframing a social problem as a technological one.” In doing so, critics argue that problem solvers fail to see the full picture, developing a tunnel vision that makes them overlook key aspects of the issue. Techno-fixes reduce “the complexity of [the] problem [and] may exclude many important factors, generating unforeseen consequences” (Scott). Scott then develops several specific philosophical critiques. He starts with the theories of Leo Marx who argued that a techno-fix mind-frame “is embedded deeply in what was, and probably is, our culture’s dominant conception of history.” He is arguing that the techno-fix has become a staple of humanity influencing the developmental path we have taken throughout history. It is as if the impulse to search for a techno-fix to a problem has become a reflex. Next Scott discusses the views of Langdon Winner who says that “it is usually taken for granted that the only reliable sources for improving the human condition stem from new machines, techniques and chemicals” again referencing the tunnel vision in looking for solutions.

I do not believe the philosophical critiques against techno-fixes stand. When outlining the philosophical arguments in favour of a techno-fix solution to agricultural issues, Scott builds context putting forth the great agricultural challenge: that our farmland needs to be able to feed an additional 3 billion people and also reduce the harmful environmental impacts. Scott presents the argument of Anthony Trewavas that a techno-fix is the best way to solve this problem. He argues that there are two options, increase the land dedicated to farming, therefore increasing the ecological impact, or increase the yields of current farms. Simply increasing the number of farms will result in a zero-sum game with any food benefits being offset by damages to the environment. On the other hand, Trewavas describes a techno-fix increasing the yields of current crops as a “win-win” (Scott). A techno-fix in agriculture could come in the form of genetically modified crops design to produce more, offer more nutritional value and be more resilient. It is a solution that can address both problems of the challenge. Detractors argue that focusing on the techno-fix is, again, ignoring the full picture. They say that the world already produces enough food, but a socially unjust distribution system prevents everyone from getting what they need. They believe an actual response to this issue involves addressing the social asymmetry, rather than reframing the issue as one that has a technological solution (Scott). Trewavas has a response to this. He says, “it is far easier for scientists to conjure more food from the plants we grow than to persuade the West to share its agricultural bounty with its poorer neighbors.” This is particularly interesting to me. He is fully acknowledging the social nature of this issue, contrary to the philosophical critiques raised against a techno-fix.

This is where the critiques fail. This human propensity to naturally search for a techno-fix is not the result of ignoring the social dimensions of an issue. It is the result of fully understanding the difficulty of dealing with a social issue. It is incredibly unlikely or, at the very least an extremely long process to uproot established social injustices and create lasting change. It is a tall ladder to climb and, while that ladder is being climbed, people are dying.

Areas are experiencing overpopulation and people are starving. Many in the world suffer from Vitamin A deficiency or VAD (Folger). There are real consequences to this food challenge. The search for a techno-fix is not brushing the social nature under the rug. It is taking a more efficient and practical approach to mitigating the problem and try to prevent as many unnecessary deaths as possible. Yes, people suffering from VAD would benefit from a fairer food distribution. Is that going to happen anytime soon? Not likely. Can they benefit immediately from Golden Rice, a techno-fix that has created a rice that is a reliable source of vitamin A (Folger)? Yes.

The philosophical arguments are flat out mistaken. A techno-fix is not a flawed philosophy embedded in our culture that overlooks social issues. The techno-fix is the result of looking at the whole picture and developing a reasonable response with an immediate impact.

-Kenny

References:

Folger, T. (n.d.) “The Next Green Revolution”. National Geographic Magazine. Retrieved from the National Geographic website.

Scott, D. (2011, June 1). “The Technological Fix Criticisms and the Agricultural Biotechnology Debate”. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics: volume 24. 207-226. https://web-b-ebscohost-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=23953e20-a158-4394-b905-eb7719f9f4fd%40pdc-v-sessmgr05

 

In their paper “Vegetarian Meat: Could Technology Save Animals and Satisfy Meat Eaters” authors Hopkins and Dacey discuss the potential of synthetic or artificially grown meat products to offer an alternative to meat from slaughtered animals. At the outset of their paper they describe people that they call “uncomfortably carnivorous”. People who are aware of both the harm farm animals endure to become food and the environmental consequences of farming animals but continue to eat meat despite the guilt. I would say that I fall into the uncomfortably carnivorous category. I was absolutely amazed while reading Hopkins’ and Dacey’s description of the developing technologies that could make it possible to eat nearly identical meat but without killing an animal or damaging the environment. Once they finished outlining some of these technologies such as self-organizing tissue cultures and organ printing, all of which create a product that is still essentially ‘meat’ but without having come froma living animal, they turned their attention to responding to the various objections people have to synthetic meats. I think there was an objection which the two forgot to address. It is an issue that has been raised by some of the previous posts on this site and was showcased in the article “Fake milk is real news, as synthetic alternatives threaten traditional dairy farms” by Cassie Slane. What about all the farmers whose livelihoods depend on raising animals? The objection that synthetic meats and animal products negatively impact farmers. I will attempt to respond to this objection in this post.

The Slane article is about dairy farmers upset by competition from a new company called Perfect Day Foods which offers a synthetic milk product very similar to milk but not created by actual cows. This synthetic milk is “made in a lab using genetically engineered yeast programmed with DNA to produce the same proteins found in cow’s milk” (Slane). The farmers are specifically trying to prevent the company from being able to advertise its product as milk. This is a very personal issue to me. I live in rural Alberta just north of Edmonton near the town of Gibbons. Many of the people I know and am friends with are farmers. Many of my friends were members of 4-H beef growing up. In my house, most of the beef we get we purchase directly from my neighbor (and my former bus driver) who raises a few cattle alongside her main job. The objection is that if society makes the switch to synthetic meats then that will hurt the animal agriculture industry. In many cases such as synthetic milk, those hit hardest are the most innocent: small, generational farmers (Slane).

This objection deserves consideration because it is peoples’ livelihoods at stake. Unfortunately, and with a heavy heart, I do not think it is a valid objection. The threat posed to farmers by synthetic animal products are simply the cost of economic progress in a fair capitalist system. It is competition in the market. Animal farmers, particularly smaller farmers, deserve much sympathy for being victims of market forces. They are still a cost and costs should always attempt to be minimized. But that does not mean we should halt the progress of synthetics for their sake.

Markets change. Consumer demands change. Innovation, brought on by technological advancement, is a good thing. These synthetic animal products offer a wide array of benefits. They contribute less to climate change. They can be healthier. They require less land and are a more efficient means of production. Synthetic animal products are a very competitive addition to the food market. Competition is healthy. Competition makes markets more efficient, not just benefiting consumers, but society as a whole.

When animal farmers balk at synthetic meats, they are opposing fair competition. When they ask the government to step in and side with them, they are asking the government to oppose fair competition. I do not personally believe that is something the government should seek to do often, especially not when the competition is from something with so many societal benefits. It was striking to me when the lawyer for farmers in the Slane article accused synthetic food start-ups of caring “more about making money than… anything else”. A profit motive in a for-profit company is not a flaw in of itself. Farmers are for-profit. Farms are private enterprises with profit motives as well. This critique does not stand. Yes, there is a wholesomeness and nobility beyond profit in farming (relations to the community, generational tradition, etc.), but there is a nobility to what Perfect Day Foods is doing as well. Surely that company has a passion for improving the environment, our health, and the welfare of animals. I do not really see a reason why farmers are in need of special treatment compared to Perfect Day.

I really feel for the plight of farmers, especially small farmers, but competition is a risk facing any business owner. There are other options for those that are struggling. Perhaps they could attempt to switch their farming to crops away from animals. Perhaps there is an opportunity for the government to help in that transition without interfering with competition. Maybe these farmers could scale down their operations and focus on selling to local clientele. They could also work a second job alongside their small operation. That is what my neighbor is doing. The transition to synthetic animal products will hurt animal farmers, but it does not spell the death of the farmer’s way of life. Synthetic animal products are progress. Progress comes at a cost but that does not mean progress must be halted.

Kenny

References:

Hopkins, P.D., and Dacey, A. (2008). “Vegetarian Meat: Could Technology Save Animals and Satisfy Meat Eaters?”. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics: volume 21. 579-596. Retrieved from https://link-springer-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/article/10.1007/s10806-008-9110-0

Slane, C. (2019). “Fake milk is real news, as synthetic alternatives threaten traditional dairy farms”. NBC News. Retrieved from the NBC News website.

 

In “the Land Ethic” Aldo Leopold puts forth a communitarian eco-centric view. He argues that our ethical duties extend beyond duties to other humans and even beyond duties to other beings. He proposes that we all adopt a land ethic that enlarges the bounds of our ethical duties to “include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.” This is a very broad scope of ethical theory which he expounds to directly oppose the common view that the environment, the biosphere, or, as he calls it, ‘the land’, are valuable only for the economic benefits they can potentially provide. He is basically opposing the view that the environment is only instrumentally good. But is there more value in the environment than just instrumental value and are Leopold’s arguments to prove such value effective? Are they persuasive enough to convince the masses and induce them to make the changes that both Leopold and I would agree are much needed in the world today? Are they even necessary to induce changes or would an instrumental argument suffice? Though Leopold and I agree that conservation of the environment is an important goal, we disagree over what makes this goal important. I believe that the environment is only instrumentally valuable, but not just for humans – it is instrumentally valuable for all beings who deserve moral consideration.

In “All Animals are Equal” Peter Singer builds the case that sentience, the ability to feel pleasure or pain, is the criteria to determine whose interests should be considered in moral decision making. In his paper, Singer develops this conclusion by offering several analogies. He argues that, since we would consider the well-being of infants, mentally-disabled people, and those who have suffered debilitating injuries, we must also consider the well-being of sentient animals because it is clear that there is no reasonably material difference between the two groups (Singer spends a great deal of time aptly defending this stance from objections in his paper, but, for the purposes of this blog post, I will assume that this stance holds up to any rebuttals without reiterating Singer’s responses). So, it is the ability to experience pleasure and pain that determines who deserves moral consideration. These analogies that Singer puts forth are much more coherent and acceptable than those put forth by Leopold.

Leopold compares an ecosystem to a community. He argues that we have duties to our community beyond self interest such as improving schools and roads, and that these duties stem from our being a part of this interconnected system. He posits that the same logic requires us to have duties to ‘the land’ that go beyond our self interest because, like a community, ‘the land’ is an interconnected system which we are a part of. This analogy is much vaguer than the ones presented by Singer and I do not believe it fully holds up. Do we have duties to our communities simply for the sake of benefiting the community or does benefiting the community provide instrumental value? The examples of duties Leopold provides offer instrumental value to the individual members of the community. Community members benefit from improved roads and better schooling. It is right to benefit the community because the community provides instrumental value, not because the community deserves its own moral consideration. This logic can be expanded to the environment. We have duties to the environment to take conservation seriously because the environment is an eco-community that has instrumental value for its members. This is a stronger justification for conservation that I feel would be more successful at convincing a wide audience.

Leopold would object to the instrumental theory and argue that valuing ‘the land’ instrumentally is already common practise and is proven to be ineffective at inducing the levels of conservation required. Leopold would be mistaken, however, because he uses a too limited definition of instrumental value. He focuses primarily on economic benefits, whether the land is profitable. But there are more considerations when determining instrumental value than the potential for profits. Maintaining thriving and healthy ecosystems create scenic locations which can yield a great deal of enjoyment in several ways. Furthermore, the instrumental value derived from upholding our duties to ‘the land’ is increased even further when Singer’s determination of who deserves moral consideration is factored in. If all sentient life deserves moral consideration, then it is not just the instrumental value of ‘the land’ towards humans that is considered, but also the instrumental value towards all sentient animals affected by ‘the land’ as well. We have a duty towards the environment because it will benefit a bounty of organisms who also deserve moral consideration. These ecosystems are these animals’ habitats and destroying them would be a huge disregard for their moral worth. Having duties towards ‘the land’ for its instrumental benefits is a more plausible, accessible, and persuasive theory than the one put forward by Leopold.

 

References:

Leopold, A. (1948). “The Land Ethic”. A Sand County Almanac: part 3, essay 4. Retrieved from http://www.neohasid.org/pdf/landethic.pdf

Singer, P. (1974). “All Animals are Equal”. Philosophic Exchange: volume 5, number 1, article 6. Retrieved from https://eclass.srv.ualberta.ca/pluginfile.php/6160284/mod_resource/content/2/All%20Animals%20Are%20Equal.pdf