“More than 1,000 drinking-water advisories are in effect in Canada at any time, many of them in First Nations communities. More than half of us live in areas where air quality reaches dangerous levels of toxicity. And from Grassy Narrows and Sarnia’s Chemical Valley in Ontario to Fort Chipewyan, Alberta, people are being poisoned because industrial interests and profits are prioritized over their right to live healthy lives.” (Huffington Post)

This quote, written by Senior Editor of the David Suzuki Foundation, Ian Hanington, might cause some raised eyebrows; how is it that the government of Canada let these widespread, toxic environmental situations happen in the first place? Is it not written in Section 7 of the Candian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that, “…everyone in Canada has, ‘the right to life, liberty and security of the person…'”? (Brinker) Technicially, Canadian citizens do have this right, however there is no expansion of rights that would include the right to a healthy environment specifically at the moment. (Macfarlane)

In 2011, Bill C-469 (the Canadian Environmental Bill of Rights) was the closest Canada ever came to producing a right to a healthy environment with “unanimous support of the opposition party” (Boyd) but still did not get passed as a law by the Canadian Constitution. So even with the unanimous support of the opposition party, the leaders of the government of Canada still are not concerned about expanding the rights of their people that would ensure their health is protected from all the pollution that they allow within their borders. When will the government address this threat of basic well-being?

As a passionate environmentalist, I think that having a right to live in a healthy environment should be considered as one of our basic needs (such as food, water, shelter) as human beings since the environment as a whole (plants, animals, water, earth, etc) provides us with these crucial basic needs for survival. Yet we can see from the article cited above from the Huffington Post, that unessential industrial interests and profits are placed above the importance of what we need to survive on this country that is being so thoroughly damaged. Of course, it can be argued that Canada is not among the leaders that contribute the most to polluting the world, yet it should not exempt the Canadian government from protecting its citizens from pollution that might hinder their right to life, liberty, and security.

Taking examples from abroad, Coleman Brinker notes how the Dutch recognize that, “…[it] was the government’s constitutional duty to protect and improve the living environment and to maintain the country in a ‘habitable state'” in his article “Your Right to Live in a Healthy Environment: Phantom or Reality?” I find it interesting, to say the least, that the Dutch government considers themselves responsible for the living environment for their citizens and the Candian government does not; what exactly makes these two countries so different where the protection of the people and the environment are not significant enough to pass a bill that would allow all Canadians the right to a healthy environment?

I think the main concern of the government of Canada, as stated above, is industrial interests and the profits that they produce. In my opinion, the economy as a whole is very necessary and crucial to the success of our country, (such as the contribution to lowering unemployment)  however I argue that adopting the right to a healthy environment should be placed above the importance of the economy, as I mentioned that the environment provides us humans with the necessities to live. Therefore, the government should make our environment/health/rights/well-being a priority first and foremost, not their wallets.

Overall, this position that the government of Canada holds on not establishing the right to a healthy environment is not just anthropocentric (regarding humankind as the most important aspect of existence) that would disregard the environment and its non-human beings, but avaricious to the point of denying all Canadian citizens their right to life, liberty, and security.

-Melissa

Works Cited:

(Ian Hanington): https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/david-suzuki/environmental-rights_b_6103258.html?utm_hp_ref=ca-right-to-a-healthy-environment

(Coleman Brinker): https://ualawccsprod.srv.ualberta.ca/2017/08/your-right-to-live-in-a-healthy-environment-phantom-or-reality/

(David Boyd and Emmett Macfarlane):

Should environmental rights be in the constitution?

This week, one of the readings that I decided to analyze was T.J. Kasperbauer’s “Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Exitinction,” and I agree with how he evaluated the ethics of de-extinction, which is, “…the process of reviving previously extinct species…in the context of advances in synthetic biology.” (1) One of the normative ethical theories that I recognized from the beginning of the course is how Utilitarianism (maximize the overall good/consequences for the greatest number of individuals) plays into the ethical concerns about justifying possible suffering (for example: genetic malformations, unadaptability in the current environment that a certain species is not used to, hunting, etc.)  that might come from de-extinction technologies. Kasperbauer criticizes that this justification is problematic, for the idea is that any species that undergoes de-extinction would have its first few generations initially suffer yet this would allow for the species to successfully continue existing in the future. So the suffering of animals, in a utilitarianists’ view, can be dismissed to provide the successful future consecutive offspring.

I agree that this argument is fallacious, as Kasperbauer notes that it could be possible that the species that undergoes de-extinction technology could suffer significantly in the future as well; would the initial suffering of the species be justifiable then? (6)Do the ends justify the means? No, I argue they would not because there is significant suffering that the species would be experiencing as a whole(initially and consecutively) due to being subjected to de-extinction technology.

In addition to this major concern about species suffering, there are other important, foreseeable negative impacts on the environment and human beings that Kasperbauer highlights: not addressing the original cause of extinction for that particular species, the species becoming invasive to the environment, etc. (4) So with these negative, unethical impacts on the environment as a whole, I argue that there needs to be more research done on de-extinction technologies before more advancement is established in this area of science.

But despite Kasperbauer’s numerous criticisms about the probable negative impacts of this new technology, he advocates for scientists to proceed in the researching of de-extinction technology without a plan for re-introduction. (10) I completely disagree with his stance, for how can this technology continued to be developed when there are more foreseeable negative outcomes than positive outcomes? For instance, Kasperbauer asserts that this technology, “…has the potential to provide a number of benefits to both humans and animals, and much of the technology can be developed without causing harm to any sentient beings.” (10)

First, from a ethical standpoint, I wonder how is it possible to avoid causing significant suffering to a species when there is a threat of genetic malformations, unadaptability in the current environment that a certain species is not used to, and hunting, especially if there is no plan to curb these threats? Yes, there might be a possiblity that the technology can be developed where genetic malformations are non-existent/minimal, however the other threats to the de-extinction species cannot be extinguished just by advancing technology; there needs to be a plan to reintroduce these animals that ensures the safety of the environment as a whole, where no/minimal suffering is probable.

Second, what exactly are these benefits that Kasperbauer claims would come from de-extinction technology? Conservation, of course, is a significant target for this scientific advancement where Kasperbauer notes that instrumental de-extinction (“bringing back those species that can serve some useful function for either human beings or ecosystems”(3)) would be a fairly large benefit, such as “enhancing the ecosystem function”(3) and advancing science. The benefits for the environment seem to provide enough reason to continue with de-extinction technology, but I would argue that there would be more damage to the environment that would result from this technology (mentioned above), especially if there is not a plan put in place before more time, energy, and resources are complied into this scientific advancement. Also, I believe that this scientific advancement in an ethical context, does not uphold the justification for the foreseeable damages (without a re-introduction plan) that will cause suffering to the de-extinct species and the ecosystem as a whole; the human benefit from de-extinction technology seems quite meager in comparison to me. However, if a re-introduction plan is properly curated, then I would agree with Kasperbauer that advancing this technology would definitely be a great benefit for humanity.

So, should de-extinction technology be completely dismissed, based off of the negative effects/risks this new technology poses to the environment? No, I believe that with this technology there are significant benefits for the ecosystem, especially with the species that have gone extinct because of humans. Yet creating a plan beforehand, with the aid of more research, could prevent suffering and irreversible damage to species and the environment. Ethically, the best possible plan of action is to conduct more research before advancing de-extinction technologies.

By: Melissa

Works Cited

Kasperbauer, T. J. “Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction.” Ethics, Policy, and Environment, vol. 20, no. 1, 2017, pp. 1-14. Taylor and Francis Online, DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

This week, one of the readings I chose to read and discuss is Kyle Whyte’s “Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance,” where food injustices caused by settler states are highlighted as the key problem with indigenous people’s food sovereignty. Despite the treaties that were signed between these two groups, there have been many violations done by the settler states(the U.S and Canada) where they, “…establish their own ways of life,” (4) to gain access and exploit the lands and waters for themselves that was origninally under the ownership of the indigenous peoples. The access to food(via hunting and fishing) is not just essential for good nutrition and survival, but there is a connection between humans and the environment that is considered sacred to the indigenous peoples throughout North America: Salmon habituat [for example] is discussed as entwined with human institutions as a collective capacity supporting indigenous self-determination. (5) Collective self-determination in this context, as Whyte notes, is a group’s capacity to adapt to situational changes (5) and he asserts that the U.S still to this day is trying to diminsh this adaptation so that the U.S themselves can exploit more resources for their own gain and profit.

I believe that the U.S-endosed actions here are not just selish and entitled, but also anti-ecocentric(where there is not focus on the system of values in nature, where there are only human centered values) because there seems to be no concept of conservation when they exploit the resources that belong to the indigenous. For Whyte, he argues that a lot of forest ecosystems benefit from “salmon contributions,” (6) and it is the indigenous people’s traditional role to upkeep this conservation of salmon; they value the environment because they benefit from it, so they keep the fishing to a sustainable level to establish a healthy balance in the environment. (*for more information about how the salmon greatly contributes to forest ecosystems see page 6) The U.S does not conserve the environment in this situation, for there was a collapse of the salmon population due to damming on the lands and waters that is designated indigenous property. (4)

The U.S. also seems to diminish the collective continuance(“a society’s overall adaptive capacity to maintain its members’ cultural integrity, health, economic vitality, and political order into the future”) of the indigenous peoples by violating these treaties, (9) for the indigenous peoples need access to their own resources to survive, and keep the relationship between humans and ecosystem alive through conservation.

From this article by Whyte, I instantly was reminded of a current event that is happening in Nova Scotia: the indigenous group Mi’kmaq’s fishing rights are being disputed by non-indigenous fishermen. From the news article(cited below) we can see that the same violations of treaties about food sovereignty are happening:

“In 1999, Canada’s Supreme Court ruled in the landmark case R. v. Marshall that several treaties signed in the 1760s granting the Mi’kmaq the right to harvest and sell fish were still valid. The over 250-year-old agreement, known as the Peace and Friendship Treaties, specified that the Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq had the right to earn a “moderate livelihood…”…Nova Scotia’s non-Indigenous fishers have called for the Sipekne’katik’s First Nation’s fishery to be closed, saying it is illegal and a threat to the environment…Jason Marr, one of the Mi’kmaw fishermen forced to take cover in a fishing pound from an angry mob trying to seize his fishing haul, said that it took the RCMP two hours to arrive despite multiple 911 calls. Marr said that after arriving, the RCMP stood by and watched the mob vandalize his car.” (Lao)

In my opinion, this infuriating case is parallel to the ones mentioned in Whyte’s article, especially the one about salmon. While the Supreme Court of Canada has established some areas on Nova Scotia’s coastline to be the property of the Mi’kmaq, the law did not do much in the way of protecting their rights to their fishing activities; they did not even protect them from the mobs of angry people trying to take their fishing haul. Based on the treaties signed so long ago, I believe that it is also a selfish and entitled act that the law and non-indigenous fishermen did to the Mi’kmaq, not to mention anti-ecocentric as well. Despite the calls that the indigenous groups were fishing to the point of damaging the environment(which was proven false later in the news article), it is not a logical argument to make as these non-indigenous fishermen would also be contributing to the claim of destroying the environment.

Also, when the fact that the Mi’kmaq are making a “moderate livelihood”(Lao) was brought up in the article, I also noticed another parallel aspect to the Whyte article: collective continuance. The treaties allowed indigenous groups to fish on designate property without interference from non-indigneous parties taking away their livelihood, which provides for their community to be collectively stable for the future that can allow them to adapt to different situations(such as a decrease in lobster populations). But with the treaty violated(and if it contiues to be violated), I believe that the collective continuance of the Mi’kmaq would significantly decrease because of the Canadian Government’s lack of protection of indigenous peoples and their rights.

Works Cited

Whyte, Kyle. “Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance.” The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics, 2018, pp. 1-15, doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199372263.013.34

Lao, David. “Mobs are attacking Indigenous fisheries in Nova Scotia. Here’s what’s going on.” Global News [Canada], 19 Oct. 2020, https://globalnews.ca/news/7403001/nova-scotia-lobster-explained/

From reading Hopkins and Dacey’s Vegetarian Meat: Could Technology Save Animals and Satisfy Meat Eaters? and Mohr’s A New Global Warming Strategy, I was intrigued about the ability of technology to possibly sizably reduce the methane emissions from factory farming, not to mention the countless animal lives it would save.

I agree with Hopkins and Dacey’s argument in favor of saving the animals while simultaneously satisfying meat eaters. And if Mohr’s article on tackling global warming via vegetarianism is correct in its scientific findings, then the idea of cultured meat should be considered. According to Mohr, “…the most important non-CO2 greenhouse gas is methane, and the number one source of methane worldwide is animal agriculture,” (2)  which surprised me, for I thought the oil and gas sector would be the top-most emitters of CO2. So based off of Mohr’s article, I turned to Hopkins and Dacey’s article about what we can do to combat the suffering of animals in factory farming, and I found they both also noted the damage that factory farming contributes to the environment. (585)

So could it be feasible to consume cultured meat, where the environment would be damaged less with less consumption of “real” meat? I think so. Considering the objections to cultured meat, there seems to not be any moral regard for animal suffering, at least not in some the objections raised by others that Hopkins and Dacey note: Danger, Cannibalism, Reality of Meat, Naturalness, Yuck factor, Technological fix is moral cowardice, and Wrong moral motivations. (585-590) While I can agree that the “Danger” and “Technological fix is moral cowardice” are some practical implications from eating cultured meat, the rest of these objections only seem to justify why not humans should stop eating “real” meat. What morality and considerability of sentient animals come from the “yuck factor”? It seems to me that there is only uncomfortableness for humans, whereas there is pain and suffering for countless animals.

This alternative to “real” meat allows one to eat realtively the same conception/taste/texture of meat, and at the same reduce/eliminate the environmental impacts that come factory farming. I brought up morals above, how animals need to be considered. Others might argue based on the immorality of selfishness, where we should “self sacrifice” meat and offer no alternative. I whole-heartedly agree with Hopkins and Dacey’s responses to this objection, that is consequentialist: our main goal here is not to boost our own moral self-regard…but to relieve animal suffering. (589)

So from these points above, we have sentientist/animal rights/biocentric/ecocentric arguments that essentially prove that possibly providing cultured meat for humans to consume will result in more benefits than negatives. Again, the negatives that come from cultured meat are reasonable concerns, where scientists must evaluate in the production of meat in the future. However, the impacts of the “real” meat industry as factory farms does more harm than good to the world at large, where every sentient/non-sentient being(including humans) is affected. Cultured meat, in my opinion, is a good possible alterative to “real” meat as the impact on animals and the environment would be minimal.

Works Cited

Hopkins, P.D., Dacey, A. Vegetarian Meat: Could Technology Save Animals and Satisfy Meat Eaters?. J Agric Environ Ethics 21, 579–596 (2008). https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1007/s10806-008-9110-0

Mohr, Noam. “A New Global Warming Strategy.” Earth Save International, 2005, http://www.earthsave.org/news/earthsave_global_warming_report.pdf

One of the readings we were assigned to read this week was Peter Singer’s “All Animals are Equal.” (Singer, Peter (1974) “All Animals Are Equal,” Philosophic Exchange: Vol. 5: No. 1, Article 6.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol5/iss1/6)

He argued in favour of  equal rights for all sentient beings(beings who can experience pleasure/pain such as animals and human beings) where there would be non-maleficence treatment towards them (unlike the treatment of present-day farm animals, testing on animals, etc.). He also brings up the fact that the majority of human beings are speciesists, where certain species’ interests are held above other species’ interests (for example, the general treatment of dogs as pets is significantly better than a factory farm hen) despite the fact that all of us are equal in sentience.

With this information  at hand, which normative ethical theory would Singer approve of in the context of “All Animals are Equal?” The four theories that were mentioned last week were: Consequentialism, Deontology, Contractarianism, and Virtue Ethics.

First, the ethical theory of Utilitarianism (Consequentialism) satisfies Singer and his argument on behalf of all animals, for he has issues with the current treatment of a lot of animals on this planet. However, it seems that human happiness is too much of a focus with this ethical theory in particular, as the term egalitarian is noted under the Utilitarianism outline without the mention of animals (Welchman, Introduction to Utilitarianism Slides, 4). Yet, the impartiality and the idea of consequences of the first principle on Utilitarianism does seem to fit the basic criteria of what Singer is trying to argue: everyone who has preferences wants their preferences met…so since everyone’s preference is to not be harmed, should this not apply to animals as well? Since the satisfaction of factory farm animals’ preferences in not wanting to be harmed would have been violated, would there not be consequences for the ones causing and contributing to their harm?

Second, the ethical theory of Deontology would not fair well in the context of “All Animals are Equal” because of its focus on respecting the autonomy of other people; this could be an argument against animal equality rights, as Kant states that only people reflecting “personhood” qualities should be respected in addition to their (autonomous) acts. (Welchman, Kant’s Deontological Ethics of Respect, 10)

Third, the ethical theory of Contractarianism would also not fair well. With Contractarianism, there are no universal principles, and that cooperation is the foundation for common rules to “limit the destruction.” (Welchman, Introducing Contractarianism and Virtue Ethics, 2) Also according to this theory, there is no right or wrong before the cooperating between indivudals to make common laws. Based off this logic, there seems to be a focus on the individual, rather than the collective; if all individuals agree that factory farming is a good way to benefit from it financially, then the needs/lives of the animals are disregarded…this would be viewed from the perspective of Contractarians as good.

Lastly, the ethical theory of Virtue Ethics would not be the strongest theory to uphold the argument in favour of the equality of all animals. While the second and third principles provide some reasonable points, the first principle is weak in that it is not impartial to everyone’s conduct because only individuals with good character do not need moral rules applied to them. (Welchman, Introducing Contractarianism and Virtue Ethics, 10) While a person might have good character initially, that does not mean that he/she will uphold their virtues for their entire life, as there are many life experiences that could create bad character. Also, the notion of “good character” does not mean they are against the treatment of animals that are experimented on for their individual needs. Based off of this reasoning, these individuals with “good character” get a free pass from moral laws.

By: Melissa