A few years ago I was in Vietnam and my travel partner got really sick, we went to a hospital and learned that he had contracted dengue fever from a mosquito bite. For over a week of our trip he was bedridden yet unable to sleep, it was miserable. Thankfully, he recovered and I got out unscathed, but there was a window of time that we were pretty concerned that he had contracted malaria (very similar symptoms to dengue) and that he would end up hospitalized (or worse) in a foreign country. The fear and suffering was very real, and so when I first started reading about gene drives to manipulate the malaria (and other disease) carrying gene out of mosquitoes I was quick assume that this could only be beneficial. If we could prevent the same pain, suffering, and even casualties caused by mosquito borne illnesses, then why wouldn’t we?

Gene drives involve genetically modifying the DNA of an organism, in this case the mosquito, to pass down certain desirable (to us) genes. Certain work involves genes which resist the parasites which cause malaria (Pugh, 2016), and a gene drive would mean that over time genetically altered mosquitoes reproduce and pass down this malaria resistant gene until the entire population had inherited it. Another example of how a gene drive might work in mosquitoes is that the genetic modification prevents the insect from having female offspring, slowly eradicating the species, and therefore its ability to spread disease. On the surface this seems like a no brainer, of course we should implement this. Alas, there are people who don’t quite see it that way.

One objection that may arise from the use of gene drives might be that we have duties to the ecological world which are ignored when we undertake the manipulation of a species in this way. Ecocentrists, such as Aldo Leopold, argue that as a whole we ought not to view ourselves as conquerors of this world, rather that we are part of the “land community.” This land community exists as something that we share holistically with all the other beings on it, including the plants, animals, soils, and waters. Included in this biotic community, inevitably, is the mosquito. Although an incredible pest (and potential carrier of deadly disease) the mosquito should not be considered an insignificant organism in any ecosystem, and therefore should not be eradicated by humans. While Leopold and other Ecocentrists would not reprimand anyone for killing any one given mosquito, using gene drives to phase them out of the community altogether is a blatant (albeit slow) disruption of an ecosystem, and furthermore asserts human dominance as the only driving force towards eradicating mosquitoes is for human benefit.

A counter-argument to Leopold’s dissent for gene-drives may uphold our duty to other people, our community. As Leopold argues that we should maintain and respect the integrity of a biotic community, he asserts this by comparing ecosystems to our own social communities, which we also have duties to. Unlike Leopold, I would not argue that our duties to the ecological world and our duties to our fellow humans are equal. I would argue that our duties to other people, for our sentient conspecifics, hold a higher value than our duties to mosquitoes. Although I do believe in respect for the environment and all of its component parts, I take more of a Kantian view on where are obligations lie in dire circumstances. In the case of gene drives we are comparing wiping out mosquitoes over several generations, and millions of cases of malaria in humans every year, resulting in not insignificant fatalities. Since we have a means to prevent profound human suffering, I think it is worth the ecological disturbance of slowly phasing out this species.

References

Leopold, A, The Land Ethic, A Sand Country Almanac, 1948

Pugh, J. Driven to Extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies. J Med Ethics, 2016;42:578-581

Among many other things, this year has brought public attention to Indigenous land disputes more than any other year that I’ve been alive.  From the protest coverage at Wet’suwet’en at the beginning of the year, to more recent confrontations at 1492 Landback Lane in Ontario and growing tensions in Nova Scotia regarding lobster fishing.  This ongoing unrest in Nova Scotia between the settler lobster fishermen and Mi’kmaq fishermen has been the center of many news stories over the past few weeks; It has erupted into violence and sabotage, by which treaty rights of the Mi’kmaq people are being contested by the settler fishermen. Arguments against setting of traps by the Mi’kmaq have been risen as “conservation” issues by the settler fishermen, but these claims have been debunked by researchers as described in this Huffington Post article. What settler fishermen are largely worried about, is diminishing lobster populations which will impact stock prices, and consequentially, their earnings. While Mi’kmaq fishermen also sell their catch, they have a different relationship with the area and the lobster.

Philosopher Kyle Powys Whyte writes in his essay Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance about the consequences of settler colonialism for Indigenous ecologies. Whyte describes the relationships that Indigenous groups have with foods such as salmon or rice as important, if not inherent, to their ability to maintain what he refers to as “collective continuance.” By this he means that there are practices and systems in place by Indigenous peoples that make up the fabric of their society, these he refers to as “collective capacities” or ecological systems. Woven together all of these collective capacities harboured by the group strengthen them and make them adaptive and resilient; this is their collective continuance. At the heart of his essay Whyte states that settler colonialism targets these relationships that Indigenous peoples have with their environment that in turn create collective capacities, therefore jeopardizing the collective continuance of the groups. This continuance is vital to the endurance of the culture and livelihood of a group.

In his example of the Karuk, indigenous to what is now Northern California and Oregon, Whyte illustrates that many of these collective capacities are, in fact, also extremely beneficial to the environment. Their knowledge of the land, tending to it, harvesting, and monitoring it as a part of their food system left the land in better condition. These practices and cultural capacities become diminished and all but destroyed as US settler colonialism restricts the Karuk’s ability to manage their own lands. These barriers put a lot at stake: food, traditional knowledge, cultural and tribal identity, and most importantly for the Karuk, basic human dignity.

For the Mi’kmaq, Whyte would consider their relationship with the lobster and their trapping as a system or ecology that leads to cultural continuance, and the fishermen who are tirelessly trying to undermine the Mi’kmaq’s right to fish for lobster as obviously the catalysts of settler colonialism, putting this collective capacity at risk of being destroyed. They are placing the relationship that has existed since time in memorial at stake, and once this relationship is broken, it may be nearly impossible to rekindle. Even if the Mi’kmaq were operating illegally by placing traps, even if there were legitimate concerns about the conservation of lobster stocks, even if the violent sabotage against the Mi’kmaq were not clear displays of racism and greed, I believe that Whyte would still argue, based on the perseverance of these crucial cultural relationships between the Mi’kmaq and the land, that the DFO should defend the Indigenous fishermen and furthermore, likely advocate for restrictions to be placed on commercial fisheries to ensure that these relationships the Mi’kmaq hold can flourish.

References

Bailey, M. (2020, October 27). Conservation Isn’t The Problem In Nova Scotia’s Lobster Dispute. But Racism Is. Retrieved October 27, 2020, from https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/nova-scotia-lobster-dispute-conservation_ca_5f96fc73c5b6e1e70762e5b2

Whyte, K. (2018), Part IV Food Justice and Social Justice. In Part IV Food Justice and Social Justice. In A. Barnhill, M. Budolfson, & T. Doggett (Eds.), Food Sovereignty, Justice, and Indigenous Peoples: An Essay on Settler Colonialism and Collective Continuance. The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics. 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199372263.001.0001

If, like me, you grew up in the Prairies, you more than likely know a farmer. I know a few. In fact, my childhood best friend is in the process of learning the ropes to take over the family farm, and nothing pushes her buttons the way the public discourse around GMOs (genetically modified organisms) does. For this reason I was intrigued Gary Comstock’s article Ethics and Genetically Modified Foods.

In his article Comstock makes an argument for the ethicality of genetically modified food (or GM products, as he refers to them) by addressing several common objections for them. The objection that my farmer friend so often hears regards the safety (or lack thereof) of GM foods. Public discourse around the hazards of GM foods is driven largely by initiatives like The Non-GMO Project (who’s logo you’ll find in any Canadian grocery store), and perpetuated by campaigns such as A&W’s “no hormones, no steroids” branding which is plastered across the walls of each of their locations. My friend’s frustration with these claims that intervention with nature is inherently wrong or dangerous is shared by many others in the industry, and rightfully so. In his article Comstock cites a study which shows the immense power we hold by the ability to “taint” food by simply stating that it is bad for you (regardless of whether or not it’s true), which is essentially what the aforementioned organizations are doing. By suggesting that there is something dangerous about consuming GMO’s, the Non-GMO Project has already done critical damage to the reputation of GM foods.

Comstock himself was anti-GMO once in his life, he admits it, but this article lists the reasons for which he is a changed man. Regarding the defamation of GMO’s he takes a utilitarian perspective; weighing the potential benefits versus the potential harm. In this case he provides a hypothetical example of providing a food that was genetically modified to be nutrient rich to poor children vs the impact of anti-GM information being able to shut down GM infrastructure via aforementioned food “tainting.” In this hypothetical GM’s are assumed to be safe. Are the benefits that the poor children eating healthy, albeit GM foods, more valuable than the anti-GM group’s right to free speech? He determines that the harm done to children in need by spreading misinformation about the safety of GMO’s outweighs the preference of the others to spread the information. This is an extremely macro example, more large scale than the examples cited by my friend. The perspective she often takes is that without genetic modification, farmers would lose many of their crops. According to her, crops such as wheat have been subject to genetic modification to improve their durability against weather and pests. Her utilitarian example focuses on the preferences of the manufacturer rather than the consumer, but begs a similar question: do the benefits of free speech regarding genetic modification outweigh the financial loss to farmers and potential food scarcity among the Canadians they feed? Her, I, and likely Comstock, would argue it does not. In the same vein we would all likely go so far as to say that spreading misinformation about GMO’s is in and of itself unethical.