This week in Philosophy 355 we are discussing the topic of de-extinction as a method for conservation. De-extinction is a novel conservation technology heavily influenced by cloning; however, it is defined by T.J. Kasperbauer as “the process of reviving genetically extinct species” (2017, pg. 1).

Since many extinctions are catalyzed by humans, proponents of this technology argue that de-extinction is a good idea for various ethical reasons such as: restoring justice, reestablishing lost value, creating value, and that it is a conservation last-resort (Sandler 2013). However, those who are in opposition to the technology are in disagreement due to it being unnatural, along with concerns about animal welfare, the potential ecological and human health impacts, and it is essentially a way of “playing God” with nature (Sandler, 2013, pg. 357). This blog post will examine the debate of de-extinction through an ecocentric philosophical ethical theory standpoint using Holmes Rolston’s viewpoints to drive the discussion as to whether this technology is unnatural or not.  

As mentioned, Rolston is an ecocentrist — a philosophical ethical theory that extends moral considerability to all things (no matter if they are sentient or not) and species as wholes while rejecting anthropocentrism (the view where only humans are assigned moral value). In his paper, Rolston speaks a lot about the importance of species and how species lineages have gone through natural selection in which valuable traits are chosen to help the organism, and therefore the species adapt and sustain life. Rolston responds to the claim that artificial selection (where humans interfere in natural selection by choosing desired traits of the organism) for de-extinction  is “unnatural” where he rebuttals and claims that “most of our cultural activities are unnatural in the sense that they are not found in wild spontaneous nature” (2002, pg. 10). Furthermore, according to Rolston, this genetic manipulation of the organism’s DNA is no more unnatural than that of plant breeding, where we use artificial selection to genetically alter more favourable and lucrative plants for consumption (2002). Rolston concludes his rebuttal in saying that as long as those who are manipulating or artificially selecting things that are found in nature are to go about it in a respectful way that appreciates and acknowledges the intrinsic value typical to natural selection, then it is okay to continue (2002). 

In my personal opinion, I really agree with Rolston’s critique on those who think de-extinction is unnatural. I feel as though a lot of people do not realize how frequent it is to artificially select traits or modify DNA sequences for common things such as the crops we eat. Furthermore, in response to his concluding statement, I think that it is important for everyone to value the intrinsic worth of all life on Earth when going about daily life or performing these novel de-extinction experiments. While it is a new technology and many of the workings have to be sorted out in order for those who are wary of it to subscribe to it, I think that it is very interesting and it has the potential to be a great conservation tool. I look forward to seeing this technology progress in the future. 

-Ashley 

References:

Kasperbauer, T.J. (2017). Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction. Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20(1): 1-14.

Rolston, H. (2002). What do we mean by the intrinsic value and integrity of plants and animals? Department of Philosophy, Colorado State University. 5-11. https://mountainscholar.org.  

Sandler, R. (2013). The Ethics of Reviving Long Lost Extinct Species. Department of Philosophy, Northeastern University. 354-360. https://conbio-onlinelibrary-wiley-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca.

This week in Philosophy 355 we are discussing gene drives as biotechnology to aid with species conservation and disease prevention. Gene drives are a novel technology that are designed to eradicate undesired traits in insects and animals done in efforts of conservation or eliminating dangerous insect-borne diseases such as malaria (Risk Bites, 0:32). Using CRISPR technology, molecules will run along DNA strands in the organism’s genome and replace unwanted genetic codes with ones that are desired by humans (Risk Bites, 1:08-1:22). When (or if) the genetically modified organism mates with another member of their species, scientists have made sure the CRISPR technology that changed the initial gene would be passed on to 100% of their offspring as opposed to 50%, ensuring that the desired characteristics would be maintained throughout generations eventually solving the problem they were trying to fix (Risk Bites, 2015, 2:05-2:38; Scudellari, 2019). This blog post will look at the issue from a biocentrist viewpoint and explain some of the criticisms that a biocentrist may raise in regard to gene drives. 

Biocentrism is a philosophical ethical theory that rejects anthropocentrism (the viewpoint that only humans are morally considerable) and argues that all living things are morally considerable even if they lack sentience (ie. the capacity to feel pleasure or pain). Other features common to biocentrism is that they believe that all living creatures on Earth have a “good of their own, deserve moral considerability for their own sake, and their way of attaining their good is intrinsically valuable” (Attfield, n.d., pg. 1). 

Based on the definition, I believe that biocentrists would be against technology like gene drives that work to eliminate species (even ones that carry diseases such as malaria) because those that subscribe to biocentrism give all life priority, not just animals in which humans like more than others (Attfield, n.d., pg. 7). Furthermore, there is no denying that mosquitoes are sentient creatures who are also in pursuit of their own good — ie. they spend their life mating, laying eggs, and obtaining nutrition for survival — and have the capacity to feel fulfilled or unfulfilled based on if their own good is met or not. I believe that based on this premise, those subscribing to biocentrism would argue against gene drives for mosquitoes especially if it involved the extinction of the species by means such as infertility — which would directly interfere with the mosquito pursuing its own good of procreating (Pugh, 2016). Additionally, If mosquitos are exterminated, biocentrists may also be concerned with animals who prey on mosquitoes and depend upon them for sustenance; the elimination of mosquitoes could have the potential to affect the other species’ right to pursue their interests and reach their own good. 

However, maybe it is possible for biocentrists to jump on board with gene drives if they do not interfere with the mosquito’s ability to pursue its own good. For example, if gene drives can be done in a way that only removes the malaria causing gene and does not exterminate the species or infringe upon its rights to pursue its own good, then maybe it is possible that biocentrists could subscribe to gene drives?

To me, gene drives are a very interesting technology that has the potential to eradicate a prominent disease carried by insects and promote conservation for animal species. While the technology seems in its early stages, it will be interesting to see if gene drives will be implemented in the future and what biocentricists will think of them.

– Ashley 

References 

Attfield, R. (n.d.). Biocentrism Talk. Cardiff University. 1-4. 

Pugh, J. (2016). Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies. Journal of Medicinal Ethics, 42(9): 578-581. https://eclass.srv.ualberta.ca. 

Risk Bites. (2015, November 30). What is a gene drive? | CRISPR. [Video]. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com. 

Scudellari, M. (2019, July 9). Self-destructing mosquitoes and sterilized rodents: the promise of gene drives. Nature.com. https://www.nature.com. 

It is without a doubt that environmental issues are becoming increasingly discussed as the threat of climate change continues to assert its influence on Earth and its inhabitants. It is common knowledge that humans are responsible for altering the environment and causing catastrophic damage and degradation to our home by means such as overconsumption and living outside of our means; however, many people have different ways of trying to deal with this issue. This blog post examines a more radical solution to ceasing human-induced environmental damage and overconsumption: by refraining from procreation, or reproduction, so the Earth can return to a place without humans.

Harrison and Tanner argue that the destructiveness of humans needs to stop and propose that the only way of salvaging the environment and interest of existing (and future-existing) animals is by humans refraining from procreation (113,119). Paraphrasing Harrison and Tanner, they justify this controversial claim by declaring that children are essentially “bad for you” and do not increase parent’s happiness or provide any benefits in the long run, therefore there is no reason to procreate (119-120). Other thinkers who are proponents of refraining from procreation do not take such a harsh stance on the utility of children, and instead focus on the debate of consumption. Thomas Young argues that we must refrain from procreation because we as humans consume too many resources (especially in the West) and adding more people to the planet further exacerbates the issue of resource depletion (185). Young concludes that in order to consume within our means, we must have small families as having more than one child increases our environmental impact and heightens resource consumption (191).

In Overall’s excerpt, she says that imposing regulations to stop people from procreating would infringe on women’s reproductive rights which also echoes the opinion of Bill McKibben as cited in Wisor’s paper, where he says that there is no need for imposing restrictions on people — we should just do it because it is a moral obligation to protect the environment (184;27). My opinion on the argument of ceasing procreation is one of skepticism; while I agree with Harrison and Tanner that humans are harming the environment and animals at an extraordinary level, and with Young’s argument that less people means reduced resource consumption, I think this is a very unattainable and lofty goal to try and get people to willingly refrain from procreation without imposing restrictions and just doing so on moral grounds. People are very selfish and as it is, it has proven extremely hard to get people to do things that are not in their interests (for example, switching to renewable energy forms), so it would be very hard to get the whole world’s consensus on refraining from continuing generations. Another reason for skepticism on stopping procreation is in response to Harrison and Tanner’s claim that procreation must be stopped because future generations will have no better environmental practices than us now (114). I think this is blatantly untrue, now more than ever, young people — like Greta Thunberg — are at the forefront of environmental movements and activism and I believe that the future is bright if young people continue down the path they are on now, so there is no need to resort to such extreme measures.

To me, there are various philosophical ethical theories that could be applied to the case of procreation and overconsumption. The argument presented by Wisor for refraining from procreation because we have a moral obligation to protect the environment could fall into a contractarianism view. Contractarianism is a theory in which cooperation between people brings about agreements to do/not to do something. In this case, we as humans would collectively agree to cease procreation due to environmental reasons. In addition, I think that Harrison and Tanner’s argument could be disputed using a utilitarian view. Utilitarian’s argue that the best course of action is the one that brings the most happiness to people; in my opinion, having children could be argued to bring about the most happiness to people as bloodlines have continued for generations — if procreation did not bring about the most happiness, in most cases, people would choose not do it.

In conclusion, I agree that human influence is having negative consequences on the Earth and the inhabitants; however, I do not believe that stopping procreation is necessary in order to help the problem of overconsumption and environmental degradation. I think that stopping procreation is almost seen as an ‘easy way out’ of the problems we’ve created instead of actually making meaningful political and social change to deal with our problems.

– Ashley

References

Harrison. G., & Tanner, J. (2010). Better Not to Have Children. Cambridge University Press, 10(27):113-121.

Overall, C. (2012). Why Have Children?:The Ethical Debate. Cambridge (Mass.: MIT Press). 184-190.

Wisor, S. (2009). Is There a Moral Obligation to Limit Family Size? Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly, 29(3/4):26-31.

Young, T. (2001). Overconsumption and Procreation: Are they Morally Equilivant? Journal of Applied Philosophy, 18(2):183-192.

The topic we are discussing this week in Philosophy 355 is eco-justice and reconciliation and its relationship with environmentalists. This blog post will focus specifically on Kevin DeLuca’s “A Wilderness Manifesto: Contesting the Infinite Self Absorption of Humans” in Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to the Environmental Movement. 

Environmental movements have continuously been gaining momentum over the last handful of decades and have had much success in increasing environmental awareness throughout the world. However, DeLuca points out that the original environmental movement that once only advocated for the conservation and preservation of wilderness (ie. land untouched by human influence (Cronon, 1)) has now been altered by environmental justice activists who want the movement to focus on more anthropocentric (human-centered) issues (27-29). This divide between what environmental movements should focus on has caused great tension between the two where environmental justice activists accuse environmentalists in engaging in racist and classist behaviour for wanting to focus on wilderness conservation rather than human issues (DeLuca, 30). 

DeLuca — a proponent of the preservation of wilderness — argues against environmental justice activists redefining the movement to focus on humans; instead, he believes that it is important for wilderness to be considered in the environmental movement for two reasons: wilderness is equally as important as human needs, putting human needs before the environment is why we face a multitude of environmental problems today; and wilderness is what made humans civilization possible (34, 28). 

While DeLuca does not explicitly say his opinion on the matter, I think that he may subscribe to an ecocentric point of view based on his arguments for including wilderness in environmental movements. Ecocentrism is a philosophical ethical theory that rejects anthropocentrism and extends moral considerability to systems as wholes whether they are sentient (have the capacity to feel pleasure or pain) or not. It is obvious from his stance on the matter that the authour is a proponent of wilderness and rejects the environmental movements shift towards anthropocentric goals. In addition, much of wilderness (ie. mountains, water, trees etc.) are not sentient beings and he still believes that humans need to preserve it even though they may not have much monetary value to humans. Secondly, DeLuca uses other ecocentrists like Aldo Leopold in order to make his point, specifically regarding how nature has helped make human civilization possible and “gives meaning to the human enterprise” (41). I think that it is important to discuss DeLuca’s possible underlying philosophical ethical theory because it not only helps to see where he is coming from and what his core values are, but also gives the argument context in why he reaches the conclusions he does. 

DeLuca concludes that we need to keep the environmental movement and the environmental justice movement separate from each other because the main concerns — preservation of wilderness versus human concerns — are not compatible enough to be classified into a single movement (47). I agree with this conclusion. I think that attempting to combine them has obviously proven to cause many harmful accusations (like being racist or classist), so the separation of them is probably for the best, unless they are able to work together in some cases. DeLuca mentions one case where they had success in working together, and that success happened due to making wilderness the grounds for environmental and social concerns (42). I wonder if an example of where the two could work together could be in a case like the Dakota Access Pipeline. Here, a proposed underground oil pipeline was to run through traditional Sioux land that they have inhabited for centuries. Perhaps the argument could be made that ecocentrists and environmentalists would want to preserve the traditional wilderness, and the environmental justice activists would want to advocate for marginalized people that are being taken advantage of by the government and big corporations invading their land. 

– Ashley

Cronon, W. (1995). The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature. In Uncommon Ground; Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

DeLuca, K. (2007). A Wilderness Manifesto: Contesting the Infinite Self Absorption of Humans, in Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to the Environmental Movement. MIT Press. pp. 27-56.