This week in PHIL 355 we are continuing our discussion on non-anthropocentric critiques. One reading we are looking at is Paul W. Taylor’s The Ethics of Respect for Nature.
In this reading, Taylor writes on biocentrism — a life centred approach to environmental ethics that essentially argues that all life (not just human life) should be protected even if it has no benefit to humans (Attfield, 1). This biocentric approach Taylor presents sharply contrasts the anthropocentric view where only human life is valued and there is no obligation to protect the good of nonhuman living things, like plants and animals (198). Taylor, a true advocate for biocentrism argues that if we reject anthropocentrism and adopt a biocentric moral theory, we acknowledge that we are morally bound to protect nonhuman living things and promote their good for their sake because like us, they are members of Earth’s integrated community and possess inherent worth (198).
In his paper, Taylor lays out three interrelated structures needed for a strong foundation in a biocentric ethical theory: a “respect for nature, a belief system that constitutes a way of conceiving of the natural world and our place in it, and a system of moral rules and standards for guiding our treatment of those ecosystems and life communities…” (197).
The first structure is respect for nature, which essentially is agreeing to believe that living nonhuman things have intrinsic worth, just as humans do (Taylor, 202). The second structure is the belief system that underlies respect for nature, which Taylor calls “the biocentric outlook on nature” (205).
The first component being that humans are members of Earth’s community of life and have the same membership as nonhumans (Taylor, 206). What Taylor is saying here is that humans and nonhumans live together on Earth and we are all affected by processes fundamental to life (natural selection, genetics etc.) (207). What is interesting is that Taylor brings moral standing into his argument. He claims that even though humans are “new arrivals” on an Earth that was flourishing with life long before we arrived, we still tend to look down on nonhumans as inferior despite going through the same evolutionary processes necessary to our survival (207).
The second component of the biocentric outlook on life is the regarding that Earth’s ecosystem is a “web of interconnected elements” or cause-and-effect relationships (Taylor, 209). I think that an example of this might be when humans cut down trees to make products, it not only fails to recognize the good of the tree, but it also affects us because it depletes an oxygen source to us which highlights the cause and effect relationship.
The third component of the biocentric outlook on life is that every organism on Earth is a teleological centre of life that pursues good in ways that are uniquely their own and for their own wellbeing (Taylor, 210). Finally, the fourth component is the denial of human superiority (Taylor, 211).This component argues that despite possessing certain capabilities that nonhumans do not, we should not consider ourselves superior over them. Taylor uses the example of a cheetah’s speed; despite a cheetah being much faster than humans, we regard it as inferior even though we do not possess the same capabilities it has because we deem them as not as valuable to us (211). This claim of superiority from a human point of view is problematic because the “good of humans is taken as the standard of judgement” and we disregard that nonhumans have a good of their own as well (Taylor, 213).
By adopting this belief system, we begin to notice the flaws in an anthropocentric system and recognize that this species egalitarian philosophy proposed by Taylor is a way to see nonhumans as beings with inherent value striving to reach their own good. I think that Taylor’s use of ecology and scientific evidence was a good way in solidifying his argument, especially in regards to the first component of the biocentric outlook. In addition, I think it is important that Taylor mentioned nonhumans should not have moral rights, but should have legal rights (218). I think that by assigning legal rights to plants and animals, humans are better able to recognize their value, and could potentially be more mindful when interacting with them.
– Ashley
Works Cited
Paul W. Taylor. The Ethics of Respect for Nature. 1981.
Robin Attfield. Biocentrism Talk. Cardiff University.
Hi Ashley,
Thank you for thoroughly describing the three interrelated structures needed for a biocentric ethical theory.
This reminds me of what I learned in my Environmental Conservation class: a value system. It adds to the anthropocentric vs non-anthropocentric (biocentric) structure Taylor mentions and divides it further into instrumental and intrinsic. Here’s the breakdown:
Anthropocentric and Instrumental:
Environments are valued because of the benefits yielding to humans. This includes any resources or values (traveling to the mountains) for future generations.
Anthropocentric and Intrinsic:
Environments are valued for themselves, but we don’t know whether it has value independent of our values. Hence, intrinsic value is assigned to the environment by humans.
Non-Anthropocentric and Instrumental:
Environmental recourses are valued because they are used by animals and plants (doesn’t matter if they are used for/by humans).
Non-Anthropocentric and Intrinsic:
Environments are valued for themselves completely. Value is not assigned by humans at all. Environment matters because it matters.
Based on this value system, I think Taylor follows a strictly non-anthropocentric and intrinsic value system. However, the second component mentions the cause-effect relationship which affects humans. Like you mentioned, the cutting down trees affects human existence. Don’t you think that follows an anthropocentric instrumental value? Hence, largely Taylor’s article is pro-biocentrism, but there is no denying the existence of some anthropocentric values still mentioned.
Source:
Environmental Conservation 473, Peter Boxall (Professor)