In Ronald Sandler’s “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” the question of the moral permissibility of bringing back extinct species is addressed. Sandler explores the reasons in favour of their revival first; justice, the establishment of lost value, creative value, and serving as a conservational last resort. Sandler also engages with arguments against revival, these being the unnaturalness of it, animal welfare concerns, ecological and health concerns and the issue of hubris. Sandler takes a mostly anthropocentric approach in grappling with the issues. 

Sandler provides very salient points in favour of reviving long extinct species but ultimately concludes that there are more pressing issues to be prioritized such as “efforts to conserve existing species and that the ecological, animal welfare, conservation, legal, and health concerns”. I completely agree with this position based on concern for existing animals and the extinct species. 

The argument is pretty straight forward for why existing species should be prioritized but I’ll still briefly address them. Firstly there is an ongoing threat to animals in existence that doesn’t exist for already extinct species. Animals that are alive today have to compete to survive whereas there is no danger presented to already extinct animals (it’s not like you can go double extinct). One could argue that the longer a species goes without existence the less prepared to deal with existence they will be when they return. This opposition holds some merit but realistically, barring catastrophic disaster, there is no way that the environment will change enough for a species to be completely unable to adapt to their environment, especially with the aid of scientists. Additionally, there is an important distinction made by Sandler to centre the discussion around long-extinct species. Specifying that the species have been extinct for a long time already suggests that whatever concerns might arise from the resurfacing of the species are not of significant concern. For these reasons, this argument doesn’t sway my perspective.  

On the other hand, in the case of the extinct species, we might assume that to not exist is bad. However, I would argue that this is not the case. To adopt an epicurean view; existence is the absence of pain which is good and an absence of pleasure which is neither nor bad. This suggests that not existing is, at very least, a neutral endeavour. There are numerous ways to object to this position of course and in this application, the most salient would be that individuals are missing out when they do not exist, therefore not existing is bad on the deprivation account. While there is merit to this perspective from our perspective as existing but if one was to not exist, there would be nobody to be deprived of experiences. 

At the centre of my perspective is still agreement. Just as Sandler outlines in their paper, there is nothing wrong with reviving long-extinct species. However, we should focus on species that are currently in existence and how we can protect them, the ecosystems and the health of the planet. Once we have dealt with those concerns, the question of bringing back extinct species can be re-examined.

– Luke

Work Cited:

Sandler, R. (2014), The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species. Conservation Biology, 28: 354-360. https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1111/cobi.12198

In “Is There a Moral Obligation to Limit Family Size?” Scott Wisor provides an interesting perspective on the problems of the antinatalism argument. Antinatalism is the idea that it is immoral to bring children into the world because of the suffering it will bring onto them and the planet in general. Wisor responds to the environmental side of the question, exploring the environmental arguments. 

Wisor provides that this form of activism is something called consumer-driven activism which “seeks to change the world by changing individual behavior”. While Wisor does not claim that this form of activism isn’t useful, they explain that it ignores the problems that exist within established institutions, instead, focusing on how these problems manifest in individuals. Wisor addresses the main issues with consumer-driven activism. The first is that consumer-driven activism requires people to have all the relevant information for any decision they make. This puts an enormous burden on the individual, forcing them to put in a large amount of research in order to assure all decisions they make are morally unobjectionable. The second issue is that consumer-driven activism is unreliable. Even if someone has the means and the desire to put in the effort to fully explore the morality of their choices, we are still human and will occasionally choose the immoral option. The third issue is that many people will choose not to make the ethical choice and simply ignore the activism. And finally, by placing the attention onto the actions of individuals, it inadvertently lets large companies and institutions off the hook for the environmental damages that they cause. I find this point particularly salient due to popular culture’s tendency to individualize problems.

Another area of life where the individualization of problems is particularly clear is within the Criminal Justice System. Often, when a crime is committed, we look at the individual and rarely are the social structures that have led this individual to commit the crime ever critically examined. This individualization of the problem often severs to increase rates of recidivism as criminals are unable to deal with the larger issues that forced them to commit the crimes in the first place. In order to achieve real, significant change, problems must be dealt with at an institutional level and shouldn’t be shrugged off onto individuals. 

Wisor also makes a very interesting point concerning the longevity of the environmental movement that I had not previously considered with the anti-natal perspective. Unless a state was to forcefully impose that everyone engages in limiting family size, the anti-natal perspective would die out, assuming that parents pass down their ideologies to their children. As people who reject anti-natalism continue to have children that group would continue to grow exponentially while the anti-natalists slowly dwindle off into non-existence.

The concept of non-natalism also appears to have another issue build into its philosophy. If the idea is that our existence is harmful to both ourselves and the environment, and that non-existence is preferable to all. Wouldn’t the logic follow that all non-natalists should simply find a way to peacefully stop existing? While this position doesn’t necessarily call for non-natalists to euthanize themselves, (though one could argue that it could) it would follow that non-natalists should not seek to preserve their lives through things such as medicine. To me, it seems particularly difficult to argue for modern healthcare, or any form of life-extending processes through the lens of non-natalism, which for me, ultimately makes the perspective unconvincing.

-Luke

 

Wisor, S. (2009). Is There a Moral Obligation to Limit Family Size?, Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly 29, 3-4.

Looking at Dale Jamieson’s “Ethics And Intentional Climate Change” provides an interesting perspective on climate change and Intentional Climate Change (ICC). I also think that it is particularly interesting that Jamieson mentioned the ‘Doctrine of Double Effect’ in relation to this discussion. Jamieson suggests that there are instances where we are responsible for what we do even if we did not intend to do them. I agree with this point but I think that there is a moral difference between purposefully doing harm and doing so accidentally.

The doctrine of double effect engages specifically with the idea that within war is it unacceptable to target civilians specifically, but, if civilians happen to be caught in the crossfire, that is morally permissible. This is the distinction between terror bombings and strategic bombings. This distinction comes from the idea that the desire was not to hurt the civilians and, if given the opportunity, a strategic bomb would prefer to remove all civilians from the area of effect. This is counter to the idea of terror bombings which need the civilians to be present in order to be successful. This is why, within the doctrine of double effect, terror bombings are immoral and strategic bombings, even if they hit civilians, are more morally permissible. 

Jamieson presents that the doctrine of double effect excuses unintentional consequences of your actions, however, this is not necessarily the case. The doctrine of double effect doesn’t seek to absolve individuals of their moral blameworthiness in the case of an unintentional negative outcome, instead, it suggests that the act itself isn’t wrong. The doctrine does not suggest that the negative outcomes aren’t tragic but only says that the intentions of the act are justifiable. 

It is easy to make the assumptions that there is no moral blameworthiness when presented with a case as black and as with the example terror bombings but in reality, there are a lot more nuanced details and more options. With the example of terror bombings, there are only two options, to bomb or not to bomb but in cases in the real world, there are many more options. This is the case with ICC. Jaimeson suggests that moving forward with ICC would be similar to the case of strategic bombings in that it may have unintentional consequences that we have yet to foresee. This point, I would agree with. However, it is our approach from here that differs. Jaimeson suggests that because of this, it would be similar to strategic bombings in that we may hit our target but have unintentional negative outcomes. For this reason, Jaimeson suggests that the act is not morally permissible as we are gambling with the wellbeing of individuals in a way that is unjust. Instead, I would suggest that while the socioeconomic outcomes may be terrible and tragic and fully agree with many of the other conclusions drawn in Jaimeson’s perspective. I think the alternative is much worse.

In the case of climate change, we’ve arrived at a point where climate scientists believe that we are teetering on the edge of no return. The climate death of our planet (or at very least the majority of life on the planet). Assuming that climate scientists are correct and we ignore any mass conspiracy theories, I would suggest that preventing the extinction of the global population is worth whatever economic and political conflict it may cause. Assuming climate change is real and something that heralds the mass destruction, it seems almost certain to be  created by humans. It seems almost just as certain that the effects of climate change will have just as devastating of effects on plants, animals, and ecosystems all across the world. And it is with that assumption that I believe that humanity has the moral responsibility to do whatever it takes to correct the mistakes we’ve made and accept any negative consequences onto ourselves, such as those associated with ICC. 

I believe that Jaimeson presented the doctrine of double effect in a way that misrepresented the ideals. The doctrine explains that we are responsible for negative outcomes but those outcomes do not necessarily make an act morally unacceptable. With this understanding of the doctrine, I believe that it is clear that despite the negative outcomes of ICC, the act itself is still permissible.

 

Jamieson, D. (1996). “Ethics And Intentional Climate Change.” Climate Change: University of Colorado, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00142580

Kevin Michael DeLuca’s “A Wilderness Environmentalism Manifesto: Contesting the Infinite Self-Absorption of Humans” was a particularly interesting read and by far one of my favourites thus far. DeLuca explored the intersectionality of the environmental issue in a very critical way. DeLuca takes a fascinating position in terms of how we need to approach the issue of climate change. DeLuca presents the point that “[c]ulture is often the problem and should not be a trump card used to stop protecting species and ecosystems” (DeLuca, 31). This perspective is interesting in that it argues, in a way, against intersectionality.

DeLuca’s perspective in this paper explains that “[e]nvironmental protection often increases human suffering” (DeLuca, 34) and because of this, trying to balance environmental and human issues can sometimes prove to be impossible. DeLuca uses a number of examples to illustrate this point, such as the concern that “[w]hen the right of minorities to have jobs is the paramount concern, it becomes difficult to condemn jobs and work practices harmful to the environment” (DeLuca, 35). 

I find this perspective so interesting because of how critically it approaches the concepts of intersectionality. Typically, people consider human needs first and foremost as DeLuca explains but this proves to be problematic and often serves to inhibit any progress. DeLuca, using an environmentally focused lens, suggests that “[i]nstead of people first, it is wilderness first but with a recognition that caring for wilderness is caring for people” (DeLuca, 43). In the paper, DeLuca doesn’t suggest that the other aspects of intersectionality aren’t important and that other social justice issues aren’t as salient but presents that they should not be positioned against each other. 

DeLuca’s position outlines the tightly woven issue with attempting to dismantle oppression in that often when acting upon one method of oppression, one contributes to another. This issue can be seen with any social movement: from suffragettes omitting black women to the Pride movements antagonizing transexual people. These examples are very human-centric but DeLuca points out how the same issues apply to environmental justice. The issue raises the question of how we rank the need for relief from oppression. Should we as humans focus on human-centric issues? Or by focusing on the environment are we given the opportunity to still serve humanistic goals while also protecting the environment as DeLuca suggests. Or is there another potential option? One that acknowledges the cyclical nature of oppression and instead of suggesting that we can deal with it in any meaningful way, presents the need for a complete restructuring of discourse and society. 

Luke

DeLuca, K. (2007). A Wilderness Manifesto: Contesting the Infinite Self Absorption of Humans, Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to the Environmental Movement. MIT Press. 27-56.

 

In “Ethics and Genetically Modified Foods” Gary Comstock engages with the intrinsic and extrinsic issues with the use of genetic modification or GMs. Comstock explores the intrinsic issues after finding that the extrinsic issues are not enough in themselves to oppose the use of GMs. While I fully agree with Comstock’s conclusions on the unconvincing nature of the intrinsic issues with GMs, I would argue that they too quickly dismissed the extrinsic issues that may cause concern in the adoption of GMs.

Comstock suggests that each country should put in place some form of organization in charge of research and oversight into the use of GMs. But this seems to put the burden onto countries as individuals rather than acknowledging their interconnectedness. It is no secret that historically countries have taken advantage of other countries to generate wealth for their people. With the implementation of GMs, we would likely see the same patterns emerge. While this still doesn’t create reasoning for why GMs are bad, this likely outcome should serve as a morally significant objection.

I suggest that GMs are extrinsically objectionable when looking at the three major ethical theories. In utilitarianism, we desire the greatest good for the greatest number of people. While GMs would create some benefit, it would also feed into social stratification and would be a tool to further marginalize groups of people. Comstock acknowledges that but chooses to find it not enough of a reason to ban GMs. While it’s impossible to truly figure out the specifics without widely accepting GMs, it is quite possible that the benefits would not outweigh the consequences. Virtue ethics would also be against such exploitative actions as prioritizing the gain of some over the pain of others would not be considered virtuous. Even with deontology, which would also likely be in favour of GMs in terms of autonomy would be opposed to the exploitation of those who find themselves less privileged.

One way to look at my objection of GMs in simpler terms is with an analogy. Take for example an individual that comes to your door asking to know where your friend is. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with telling this individual where your friend is, but if you were to know beyond of a shadow of a doubt that this individual was looking for your friend to harm them, then there is an issue with the consequences. This means what while GMs (or telling the individual where your friend is) holds no intrinsic harm, the extrinsic harms are so likely and great that they must be considered before any decisions can be made on the subject.

In this case, we should employ the precautionary principle. This principle states that if there is something of which we have very little scientific knowledge, we should proceed with caution and take the progress as slow as possible. I believe that this case demands us to employ this principle in order to assure that we are able to protect those not in a situation to protect themselves.

-Luke

 

Work cited:

Comstock, G. (2010). “Ethics and Genetically Modified Foods.” The Philosophy of Food: Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 122-139