One of the required readings for this week was “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species,” written by Ronald Sandler. In this paper, he gives several reasons for why a person may argue for or against using cloning to reverse the extinction of a species. Ultimately, he concludes with the thought that there is no strong justification for using what he calls “deep de-extinction” to revive a species, but there is also no strong justification to completely put it out of the question. Therefore, cloning could be responsibly used to revive specific species, but it must not be the one and only method of conservation we should use (359). In fact, Sandler argues deep de-extinction ought not to be the first conservation method we should entertain. There are many reasons for this, but the central idea is that it does not protect a species from extinction; it can only bring them back after the fact (357). I will use this blog post as an opportunity to analyze why this is the case. 

First off, we have an ethical responsibility to prevent future species extinction due to human activity (Sandler 357). Because of this, modern conservation methods must be developed in an attempt to save a species at risk of extinction. One of the ways we could hypothetically conserve a species is through deep de-extinction, where the species is revived through cloning techniques. However, as stated previously, that does not prevent the initial extinction. And, if the species went extinct in the first place, who is to say the environmental and/or anthropogenic pressures for its extinction have also disappeared? It is entirely possible that the resurrection of a species would also result in its re-extinction. 

One of the worries behind using this method is that it will create the idea that we do not need to develop conservation methods. If we can simply bring a species back, why should we go to extraordinary lengths to prevent the initial extinction in the first place? Again, if the species went extinct in the first place, it will go extinct again if we do not incorporate rehabilitation efforts after we revive the species (Sandler, 355-356). I am willing to argue that these rehabilitation efforts are similar to, if not the same as, the conservation methods we ought to use before the extinction event. For example, if a species went extinct due to hunting by humans, we could either incorporate laws to prevent species extinction beforehand, or we could invest a large sum of money into reviving the species through controversial methods. If we decide to revive the species instead of conserving it, we would still need to introduce laws and policies to prevent the hunting of that species anyway, just at a later date. Therefore, we need to develop conservation or rehabilitation methods regardless of if we use deep de-extinction. 

Ultimately, the successful revival of a species would need to involve some form of a rehabilitation method. These methods will look the same as (or be very similar to) the conservation methods one would use to prevent a species extinction in the first place. Thus, while I do not see any particularly enticing ethical reason to reject the use of cloning to resurrect a species, its use is ultimately redundant. Of course, there are cases where a species could be revived to be kept in captivity, but that is not the topic I have been discussing in this blog post. I am merely commenting on the use of deep de-extinction to resurrect a species for reintegration into our modern ecosystems. 

– Leah

Works cited

Sandler, Ronald. “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species.” Conservation Biology, vol. 28, no. 2, 2014, pp. 354–360., doi:10.1111/cobi.12198. 

Many familiar species, such as mammoths, thylacine, and passenger pigeons, have disappeared from the planet, some due to species competition or environmental changes, others due to human activities. Their extinction was once thought to be irreversible, but with the rapid development of genetic engineering technology, scientists have found that it is possible to resurrect these extinct animals through “De-extinction” biotechnology. Currently, no previously extinct species has been successfully resurrected. (2017)Scientists estimate that the technology holds the promise of a milestone breakthrough within the next few decades. (2017)Although the technology is still far from being ready for use, the potential problems it may cause have already caused widespread concern in society. In Tyler J. Kasperbauer’s article “Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction,” he summarizes 5main challenges for “De-extinction” biotechnology. I will selectively discuss the first, second, and the fifth challenge.

1)Species resurrected by anti-extinction techniques may become extinct again for the same reason.
2)There is potential for resurrected species to become invasive.
3)The dilemma between resilience and reversibility.
4)Bringing back only one species may not provide meaningful ecosystem services.
5)Ethical Challenges

Taylor believes that one of the biggest causes of the extinction of the traveling pigeon is human hunting practices. Many people consider them to be pest birds, and if they are resurrected, they will probably be hunted again. (2017)If certain human activities led to some species’ extinction, then we should be prepared to ensure that these behaviors do not occur again before resurrecting the species. I believe the human overhunting problem is relatively easy to solve with better laws, more effective hunting regulations, and more education. We should carefully consider resurrecting species that have become extinct due to habitat loss or climate change. Species that extinct due to environmental reasons may be less suitable for resurrection using anti-extinction techniques, as recreating the right Living Environment for them may be very difficult or costly.

Secondly, he points out that the resurrected species may become invasive. After the extinction of the traveling pigeon, its place in the ecosystem has been taken by other species. Suppose the pigeon population was to be revived and released， it will undoubtedly affect other animals in the ecosystem that share the same food source as the pigeon and even leading to the extinction of other endangered species. In the past, as many as five billion passenger pigeons lived in the United States. If the cloned pigeon population could be increased to a level similar to that of the original, the natural balance disturbance would be unimaginable. Maybe we will need to hunt to control passenger pigeons’ population, as ironic as it may sound since human hunters exterminated them.

In the fourth challenge, he brings up a popular misconception that I think is critical to De-Extinction technology. A common argument is that resurrecting extinct organisms can conserve diversity and restore stability to declining ecosystems, which is inaccurate. Given the large population size of passenger pigeons, their resurrection could significantly increase or decrease the stability of the ecosystem. In most cases, however, a single species cannot significantly affect the stability of an ecosystem. (2017)If the goal is to increase environmental stability and species diversity, it is essential to consider bring back numbers of associated species together. But doing so tends to increase the risks associated with De-Extinction significantly.

Finally, We still have many questions to answer before we can resurrect the traveling pigeon. I believe that there are many limitations and side effects to the use of De-Extinction techniques. Protecting species diversity requires more consideration of how to protect currently endangered species and environmental stability. If we try to protect the environment through technology that brings back extinct species, it’s likely to be half the results with double the effort.

-Dengnan Chen

Reference:
T. J. Kasperbauer (2017) Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction, Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20:1, 1-14, DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

I love the idea of reversing extinctions. Though in my opinion it must be done with an ecocentric set of morals. This means animals that went extinct due to non-human causes must be left extinct: no dinosaurs, no dire wolves or cave bears, no North American horses, nothing that went extinct because of normal climate changes from the flux of ice ages. Human induced damage should be reversed when possible, as Kasperbaur says, to reestablish a species’ former role within an ecosystem. The integrity of an ecosystem should be a paramount goal of an environmentally responsible society. While we try our best to remove invasive, likewise we should do our best to de-extinct the animals we killed off. Kasperbauer introduced some primary ethical challenges that complicate a desire for de-extinction: I will attempt to nullify what in my opinion were the most prominent three.

The first complication that Kasperbauer introduces is that “for many species, the original cause of extinction still exists” (2017). For his example of a passenger pigeon this means humans as a threat still exist, therefore human over hunting could happen again. I think classifying humans as the threat is too convenient and simple. Culture was the problem. The culture that decimated bison (and the passenger pigeon) is gone. If it were not then the few remaining bison in our parks would not be remaining. Instead of following through with the extinction we are now trying to stabilize the population. Social media of today also strongly discourages practises like overhunting – look how trophy hunters are treated on facebook. The original threat IS gone.

“The second challenge for de-extinction is that there is a risk of species becoming invasive” (2017). Kasperbauer says passenger pigeons would be classified as ‘invasive’ if they caused a negative impact on an ecosystem, he goes on to describe how their huge flocks may consume large amounts of food and habitat other birds currently depend on (2017). This in my eyes would be healthy competition. The other bird species living in the native habitat of passenger pigeons got on before the extinction and they would again with a reintroduction. Other bird species’ populations would certainly fall to make room for the passenger pigeons (resources are finite), but there is no reason to believe they would be pushed to extinction themselves.

“The most challenging moral issue raised by de-extinction is that it seems to entail significant suffering for sentient individual animals” (2017). To this I would argue that evolution happens for one sole purpose and that is to increase fitness and survivability in order to pass on your genes. It is my opinion that the one goal in life, common to all living things, is to have kids; it is the driving force behind evolution. To this end, as having offspring is the ultimate achievement, I do not think suffering is a valid consideration. Suffering would be welcome if it means being given the chance to continue your lineage (your species). More, I think suffering is viewed in this example with a narrow mind. Just because suffering is ‘bad’ does not mean it should be avoided. Sometimes suffering is necessary for the achievement of a greater goal, such as suffering through university.

I think there is no reason not to pursue de-extinction. It should be done with caution, but it must be done in order to restore ecological integrity.

T. J. Kasperbauer (2017) Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction, Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20:1, 1-14, DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

Humans are indisputable dependent on the world they occupy. Sharing the world are countless organisms that form a vast, interconnected network that exchange and recycle both matter and energy. This continuous movement of resources serve as the foundation of all life on Earth by creating the necessary conditions and equilibrium for life to exist and thrive. Conversely, this means that disruptions to the perpetual flow of resources threaten both the systems that rely on it and the systems that preceded it. A simple way to visualise this is probably the food chain where relationships of consumption from one species to another are illustrated. Combine several food chains together and a food web emerges, portraying the dynamic relationships between species because they usually have more than one food source.

Should one link disappear because a species has gone extinct, it is not hard to imagine how the change would ripple outwards through the food web and to the systems beyond. Being an independent self-reliant system, the Earth mitigates these shocks by introducing redundancies, such as animals have more than one food source, and evolutionary mechanics so that a new equilibrium can be formed. However, when too many sudden shocks impact the system, too quick for the system to correct itself, the collapse of one system threatens the next and so forth in a spiraling cascade with the worst case scenario being system collapse. This is when the flow of resources stagnate and the conditions and equilibrium that enable humanities’ survival turn hostile instead. The extinction of other species imposes two existential threats on humans, the threat of reducing resiliency of the systems we need to survival and the threat to very idea of our continuity. That if other species can go extinct, then so can we.

In the “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” by Ronald Sandler, the author outlined his arguments for deep de-extinction as a tool of scientific advancement, rather than species conservation. Sandler argued that because species themselves lack any goal, interest or preference distinct from its members that make up the species, we have no obligation to act on the species’ behalf. Furthermore, for sufficiently long extinct species, the ecological system they were a part of has adjusted to their absence and so their reintroduction would be a disruption. Therefore, after the death of all members of a species and destruction or evolution of those that rely on them, there is no one to whom humans have an obligation to act on behalf of. Instead, only humans will find them valuable for scientific discoveries. This demonstrates a strong biocentric view, the belief that humans have duties only to individual living things, while rejecting ecocentrism, the belief that humans have duties to collectives as well. Suppose we continue to apply this view point hereafter. In the cases of recently extinct species, we can conclude that their absence is still affecting the ecological system they were a part of and any species that relied on them would be struggling to adjust. As members of those struggling species still exist, we would have an obligation to ease their suffering and aid their survival.

Another concern Sandler discussed is that de-extinction for species conservation would diminish or displace current conservation efforts or the obligation and urgency humans feel towards conservation. While this is a valid concern, there is another barrier to conservation that de-extinction may ease, despondent helplessness. In spite of all our efforts and wishes, some more than others, conservation seems like a losing battle. Every day, it seems that more species are added to the endangered list or go extinct than species are removed from the list, causing the systems we rely on to become evermore fragile. There always seem to be new ecological crises that we can only slow with tremendous effort. This generates enormous amounts of unhappiness and dissatisfaction that we should not only dispel for its own sake, but also because it may discourage people from taking action to help. De-extinction presents humans with new hope to ease our existential fears. Conservation is still of vital importance, but should we fail, there is still another method to restore the systems we have broken. Even if we think that we have no obligation to the systems themselves, surely we have an obligation to save ourselves by saving the systems. At its core, de-extinction promises that even after the death of all the members of a species, it is still not the end. Not for the animal and perhaps not for humans either. That very promise, I think, is why de-extinction is so necessary and compelling.

Keisey

Work Cited

Sandler, R. (2013). The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species. Conservation Biology, 28(2), 354-360. 10.1111/cobi.12198

This weeks readings covered an interesting topic that I had not thought of before, The ability to Bring back species from extinction (known as De-extinction). My mind ran straight towards the thought of bringing back dinosaurs (thinking immediately of  Jurassic park). My immediate reaction was negative as, that would be near impossible based on the environmental requirements of dinosaurs, plus the danger that would come with having them around. However, the two articles I will discuss did not mention dinosaurs, but instead animals that have only recently gone extinct such as the Passenger pigeon. Both T.J. Kasoerbauer and Ronald Sandler brought up important concerns and questions regarding de-extinction that I agree are vital to answer before moving forward with the prospect of bringing back extinct species. I would like to go over all the points I agree with but I lack time so I will go over two key arguments and concerns that jumped out at me. First being our real obligation towards extinct species, and second, the potential outcome of successfully accomplishing de-extinction.

Ronald Sandler mentions that a reason to bring back species who’s extinction was caused by humans is to bring justice to the species and right our wrong. However, as he mentions soon after, “it is not possible to harm or wrong a species because a species do not have aims or welfares distinct from those of the organisms that’s comprise them.”(Pg. 355)  So to bring back a species to make up for what has already happened does not work and in fact as Kasperbauer points out, “for many species, the original cause of extinction still exists.” (Pg.4) so even if we were to bring them back for the sake of justice, they could very well end up extinct again because of us. Sandler goes on to say that it would be more beneficial to look after future populations of species rather than focusing on bringing back ones we have already lost. The wrong can be made right again by acknowledging our mistakes, learn from them,  and  treat the species we do have better than before. I agree that it would be more beneficial to focus our efforts on conserving the species we still have that are endangered. Even in the event that we use de-extinction on a species such as the passenger pigeon, they will not be the individuals that were harmed in the past, and won’t necessarily even be the same as those species. We can try our best to recreate the species but it will most likely not be a 100% match anyways. Another argument towards the supposed justice it would bring is that de-extinction could potentially only harm the individuals as the very process of reviving a species will involve a large number of failed attempts and lost lives. With this in mind, bringing back a species could possibly cause more harm to them rather than fixing what has happened.

An issue that both articles raise is the effect de-extinction will have after it has been successfully accomplished. There is a chance the species could become invasive and only create more of an environmental problem for us and for other animals. Although one of the main reasons for pursuing De-Extinction is that the species could prove highly beneficial to the environment and help create more diversity where it may be needed, it could also have an opposite effect. Sandler does point out however, that the animals that are in line to be tested would most likely be unable to survive long if they were able to spread because there would be low genetic diversity and rates of reproduction(Pg. 358). Kasperbauer believes that in the case of passenger pigeons, there is a significant chance that they could become invasive as they were known to travel in flocks of billions, because of this, there is a dangerous chance that they could eat up food supplies for other animals and cause great damage. I believe it really depends on the species, as Sandler mentions that mammoths, for example, would have a low rate of reproduction, making it less likely for them to really become a threat as numbers would be easier to control. Of course research should be done on each species that is being considered for de-extinction so as to run through all potential risks they may have on the environment.

Both articles brought up interesting and important points regarding de-extinction. It is definitely hard to come to a definite decision on whether this technology should be fully pursued or not as there are many good arguments for and against it. But as both articles and I  agree, extensive research is required before decisions can be made. I do believe that we have a bigger obligation towards maintaining the populations we have now rather than focusing on long gone species but I do also see the positive implications this technology could bring to the field as well.

-Olivia Salioh

Sources Cited

Sandler Ronald.(2014). The ethics of reviving long extinct species. Conservation Biology, 28(2), 354-360.

T. J. Kasperbauer.(2017). Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction, Ethics, Policy & Environment, 20:1, 1-14.

Up until now, extinction has always been considered an irreversible phenomena and conservation efforts have focused on the prevention of species extinction in order to mitigate the effects of biodiversity loss. However, advancements in technology now allow for the possibility of reviving species that have gone extinct using genetics and synthetic biology – a process that has been dubbed “de-extinction”. Sandler explores the ethical dimensions of de-extinction in his paper titled “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” in which he discusses some prominent arguments for and against the technology. At the end of the article, Sandler comes to the conclusion that it is ethically permissible to pursue de-extinction, so long as it does not interfere with efforts to prevent extinction from occurring in the first place. While I agree with this conclusion, I do not necessarily agree with the way that Sandler arrived at it. In this blog post, I will be dissecting one of Sandler’s arguments and providing my own thoughts on the matter. 

The first ethical consideration that Sandler assesses in his article is the idea that we have a responsibility to revive certain species as a matter of justice. This is specifically in regards to species that went extinct due to anthropogenic causes, in which case some would argue that we have a moral obligation to make up for the wrongs that we did to that species or ecosystem. In response to this, Sandler argues that it is not possible to harm a species or ecosystem due to the fact that these collectives themselves do not have goals or interests. Therefore, Sandler believes that it is not a restorative justice approach that must be taken to extinction, but rather a reparation and rehabilitation approach. What this means is that we focus on minimizing the impact of species extinctions and preventing them from happening in the future. Sandler argues that de-extinction would not be beneficial in furthering these efforts, as it would not prevent species from going extinct nor would it address the causes of extinctions. 

While I agree with Sandler that de-extinction would not serve to prevent extinctions from occurring, I do believe he made an oversight when claiming that it is not possible to harm a species or ecosystem. I say this because ecocentrists such as Leopold argue that we still have a moral obligation to entire species and ecosystems – despite their lack of sentience. According to Leopold, each species plays an important role in the ecosystem and is therefore deserving of moral consideration. If Sandler had taken an ecocentric approach to the question of justice, he would arrive at a much different conclusion regarding whether or not we have a moral responsibility to revive certain species. This may in turn lead to Sandler taking a restorative justice approach to anthropogenic extinction after all. 

To conclude, I support Sandler’s position on de-extinction in that it is ethically permissible so long as it is approached with caution. However, I do think his argument could benefit from an ecocentric perspective as this would allow him to consider the moral significance of entire species and ecosystems. Nevertheless, Sandler’s paper provides a well-rounded analysis of de-extinction and its place in relation to broader conservation efforts. I believe that his paper makes a meaningful contribution to literature discussing genetic technology and should be read by anyone interested in environmental ethics. Thank you for reading!

– Keira

Sources

Leopold, A. (2014). The land ethic. In The Ecological Design and Planning Reader (pp. 108-121). Island Press, Washington, DC.

Sandler, R. (2014). The ethics of reviving long extinct species. Conservation Biology, 28(2), 354-360.

The issue of discussion for this week focuses on the idea of “de-extinction” of a species. I will be specifically focusing on the ideas of Ronald Sandler in his ethical analysis, “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species”. In his essay, Sandler analyzes various arguments in favour and against the practice of species de-extinction, but ultimately makes the conclusion that, although neither of the ethical arguments are very strong, it is not a priority that humanity should readily accept without addressing the concerns. For such an idea to be considered “ethically acceptable”, Sandler states that there are many concerns that need to be addressed first. I will be analyzing the concerns that Sandler mentions regarding the unnaturalness, animal welfare, and ecological issues tied to the process of bringing a species back from extinction (Sandler 355).

The technology used to bring a species back from extinction involves the use of “transgenic biotechnology” which is used to mix genomic material of individuals that could not have bred otherwise. This is where protests arise against the “unnaturalness” of de-extinction and the associated technology (Sandler 357). Although he does acknowledge the validity of this argument, he identifies potential flaws in this argument. One of which is that our society is reliant upon many things that would not exist without human intervention or the purposeful crossbreeding of species for the benefit of humans (Sandler 357). Specifically, vaccines and much of the agricultural products exist today because of the use of some form transgenic biotechnology and the intervention by humans.

The concerns regarding animal welfare are valid and these concerns can be tied into many other fields of scientific research and just the overall impacts of humans on animal species. Sandler provides a rebuttal to this through examples of the current use of animals in scientific research and the animal agriculture. Sandler argues that because of how we already treat animals, concerns regarding animal suffering in the use of transgenic biotechnology do not pose a special or particularly imposing problem (Sandler 358). However, I am inclined to disagree with his argument, specifically the use of the example in the argument itself. Our current treatment of animals in research and agriculture is not ethical, at least in my opinion. The concerns regarding animal welfare need to be addressed in these issues as well as the issues surrounding de-extinction. I believe Sandler makes a mistake of the use of a logical fallacy in his argument. His justification that it de-extinction does not pose any more harm onto animals as does scientific research and agriculture is a red herring that pushes the focus away from the question that should actually be discussed, if our current practices should be considered ethically acceptable.

The ecological concerns regarding the de-extinction of a long-lost species are valid, and I believe should be of the top arguments against the use of transgenic biotechnology. Sandler argues that bringing an extinct species back does not address the environmental or ecological issues that caused extinction in the first place, climate change is an example that he referred to (Sandler 358). Another concern pertains to the potential impact the de-extinct species could have on the ecosystem (Sandler 358), as it is arguably very different from when the species was last alive because this topic is discussing a species that has long been extinct. Many of the potential lost species to choose from were lost due to human activity and destruction of habitat and without addressing the human activities that caused the extinction in the first place, biotechnology to bring a species back from extinction will not help us.

While it sounds like a very cool scientific advancement to bring a species back from extinction, I do not believe it can be considered ethically acceptable. Although, the technology does have implications for future conservation efforts on endangered species, and as alluded to by Sandler, can be used as a last-ditch conservation effort (Sandler, 354). I agree with Sandler’s conclusion that this topic is not a priority over current issues that plague animals’ species, however I do believe that parts of his argument for the use of transgenic biotechnology may be slightly flawed.

Sources:

Sandler, R. (2014). The ethics of reviving long extinct species. Conservation Biology, 28(2), 354-360.

This week, one of the readings that I decided to analyze was T.J. Kasperbauer’s “Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Exitinction,” and I agree with how he evaluated the ethics of de-extinction, which is, “…the process of reviving previously extinct species…in the context of advances in synthetic biology.” (1) One of the normative ethical theories that I recognized from the beginning of the course is how Utilitarianism (maximize the overall good/consequences for the greatest number of individuals) plays into the ethical concerns about justifying possible suffering (for example: genetic malformations, unadaptability in the current environment that a certain species is not used to, hunting, etc.)  that might come from de-extinction technologies. Kasperbauer criticizes that this justification is problematic, for the idea is that any species that undergoes de-extinction would have its first few generations initially suffer yet this would allow for the species to successfully continue existing in the future. So the suffering of animals, in a utilitarianists’ view, can be dismissed to provide the successful future consecutive offspring.

I agree that this argument is fallacious, as Kasperbauer notes that it could be possible that the species that undergoes de-extinction technology could suffer significantly in the future as well; would the initial suffering of the species be justifiable then? (6)Do the ends justify the means? No, I argue they would not because there is significant suffering that the species would be experiencing as a whole(initially and consecutively) due to being subjected to de-extinction technology.

In addition to this major concern about species suffering, there are other important, foreseeable negative impacts on the environment and human beings that Kasperbauer highlights: not addressing the original cause of extinction for that particular species, the species becoming invasive to the environment, etc. (4) So with these negative, unethical impacts on the environment as a whole, I argue that there needs to be more research done on de-extinction technologies before more advancement is established in this area of science.

But despite Kasperbauer’s numerous criticisms about the probable negative impacts of this new technology, he advocates for scientists to proceed in the researching of de-extinction technology without a plan for re-introduction. (10) I completely disagree with his stance, for how can this technology continued to be developed when there are more foreseeable negative outcomes than positive outcomes? For instance, Kasperbauer asserts that this technology, “…has the potential to provide a number of benefits to both humans and animals, and much of the technology can be developed without causing harm to any sentient beings.” (10)

First, from a ethical standpoint, I wonder how is it possible to avoid causing significant suffering to a species when there is a threat of genetic malformations, unadaptability in the current environment that a certain species is not used to, and hunting, especially if there is no plan to curb these threats? Yes, there might be a possiblity that the technology can be developed where genetic malformations are non-existent/minimal, however the other threats to the de-extinction species cannot be extinguished just by advancing technology; there needs to be a plan to reintroduce these animals that ensures the safety of the environment as a whole, where no/minimal suffering is probable.

Second, what exactly are these benefits that Kasperbauer claims would come from de-extinction technology? Conservation, of course, is a significant target for this scientific advancement where Kasperbauer notes that instrumental de-extinction (“bringing back those species that can serve some useful function for either human beings or ecosystems”(3)) would be a fairly large benefit, such as “enhancing the ecosystem function”(3) and advancing science. The benefits for the environment seem to provide enough reason to continue with de-extinction technology, but I would argue that there would be more damage to the environment that would result from this technology (mentioned above), especially if there is not a plan put in place before more time, energy, and resources are complied into this scientific advancement. Also, I believe that this scientific advancement in an ethical context, does not uphold the justification for the foreseeable damages (without a re-introduction plan) that will cause suffering to the de-extinct species and the ecosystem as a whole; the human benefit from de-extinction technology seems quite meager in comparison to me. However, if a re-introduction plan is properly curated, then I would agree with Kasperbauer that advancing this technology would definitely be a great benefit for humanity.

So, should de-extinction technology be completely dismissed, based off of the negative effects/risks this new technology poses to the environment? No, I believe that with this technology there are significant benefits for the ecosystem, especially with the species that have gone extinct because of humans. Yet creating a plan beforehand, with the aid of more research, could prevent suffering and irreversible damage to species and the environment. Ethically, the best possible plan of action is to conduct more research before advancing de-extinction technologies.

By: Melissa

Works Cited

Kasperbauer, T. J. “Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction.” Ethics, Policy, and Environment, vol. 20, no. 1, 2017, pp. 1-14. Taylor and Francis Online, DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

Today’s society is an era of the rapid development of science and technology. Gene-drive technology can change the genes of mosquitoes to reduce the number of mosquitoes and control the spread of disease. In Sandler’s article, he mentioned de‐extinction technology (Sandler, 2013). This technology can revive species that have been extinct for decades or even longer (Sandler, 2013). This is to reconstruct the DNA of extinct species by extracting DNA from extinct species (available from some fossils and specimens), and obtaining genetic information from closely related species, so as to revived extinct species (Sandler, 2013).

The development of de-extinction also brings some ethical concerns. In Sandler’s article, it is mentioned that this technology is unnatural and may cause suffering to animals (Sandler, 2013). The revived species may be harmful to the environment and human beings. Moreover, human beings are playing the role of God (Sandler, 2013). After the revived species, it may be released back to nature, but changes in the environment can cause unadapted of the revived species (Sandler, 2013). This will make it difficult for the revived species to survive in the new environment and may cause extinction again. This deep de-extinction technique may lead to some health problems in offspring and increase the suffering of animals (Sandler, 2013). It is immoral that human behaviour increases the pain of animals. Sandler’s article also mentioned that if this technology is used to alleviate human’s guilt, but does not fully respect nature and species, then the technology is ” hubristic” (Sandler, 2013). Moreover, the technology is not perfect and cannot guarantee its success. At the same time, this technology also has a lot of uncertainty. So far, no species have been successfully revived (kasperbauer, 2017).

At the end of Sandler’s article, it is mentioned that this technology cannot solve the existing ecological problems, nor can it make up for the harm people have done to these species in the past (Sandler, 2013). Therefore, there is no very strong or persuasive ethical reason to revive species that have been extinct for a long time. At the same time, this technology will bear high costs and high risks (Sandler, 2013).

In my opinion, I am not in favour of reviving extinct species by using de-extinction technology. The ecological environment will change slowly with the passage of time, and the structure of some species will also change. If the de-extinction technology enables species revived, it may be considered invasive species and may cause damage to the ecosystem and food chain. Environmental changes may lead to the fact that the revived species cannot survive independently (Sandler, 2013). Although it is mentioned that many of the revived species will be used to research and exhibited rather than release (Sandler, 2013). However, such behaviour increases the pain of animals, which is not in line with ethics and violates animal welfare. At the same time, the development of this technology is irresponsible, because through this technology, people can revive these species when they need to. That makes people will not fully respect and protect the environment and protect the existing species. In my opinion, human beings have not taken up the moral responsibility of treating species equally and protecting the environment.

In general, there are some ethical concerns in reviving the extinct species. I think we should pay more attention to how to protect the existing endangered species. At the same time, I think it is more important for humans to take responsibility for protecting the environment instead of making up for it with technology.

Yiyang

Reference

kasperbauer, T., J. (2017). Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21550085.2017.1291831

Sandler, R. (2013). The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species. https://conbio-onlinelibrary-wiley-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/doi/full/10.1111/cobi.12198

Stanley A. Temple in TEDX expresses his dissatisfaction with extinction. His experience in conservation works with three strategies for preventing extinction those are, protection, conservation and restoring. But Temple talks about a fourth strategy that is now being incorporated, revive. But there are concerns with reviving from extinction, he says that this is a new ball game where extinction has never not been permanent before and we must consider the effects of reviving and the implications. The questions he is analyzing is should we revive?

It seems many would quickly react to supporting this idea of de-extinction. Bringing back a species that was previously extinct. But how does that impact the ecosystems and other species around them? And further, how do we decide which species get to be revived, and who gets to choose? There is more complicated implications to de-extinction in considering what is morally correct. Reviving species could potentially advance far enough that we would be reviving species that have been extinct for several decades, centuries, or millenia. Should we engage in this deep de-extinction of long dead species or are the risks too complicated?

Sandler speaks to a justice approach for why we should be involved in de-extinction, he ends up disagreeing with the argument. The justice approach states that if humans were the cause of extinction for example overhunting as a cause, then we should revive the species. The main issue Sandler takes to this is that it is not the proper way to correct the wrongs, as on an individual level we could not restore the same animal and the species as a whole doesn’t have the capacity to be wronged. I agree with Sandler here to some extent, in recognizing the wrongs humans have caused it is a matter of making sure we changed our actions for the future. We are already working towards de-extinction but continue to display the same behaviour patterns on other animals. Many species have been over hunted or over fished by humans and it is more important to attack that problem instead of revitalizing species.

Within an ecosystem species play many different roles and whether we deem them necessary they are important and valuable intrinsically. Sandler concludes that for this reason anthropogenic extinction is wrong and we should use de-extinction to restore the value that was lost. I have to challenge this thought, as mentioned before we would not be restoring the individual but would be reviving the closest genetic makeup so I still conclude we would not be restoring the damage that has been done.

I think Sandler makes a very important argument, deep de-extinction as luxury conservation. This again addresses as mentioned before avoiding addressing human actions and instead coming up with fixes to ensure our actions have a lesser impact. Humans have a tendency to view themselves above other species, also known as speciesism. If we have the ability to revive any species after extinction, I do believe that humans would be less inclined to change their actions and the harms they are creating. De-extinction would soon be seen as a quick fix instead of dealing with the implication and real consequences of human actions.

“It is fine to pursue if people want, so long as it does not interfere with or compromise ethically important things.” Sandler concludes in his argument that as long as de-extinction practices do not interfere with other things such as human welfare, and existing species then it is ok to engage. I do not agree with him as for as long as de-extinction is a practice that is seen as a “luxury” the right intentions are not being practices. What is ethically important needs to be re-assessed.

Alison

Sandler, Ronald. Dec 20, 2013. The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species. Society for Conservation Biology. https://conbio-onlinelibrary-wiley-com.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/doi/full/10.1111/cobi.12198

Stanley A. Temple. De-extinction: a game changer for conservation biology. https://reviverestore.org/events/tedxdeextinction/de-extinction-a-game-changer-for-conservation-biology/

This week in Environmental Ethics, we are discussing the issue of “de-extinction,” the technological revival of a species, as a conservation strategy. As Ronald Sandler explains, the process of de-extinction involves “reconstructing close approximations of the extinct species’ genomes based on information found in preserved DNA…and on genetic information from close living relatives” (2013, 355).

In his essay, “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species,” Sandler provides an in-depth analysis of ethical considerations regarding the technological revival of extinct species like the Passenger Pigeon and the Ivory-billed Woodpecker (2013). These include ecological concerns, the problematic nature of “technofixes,” and biocentric arguments for creating or restoring intrinsic value held by extinct forms of life.

Although Sandler explores several important ethical concerns to explain why de-extinction is not currently a viable conservation strategy, I believe he fails to address the concerns regarding instrumental use of animals for human achievement, making his arguments largely anthropocentric.

Sandler provides solid reasoning for his objections to de-extinction as a conservation strategy. First, he explains that the re-creation of extinct species will not necessarily re-establish the value they once held. In particular, he raises an important point regarding the ecological impacts of re-introducing a long-gone species. For instance, there is the fact that the environment has since evolved to exist without the niche once held by that species, such that reintroducing them would not restore lost ecological relationships and may even cause suffering to reintroduced individuals (Sandler 2013, 356).

Sandler further explains that viewing de-extinction as a “conservation last resort” is a techno-fix, leaving the root causes of extinction unaddressed (2013, 357). Current conservation strategies, on the other hand, do aim to prevent the causes of extinction by “mitigating, managing, and documenting loss” (Sandler 2013, 357). Therefore, the uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of de-extinction for conservation, and its potential to cause harm to individual members of species by introducing them into an environment that can no longer support them, are reasons enough to avoid its implementation as a conservation strategy.

Despite his conclusion that de-extinction should not be used for conservation, Sandler considers how it could create value as a scientific and technological advancement, without explaining who would benefit from this scientific value (2013, 356).

In this case, it is humans, of course, who have the most to gain from scientific advancement, seeing as Sandler has dismissed de-extinction as a conservation strategy. Having explained the reasons why de-extinction would not benefit ecosystems, species, or individual members of species, the ensuing argument for the value of technological innovation is ultimately anthropocentric. Sandler even explains how “Many revived species will be intended for research and exhibition, not release,” indicating that they will only be brought into existence for human use and/or enjoyment (2013, 358).

The treatment of non-human life as instrumental to human enjoyment is even clearer in Sandler’s acknowledgement that “It is polar bears roaming the arctic, salmon spawning in the rivers, and Passenger Pigeons in mass migration that people value,” beyond simply the species’ genetic preservation (2013, 257). Therefore, even when advocating for conservation, Sandler still promotes an anthropocentric view of preserving species for the value they bring to humans. Even more concerning is Sandler’s prioritization of charismatic megafauna like polar bears, indicating the possibility that de-extinction for conservation may not be used equally for smaller species that have equal or greater ecological significance.

Overall, I agree with Sandler’s stance that there is not enough ethical justification or scientific evidence for de-extinction to be an effective conservation strategy. However, I think Sandler leaves out an important ethical consideration that non-human life should be valued intrinsically, rather than for its role in human advancement. Therefore, I do not support Sandler’s stance that de-extinction is valuable as a technological achievement, if that achievement only serves human knowledge and excludes ecological priorities.

-Mary

Reference:

Sandler, Ronald. 2013. “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species.” Environmental Ethics 28(2): 354-350. https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1111/cobi.12198.

Wouldn’t it be just a magical scientific phenomenon to bring back extinct species from the past decade, century, or millennia? With deep de-extinction, this may be possible. Deep de-extinction is bringing back extinct species by rebuilding close prototypes of the extinct species genome from preserved DNA or from genetic information from close living relatives (Sandler 355). Basically, it’s Jurassic Park in real life. Obviously, before we move forward with this new radical and powerful scientific technology, it needs to be ethically evaluated. There is support for this technology from ethicists and also disapproval. I will look into some of these supports and disapprovals with specific regards to the deep de-extinction of mammoths.

First of all, having mammoths back in the world will create value. It may not create lost value because Homo Sapiens and woolly mammoths were not present at the same time. However, it would bring scientific and technological value by advancements in genetic and synthetic biology (Sandler 356). Additionally, even if put these mammoths in the zoo, many people will be pleased to see this wondrous creature that they have only seen in its skeleton, or drawings, or animated movies (Sandler 356). Think about it in terms of species from today. Even if you have never seen a panda upfront, aren’t you happier with the thought that they are not extinct yet? Let’s look at the other way around. Brazil’s Spix macaw are now extinct in the wild and this has created much sadness around the (Twitter) world. Hence, outside of scientific progression, it would be wondrous to see a mammoth during our lifetime.

Should Wholly Mammoths be Brought Back?

Regardless of value, we still need to consider other reasoning for why we should use deep de-extinction with mammoths. Some ethicists claim that we need to bring back species that faced artificial (human-led) extinction (Sandler 355). What about species that did not face artificial extinction? It is widely debated on how exactly the mammoth went extinct, however, many claim that it was due to natural climate change. Around 10,500 years ago, global warming led to the loss of the wholly mammoth habitat, which left isolated populations in islands. These isolated populations faced reduced fertility and diabetes due to mutations and weak genetic variation. Thus, the question is asked: are humans responsible for bringing back mammoths that faced natural extinction? Should humans bring them back? After all, one can claim that mammoth extinction is “meant to be”. This may sound cosmic, but maybe there is a reason why the mammoths species died out before the rise of the Homo Sapiens.

There are also other aspects to consider if the mammoths are brought back. Do we have the expertise, habitat, and technology to create a safe and healthy environment for them? Do we have to create an ecological context for the mammoths (Sandler 356)? Should we not use those recourses to perhaps preserve the species that are going extinct currently? Again, very cosmic, but maybe there is a reason a species exists at the same time as we do. Thus, we may have a more pertinent duty to preserve the current endangered species rather than invest our resources in bringing back another species from thousands of years ago.

Questions for the comments: Are there other reasons that can be found in approval or disapproval of the deep de-extinction of mammoths? Are there consequences such as ecological, economic, and social burdens that will surface with the revival of mammoths through deep de-extinction?

Sources:

SANDLER, R. (2014), The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species. Conservation Biology, 28: 354-360. https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1111/cobi.12198

The development of genetics and synthetic biology offers a possibility of cloning extinct species and bring them back to life again. This technology sounds like an excellent opportunity for humans to repair the diversity in the ecosystem. However, there are still a lot of debates in relation to the safety and effectiveness of this technology, particularly its ethical concerns. This paper holds the opinion that de-extinction is not an ethical choice for humans to repair their mistakes because it might bring suffering to animals and fail to copy the original species.

First, de-extinction might make extinct animals suffer again. The cloning technology has a low success rate and often causes “donors, surrogates, and offspring with health problems and abnormalities” (Sandler 358). It is probably that this technology will bring suffering to extinct animals. In order to increase the success rate and reduce negative impacts on animals’ health, there must be a lot of experiments taken. During this process, extinct animals will suffer a lot of pain in those experiments, which is brutal and unethical.

Second, de-extinction might fail to 100% copy those extinct species. It is not sure whether the technology can bring back extinct species exactly as they were. Cloning and genetic engineering cannot make an identical copy to the original extinct species. In addition to the limitation of the technology, changes in the environment can also influence the result. Shapiro argues that “even organisms cloned from frozen cells will not be identical to the extinct organism with which they share their nuclear genome” (1000). It is possible that humans create a new species based on an extinct species. In that case, humans bring new threats to the current ecosystem and break its balance instead of repairing the ecosystem to its previous balance.

Third, de-extinction cannot solve the threat to the extinction of animals and might repeat the same mistake without a sound system to protect animals and the ecosystem. Even though extinct species are brought back to life, they might go extinct again without a sound system of protection. The original cause of their extinction still exists, such as human hunting, environmental pollutions, and changes in the climate (Kasperbauer 4). It is meaningless to bring extinct species back to life without offering them a safe and suitable environment in which they can reproduce quickly. As long as the threat to animals’ extinction exists, those extinct species might soon go extinct again even though the de-extinction technology succeeds.

There are still some supporters who try to promote this technology for the benefits of humans and the ecosystem. Supporters of de-extinction believe that this technology can maintain justice by correcting humans’ mistakes, reestablish lost value, and even create new value (Sandler 355). However, the benefits of de-extinction are offered based on the benefits of humans instead of those extinct animals. Humans want to use this technology to repair their previous mistakes so that they can be less guilty. They want to bring some useful extinct species back to life because those extinct species can bring benefits to them and create new values. De-extinction is still based on humans’ selfishness.

Thus, de-extinction should not be supported due to its unethical nature, the possible suffering to extinct animals, and the failure in copying extinct species 100%. Moreover, the technology hasn’t been mature, and there are a lot of possible negative impacts or low success rates. It is not worth investing so much in a technology that still fails to solve the problem of animal extinction because those threats to animals still exist.

-Kaize

Sources:

Kasperbauer, T. J. “Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction.” Ethics, Policy & Environment, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2017, pp. 1-14.

Sandler, Ronald. “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species.” Conservation Biology, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2013, pp.354-360.

Shapiro, Beth. “Pathways to de-extinction: how close can we get to resurrection of an extinct species?” Functional Ecology, Vol. 31, 2017, pp. 996-1002.

In the article “Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction,” Kasperbauer proposes the synthetic biology technology that makes it possible to revive extinct species of animals. He proposed this technology as a way to solve the extinction of animals through the process of de-extinction. Also, he mentioned challenges for this technology. It sounds like a very meaningful and attractive technology to bring those extinct animals back to the ecosystem and repair the diversity of species. However, this paper doesn’t agree with Kasperbauer’s support for de-extinction and believes that this technology should not be developed. De-extinction is unethical to intervene in the ecosystem again and ineffective to solve the extinction problem as long as humans fail to establish a sound system to protect the ecosystem.

In relation to this technology, the advantage of this technology is to repair the ecosystem by increasing its diversity. Extinct animals could be used to fulfill their historic functions or perform new functions in the ecosystem, playing an important role in benefiting humans beings and protecting the ecosystem (Kasperbauer 3). For example, some extinct animals can be brought back to eat pests. These extinct animals can play their previous roles in maintaining the balance of the ecosystem. It is a way that humans repair their previous mistakes. It is the main reason for supporting this technology. Some extinct animals can be useful for humans. The ecosystem can restore its previous balance.

However, this technology also has a series of disadvantages and ethical challenges. One major challenge argued by Kasperbauer is that “the original cause of extinction still exists” (4). So far, humans haven’t established an effective system to protect animals from extinction or control their exploitation of nature. Even though extinct animals are brought back to nature, they might soon go extinct in the same way again. Without a sound system to protect animals, this technology is ineffective in preventing the extinction of animals. Meanwhile, another ethical challenge is that de-extinction “seems to entail significant suffering for sentient individual animals” (Kasperbauer 5). Since there hasn’t been any successful case, it is not sure whether animals will suffer during the process of de-extinction. If extinct animals are brought back to life but soon die in suffering, it will bring a great torture to them, which is more serious than extinction. Humans don’t have such right to impose suffering on extinct animals. Besides, de-extinction, in essence, is still humans’ intervention in the ecosystem. It still breaks the current balance in species by bringing back extinct animals. If some species are invasive, they might cause more problems and threaten other living species. Moreover, for so many extinct species, humans cannot target all for de-extinction. It is possible that humans only choose specific species for de-extinction. This selective operation in de-extinction has a strong bias. If humans only choose extinct animals that can benefit them and are easy to control, they develop this technology for themselves, not the ecosystem or extinct species. It is still selfish and irresponsible behaviour.

Thus, even though de-extinction might increase diversity in the ecosystem, it is still unethical and ineffective if humans don’t establish a sound system to protect animals and the ecosystem. Even if this technology succeeds, it is hard to ensure that those species will not go extinct again. In essence, humans develop this technology for their own interests because they tend only to choose extinct animals that can benefit them instead of the ecosystem. Instead of spending so much time and money on studying re-extinction, it is more effective to study how to protect living animals from extinction and control humans’ intervention in Nature.

Work Cited

Kasperbauer, T. J. (2017) “Should We Bring Back the Passenger Pigeon? The Ethics of De-Extinction.” Ethics, Policy & Environment.

https://eclass.srv.ualberta.ca/pluginfile.php/6160367/mod_resource/content/2/Should%20We%20Bring%20Back%20the%20Passenger%20Pigeon%20The%20Ethics%20of%20De%20Extinction.pdf

While reading Jonathan Pugh’s article and his arguments towards the use of gene-drive technologies on mosquito populations I found myself disagreeing with some of his points regarding “moral value”, and the falsity of the sacredness of life. I believe the usage of “moral value” is too intrinsically biased to be used as an argument in this situation. Our opinion of what it means to say that life is sacred also differ. Looking at more factual, science based information would seem a better method of advocating this technology in the hopes of decreasing mosquito transmitted disease. He does however mention the requirement for more experimentation which is an opinion I do agree with. In this blog post I will explain my disagreements as well as my agreement with Jonathan Pugh’s article and why I believe we shouldn’t rely on biased terms in determining what is best.

One of my biggest objections to Jonathan’s argument is using a being’s ‘moral status’ to help determine whether we should or should not do something. I do not believe that humans have the power to decide whether or not something has ‘moral status’.I personally see no valid reason why we are able to decide such matters. It is too easy to be biased and say something has no moral value based on what we deem to be valuable qualities. We decide that a mosquito has little or no moral value because it does not appear to be self aware or conscious, a standard that we created. So how do you measure moral status in an unbiased way? A person could claim that a brain surgeon has a higher moral status over a retail worker because they are capable of performing complex surgery while a retail worker simply puts out new stalk and takes care of customers. A doctor has more refined skills and has the ability to save peoples lives on a daily basis so one could decided that a doctor is of higher moral status based on their skill while the retail worker is of little moral value because they are incapable of this higher degree of skill. But then what if the retail worker has an outstanding skill at speaking with people, selling things, and making good conversation while the doctor’s social and communication skills outside surgery are lacking. Could you not just decide that the retail worker is of higher moral status because they can connect more easily with other humans, which may be a quality you find more human and more valuable? Bringing up Moral value is not a valid argument in determining if we should kill off an entire species because there is no unbiased way of deciding whether something is morally valuable or not. So the decision to eradicate mosquitos on the basis that they don’t seem to present self awareness or human like qualities, in my opinion, is not justifiable.

Pugh discuses an argument against using the concept that all life is sacred and mentions Peter Singer’s point of view which is that no one actual means what they say when saying that because in every day life people eat vegetables and fruit without issue or take antibiotics that destroy bacteria (Pg. 579) . I ,however, believe that both of them are over analyzing the meaning of the word ‘sacred’. Just because something is sacred does not mean we must do everything in our power to prevent a life from ending as this would be impossible. I believe calling life sacred means that it deserves our utmost respect and that it should not carelessly be wasted. Although vegetables and fruits are living, their literal purpose is to be eaten especially in the case of a fruit where the only way for the species to survive is for an animal to come along and eat it and spread the seeds. As for bacteria, allowing a harmful bacteria to kill you willingly just goes against human nature for survival. It is actively damaging you in a parasitic relationship so there is almost no choice in the matter. It is only natural to act in your own self interest so that you can survive. To say life is sacred means that it is deserving of respect, killing off an entire species, to me does not show respect as this decision acts too much in the self interest of humans. As I will discuss in the next paragraph, many other species could be effected by this decision, major food could will be cut off for many animals, possibly resulting in death of other species. It is necessary to treat the life of mosquitoes with respect, their life plays a specific role in the environment. If we did not treat life as sacred it would be much easier to go in and wipe out populations that seem to have no effect on us but because it is sacred, immense amounts out thought must be put into the decision of using gene-drive technology.

I do agree with Pugh that more extensive research is needed on the effects gene-drive technology could have when executed. He mentions that the “long-term ecological consequences of eradicating mosquitoes is mixed.”(pg 580) Which means more research is necessary for us to come to a concrete understanding and decision, it is not only the human population we must take into account but every population in the area as well. As he mentions, mosquitos have an effect on the ecosystem regarding food sources, and pollination. To come to a concrete decision, factual information is required more than biased opinions on whether or not mosquitoes are morally valuable or not.

Olivia Salioh

Pugh, J. (2016). Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies. Journal of Medical Ethics, 42(9), 578-581. doi:10.1136/medethics-2016-103462

The first reading I did this week was Jonathan Pugh’s ‘Driven to Extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies’, in which he disputes two arguments  against gene-drive technology and concludes that it is too soon to form a moral opinion on the tech because it is so new and the consequences of its implementation are not yet known. Conversely, in the petition ‘A Call for Conservation with a Conscience: No Place for Gene Drives in Conservation’ the authors argue that gene drive technology would “irretrievably [release] genocidal genes into the natural world” and they and their many high profile signers “call for a halt to all proposals for the use of gene drive technologies […] especially in conservation.” (citation). When I first read this perspective I was taken aback, it seemed dramatic and like a rather hard line to take on a new and emerging technology. However, I agree that the extermination of a species under the banner of “conservation” is horribly hypocritical and I would argue that their passion and message of caution is warranted.

These documents offer insight to the contrast between the utilitarian/consequentialist philosophy exemplified by Pugh versus the more deontological view expressed by the signers of the above petition. In the deontological view all beings possess inherent worth. The petition signers do not want extinction to be used as a tool for conservation because it is ultimately antithetical to the stated goals of conservation.

This debate reminded me of the ‘Technological Fix’ and ‘climaterian’ discussions from week 6 of this course. In the choice between eating meat and going vegetarian there are moral considerations to be made and one could argue that one ‘should’ choose not to eat meat and further that they ‘should not’ need a technological fix to help them. This is one of the many arguments discussed in Hopkins and Dacey’s paper on ‘Vegetarian Meat’, and they conclude that rather than the seeking of new tech being a moral failing on our part, “champion[ing] the development of new technologies, [can be a] step toward the production of a world that in fact, and not merely in ideal, mirrors the moral vision we possess for it” (Hopkins and Dacey 17).

In this case, the moral vision of conservationists is one that is not anthropocentric, in which not all decisions are made for the benefit of human beings, and all life is valued. The implementation of gene drives is not a step toward a world that mirrors their moral vision, so in this case I would argue that it is not a good technological fix for conservationists.

However, I do agree in part with Pugh’s conclusion: that it is too soon to definitively either way, and that the utmost caution ought to be used in the testing and implementation of this tech (Pugh 3-4). I believe there must be ways of implementing tech like this that would help human beings without the goal of extermination, since this is clearly antithetical to the goals of conservation and environmentalism.

• Renée

Sources:

‘A Call for Conservation with a Conscience: No Place for Gene Drives in Conservation’

https://www.etcgroup.org/files/files/final_gene_drive_letter.pdf

Pugh, Jonathan. ‘Driven to Extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies’. J Med Ethics 42, 578–581 (2016)

https://eclass.srv.ualberta.ca/pluginfile.php/6160359/mod_resource/content/1/Pugh%20Driven%20to%20Extinction%20the%20Ethics%20of%20Eradicating%20Mosquitos%20with%20Gene%20Drive%20Technologies.pdf

Hopkins, P.D., Dacey, A. ‘Vegetarian Meat: Could Technology Save Animals and Satisfy Meat Eaters?’. J Agric Environ Ethics 21, 579–596 (2008).

https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1007/s10806-008-9110-0

It can not be understated how terrible a blight on humanity mosquito-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue fever are. Buried beneath cold statistics like an estimated death toll of 405, 000 from malaria in 2018, lie the harsh reality of enormous human suffering. Suffering which falls disproportionately on poor, rural farmers who can afford it the least, despite dedicated efforts to combat the spread of the diseases. Therefore, surely any effective method to eradicate the disease and/or its hosts would applauded, would it not?

Yet controversy seems to plague a novel solution made possible by a technology called the gene drive. With it, humans will be able to not only manipulate the DNA of mosquito to engineer the species, but also to force these changes to future generations. Some possible outcomes are only allowing mosquitoes to produce male offspring (that do not bite other animals), allowing them to produce antibodies against the parasites, changing the shape of their proboscis (mouth) to prevent transferring of diseases, etc. If the gene drive works as intended, the result would be human-made modifications rippling outward through the mosquito population until all its members are unable to infect humans with diseases. Of course, being a novel, untested technology there many extrinsic concerns over the safety, possible future impact and even if it works at all. To this there does not appear to be any significant objections that further research and testing is required. Those involve agree that there needs to be greater oversight and new regulations to inhibit misuse. More contentious appears to be objections raised against the intrinsic nature of the technology itself and the additional power it grants humans to modify living things at will, up to and including extermination of species.

In the article “Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies” by Jonathan Pugh, the author outlines several defenses of the technology. Not the least of those defenses is the argument for the shear utility of reducing overall human suffering, especially since it is unclear whether or not mosquitoes are capable of suffering at all. Surely though, biocentrists, who believe that all living things are morally considerable, would disagree with the wanton tampering of other species to suit human needs. However, biocentrists have also had to navigate the contradiction inherent in that if all living things are morally considerable, how should conflicts between species be resolved? After all, unless an organism is capable of creating organic matter from inorganic material, it must consume another organism to survive, while the other organism is invested in its own survival and uninterested in being consumed. To resolve this dilemma, several biocentrists argue that just because all living things are morally considerable, it does not mean that we have a duty to act for its sake. Others appeal to the principles of self-defense that would allow us and all living things to consume others to survive. Therefore, in this case of eradicating mosquito borne diseases and/or its host the mosquitoes, biocentrists would agree that humans have the right to defend themselves from contracting deadly diseases. It should come to no surprise that biocentrists wouldn’t have much objection. After all, they are not arguing against traditional methods already being employed to eliminate the mosquitoes or the use of vaccination to eradicate polio or smallpox.

That said, gene drive is a versatile tool that can be used and misused for many purposes. While engineering mosquitoes to prevent the spread of diseases would satisfy the self-defense clause, other frivolous uses such as creating trees that glow in the dark would not. Like any tool, gene drive as a technology has the potential for great harm and great benefit in the hands of humans, but by itself does not possess any agency or autonomy. The intrinsic objections raised are not against the technology itself, but what human can do with it. Therefore, biocentrist and other ethicists should evaluate its merits and demerits on a case by case basis, rather than rejecting or accepting it wholly.

Keisey

Works Cited

Pugh J. J Med Ethics 2016;42:578–581.

World Health Organization. WHO|Malaria. WHO. 2020 (cited 17 November 2020).https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/malaria

Mosquitoes can transmit the virus to humans. The outbreak of the disease has led to calls for a reduction in mosquito populations in several regions (Pugh, 2016). The main diseases transmitted by mosquitoes include malaria and yellow fever etc. The transmission of these diseases is mainly caused by Anopheles gambiae，Anopheles stephensi and Aedes aegypti (Pugh, 2016). In 2015, 214 million people got malaria, resulting in 438000 people died. In addition, although the mortality rate of other viruses is not as high as malaria, these viruses still make people die every year (Pugh, 2016). In addition, the number of mosquitoes cannot be effectively controlled or reduced by the method of eliminating mosquito breeding grounds (Pugh, 2016). So, advances in gene-drive technology can help eradicate mosquitoes. This technology uses a CRISPR-Cas9 editing system to change the genes of species, and then pass the target genes to the offspring through these species (Pugh, 2016). For example, female Anopheles gambiae will transmit the virus. Therefore, the transformation of Anopheles gambiae is male mosquitoes can only transmit the Y chromosome, thus reducing the reproduction of female mosquitoes, reduce transmission rate and also reduce the number of mosquitoes (Pugh, 2016).

Gene-drive technology is also considered immoral. Entomologist Metcalf opposes this form of total removal of species. Metcalf believes that “all species should be regarded as sacred, and human beings have no right to destroy them” (Pugh, 2016). This kind of intervention is a kind of behaviour in which human beings play the role of God. Moreover, there have uncertainties in gene-drive technology, which cannot guarantee this technology success or no possibility of mutation happen in the future (Pugh, 2016). In addition, some people believe that the extinction of mosquitoes will have an impact on the ecosystem because mosquitoes are the source of food to other species, so it is immoral to eradicate mosquitoes (Pugh, 2016).

Pugh claims “We should abandon the development of biotechnology in the face of any kind of risk” (Pugh, 2016).  And, advocates of gene-drive technology should recognize and reduce uncertainties (Pugh, 2016). Moreover, more data is also needed to determine whether mosquito eradication is correct behaviour. If the disadvantages outweigh the benefits, the technology should be avoided. If this technology can effectively reduce the spread of the virus, then have moral reasons to choose this technology (Pugh, 2016).

My view is should use this technology to eradicate the mosquito, and I think this intervention should be used to help alleviate the transmission of these diseases. Pugh mentions total utilitarianism in the article. The goal of total utilitarianism is to increase the amount of happiness, whether it is to increase the happiness of existing lives or to increase the number of people who live happiness (Pugh, 2016). Even though mosquito also can increase happiness, it has caused too many human deaths and environmental damage. Mosquito transmission of diseases to humans actually increases humans’ suffering, which is contrary to the goal of total utilitarianism. If we use this technology, we can reduce the spread of the virus and increase human happiness. In addition, mosquitoes also will transmit some viruses to animals, which can destroy the stability of the ecosystem and cause some environmental damage. When mosquitoes transmission the viruses to animals, eradicating mosquitoes also increases other species’ happiness. So, we have a stronger moral reason to kill mosquitoes. This technology protects human health and the balance of ecosystems.

Ecocentrism may be against my opinion because killing mosquitoes means destroying the integrity of nature. Ecocentrism regards nature as a whole, and human beings are also a member of the whole. Humans have no right to deprive other species of life, and the living and non-living things in the ecosystem are interdependent. But I think the existence of mosquitoes threatens the lives of humans and some animals, and it needs some intervention to protect humans and animals.

In general, I think there has morality to eradicate mosquitoes through gene-drive technology. At the same time, the continuous progress of science and technology is also necessary to reduce uncertainty and stabilize ecological balance.

Yiyang

Reference

Pugh, J. (2016). Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies. https://jme.bmj.com/content/42/9/578

As someone from sub-Saharan Africa who also has had several relatively mild experiences with malaria, this topic is very interesting to me and close to home. Nigeria, my home country, accounted for about 25% of all the malaria cases in the world in 2018 (about 57 million cases) [1]. This means that doing something about malaria and the Anopheles mosquitoes that are carriers would definitely be beneficial to us. And while research and public health efforts have made malaria a little less deadly, other forms of action would be greatly appreciated. This is why the idea of gene drive technology for mosquitoes seemed fascinating to me.

Based on Megan Scudellari’s article in Nature and Jonathan Pugh’s paper, there are two main forms of gene drive technology for eradicating diseases commonly transmitted by mosquitoes (malaria, dengue fever, yellow fever etc) [2,3]. There is the form that would wipe out mosquitoes completely by making either the females or males infertile and another form that would make mosquitoes resistant to the diseases [2]. There are several questions that have been raised about the morality and ethicality of such technologies and Pugh touches on some of them in his paper. Pugh discuses Peter Singer’s utilitarian views on moral status and the fact that followers of what Singer describes as ‘total utilitarianism’ would advocate for the increase the total amount of pleasure in the world. He also noted that they would not be particular about the method of increasing that pleasure which would imply that ‘total utilitarians’ would be okay with either form of the gene drive technologies. Pugh also goes on further to say that it is necessary to gather as much information about the possible negative consequences of this technologies as well as not underestimate the potential benefits. He notes that it plausible to prefer the second form of gene drive technology as it seems to have the least amount of risk involved (particularly when comparing the two forms).

I agree with Pugh concerning the need for caution and research as it relates to potential negative consequences. This is in line with the precautionary principle and would help mitigate against any catastrophic consequences. Personally, I prefer the second gene drive strategy which would not eradicate mosquitoes completely. I prefer this method as I chose to look at this through the lens of ecocentrism. Mosquitoes, as annoying and pesky as they may be, are part of an ecosystem and the compete eradication of them would definitely alter that ecosystem in several ways. Mosquitoes are pollinators and the eradication of them would definitely affect the pollination process.

Beyond all of this, I am a bit wary of this due to some of the reasons Scudellari brings up in her article. The problem of malaria, for several reasons, affects sub-Saharan Africa the most and most of the research into gene drives are from and by Western researchers. It feels a little off to have an outsider try to give you a solution to a problem when their track record with you has not been the greatest. Scudellari mentions that African scientist should be respected and given sufficient funding to carry out this research for themselves and should have a chance to make decisions on these for themselves and I wholeheartedly agree. This should be part of the ethical considerations as it relates to these technologies.

As different efforts are made to eradicate malaria, we need to make sure that we are not tampering with ecosystems in the process and are also not excluding those we are trying to help in the process.

Oseyi

References:

1. World Health Organisation. (2020, January 14). Fact sheet about Malaria. Retrieved November 18, 2020, from https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/malaria
2. Scudellari, M. (2019, July 09). Self-destructing mosquitoes and sterilized rodents: The promise of gene drives. Retrieved November 18, 2020, from https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02087-5
3. Pugh, J. (2016, April 26). Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies. Retrieved 2020.
4. Bustamante, J. (2019, December 18). Do Mosquitoes Pollinate?: Yes: Find Out Which Flowers. Retrieved November 18, 2020, from https://mosquitoreviews.com/learn/mosquitoes-pollination/

In this short blog post, I will analyze if gene drive testing and implementation should occur in order to combat mosquito-borne diseases. First off, it is pertinent to briefly discuss what gene drives are and how they work. Gene drive technology uses a CRISPR editing system (Pugh 2016). One parent chromosome having the CRISPR system edits out the targeted DNA in the other parent chromosome and replaces it’s with the modified gene drive to make it a dominant trait in the offspring (Scudellari 2019). This technology spreads genetic modification in a species at a much higher rate of inheritance than normal (Scudellari 2019). Gene drives are being made to spread infertility in female mosquitos to drive them to extinction or to resist the genus that causes malaria (Pugh 2016). There are also gene drive technologies available that kill the mosquito as soon as a virus is detected in the mosquito’s body (Scudellari 2019). All these methods are to combat mosquito-borne diseases such as malaria, dengue, Zika, etc.

Why are Scientists Condemning Gene Drives?

One reason scientists are hesitant to establish gene drives is that it is a radically innovative technology that may have consequences unaware to humans (Goodall et al 2016). Playing around with genetics may pose serious risks and using that technology to end a species can “intervene in evolution” or “dramatically modify ecosystems” (Goodall et al 2016). This is a great power to hold and as we all know “With great power comes great responsibility” (Marvel). Currently, there are no methods to regulate, evaluate, or govern this technology (Goodall et al 2016). Scientists argue that they cannot coherently assess all the risks associated with gene drives because, ostensibly, there are “obvious dangers” in releasing “genocidal genes” to ecosystems and there are also moral implications as well (Goodall et al 2016).

To Pursue or Not to Pursue?

A trial is needed to test this gene drive in order to fully be aware of the potential effects. To take this leap of faith, it is essential for humans to believe that expected benefits may outweigh the risks. Currently, it is the opposite thinking that demoralizes gene drives: the negative consequences unaware to humans; What may happen to an ecosystem with this genocidal gene drive? Pugh (2016) argues that in assessing the consequences of gene drives we should also consider its likelihood of occurring. How likely is it that a gene drive may severely disrupt an ecosystem? How about looking it the other way around? Perhaps in a more positive manner. The potential benefit of gene drives in mosquitos is the eradication of diseases that incessantly causes human suffering and deaths (Pugh 2016). If human lives are more or equal to mosquito lives, shouldn’t we consider the likelihood of benefit that gene drives may pose to humans in the ecosystems? Every new technology will have intrinsic and extrinsic risks that are unforeseeable (Pugh 2016).  Facebook, for example, was created on the basis of staying connected. Now, it manipulates national elections. Did anyone ever see that coming? I’m pretty sure 19-year-old Mark Zuckerberg didn’t even see that coming. In the case of gene drives, we have mature and credible scientists working on this technology and assessing its risks to save human suffering, economic loss, and human loss.

A Complication

Although I have given gene drives the green light to eradicate mosquito-borne diseases, there are still some issues that may come forward with testing. Which human communities will the guinea pig environments to test gene drive technology? Most mosquito-borne diseases are apparent in Africa such as malaria, dengue, Zika, etc. (Scudellari 2019). How will Africans react to tests occurring in their communities? Will the use of African scientists working in these communities (as opposed to other ethnicities) be sufficient in gaining trust from the community? Hence, which community should be tested on poses another branch of moral implications associated with gene drives.

Sources:

Pugh, J. (2016). Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies. Journal of Medical Ethics, 42(9), 578-581. doi:10.1136/medethics-2016-103462

Scudellari, M. (2019, July 09). Self-destructing mosquitoes and sterilized rodents: The promise of gene drives. Retrieved from https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02087-5

Goodall et al. (2016, October 11). A Call for Conservation with a Conscience: No Place for Gene Drives in Conservation. Retrieved from http://www.synbiowatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/letter_vs_genedrives.pdf

With the coexistence of their apparent benefits and drawbacks, biotechnologies have always been controversial. Growing up, I have always been told to “stay away from the genetically modified stuff”, but I never read into what these GMO products actually are, until recently. It seems that the existence of GMO foods is controversial enough for us to figure out, yet it surprised me that biotechnology’s potentials are far greater than changing a food to make it healthier or more easily produced. With our technological advancements, we are capable of wiping out an entire species using biotechnology. Gene-drive is “a technology that seeks to facilitate the biased inheritance of particular genes throughout an entire species by genetically modifying some members of that species.” ¹ After these members are modified, they would then pass on the desired genes to their offspring, until the generations of the organism are composed entirely of the genetically modified genes. It is therefore possible to create a gene that prevents a species from reproducing, slowly wiping out the existence of that entire species. The shockingly powerful potential of this technology is immensely controversial, it is as dangerous as it is promising. In Jonathan Pugh’s paper, he attempted to dispel two moral criticisms of gene-drive, and after this discussion, reached a balanced conclusion on this issue. In my post I will explain his second argument and conclusion, as well as offer my own thoughts on this matter.

Pugh’s second argument centered around the hubris that arises from the mere thought of manipulating nature. The main case study that Pugh used to defend his position was the eradication of smallpox, meaning the eradication of the virus that caused it, variola virus. Pugh maintained that not only was this a celebrated success for humanity, the fact that it saved millions of lives should “surely outweigh the moral wrong of displaying a hubristic attitude”.¹ I agree that we may defend this “playing God” criticism in seeing that the benefits of such efforts outweigh the costs. However, I would like to offer another argument against the hubris criticism.

It seems easy to say that we should respect nature for what it gives us, and not try to enforce our own modifications onto it. Nevertheless, I find this claim ironic in that humans have already “played God” by destroying habitats of species, driving them to extinction. In doing so, we have already forced changes within nature and its ecosystems. Those who make the hubris claim then seem as if that it is alright to play God by accidentally eradicating species, but wrong to do it purposefully for greater benefits. The irony of this is especially apparent when we examine a case study of gene-drive’s potential to save certain species from extinction. Hawaii’s birds have been on the decline ever since their habitats were disturbed by settlers and later by climate change, causing many species to go extinct. Recently, the avian malaria carried by mosquitoes is causing a sudden, drastic decline of the many endangered species of birds in Hawaii. It is true that we would be playing God if we use gene-drive to eradicate these mosquitoes and protect the already fragile bird species from going extinct. However, it would also be true that we had already played God by causing the extinction of many bird species at Hawaii, as well as taking away their last refuge of the higher grounds with climate change.² If we have to play God in order to fix our mistakes through having played God (wrongfully), I believe it is a path that we should take.

Pugh’s conclusion took an optimistic but still relatively objective view on this topic. He asserted that we should avoid “risk averse in the extreme” as all new technologies have unpredictable risks associated with them, and that shouldn’t stop us from attempting them if necessary.¹ I am in favour of his opinion. Despite how I believe it is necessary to use technology to fix past mistakes, I agree that we should do so from “an approach of epistemic humility”, in which we admit that there exist uncertainties in the gene-drive technology’s effects on the target species as well as the ecosystem as a whole.¹ Therefore, we should gather more data about the potential negative consequences of the implication of such technology before coming to a decision to implement it or not.

Lastly, I would add that we need to be cautious not to let gene-drive become a simple techno-fix. While remaining open to its possibilities and optimistic of its positive effects, we should be conscious of the potential underlying social issues that still need to be solved, such as climate change itself. Gene-drive is a promising potential for the future, but it should not be our only effort to right our wrongs.

References

¹ Pugh, Jonathan. “Driven to Extinction? The Ethics of Eradicating Mosquitoes with Gene-Drive Technologies.” Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 42, no. 9, 2016, pp. 578–581., doi:10.1136/medethics-2016-103462.

² Regalado, Antonio. The Plan to Rescue Hawaii’s Birds with Genetic Engineering. 2 Apr. 2020, www.technologyreview.com/2016/05/11/160276/the-plan-to-rescue-hawaiis-birds-with-genetic-engineering/.

Mosquitoes suck; literally and figuratively. Is the world better without them? They swarm and they bite causing irritating allergic reactions that itch for days. Beyond that, they also pose serious health risks, particularly in developing countries. Mosquitoes can carry deadly diseases such as malaria which they can pass on to humans. These diseases kill thousands of people and are an extreme burden on society. Mosquitoes are fatal, harmful, and annoying. It would be great if they just did not exist.

There might be a means to eliminate mosquitoes. A technology called gene drives has the potential to wipe out mosquitoes. Scientists would swap out a gene in some mosquitoes and add a gene drive. The gene drive serves to make the swapped gene dominant. This means that the gene would always be passed down to the offspring of the modified mosquito. The gene would also be dominant in the offspring so it would be passed down to the offspring’s offspring and continue all the way down the line. The gene would prevent offspring from being female. As it is passed down and spread throughout the population, mosquitoes would become mostly male and eventually be unable to reproduce due to a lack of female partners. Gene drives could potentially make mosquitoes go extinct.

The prospect of gene drives eradicating mosquitoes brings with it many ethical considerations. In his paper Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies, Jonathan Pugh discusses the ethical issues of gene drives. Pugh responds to two main objections to gene drives. One objection is that using gene drive technologies to make a species go extinct involves an unacceptable degree of hubris. I will not go into detail about how Pugh responds to this objection in this post. The other objection is that driving an animal to extinction goes against the ‘sanctity of life’ and is immoral. Pugh responds to this by denying the ‘sanctity of life’ argument and instead invoking Sentientistism to determine whether the lives of the mosquitoes should be considered. Sentientism is the belief that only those living things that possess sentience have a considerable degree of moral significance. Sentience is an organism’s awareness of its own being. Whether the organism has interests that can be fulfilled. Sentience is usually referred to simply as the ability to experience pleasure or pain. If something has moral significance, then its welfare should be considered in moral decisions. So, Sentientism states that only those organisms who can experience pleasure and pain or have interests should be considered when making moral decisions (Singer). Pugh argues that mosquitoes nor the mosquito species possess sentience. So, they should not be considered. Pugh believes eradicating the mosquitoes with gene drives is not an immoral course of action.

Pugh is not, however, gung-ho about gene drives. He does believe that caution and skepticism should be directed towards the technology. He calls it an ‘epistemic humility’. Because there might be harmful unforeseen consequences to gene drives, Pugh argues that humans should be patient and diligent in their testing of gene drives to try to prevent negative outcomes. The remainder of this blog post will acknowledge that caveat but assume that all consequences of gene drives are known and that they will work exactly as intended. I adopt this assumption so that gene drives can be assessed on purely ethical terms.

There is an ethical theory called Eco-centric Holism that would disagree with Pugh’s Sentientist appraisal of the mosquito species. Eco-centric Holists believe that it is not just sentient life, or even the lives of all living organisms that should be morally considered. They believe that ecosystems of living and non-living entities should be considered morally in their entirety. It is the whole system with all its individual parts that has value to be considered. They also consider species as a whole in moral decisions. They believe there is a moral obligation to preserve species and prevent extinction (Rolston). The justifications and arguments supporting Eco-centric Holism are beyond the scope of this post. All that is important is the understanding that they value entire species. So, they would value the entire species of mosquitoes and want to preserve them. Eco-centric Holists would not agree with Pugh about gene drives.

Even if the entire mosquito species has value as the Eco-centric Holists say, that does not mean we cannot use gene drives. If the mosquito species has value, does that value outweigh the benefits of killing off the species? So many lives can be saved if mosquitoes were eliminated. You can still value the mosquito species and permit the use of gene drives. The loss of that species would be a regrettable cost of preventing human deaths from illnesses such as malaria. There are also applications of gene drives that do not wipe out the entire mosquito species. Gene drives can be used to target only a specific genus of mosquito. There are only three types of mosquitoes that spread diseases to people (Pugh). A gene drive could wipe those types out while other types survive. The entire mosquito species would not be erased from the planet. Gene drives can also target specific areas. The spread of diseases by mosquitoes mostly affects developing nations. The gene drive could eliminate mosquitoes in those areas to save lives but not be used to eliminate mosquitoes in areas where these illnesses are not as big of a problem. An Eco-centric Holist does not necessarily need to be completely against using gene drives on mosquitoes.

Kenny

References:

Pugh J. (2016). “Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies”. Med Ethics: volume 42, pp. 578-581. Retrieved from https://eclass.srv.ualberta.ca/pluginfile.php/6160359/mod_resource/content/1/Pugh%20Driven%20to%20Extinction%20the%20Ethics%20of%20Eradicating%20Mosquitos%20with%20Gene%20Drive%20Technologies.pdf

Rolston H. (1985). “Duties to Endangered Species”. BioScience: volume 35, pp. 718-726. Retrieved from https://sites.google.com/a/rams.colostate.edu/rolston-csu-website/environmental-ethics/ee-chbk/duties-edangered-species-biosci-a-pdf

Singer, P. (1974). “All Animals are Equal”. Philosophic Exchange: volume 5, number 1, article 6. Retrieved from https://eclass.srv.ualberta.ca/pluginfile.php/6160284/mod_resource/content/2/All%20Animals%20Are%20Equal.pdf

This week’s reading spread to us that gene-drive technology is whether good or ethical inadequate. These articles are also very fascinating. As we all know, the reason why the Earth is unique is that life on Earth is unique. All live with their own code and their own genetic information, which activates it as a living biosphere. Because of this uniqueness, we often develop our own ideas to create filters that allow us to cut the genes of life forms in the biosphere that are harmful to the environment and human health, and keep it once and for all. Gene drive (CRISPR) is the process of using designed molecules to find the DNA in an organism’s genome, cutting out the genetic information and adding a new piece of information. CRISPR is the modification of specific genetic information in the human genome to get characteristics required by life forms. (nature)Today, it is limited by the laboratory stage, but scientists have tried to use it to edit crops, livestock and even human embryos. The question that arises is whether a gene drive should be used and whether it will have an unpredictable impact on us.

On a specific topic, the mosquito has become the dominant subject of this technological experiment. Why you might ask? Pugh stated that “WHO estimates (released in December 2015) suggest that there were 214 million cases of Malaria in 2015, resulting in 438,000 deaths. There have also been explosive outbreaks of dengue and chikungunya in the past decade, although these viruses are less lethal than malaria; an estimated 500 000 people are hospita-lised with severe dengue each year and about 2.5% of those affected die.” (p.578) Scientists chose mosquitoes as a prime target for attack because mosquito-borne diseases put a huge strain on global medical care, and every year many people are killed by Mosquito-borne diseases and lose a lot of lives. Thus, more and more scientists want to apply gene-drive technology to mosquito breeding. Their main direction is to put modified mosquitoes into nature to make their population disappear.

In fact, this could save thousands of human beings, if it works. nature mentioned that, “As soon as researchers began to make gene drives in the labs, animals developed resistance against them – accumulating mutations that prevented the drives from spreading. Tests of two drives inserted into fruit flies, for example, genetic variants conferring resistance formed. , mutations alter a sequence that CRISPR is set to recognize, preventing the gene from being edited.” (nature) Which means the miracle of life is also in its unpredictability, if one species carries a gene-drive feature, it may evolve some new mechanism of life even if we can predict that it will keep replicating, but its unpredictability makes me a little apprehensive. And life is resilient, all the more reason we need to prevent gene-drive technology from having an impact on our biosphere. Thus, we need to invest more to create a stable way to apply gene-drive. But, this new technology is more like a challenge to the laws of nature, which I also think is undesirable. It’s more like the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement we discussed at Week 10, which has signalled an urgent need to take steps to protect our environment. So in the end, in the case of this technology poses a potential extinction risk to mosquitoes. It is more workable to use gene-drive to get antibodies to malaria in their bodies. So, we should use gene-drive technologies when they are more effective and have a less environmental impact.

-Linfeng Xie

Work cited：

Scudellari, M. (2019, July 09). Self-destructing mosquitoes and sterilized rodents: The promise of gene drives. Retrieved from https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02087-5

Pugh, J. (2016). Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies. Journal of Medical Ethics, 42(9), 578-581. doi:10.1136/medethics-2016-103462

In 2011, two geneticists at Imperial College London successfully genetically engineered mosquitoes so that a gene they inserted into the mosquito genome has radiated throughout the mosquito population, reaching more than 85 percent of the mosquito offspring. This gene-driven technology can be used to reverse the sex ratio of mosquito offspring to produce more non-biting male offspring, thereby controlling mosquito populations and reducing or eliminating insect-borne diseases. Not only that, but the technology can also be applied to other biological populations to control invasive species and address the problem of pest resistance. The potential public health and economic benefits of this technology are arguably enormous. But the potential risks of this technology are also huge, such as the impact that a collapse in a particular species’ population could have on other species in the food chain. There has also been debate over the ethics of using genetic technology to make specific mosquito populations extinct. In Megan Scudellari’s article “Self-destructing Mosquitoes and Sterile Rodents: The Promise of Gene Drives,” she discusses some critical questions about gene drives. Two of my concerns are the validity and controllability of her discussion.

Where will We Use Gene Drives?

Articles she cites suggest gene drive technology performs well in the experiment of Anopheles Gambiae Mosquitoes. The drive can spread effectively in the experimental cage. But it faces a lot of difficulties in the experiment of mammals. It seems that the technique is more likely to be used in the near future to eliminate disease-carrying mosquito populations. Mosquitoes now dominate the application of technology. More experiments and research are needed to control invasive rodents using gene drive technology. Another technique she mentions is genetically engineering the Aedes aegypti mosquito to be resistant to all four major dengue viruses. If this technique can be proven to be effective, practical operations’ ethical problems could be greatly alleviated. People are conservative about using genetic technology to exterminate specific biological species. But public acceptance of the technology goes up considerably if it is to alter its genes to fight disease.

Is Gene Drives Safe?

It could be argued that this technology is currently under control. According to Megan’s article, the Safe Gen contract explicitly prohibits field trials. All experiments are now conducted in cages. However, as this technology evolves in the near future, field experiments are an inevitable step forward. Megan raises the concern that once the field trial begins, gene drives can change entire populations and, thus, entire ecosystems. “This technology has the potential to be immensely powerful and to change the course of things that we may not be able to predict,” says molecular biologist and bioethicist Natalie Kofler.(Scudellari)

I’m conservative about Gene Drive technology. My main concerns are the ethical aspects of this technology and the potential threat to species diversity. All living things on Earth have a reason for their existence and a place in the ecosystem. Even if we did have the ability to exterminate other creatures, we do not have the right to choose to exterminate any of them. Wiping out specific mosquito populations may be beneficial to the human population as a whole. However, suppose the scope of use of gene drive technology is measured in terms of benefits rather than morality. In that case, I fear that the technology may end up being a terrible weapon. From the species diversity point of view, there are also considerable risks associated with this technique. Imagine if a mosquito population is wiped out, the frogs, spiders, and other small animals that feed on these mosquitoes would also be in jeopardy. And so on, the number of predators such as snakes that feed on these small animals would also decrease accordingly, and eventually, the destructive consequences could befall us. But I have to say I’m also excited about the potential for the technology described in this article. I look forward to more experimental advances that will alleviate my doubts. If gene drive technology can eliminate the spread of malaria by allowing mosquitoes to inherit antibodies, then this could be an appropriate solution.

– Dengnan Chen

References:

Scudellari, Megan. “Self-Destructing Mosquitoes and Sterilized Rodents: the Promise of Gene Drives.” Nature News, Nature Publishing Group, 9 July 2019, www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02087-5.

A few years ago I was in Vietnam and my travel partner got really sick, we went to a hospital and learned that he had contracted dengue fever from a mosquito bite. For over a week of our trip he was bedridden yet unable to sleep, it was miserable. Thankfully, he recovered and I got out unscathed, but there was a window of time that we were pretty concerned that he had contracted malaria (very similar symptoms to dengue) and that he would end up hospitalized (or worse) in a foreign country. The fear and suffering was very real, and so when I first started reading about gene drives to manipulate the malaria (and other disease) carrying gene out of mosquitoes I was quick assume that this could only be beneficial. If we could prevent the same pain, suffering, and even casualties caused by mosquito borne illnesses, then why wouldn’t we?

Gene drives involve genetically modifying the DNA of an organism, in this case the mosquito, to pass down certain desirable (to us) genes. Certain work involves genes which resist the parasites which cause malaria (Pugh, 2016), and a gene drive would mean that over time genetically altered mosquitoes reproduce and pass down this malaria resistant gene until the entire population had inherited it. Another example of how a gene drive might work in mosquitoes is that the genetic modification prevents the insect from having female offspring, slowly eradicating the species, and therefore its ability to spread disease. On the surface this seems like a no brainer, of course we should implement this. Alas, there are people who don’t quite see it that way.

One objection that may arise from the use of gene drives might be that we have duties to the ecological world which are ignored when we undertake the manipulation of a species in this way. Ecocentrists, such as Aldo Leopold, argue that as a whole we ought not to view ourselves as conquerors of this world, rather that we are part of the “land community.” This land community exists as something that we share holistically with all the other beings on it, including the plants, animals, soils, and waters. Included in this biotic community, inevitably, is the mosquito. Although an incredible pest (and potential carrier of deadly disease) the mosquito should not be considered an insignificant organism in any ecosystem, and therefore should not be eradicated by humans. While Leopold and other Ecocentrists would not reprimand anyone for killing any one given mosquito, using gene drives to phase them out of the community altogether is a blatant (albeit slow) disruption of an ecosystem, and furthermore asserts human dominance as the only driving force towards eradicating mosquitoes is for human benefit.

A counter-argument to Leopold’s dissent for gene-drives may uphold our duty to other people, our community. As Leopold argues that we should maintain and respect the integrity of a biotic community, he asserts this by comparing ecosystems to our own social communities, which we also have duties to. Unlike Leopold, I would not argue that our duties to the ecological world and our duties to our fellow humans are equal. I would argue that our duties to other people, for our sentient conspecifics, hold a higher value than our duties to mosquitoes. Although I do believe in respect for the environment and all of its component parts, I take more of a Kantian view on where are obligations lie in dire circumstances. In the case of gene drives we are comparing wiping out mosquitoes over several generations, and millions of cases of malaria in humans every year, resulting in not insignificant fatalities. Since we have a means to prevent profound human suffering, I think it is worth the ecological disturbance of slowly phasing out this species.

References

Leopold, A, The Land Ethic, A Sand Country Almanac, 1948

Pugh, J. Driven to Extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies. J Med Ethics, 2016;42:578-581

This week in Philosophy 355 we are discussing gene drives as biotechnology to aid with species conservation and disease prevention. Gene drives are a novel technology that are designed to eradicate undesired traits in insects and animals done in efforts of conservation or eliminating dangerous insect-borne diseases such as malaria (Risk Bites, 0:32). Using CRISPR technology, molecules will run along DNA strands in the organism’s genome and replace unwanted genetic codes with ones that are desired by humans (Risk Bites, 1:08-1:22). When (or if) the genetically modified organism mates with another member of their species, scientists have made sure the CRISPR technology that changed the initial gene would be passed on to 100% of their offspring as opposed to 50%, ensuring that the desired characteristics would be maintained throughout generations eventually solving the problem they were trying to fix (Risk Bites, 2015, 2:05-2:38; Scudellari, 2019). This blog post will look at the issue from a biocentrist viewpoint and explain some of the criticisms that a biocentrist may raise in regard to gene drives. 

Biocentrism is a philosophical ethical theory that rejects anthropocentrism (the viewpoint that only humans are morally considerable) and argues that all living things are morally considerable even if they lack sentience (ie. the capacity to feel pleasure or pain). Other features common to biocentrism is that they believe that all living creatures on Earth have a “good of their own, deserve moral considerability for their own sake, and their way of attaining their good is intrinsically valuable” (Attfield, n.d., pg. 1). 

Based on the definition, I believe that biocentrists would be against technology like gene drives that work to eliminate species (even ones that carry diseases such as malaria) because those that subscribe to biocentrism give all life priority, not just animals in which humans like more than others (Attfield, n.d., pg. 7). Furthermore, there is no denying that mosquitoes are sentient creatures who are also in pursuit of their own good — ie. they spend their life mating, laying eggs, and obtaining nutrition for survival — and have the capacity to feel fulfilled or unfulfilled based on if their own good is met or not. I believe that based on this premise, those subscribing to biocentrism would argue against gene drives for mosquitoes especially if it involved the extinction of the species by means such as infertility — which would directly interfere with the mosquito pursuing its own good of procreating (Pugh, 2016). Additionally, If mosquitos are exterminated, biocentrists may also be concerned with animals who prey on mosquitoes and depend upon them for sustenance; the elimination of mosquitoes could have the potential to affect the other species’ right to pursue their interests and reach their own good. 

However, maybe it is possible for biocentrists to jump on board with gene drives if they do not interfere with the mosquito’s ability to pursue its own good. For example, if gene drives can be done in a way that only removes the malaria causing gene and does not exterminate the species or infringe upon its rights to pursue its own good, then maybe it is possible that biocentrists could subscribe to gene drives?

To me, gene drives are a very interesting technology that has the potential to eradicate a prominent disease carried by insects and promote conservation for animal species. While the technology seems in its early stages, it will be interesting to see if gene drives will be implemented in the future and what biocentricists will think of them.

– Ashley 

References 

Attfield, R. (n.d.). Biocentrism Talk. Cardiff University. 1-4. 

Pugh, J. (2016). Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies. Journal of Medicinal Ethics, 42(9): 578-581. https://eclass.srv.ualberta.ca. 

Risk Bites. (2015, November 30). What is a gene drive? | CRISPR. [Video]. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com. 

Scudellari, M. (2019, July 9). Self-destructing mosquitoes and sterilized rodents: the promise of gene drives. Nature.com. https://www.nature.com. 

Gene editing–should we and can we? I have to say that I am a proponent of gene-editing and I am not a proponent of playing God. As I understand the matter, we do gene-edit in medicine. We gene-edit with regard to the vaccine for babies who are likely to inherit Alzheimer’s. The M.S. vaccine which is in test trials at this very moment also involves some gene-editing. We save lives when we do this and we save money. On an ethical level, this is both utilitarian and Kantian. I would go even further and say that we approach a certain level responsibility too. This is to say, we have spent millions on DNA research and when we find a genetic technique that can save lives and money, we are obligated to follow through  with the new medicine as long as we do no harm in the process.

What are the possibilities for gene-editing where a species or the environment is concerned? Jonathan Pugh in “Driven to Extinction” and Megan Scudellari in “Self-Destructing Mosquitoes and Sterilised Rodents” discuss the possibility of gene-editing for the sake of eradicating pests like malaria carrying mosquitoes or disease infested rats. My question is, ‘Why can’t we just gene-edit the diseases they carry?’ Why do we need to eliminate mosquitoes when they feed whole reptile-based ecosystems including some of the birds. (I love frogs by the way and they often feast on mosquito larvae.) Why would we eliminate rats when they too feed various species in some ecosystems. (Birds and Snakes eat them–I don’t know why. They are not my favourite food…) What is more, if we are successful in gene-editing the illnesses mosquitoes and rats carry we might have more luck with other species like the Blackfooted Ferret. This Ferret is dependent upon medicinal peanut butter balls that are laced with a plague eradicating vaccine that we feed them for survival. I mean, to put the matter baldly, if we had a way to safely gene-edit these species, the species themselves would not change at all except for becoming malaria resistant, plague resistant and whatever else is in the rats. The Prairie Dogs might not thank us where the Ferrets are concerned but just about every other species will.

Where else do we gene-edit? The Quaga project which involves back breeding zebras has an element of gene-editing to it. The Quaga are keystone creatures and all zebras carry some of their genes. This is a humane project and will likely yield a creature that is Quaga mostly and a bit zebra too. We can’t bring back what was but we might get close. This kind of project is called de-extinction and we are attempting to right the wrong that humans have done to Quagas. I know this sounds radical, but we back breed all the time with birds. We mate hawks to eagles to form an eagle-hawk. Then we breed in more eagles to make an eagle that is genetically fortified and we never mention that they will always carry a few Hawk genes. We can even go so far as to breed phoenixes back to life this way and eventually take them off life support. Again, there is an element of gene-editing in this and we wind up with more birds too.

I guess I am stumped: why are we talking about eradicating a species when we might finally arrive at a point where we can gene-edit Galapicos turtles or White Rhinos to save species so endangered that they are at the end of life-support? I realise that crisper as a technology is easy medically speaking, but introducing the gene edited embryo in something more than a mosquito is complicated. In truth, we are half way to torturing rats if we do gene edit and implant their embryos. Both Pugh and Scudellari call for some kind of ethic to guide any venture into the realm of what is still experimentation, but I would suggest that we begin such a venture with the medical ethic–the oath to ‘do no harm.’ We do not have the right to really alter a species and we do not have the right to cause their extinction. We do not have the right to ignore the delivery of aid when we have the aid to bring to them. We are not responsible at all if we have harmed a species and then refused aid. The onus is on us and not the species to save themselves. They often take care of ecosystems by doing their part and we are offensive on this count.

I realise I have raised the issue of animal rights and those so-called rights are ill defined in law if they are there at all. But maybe we might want to take what is ostensibly a human-centred way of thinking and ask ourselves what do we really have rights to here? Maybe medical ethics, starting with the statement ‘Do no harm!’ is really the beginning of evaluating what it is we are doing. This might be a Kantian approach or a Utilitarian approach or even an Ecocentric approach. I doubt it matters that much where harm is concerned. To have an ecological conscience you cannot harm a whole ecosystem or even an eighth of it. To be Kantian, you cannot harm a whole species if animals and ecology are an integral part of beneficence (and when do we really know who is who anyway?). How is destroying a species ‘of utility’ to an ecosystem–we all live in an ecosystem or several of them and we all have a purpose these systems even if our purposes are not always apparent.  So, while we can debate animal rights or what we think is right for humans, what we really need to ask is when did we have the right encroach so far on a species that we can harm them for all time.

Tammy (Juniper 8)

Along with changing weather patterns, melting ice caps and rising sea levels, one of the most distinctive effects of climate change is the loss of biodiversity. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “at the global level, human activities have caused and will continue to cause a loss in biodiversity through land-use, soil and water pollution, habitat fragmentation, the introduction of non-native species, […] and increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide” (IPCC, 2002). The current extinction rate is as much as a thousand times higher than the background rate, and many have identified that we might be in the midst of a sixth mass extinction event (Kolbert, 2015). All living organisms alter their habitat in one way or another. But humans are the only species on the planet capable of transforming their environment to the extent of driving countless other life forms to extinction. In the words of Ronald Sandler, “the influence of humans in the environment is pervasive, transformative, and enduring” (Sandler, 2017). In this context, the development of genetic engineering strategies has brought up the possibility of mending some of this damage by using gene drives as a form of conservation. In this essay I will examine some of the opportunities and ethical problems of deploying this conservation strategy. 

A gene drive is a genetic modification designed to spread through a population at higher than normal rates of inheritance (Scudellari, 2019). This strategy gives scientists the opportunity to intentionally engineer ecological systems and communities to be better adapted to the changing conditions of their environment. Current conservation strategies are local, and they depend upon the relative stability of the environment in which the species lives. However, preserving species in their local habitat is becoming an ever-challenging task because the stability of ecosystems worldwide is in decline.

Gene drives are an alternative approach to conservation where endangered populations could be designed to be better adapted to changing conditions (Sandler, 2017). The problem with this type of intervention is that it involves transforming natural systems according to how we believe they ought to be, giving human beings god-like powers. In my view, this strategy should not be deployed for several reasons. Firstly, engineering our way of the environmental crisis will not solve the deeper issues that caused the crisis in the first place. It is true that we should, to the best of our ability, try to mend the damage we have caused on the planet. But at the same time, it is important to recognize that the crisis emerged out of our ever-increasing desire to control nature, and our belief that the natural exists solely to benefit human interests. Further, what’s problematic about gene drives as a tool for conservation is that it focuses on changing the species instead of changing the environment that we have degraded. For instance, the reality of corals dying due to ocean acidification and fisheries crashing around the globe is a call to stop bumping tons of carbon dioxide into the oceans and cease overfishing. It isn’t a call to change the species and pretend everything is fine. As Sandler has pointed out, this outlook implies that the problem with endangered species “is that they are not well fitted to the world. But, of course, the problem is that we have made a world that is not hospitable for them” (Sandler, 2017). 

Aside from being deployed as a conservation strategy, gene drives can also be used to control populations of species that are harmful to humans. One of the most prominent lines of research in this field is implementing gene drives to reduce the prevalence of disease-transmitting mosquitoes. This biotechnological strategy is different from the conservation approach in that the end goal is to improve human health by eradicating harmful species, not modifying species to be better adapted to the pressures we have imposed on their environment. This strategy too can be criticized for being too anthropocentric. However, our current way of practicing medicine already has some of the same presuppositions about the place of humans in the natural world.  For instance, the eradication of smallpox in the 1980’s was seen as a positive achievement, because we value human lives much more than viruses. Nonetheless, it is still important to consider the effects of implementing this technology in the field, as it will alter entire populations and ecosystems for long periods of time. If used cautiously, gene drives could be deployed as a public health mechanism to prevent diseases because, as Jonathan Pugh has pointed out, “the status quo is one where hundreds of thousands of lives are being lost each year to mosquito burden diseases” (Pugh, 2016). 

In conclusion, gene drives can be implemented both as a form of conservation and as a strategy to eradicate diseases. As a form of conservation, implementing gene drives is unethical as well as impractical because it doesn’t solve the underlying causes of the climate crisis. As Sandler has pointed out “the best conservation strategy, by far, remains reducing the number of species that are at risk; and the only way to do that is to limit the scale of climatic and ecological anthropogenic change through technological innovation and modifying our behaviors, practices, and systems” (Sandler, 2017). On the other hand, and perhaps paradoxically, I find that the most ethical use of genetic engineering is to drive disease-transmitting species into extinction. 

References:

• IPCC (2002). Climate Change and Biodiversity. Retrieved from: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/climate-changes-biodiversity-en.pdf
• Kolbert, E. (2015). The sixth extinction: An unnatural history. New York: Henry Holt.
• Scudellari, M. (2019). Self-destructing mosquitoes and sterilized rodents: The promise of gene drives. Nature, 571(7764), 160-162. doi:10.1038/d41586-019-02087-5
• Sandler, R. (2017). Gene Drives and Species Conservation. An Ethical Analysis. In Braverman, I. Gene editing, law, and the environment: Life beyond the human. (39-53).  Taylor & Francis Group
• Pugh, J. (2016). Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies. Journal of Medical Ethics, 42(9), 578-581. doi:10.1136/medethics-2016-103462

Over the course of human history, our species has made incredible progress in the realm of science and technology. This progress is almost always described as being beneficial, with consequences either minimized or disregarded altogether. While many scientific breakthroughs have indeed benefitted the human species, they have also had dire implications for many of the other species that inhabit this planet. This concept is discussed by Pugh in his article titled “Driven to Extinction” in which he considers the use of gene-drive technologies to eradicate mosquitoes. Pugh uses Singer’s utilitarianism to argue that this use of gene-drive technology is permissible, so long as we proceed with caution. In this blog post, I will be analyzing Pugh’s arguments and offering my own ethical rebuttals to his claims.

There are two moral objections to the use of gene-drive technologies that Pugh focuses on in his article. The first one is the concept of life being sacred, so therefore driving the mosquito species to extinction would be inherently wrong. Pugh uses Singer’s utilitarianism to argue that neither individual mosquitoes nor mosquito species can be said to have moral status and consequently do not need to be protected from eradication. However, this fails to consider the other species that could potentially be implicated in the extinction of mosquitoes. While Pugh does briefly touch on this concept later in the article, I believe that it is also important to mention here. When considering total utility, the outcome would be vastly different if the effects on whole ecosystems were considered rather than simply the impact on humans or mosquitoes as individual species.

The second objection that Pugh discusses is that to use this technology is to play God, which is something that is often brought up in debates around genetic modification and other technological fixes. In response to this, Pugh claims that it is compassion rather than mastery that drives us to pursue technological solutions to human problems. Using the example of smallpox, he insists that the millions of lives saved by the variola virus outweigh the costs of potentially playing God. While this argument has value, it inherently gives more importance to human lives than to the rest of the environment. Although the variola virus did not do any harm to broader ecosystems, other technological fixes certainly could – and have in the past. Whilst I agree with Pugh that we must proceed with caution when considering the use of gene-drive technology, I think we could go a step further by seeking out solutions that prioritize traditional knowledge systems rather than Western science. 

To conclude, Pugh takes a utilitarian approach to the debate surrounding the eradication of mosquitoes using gene-drive technology. He refutes two of the most prominent objections to gene-drive technology, however, I believe there is still room for ethical rebuttal to his claims. As I mentioned, the consideration of entire ecosystems rather than simply mosquitoes and humans could alter Pugh’s total utility calculation. Not only that, but the prioritization of Western science as the solution to our problems fails to consider traditional knowledge systems that may be able to provide more sustainable fixes.

– Keira

Source: Pugh, J. (2016). Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies. Journal of medical ethics, 42(9), 578-581.

This blog post explores the arguments put forth in “Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-driven technology” by Johnathan Pugh.

Mosquitoes are a burden, especially with their pesky bites and diseases. The diseases they carry often result in calls to reduce the population of certain species mosquitos. If you’re the average person, your duty is to ensure there is no standing water on your property. If you’re a scientist in gene technology, you may be asked to eradicate entire species of mosquitoes with genetic modification (Pugh, 578). This has been met with public criticism, based on moral objections that Pugh wants to dispel for us (578). I will focus on one Pugh’s first argument that seeks to dispel claims of the sanctity of life.

The sanctity of life is consistently invoked to claim we shouldn’t drive an animal to extinction (579). Pugh uses Singer to make us aware of the fact that most people invoke this argument and live their own lives to the contrary. For example, people would not use antibiotics to kill unwanted bacteria if the sanctity of life governed them. However, I raise an objection here as Pugh seems to be picking and choosing Singer’s ideas to justify his objections. Singer requires us to consider the morality of animals, and a rejection of speciesism (Singer, ch.1). By this he means to say that a cow is as morally considerable as a human. This doesn’t mean we can’t eat beef, but it does mean that we shouldn’t treat animals in an inhumane way for human consumption. In this way, we must also consider the morality of mosquitoes. 

I will overview Peter Singer’s arguments in Animal Liberation (his book on animal rights) for the purpose of this blog. In his first chapter, he tells us that if a living entity is suffering there does not exist a justification for not considering that suffering – no matter the nature of the being (Singer, ch.1). Equity requires that suffering is suffering no matter what or whom it is experienced by – provided the being can experience suffering (ch.1). So the limit we are given by the idea of a distinct lack of sentience (and the ability to experience suffering) is the only acceptable limit for eradicating species of mosquitoes.

Now Pugh addresses this, and even if we assume that mosquitoes can experience pain Pugh says that this eradication of certain species would not cause any individuals of these species to die prematurely because of the nature of using genetic modification (Pugh, 579). Instead, the species are gradually phased out, which should by Singer’s standards be morally acceptable (579). Pugh also talks about the fact that from the standpoint of a utilitarian analysis, the continued existence of mosquitoes will most likely “lead to the death of a considerable number of persons” and human suffering (580). But once again, Pugh is missing the point of Singer and his arguments! Pugh claims that the utilitarian equation would mean that not eradicating these species of mosquitoes would actually be morally unjust (580). However, mosquitoes are as morally considerable as human beings, because rejecting speciesism provides us with the argument that a single mosquito is as morally justified in living as any one human being. So it would seem to me that the sanctity of life is a perfectly valid moral argument regardless of whether or not humans respect it in their own individual lives. After all, morality is what we ought to do, not what we end up doing.

As a final blow to Pugh’s argument, I want to talk about the holistic approach of Rolston in  “Duties to Endangered Species”. If we as humans were to eradicate species of mosquitoes, we are committing a moral atrocity akin to mass murder. Rolston requires us to think of species as genetic lifelines, just as we humans would think about our own family trees and ancestry (722). By eradicating even a single species of mosquito, we are erasing the work of millions of years of evolution that led to these creatures’ current existence. Rolston tells us that we owe duties to species we have harmed, meaning that we should not even be considering the extinction of any single species, let alone a few (718). It is also prudent to note that Rolston requires us to examine ecosystems as a whole, as each unique species plays a role in the continuation and health of any ecosystem (725). By eradicating a species of mosquito, we may be removing a food source for one (if not many) animals and even plants. Therefore, the extinction of any one species of mosquito could lead to the endangerment of other species (725). Once again, we have another reason for claiming that the sanctity of life is valid in this scenario. 

Pugh has no moral ground to deny that the sanctity of life is an invalid reason for justifying why we cannot drive a species to extinction. I argue that his use of Singer is misstaken and misinformed, and that Rolston gives us even more reason why we should respect the existence of every species that continues to evolve – even that of a lowly mosquito.

~Suzanah

Pugh, Johnathan. “Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-driven technology”. Journal of Medical Ethics 2016;42:578–581

Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation: a New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals. New York: New York Review Book; distributed by Random House, 1975.

Rolston, Holmes. “Duties to Endangered Species.” BioScience, vol. 35, no. 11, 1985, pp. 718–726. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1310053.