This week in Environmental Ethics, we are discussing the issue of “de-extinction,” the technological revival of a species, as a conservation strategy. As Ronald Sandler explains, the process of de-extinction involves “reconstructing close approximations of the extinct species’ genomes based on information found in preserved DNA…and on genetic information from close living relatives” (2013, 355).
In his essay, “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species,” Sandler provides an in-depth analysis of ethical considerations regarding the technological revival of extinct species like the Passenger Pigeon and the Ivory-billed Woodpecker (2013). These include ecological concerns, the problematic nature of “technofixes,” and biocentric arguments for creating or restoring intrinsic value held by extinct forms of life.
Although Sandler explores several important ethical concerns to explain why de-extinction is not currently a viable conservation strategy, I believe he fails to address the concerns regarding instrumental use of animals for human achievement, making his arguments largely anthropocentric.
Sandler provides solid reasoning for his objections to de-extinction as a conservation strategy. First, he explains that the re-creation of extinct species will not necessarily re-establish the value they once held. In particular, he raises an important point regarding the ecological impacts of re-introducing a long-gone species. For instance, there is the fact that the environment has since evolved to exist without the niche once held by that species, such that reintroducing them would not restore lost ecological relationships and may even cause suffering to reintroduced individuals (Sandler 2013, 356).
Sandler further explains that viewing de-extinction as a “conservation last resort” is a techno-fix, leaving the root causes of extinction unaddressed (2013, 357). Current conservation strategies, on the other hand, do aim to prevent the causes of extinction by “mitigating, managing, and documenting loss” (Sandler 2013, 357). Therefore, the uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of de-extinction for conservation, and its potential to cause harm to individual members of species by introducing them into an environment that can no longer support them, are reasons enough to avoid its implementation as a conservation strategy.
Despite his conclusion that de-extinction should not be used for conservation, Sandler considers how it could create value as a scientific and technological advancement, without explaining who would benefit from this scientific value (2013, 356).
In this case, it is humans, of course, who have the most to gain from scientific advancement, seeing as Sandler has dismissed de-extinction as a conservation strategy. Having explained the reasons why de-extinction would not benefit ecosystems, species, or individual members of species, the ensuing argument for the value of technological innovation is ultimately anthropocentric. Sandler even explains how “Many revived species will be intended for research and exhibition, not release,” indicating that they will only be brought into existence for human use and/or enjoyment (2013, 358).
The treatment of non-human life as instrumental to human enjoyment is even clearer in Sandler’s acknowledgement that “It is polar bears roaming the arctic, salmon spawning in the rivers, and Passenger Pigeons in mass migration that people value,” beyond simply the species’ genetic preservation (2013, 257). Therefore, even when advocating for conservation, Sandler still promotes an anthropocentric view of preserving species for the value they bring to humans. Even more concerning is Sandler’s prioritization of charismatic megafauna like polar bears, indicating the possibility that de-extinction for conservation may not be used equally for smaller species that have equal or greater ecological significance.
Overall, I agree with Sandler’s stance that there is not enough ethical justification or scientific evidence for de-extinction to be an effective conservation strategy. However, I think Sandler leaves out an important ethical consideration that non-human life should be valued intrinsically, rather than for its role in human advancement. Therefore, I do not support Sandler’s stance that de-extinction is valuable as a technological achievement, if that achievement only serves human knowledge and excludes ecological priorities.
-Mary
Reference:
Sandler, Ronald. 2013. “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species.” Environmental Ethics 28(2): 354-350. https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.1111/cobi.12198.
Hi Mary,
I was intrigued by your arguments that Sandler’s view was heavily anthropocentric, as this didn’t occur to me when I read his paper, and your point of view was very refreshing. As well, I was particularly convinced as you made a distinction between your agreeing with Sandler’s views and acknowledging that there are flaws in his perspectives.
I do agree that Sandler’s take barely acknowledges any non-human perspectives (if any). I am wondering if his focus on an anthropocentric perspective could be meaningful in other ways. For instance, perhaps it could be easier to convince more people if the perspective is directed from the perspective of a human, as it is more easily relatable than the perspective of a non-human. This could potentially be a good reason to put more emphasis on anthropocentric views. However, I think that if Sandler had incorporated more diverse views (without taking away his current anthropocentric points), it could only make his arguments stronger, as he would be able to make his case of caution against de-extinction more appealing to whichever audience he might have.
Hello Mary,
I think your post neatly and concisely outlined Sandler’s arguments against de-extinction for conservation of species. While reading the article, I was also struck by how heavily anthropocentric it was and I am glad to see a post that addressed the issue. Though he does seem see intrinsic value in non-human life, it appears to be a weakly biocentric one, where humans are more morally considerable and rejects ecocentrism entirely. He only briefly mentioned the roles species can play in an ecological and derived their value from that role, without assigning the species themselves with intrinsic value, which you pointed out.
I agree that we should not revive deeply extinct species simply for the purpose of human entertainment and achievement. However, if we consider these species inherently valuable and so deserving of resurrection on those merits, we run into the issue that there is no suitable ecology for them to live in. The only option would be human-made habitats, which would make them dependent on humans and loop back to the previous problem of their exploitation by humans. The only conclusion that I can arrive at, is that deep de-extinction should not be attempted to prevent the newly revived species from suffering. This is the same conclusion that Sandler mostly reached, but one that considers the well-being of other species.
Keisey