Up until now, extinction has always been considered an irreversible phenomena and conservation efforts have focused on the prevention of species extinction in order to mitigate the effects of biodiversity loss. However, advancements in technology now allow for the possibility of reviving species that have gone extinct using genetics and synthetic biology – a process that has been dubbed “de-extinction”. Sandler explores the ethical dimensions of de-extinction in his paper titled “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” in which he discusses some prominent arguments for and against the technology. At the end of the article, Sandler comes to the conclusion that it is ethically permissible to pursue de-extinction, so long as it does not interfere with efforts to prevent extinction from occurring in the first place. While I agree with this conclusion, I do not necessarily agree with the way that Sandler arrived at it. In this blog post, I will be dissecting one of Sandler’s arguments and providing my own thoughts on the matter. 

The first ethical consideration that Sandler assesses in his article is the idea that we have a responsibility to revive certain species as a matter of justice. This is specifically in regards to species that went extinct due to anthropogenic causes, in which case some would argue that we have a moral obligation to make up for the wrongs that we did to that species or ecosystem. In response to this, Sandler argues that it is not possible to harm a species or ecosystem due to the fact that these collectives themselves do not have goals or interests. Therefore, Sandler believes that it is not a restorative justice approach that must be taken to extinction, but rather a reparation and rehabilitation approach. What this means is that we focus on minimizing the impact of species extinctions and preventing them from happening in the future. Sandler argues that de-extinction would not be beneficial in furthering these efforts, as it would not prevent species from going extinct nor would it address the causes of extinctions. 

While I agree with Sandler that de-extinction would not serve to prevent extinctions from occurring, I do believe he made an oversight when claiming that it is not possible to harm a species or ecosystem. I say this because ecocentrists such as Leopold argue that we still have a moral obligation to entire species and ecosystems – despite their lack of sentience. According to Leopold, each species plays an important role in the ecosystem and is therefore deserving of moral consideration. If Sandler had taken an ecocentric approach to the question of justice, he would arrive at a much different conclusion regarding whether or not we have a moral responsibility to revive certain species. This may in turn lead to Sandler taking a restorative justice approach to anthropogenic extinction after all. 

To conclude, I support Sandler’s position on de-extinction in that it is ethically permissible so long as it is approached with caution. However, I do think his argument could benefit from an ecocentric perspective as this would allow him to consider the moral significance of entire species and ecosystems. Nevertheless, Sandler’s paper provides a well-rounded analysis of de-extinction and its place in relation to broader conservation efforts. I believe that his paper makes a meaningful contribution to literature discussing genetic technology and should be read by anyone interested in environmental ethics. Thank you for reading!

– Keira

Sources

Leopold, A. (2014). The land ethic. In The Ecological Design and Planning Reader (pp. 108-121). Island Press, Washington, DC.

Sandler, R. (2014). The ethics of reviving long extinct species. Conservation Biology, 28(2), 354-360.

Over the course of human history, our species has made incredible progress in the realm of science and technology. This progress is almost always described as being beneficial, with consequences either minimized or disregarded altogether. While many scientific breakthroughs have indeed benefitted the human species, they have also had dire implications for many of the other species that inhabit this planet. This concept is discussed by Pugh in his article titled “Driven to Extinction” in which he considers the use of gene-drive technologies to eradicate mosquitoes. Pugh uses Singer’s utilitarianism to argue that this use of gene-drive technology is permissible, so long as we proceed with caution. In this blog post, I will be analyzing Pugh’s arguments and offering my own ethical rebuttals to his claims.

There are two moral objections to the use of gene-drive technologies that Pugh focuses on in his article. The first one is the concept of life being sacred, so therefore driving the mosquito species to extinction would be inherently wrong. Pugh uses Singer’s utilitarianism to argue that neither individual mosquitoes nor mosquito species can be said to have moral status and consequently do not need to be protected from eradication. However, this fails to consider the other species that could potentially be implicated in the extinction of mosquitoes. While Pugh does briefly touch on this concept later in the article, I believe that it is also important to mention here. When considering total utility, the outcome would be vastly different if the effects on whole ecosystems were considered rather than simply the impact on humans or mosquitoes as individual species.

The second objection that Pugh discusses is that to use this technology is to play God, which is something that is often brought up in debates around genetic modification and other technological fixes. In response to this, Pugh claims that it is compassion rather than mastery that drives us to pursue technological solutions to human problems. Using the example of smallpox, he insists that the millions of lives saved by the variola virus outweigh the costs of potentially playing God. While this argument has value, it inherently gives more importance to human lives than to the rest of the environment. Although the variola virus did not do any harm to broader ecosystems, other technological fixes certainly could – and have in the past. Whilst I agree with Pugh that we must proceed with caution when considering the use of gene-drive technology, I think we could go a step further by seeking out solutions that prioritize traditional knowledge systems rather than Western science. 

To conclude, Pugh takes a utilitarian approach to the debate surrounding the eradication of mosquitoes using gene-drive technology. He refutes two of the most prominent objections to gene-drive technology, however, I believe there is still room for ethical rebuttal to his claims. As I mentioned, the consideration of entire ecosystems rather than simply mosquitoes and humans could alter Pugh’s total utility calculation. Not only that, but the prioritization of Western science as the solution to our problems fails to consider traditional knowledge systems that may be able to provide more sustainable fixes.

– Keira

Source: Pugh, J. (2016). Driven to extinction? The ethics of eradicating mosquitoes with gene-drive technologies. Journal of medical ethics, 42(9), 578-581.

As the threat of climate change is exacerbated, many eco-friendly practices are becoming more common in mainstream society. These practices include things such as avoiding single-use plastics, opting for public transportation or eating less meat. Something that is often not considered by mainstream environmentalists, however, is whether or not we should have children. This is something that Harrison and Tanner discuss in their article “Better to Not Have Children”, in which they argue that the best way to halt environmental destruction is to halt procreation. It is my opinion that, while the authors make some very convincing claims, there are certain ethical considerations that have been left out of their article. In this blog post, I will be engaging critically with the first argument made in Harrison and Tanner’s article – in order to effectively explain how I came to this conclusion.

The argument that I will be discussing is that procreation is bad for others, namely animal species. The reason provided for this is that humans are responsible for the loss of animal habitats as well as entire animal species. While Harrison and Tanner acknowledge that there are other methods of preventing this destruction, such as recycling and becoming vegetarian, they conclude that stopping procreation altogether is the best way to do this. The authors claim that there is no evidence to suggest that humans are becoming any more responsible as time goes on, and therefore we must remove our species from the planet altogether. This may seem to suggest that we should also start killing others or ourselves, but Harrison and Tanner argue that this would be much less ethical than halting procreation because it would require the removal of a life that is already in existence, rather than a life that has yet to be created.  

Although I completely agree that humans have been responsible for terrible destruction and degradation of the planet, I do believe that certain considerations are lacking from this argument. First of all, I think the claim that humans are not becoming any more responsible is not entirely true, as it fails to acknowledge the progress that has been made in recent years when it comes to environmental awareness. This is not to disregard the fact that we still have a long way to go, but rather to refute the claim that we have not made any progress whatsoever. Not only that, but no mention is made in the article of Indigenous peoples who have lived in harmony with their environments since Time Immemorial and continue to do so despite all the destruction caused by settler-colonialism. While I absolutely believe we need to do everything we can to reverse the damage that has been done to the planet, I also believe that it is necessary to recognize who has caused this damage, and by extension who has suffered from it.

To conclude, there are certain ethical considerations that have been left out of Harrison and Tanner’s position, and while I focused specifically on the first argument made in the article, I believe that other objections could be made to the rest of the authors’ assertions as well. By leaving these important considerations out, the debate against procreation is weakened and it would be more difficult to convince the greater public to adopt the same mentality. Although Harrison and Tanner did make some very convincing claims, I would be interested to know if they could still defend their position while taking into account the environmental progress that has been made in recent years, along with the inequality that has occurred when it comes to environmental degradation. That being said, I do agree that we must do everything in our power to reverse the damage that has been done – I’m just not sure if we can achieve that by wiping out our own species. 

– Keira

Source: Harrison, G., & Tanner, J. (2011). Better not to have children. Think, 10(27), 113-121.

As Scott discusses in his article on agricultural biotechnology, critics often dismiss technological fixes such as genetic modification on the basis that they end up doing more harm to the environment than good. He gives a comprehensive explanation of various technological fix criticisms and presents some rebuttals to these criticisms. Overall though, the article’s message seems quite clear – technological fixes offer trade-offs, not solutions. This idea is also explored in Folger’s National Geographic article titled “The Next Green Revolution” in which he analyzes two very different answers to the global food crisis – one that involves genetic modification, and one that doesn’t. In this blog post, I will be using Scott’s analysis of technological fixes to illustrate which of these answers I believe is best for the environment and the global population.

In Scott’s article, he starts off by addressing the philosophical criticisms of technological fixes, which he makes clear are not against the use of biotechnology altogether. Rather, these criticisms do not believe that biotechnology is the only solution to any one problem, especially given the fact that science and technology are largely responsible for many of the problems that we currently face. Scott uses a number of different philosophical theories to illustrate this point, such as White who believes that the ecological crisis has been caused by Western Christianity’s anthropocentric use of science and technology towards nature, or Kuhn who believes that we should not hold an uncritical belief in scientific progress. The article also addresses some practical criticisms of technological fixes; specifically that they do not solve problems but rather create new ones, and that they preserve or “fix” systems that should in fact be replaced by better ones. All of this boils down to the concept mentioned earlier – that technological fixes offer trade-offs, not solutions. As for the rebuttals to these criticisms, the main argument is that biotechnology is a much simpler solution to a complex social issue that would require a shift in people’s attitudes and behaviours. 

Folger spends the first half of his article discussing the use of GM crops to address global hunger, which is a tech-intensive way to continue breeding better crops using modern genetics. The idea behind this solution is that it will make farming more productive, but there are unforeseen consequences to this kind of technology – such as pests becoming resistant to certain pesticides being used. Not only that, but GM seeds are expensive – especially for farmers in the Global South – and many of the synthetic fertilizers and pesticides used in GM crops are harmful to the environment. This has led many folks to believe that there is an alternative to a genetically modified future, such as the organic farms in Tanzania that have been started through a nonprofit called Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania. These farms are all owned by women and feature a variety of crops, which provide a safety net in case one crop fails and also help to minimize the amount of pests. This way of farming is much less harmful to the environment and much more cost-effective, which leaves more money available for farmers to put their children through school. 

After reading both articles, it seems to me that Scott’s practical criticisms of technological fixes hold true when it comes to the GM crops that Folger discussed in his article. Although biotechnology may provide a temporary solution to a single problem, it also creates many more problems in the form of financial debt and environmental degradation. Not only that, but it upholds a system of countries in the Global North sweeping in to provide simple technological answers to complex social issues in the Global South – issues that have almost always been created (whether intentionally or not) by the same countries that are now trying to fix them. While organic farming has yet to gain traction in the global sphere, I believe it is a desirable long-term solution to world hunger. Sustainable agriculture fixes more problems than it creates, and represents a mindset shift away from quick fixes and towards the creation of a more livable planet for all its inhabitants.

– Keira

Sources

Folger, T. (2014). The next green revolution. National Geographic, 226(4), 32-57.

Scott, D. (2011). The technological fix criticisms and the agricultural biotechnology debate. Journal of agricultural and environmental ethics, 24(3), 207-226.

In “Ethics and Genetically Modified Food” by Comstock, the moral acceptability of genetic modification is discussed primarily in the context of science, religion and various ethical theories. Comstock defines genetically modified food as food that has been altered at the molecular level in order to provide it with traits that are considered desirable by farmers or consumers. GM foods have been criticized for an assortment of reasons, which Comstock assesses using three different ethical theories: rights theory, utilitarian theory and virtue theory. Rights theory focuses on treating individuals as autonomous beings, while utilitarianism attempts to maximize overall utility and virtue theory emphasizes the importance of justice and fairness.

One of the most prominent concerns when it comes to GM foods is that they will have negative effects on humans, animals, or whole ecosystems – this is what Comstock refers to as an extrinsic objection. He claims that although it is necessary for GM technology to be developed responsibly and with appropriate caution, this is not enough of a reason to permanently ban GM altogether as there is still the possibility that the benefits could outweigh the harms. Comstock also touches on intrinsic objections which deal with the idea that GM as a whole is unnatural and therefore objectionable. For the remainder of the article, Comstock addresses four main concerns regarding the unnatural aspect of GM: that it is like playing God, that it is world-changing technology, that it crosses species boundaries, and that it commodifies life. He goes into detail about each of these claims, and refutes them using the ethical theories mentioned above. At the end of the article, Comstock comes to the conclusion that as long as we proceed responsibly and with caution, that we can use genetically modified food in an ethical way.

I believe that Comstock makes a number of very good points in his article, and also makes his ethical discussion incredibly accessible to a general audience. He does so by thoroughly describing each step that he takes to reach his conclusion, from the values held by scientists to the conflicts that could arise with different religious beliefs. Two of the points that I agree with the most in the article are that GM foods could help the world’s most vulnerable populations and that our decision regarding GM foods should be a secular one. As Comstock mentions in the article, the way that developed nations choose to address the issue of GM foods could have negative consequences for developing nations – this is something that I feel should be taken very seriously. When it comes to secularism, Comstock states that the only way to respect religious freedom is to make the decision independent of any religion – which I also agree with.

It is my opinion that Comstock’s article left something to be desired in the realm of current-day discussion. As he articulated at the very beginning of the text, the majority of food consumed in the US is already genetically modified, yet the entirety of the article was spent discussing whether or not this practice is ethically justifiable. It wasn’t until the very last paragraph that Comstock divulged his position on the matter, which is that using GM food is perfectly acceptable, so long as we proceed with an appropriate dose of caution. I do not disagree with this statement, in fact I think this is exactly the approach that is needed when dealing with things such as agricultural biotechnology. However, this left me wondering exactly what Comstock’s vision of responsibly-curated GM food would look like, and how we would go about achieving his goal. Not only that, but he failed to situate the GM discussion within the larger context of the global food crisis, which could have opened the floor to the ways in which this could (or could not) lead us towards a more sustainable future.

As I mentioned earlier, I wholeheartedly believe that GM foods could have a very positive impact on the global community – if they are handled with care. Comstock gave a detailed outline of why the use of agricultural biotechnology should indeed be considered ethically sound. However, it is my personal belief that he failed to mention how he feels we should go about using it in the future. Nevertheless, this article is a valuable piece of literature that lays down the foundation for an important ethical discussion that is more relevant now than ever before.

– Keira 

Source: Comstock, G. (2010). Ethics and genetically modified foods. In Food ethics (pp. 49-66). Springer, New York, NY.