As an animal lover myself, I am fascinated by all the different animals and the little intrinsic differences they have between them: each species is unique and valuable on its own. Because of this, extinction is a sad word to me, as it means that every single member of an unique animal species disappears forever from this planet. Extinction due to natural causes are perhaps more acceptable, such as the mammoths and dinosaurs. But when it comes to extinction with some or more anthropogenic causes, I experience frustration with the human race and the destruction it has done to the planet. When I first came across the concept of de-extinction, it seemed absolutely wonderful. De-extinction is “accomplished by reconstructing close approximations of the extinct species’ genomes based on information found in preserved DNA and on genetic information from close living relatives.” ¹ It seems that being able to bring back the species that we have forced into extinction is a matter of justice, an effort of making amends for our past wrongs. Ronald Sandler, however, does not agree with this belief. He takes a generally negative view on the matter of de-extinction, remaining only slightly open to its development when it does not compromise “ethically important things.” ¹ When it comes to justice, he denies this claim, explaining that while individual animals are alive, the species as a whole is not alive, and therefore does not deserve moral considerations. Further, Sandler puts more emphasis on reparations and rehabilitation, rather than a restorative approach. Which means that it is more important to “reform our practices and institutions so as to minimize future extinctions.” ¹ Sandler’s arguments makes it apparent that even though we may feel compelled to fix our mistakes through de-extinction, it is difficult to justify such an urge of justice. I began to think if there are more concerns that I have overlooked.

While Sandler discusses that revived species could have some value to them (thought different from before they went extinct),¹ he overlooks the possibility that de-extinction could render all species’ intrinsic value worthless. While animals’ ecological and instrumental values could remain relatively the same, something intrinsic is undoubtedly lost when biotechnologies are capable of modifying an entire species. In modifying the genes of a species, gene-drive technologies have already undermined much of that value. But with de-extinction, we would be creating an entire species with pieces of DNA invisible to the naked eye, nearly “out of thin air”. This thought is terrifying. If we could easily make our own species, then how valuable would that make all animal species that existed from evolution, who took existence on their own? The respect that we have for nature’s creations would decrease drastically if we are capable of doing the same thing. Sandler expresses a similar concern that conservationist efforts would likely be threatened as resources are diverted,¹ but I think this loss of value concerns beyond the endangered species that need our protection. When we are capable of personalizing and creating species to our hearts’ desires, all that has been made by nature becomes a lot less valuable, as we can easily do the same thing. Sandler addresses this issue of hubris in his paper, in defending that proponents of de‐extinction often “emphasize the value of species and are motivated at least in part by wonder and a sense of responsibility toward extinct species”. As well, he explains that responsibly pursuing de-extinction will not be problematic, including concerns for ecological sensitivity and compassion for the animals involved. I agree entirely with his views. Where I diverge from his opinions is my concern for the reaction from the public. It is reasonable to think that proponents of de-extinction, motivated by science and responsibility, will not take a hubristic attitude towards the natural world. However, such experts cannot prevent a decline of animals’ intrinsic value in the eyes of the public. When something becomes more easily attainable, its value usually decreases. This remains an important concern of mine.

Perhaps my most significant concern is the unstoppable nature of new technology. It seems that we can address many ethical concerns with new technology, allowing more cautious measures to be taken when it comes to their implementation and development. Nonetheless, we don’t seem to be able to halt their development, no matter how much fear is attributed to them. Artificial intelligence is one such technology in which many individuals acknowledge their potential threats to us humans. Still, as Arend Hintze, an expert of AI comments, AI will continue to be developed despite these fears.² Sandler also points out that de-extinction creates value in being a “tremendous scientific and technological achievement” when achieved. How likely is it that we will cease pursuing such an achievement? That is, perhaps, the most terrifying part about technologies. We may be able to contribute to this debate in bringing up more issues to be addressed, but the development and study of this technology will continue to proceed, against all odds.

 

References

¹ Sandler, Ronald. “The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species.” Conservation Biology 28, no. 2 (2014): 354–60. https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.12198.

² Hintze, Arend. “What an Artificial Intelligence Researcher Fears about AI.” 11 Nov. 2019, theconversation.com/what-an-artificial-intelligence-researcher-fears-about-ai-78655.

With the coexistence of their apparent benefits and drawbacks, biotechnologies have always been controversial. Growing up, I have always been told to “stay away from the genetically modified stuff”, but I never read into what these GMO products actually are, until recently. It seems that the existence of GMO foods is controversial enough for us to figure out, yet it surprised me that biotechnology’s potentials are far greater than changing a food to make it healthier or more easily produced. With our technological advancements, we are capable of wiping out an entire species using biotechnology. Gene-drive is “a technology that seeks to facilitate the biased inheritance of particular genes throughout an entire species by genetically modifying some members of that species.” ¹ After these members are modified, they would then pass on the desired genes to their offspring, until the generations of the organism are composed entirely of the genetically modified genes. It is therefore possible to create a gene that prevents a species from reproducing, slowly wiping out the existence of that entire species. The shockingly powerful potential of this technology is immensely controversial, it is as dangerous as it is promising. In Jonathan Pugh’s paper, he attempted to dispel two moral criticisms of gene-drive, and after this discussion, reached a balanced conclusion on this issue. In my post I will explain his second argument and conclusion, as well as offer my own thoughts on this matter.

Pugh’s second argument centered around the hubris that arises from the mere thought of manipulating nature. The main case study that Pugh used to defend his position was the eradication of smallpox, meaning the eradication of the virus that caused it, variola virus. Pugh maintained that not only was this a celebrated success for humanity, the fact that it saved millions of lives should “surely outweigh the moral wrong of displaying a hubristic attitude”.¹ I agree that we may defend this “playing God” criticism in seeing that the benefits of such efforts outweigh the costs. However, I would like to offer another argument against the hubris criticism.

It seems easy to say that we should respect nature for what it gives us, and not try to enforce our own modifications onto it. Nevertheless, I find this claim ironic in that humans have already “played God” by destroying habitats of species, driving them to extinction. In doing so, we have already forced changes within nature and its ecosystems. Those who make the hubris claim then seem as if that it is alright to play God by accidentally eradicating species, but wrong to do it purposefully for greater benefits. The irony of this is especially apparent when we examine a case study of gene-drive’s potential to save certain species from extinction. Hawaii’s birds have been on the decline ever since their habitats were disturbed by settlers and later by climate change, causing many species to go extinct. Recently, the avian malaria carried by mosquitoes is causing a sudden, drastic decline of the many endangered species of birds in Hawaii. It is true that we would be playing God if we use gene-drive to eradicate these mosquitoes and protect the already fragile bird species from going extinct. However, it would also be true that we had already played God by causing the extinction of many bird species at Hawaii, as well as taking away their last refuge of the higher grounds with climate change.² If we have to play God in order to fix our mistakes through having played God (wrongfully), I believe it is a path that we should take.

Pugh’s conclusion took an optimistic but still relatively objective view on this topic. He asserted that we should avoid “risk averse in the extreme” as all new technologies have unpredictable risks associated with them, and that shouldn’t stop us from attempting them if necessary.¹ I am in favour of his opinion. Despite how I believe it is necessary to use technology to fix past mistakes, I agree that we should do so from “an approach of epistemic humility”, in which we admit that there exist uncertainties in the gene-drive technology’s effects on the target species as well as the ecosystem as a whole.¹ Therefore, we should gather more data about the potential negative consequences of the implication of such technology before coming to a decision to implement it or not.

Lastly, I would add that we need to be cautious not to let gene-drive become a simple techno-fix. While remaining open to its possibilities and optimistic of its positive effects, we should be conscious of the potential underlying social issues that still need to be solved, such as climate change itself. Gene-drive is a promising potential for the future, but it should not be our only effort to right our wrongs.

References

¹ Pugh, Jonathan. “Driven to Extinction? The Ethics of Eradicating Mosquitoes with Gene-Drive Technologies.” Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 42, no. 9, 2016, pp. 578–581., doi:10.1136/medethics-2016-103462.

² Regalado, Antonio. The Plan to Rescue Hawaii’s Birds with Genetic Engineering. 2 Apr. 2020, www.technologyreview.com/2016/05/11/160276/the-plan-to-rescue-hawaiis-birds-with-genetic-engineering/.

Gerald Harrison and Julia Tanner have provided some very convincing reasons as to why it is best that we don’t have children, covering reasons from the wellbeing of the child (for instance, bringing them into a world in which they don’t want to be in) to the effects a child would have on others and the environment (for instance, overconsumption).² All of their reasons appeal to me, but I support their proposition only to a certain extent. Instead of completely abolishing the idea of having children, I am willing to take a step back. I would not call myself an anti-natalist because I understand how important it can be for some people to have children. For some, it may even determine their happiness and fulfillment for their entire life. Therefore, I must disagree with Harrison and Tanner in that I do not believe that this is something we should take away from people. As a solution for all the problems they listed, I am in favor of Christine Overall’s proposal of a One-Child-Per-Person responsibility.⁴  Processing this logically, if every couple only gives birth to one child, that is if every two people leave only one behind when they die, our population would surely decrease. I believe that not being able to have children would make some people miserable, while limiting the number of children doesn’t necessarily destroy or even limit happiness as many couples are perfectly happy with having just one child. I will expand on my position as well as reinforce Overall’s concerns of a deontologist opposition on this stand.

 

Telling people that they are limited to one child per couple is “likely to provoke many objections”.⁴ Just as Overall, I also anticipate this setback. To Overall, enforcing the One-Child-Per-Person responsibility as a legal policy is undesirable as consequential social policies could make children born after the limit suffer. This, however, is where my opinions diverge from Overall’s. Having grown up in China, I had years of experience with living within a one-child policy. Perhaps surprisingly, despite knowing that the intent of the policy only barely targeted reducing environmental impact, I am still positive towards the idea of reducing procreation as a means to protect the environment.

Firstly, according to a survey done in 2006, 76% of the population supported the government’s decision to implement this policy.¹ This is largely over the majority. My interpretation of the result of this 27 years late survey is the construction of a new norm. Though there still remain people who feel suppressed with this policy, the majority of the society has adapted to it as time progressed. With time, a new norm eventually established, in which people began to accept having only one child. I am making this interpretation from personal experience, as growing up, I never thought that having one child was strange. To me, one child per family was normal, rather, those with a sibling were abnormal. I am an example of the new generation who has already adapted to the norm. The idea of only having one child is so perfectly reasonable to me that I accepted it as my reality, and will likely continue in life holding this belief. From this, I can conclude that Overall’s claim is not necessarily true. As with a policy, the norm is more easily “forced” onto individuals, and will gradually become natural, and even become a moral standard of the said society. With the reinforcement of merely a social responsibility, this state of norm is less likely to occur.

Secondly, I’ve observed that in North America, adult children often seem more distant from their parents in comparison to China. While this is partly due to cultural factors, the parent-child bond can also contribute to this observed phenomenon. Due to China’s (previous) one-child policy, the parents mostly have only one child to care for. Understanding this from either common sense or the social impact theory, having the source directed towards a single target will mean larger impact for the target, compared to a source with many targets.

This means that when parents direct their attention to only one child, it is more likely that they will develop a stronger bond with their child. With a stronger bond, the observed phenomenon of adult children refusing to provide care for their elderly parents may be reduced. Both of the above reasons would defend my position that a one-child policy is not as detrimental to society as Overall worried, rather, it may even be beneficial.

 

Later in the same chapter, Overall’s criticisms of a deontologist’s opposing view interested me, and I would like to reinforce it. Though many deontological reasons against anti-natalism can be solved with her One-Child-Per-Person responsibility, there is one that cannot be satisfied. This is the idea that women have a moral responsibility to produce offspring.⁴ As a member of the female sex, I do not enjoy the idea that my purpose of existence is purely to reproduce. Especially given the current immense population on Earth, I find this (seemingly) ancient belief rather disturbing. Though many mainstream cultures have shifted this point of view in giving more freedom of purpose to women, it is dismaying still to think that there exists cultures or specific groups within a mainstream culture who still consider women’s functional purpose to be that of procreation. In Islam, for instance, women’s priority in life is the task of raising and giving birth to children.³ As for China, though the mainstream movements are advocating for women’s freedom from the obligation of procreation, there are many families who value passing their lineage and have difficulties accepting a woman who refuses to bear children.

These beliefs are, and certainly will continue to hold us back from reducing birth and lowering our population to strike a balance with nature. Overall’s suggestion for individuals with religious beliefs is to consider the extent to which their God would accept their procreation to degrade the planet or infringe upon future generations’ right to procreate, in order to come to accept the idea of limiting their procreation. ⁴ I agree that this is a good approach to religious beliefs, however, for those without religious attachments, this suggestion would not be able to convince them. Nonetheless, such deontological beliefs remain concerns that need to be addressed in order for a One-Child-Per-Person policy or responsibility to be passed.

 

¹ Gaille, Louise. “12 Pros and Cons of China One Child Policy.” Vittana.org. December 16, 2019. Accessed November 04, 2020. https://vittana.org/12-pros-and-cons-of-china-one-child-policy.

² Harrison, Gerald, and Julia Tanner. “Better Not To Have Children.” Think 10, no. 27 (2010): 113-21. doi:10.1017/s1477175610000436.

³ Hussain, Nadia. “The Status of Women in Islam.” Muslim Mirror. June 30, 2020. Accessed November 04, 2020. http://muslimmirror.com/eng/the-status-of-women-in-islam/.

⁴ Overall, Christine. Why Have Children? the Ethical Debate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012.

In today’s society, there seems to be a “preference for solving problems with technology”¹. This preference leads to the development of a compound noun: technological fix. In Dane Scott’s paper, The Technological Fix Criticisms and the Agricultural Biotechnology Debate, he defines a technological fix as “an attempt to solve problems using technology that will ultimately prove to be counterproductive”¹. It is interesting to note that while the social bias of preferring technological solutions exists, the word “technological fix”, indicating an exact opposite impression, also exists. This paradox occurs because while technological fixes seem effective and practical at the moment, they ultimately make things worse in the long run¹. To explain how it is so, Scott analyzed both the philosophical and practical criticisms of technological fixes. To focus on the practical criticisms, these are his concerns regarding technological fixes: the inability to solve underlying problems, creating new problems, as well as being conservative of the present state¹. To better understand these criticisms, this blog post will use two example applications to test Scott’s analysis.

In his paper, Scott expressed his concerns for the future of “both [needing to] feed an additional 3 billion people over the next 50 years and reducing the environmental impacts of agriculture”¹. This is a concern that seems solvable by technological advancements. Anthony Trewavas, a biochemist (which Scott considered to be “representative of mainstream scientists working in this field”), advocated that agricultural biotechnology would be the key solution to the paradoxical problem mentioned above¹. But is it true that to harmonize such a difficult task, we must seek technology for help? In focusing on one solution, we can easily overlook other solutions. Let us shift our focus to the part of the problem concerning population growth. Perhaps it cannot be determined whether poverty causes population growth or vice versa², but nonetheless, an absolute correlation between the two suggests a potential concern that would not be addressed by a technological fix. We may easily overlook the problem of excessive birth or poverty, which would lead to an increasing population demand that our planet cannot keep up with. Here we see the conservative problem outlined by Scott, as we fail to acknowledge the underlying social issue that needs to be resolved, while having our attention directed towards a technological fix.

Scott’s analysis on technological fixes can also apply to climaterianism. Climaterianism advocates for vegetarianism in order to promote sustainability, among numerous reasons, including methane emission and water resource degradation. From this perspective arises the need to convince meat-lovers to become a vegetarian. One technological fix seems to be the development of synthetic animal products, which attempts to replace natural animal products such as meat, milk, and eggs for those who need these in their diet. On the surface, it seems that by making these replacement products, more people would be able to join the vegetarian side. However, in directing our attention towards these technological fixes, we can easily neglect the actual root problems. If we take a step back from the technology and examine the reasons that have led to climaterianism, we would see more solutions that could fix these concerns directly. Take the case of water degradation for instance, which is the result of mainly runoff fertilizer and manure from farms, leading to oxygen-deprived waters as a result of bacterial or algae growth³. Yes indeed, if we limit cattle consumption, we would limit manures, and in limiting manures, we could protect water sources from being contaminated. However, this thought process lies two flaws. One being that vegetarianism will not be able to solve the problem of fertilizer runoff, as plantation agriculture will continue to cause this problem. Possibly with worse impacts than before, after plants become the primary food source for all, while farmers attempt to increase crop yields. The other flaw then stems from the first one: it is not vegetarianism that can solve water contamination, but the farmers. Only the farmers can handle manure so it is used and distributed properly (as fertilizer or else), just as only the farmers can control the amount of fertilizer they apply to the crops to prevent excess. This underlying problem would not be recognized had we fixated only on technological fixes that could guarantee the adoption of climaterianism. These popularized technological solutions blind us from the actual, deeper problems that deserve attention, as concluded by Scott.

When we “reframe a social problem as a technological one”, we seem to have simplified the “complexity and unpredictability of human behavior”¹. But as Scott concluded, these technological fixes are rarely true solutions to a problem, environmental or social. The real cause is usually left untouched. While Alvin Weinberg claimed that technological fixes “can buy time until the problem can be dealt with on a deeper level”, Scott maintains that the conservative nature of technological fixes will only let the present state persist, instead of actually leading to deep solutions¹. Through the two examples, Scott’s conclusions are seen to be effective in seeking to understand a problem instead of seeking mere technological fixes.

 

¹ Scott, Dane. “The Technological Fix Criticisms and the Agricultural Biotechnology Debate.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 24, no. 3 (2010): 207–26. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-010-9253-7.

² Meadows, Donella. “Poverty Causes Population Growth Causes Poverty.” The Academy for Systems Change, July 24, 2013. http://donellameadows.org/archives/poverty-causes-population-growth-causes-poverty/.

³ National Geographic Society. “Dead Zone.” National Geographic Society, October 9, 2012. https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/dead-zone/.