De-extinction is a relatively new conversation in environmental circles. Previously, extinction was seen as the end for a species, with no way for that species to return (this is still the general and popular view in the general public). De-extinction has given environmentalists and conservationists a way to possibly reverse this. De-extinction is the general term that is used to describe the process of reviving previously extinct species using genetics and synthetic biology. This process could be used to revive species that have been extinct for several decades or even millennia (Sandler). As this is being discussed more, it is essential to discuss the ethicality surround such technology and whether it would be used as a tool to absolve human guilt for previously destructive actions (which stems from an anthropocentric view) or in other ways.

Ronald Sandler in his paper, The Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species, talks about the concept of de-extinction and the ethical considerations surrounding this concept. The first point he brings up is the concept of restorative justice for species such as the passenger pigeon and thylacine which went extinct due to anthropogenic causes such as habitat destruction and hunting (Sandler). This point resonated with me the most in the ethical arguments for de-extinction because I am a strong believer in restorative justice in other areas of life and found that logic sound. However, as I thought about it a bit more, I realized that while it is a good starting point, it would not be sufficient response to the issue that led to the extinction of these species in the first place. If the scientists and researchers are successful in reviving the passenger pigeons or thylacine, what are the chances that they would not go extinct again or be endangered? I asked myself this because while improvements have been made in regulating hunting and protection of endangered species, we are not here yet as it concerns habitat conservation. Many species are endangered and on the verge of extinction today, and I am concerned that we may not yet have fully addressed the reasons for their extinction. 

What stood out to me in this point though, was the fact that Sandler says that species and ecosystems lack ‘interests and welfares distinct from the individuals that constitute and populate them’ and that for this reason, there is no ethical responsibility grounded in restorative justice to engage in restorative justice (Sandler). I would have to disagree with Sandler on this point from an ecocentric point of view. Looking at this through the lens of ecocentrism, de-extinction would be trying to revive species that were once a part of an ecosystem. And trying to repair an ecosystem that had previously been disrupted due to anthropocentric causes would be an ethical responsibility well-grounded in the idea of restorative justice to that ecosystem. 

Further into the paper, Sandler discusses ethical arguments against de-extinction and the point that stood out the most to me was the fact that de-extinction, as it is presented now, is a form of luxury conservation and a technological fix (Sandler). I agree with Sandler on this and the fact that de-extinction does not fully address any pressing ecological or social problems (Sandler). As I mentioned earlier in this post, it presently seems to be a way to absolve human guilt and concern without dealing too much with the root issue which is human behaviour. De-extinction as technology is not inherently problematic and could be beneficial in repairing disrupted ecosystems. However, a lot more work concerning human behaviours and attitudes will be required before this can happen effectively. 

– Oseyi

Sources:

1. Sandler, R. (2014). The ethics of reviving long extinct species. Conservation Biology, 28(2), 354-360.