In “Ethics of Reviving Long Extinct Species” by Ronald Sandler, various arguments are presented both in favour of and against the de-extinction of animals. The article’s numerous arguments supporting de-extinction research provide a clear picture of de-extinction’s limitations. I will be looking at some of these arguments and expand on them to further state it’s shortcomings.

Sandler states “Deep de‐extinction may offer an optimistic and creative research agenda in comparison with what some see as the current primary conservation biology activities” (Donlan et al. 2006; Brand 2013; Novak 2013 as cited in Sandler 2013). This argument presents de-extinction technology as an easy way out compared to traditional mitigation and maintenance efforts. However, this raises the question of why traditional methods are incapable of “offering optimistic and creative research methods”. It could be stated that de-extinction brings forth a new way of understanding and tackling environmental problems; along with the numerous scientific advancements the field would generate. However, this creates the idea that people should give up on traditional methods because they lack novelty and instead focus on de-extinction research. But novelty in no way indicates that de-extinction is as effective as traditional methods. Researching de-extinction technology is significantly easier than completely re-structuring the world’s consumption, waste management, and environmental protection systems. Yet, time and time again, case studies show that traditional methods are effective and are capable of generating long term environmental sustainability with proper implementation. So, rather than ponder on the capabilities of a relatively young branch of science, we should do all we can to prevent further environmental degradation where possible. As Sandler stated, ” deep de‐extinction is not itself a significant species conservation strategy because it does not prevent species from going extinct. Nor does it address the causes of extinction.” Humans need to solve the problem at its core rather than looking for temporary solutions or deceiving themselves in the potential that de-extinction projects have. Firms and countries alike should work together to make traditional efforts more practical and easily applicable rather than funding the unknown potential of an expensive scientific innovation.

Another argument Sandler uses to support de-extinction technology is: “many people would find it wondrous and awesome to see a living ivory‐billed woodpecker, thylacine, or mammoth, even if only in a zoo or wildlife park.” Sandler makes the previous statement as a support for the value that de-extinction can create for people as such it is likely Sandler did not intend to imply that humans would bring back extinct species for the sole purpose of human satisfaction. However, assuming de-extinction to be possible, it’s likely that companies and countries alike would attempt to profit off of the created animals as much as possible. Which begs the question: is the resurrection of species for human pleasure ethical? I would argue that it’s not. Given that such animals would have less intrinsic value compared to their original ancestors because they did not evolve into existence. Creating these animals for the sole purpose of profit would only further strip them of any value they have left. Since animals gain value from their interconnectedness with their environment, an animal with no environment to become interdependent on would become meaningless.

An additional argument used to support de-extinction technology is its ability to be used as a last resort, specifically: “If all other conservation efforts for a species fail, then at least the species’ DNA can be preserved so that it can be revived later when the threats to it are mitigated, habitat is reestablished, or it will be useful to us.” But this argument assumes that it’ll be physically possible to reestablish the environment using previously extinct species when nothing else works. Realistically, assuming Sandler is right about de-extinction’s ability to be used as a last resort, it’s likely that when such a time comes the environment will already be irreparable. If a large number of species were to go extinct then the earth would likely be in a position where supporting life, let alone large numbers, would be close to impossible. At which point, the chance of ever reestablishing habitats and environments after they have been completely destroyed isn’t feasible. De-extinction isn’t a good last resort because it only works so long as an environment exists that can support the animals we will introduce into it. But if such an environment doesn’t exist or is on the verge of collapse, de-extinction technology becomes useless. Society needs to use the current strategies developed to combat environmental destruction and develop long term sustainability. Ignoring the problem and suddenly reviving numerous species because of environmental degradation is not the answer. Like Sandler later states: “What would be problematic is using de‐extinction in lieu of alternative approaches.”

Lastly, Sandler takes a utilitarian perspective in his comparison of animal welfare: “Compared with the number of animals already used in research (estimated to be 10–25 million/year in the United States alone) and in animal agriculture (estimated to be 56 billion land animals/year globally), conservation cloning (let alone deep de‐extinction) does not pose a special or very large animal welfare problem.” The argument applies a bias against small groups when compared to larger ones. I found myself asking why the intense suffering of a few is considered less than the suffering of the many? If a small village were to be hit by a tornado and all of the people were to die, would we say that their suffering is less compared to if an earthquake had destroyed New York City killing everyone. The average person wouldn’t make such a claim, so why is it justified to make the same claim with animals? People accept that in either case, the deaths of any number of people is a horrible thing, yet we count and compare animals’ lives as if they were nothing more than statistical figures, all the while disregarding their worth and value. By the logic of Sandler’s argument, it follows that we should disregard the elderly and sick, and focus on the young, middle-aged and healthy since they make up a larger proportion of the population. It’s a radical claim, rather we should not disregard the suffering experiences of a set of people nor animals simply due to their lack of numbers.