The sustained, widespread environmental degradation caused by human activity has given environmentalists reason to reflect on whether it is ethically permissible for couples to bring into existence a child, who will undoubtedly carry some eco-footprint. Restricting procreation may appear shocking, objectionable, and too great a personal sacrifice for some, but in consumerist North America, where the average American contributes far more to environmental degradation than people in developing countries (Young 184), the argument to limit procreation seems more plausible. It is not uncommon to feel that we should try to minimize our harm on the planet. It is not uncommon to feel that we should we be doing more. And yet it is strikingly uncommon to find couples consider the environmental consequences of having a child. Thomas Young argues that consistency demands we view procreation in the same way as overconsumption (“eco-gluttony” [185], in Young’s words), and he concludes that procreation in developed countries like the US is, in most cases, morally wrong.1 This blog post scrutinizes Young’s argument, suggests an approach to the morality of procreation that adopts virtue ethics as its underlying normative ethical theory, and aims to show that procreation is morally permissible in more circumstances than Young considers.
Young points out that “mainstream environmentalism” is inconsistent in how it views the morality of eco-gluttony relative to that of procreation: the former is viewed as condemnable while the latter is permissible. But for Young, if we understand eco-gluttony as selfish, imprudent, and morally wrong, then we should also understand having children voluntarily as selfish, imprudent, and morally wrong, since the potential environmental impacts of these two life decisions are analogous (185). Conversely, if we accept that the environmental consequences of parenthood are permissible, then we must accept that the environmental consequences of eco-gluttony are permissible. Since environmental ethics is intuitively incompatible with a lifestyle of eco-gluttony, then it is preferable not to have children. Indeed, in most cases, Young considers it morally wrong.
As Young notes, one can object to his analogy by pointing out that “[d]ecisions to procreate are usually less selfish (however defined) than lifestyle choices involving eco-gluttony” (186). Young responds, however, that parenthood also tends to be selfishly motivated, thus rendering no significant moral difference between it and eco-gluttony. In many instances, parents bring children into the world for the sake of their own interests, rather than those of their children: couples who choose to procreate in order to fulfill social expectations or personal ambitions of having children are acting to fulfill their own desires, despite how well-meaning and earnest these couples may be. In cases where one has children solely as a means of becoming loved and wanted, or as a means of ‘saving’ a failing relationship with their partner, the non-altruistic intentions are much clearer. Indeed, upon closer inspection one can observe that parenthood is often a profoundly selfish act. I wish to scrutinize this point more thoroughly, however, and reframe the objection in terms of virtue ethics to undermine Young’s analogy,2 as I will maintain that the decision to become a parent can be weighted differently than he suggests. For this discussion, I roughly assume a desirable virtue of environmental altruism, for which each moral agent should be expected to promote the good of the environment and to reduce their eco-footprint.
I maintain that couples who choose to procreate for no better motivation than for the selfish ones noted, act viciously. This point does not conflict with Young’s argument. I will reject, however, that there are no morally significant differences between the motivations of eco-gluttony and that of procreation. The difference is that the eco-glutton always acts viciously; there is no ethically defensible mean in wilfully overconsuming one’s fair share and in ignoring the environmental harm of one’s sizeable eco-footprint.3 The parent, however, is not always guilty of the same vice, for several reasons I will maintain: first, a potential parent cannot be morally required to sacrifice their desire to have children. Opponents of procreation like Young tend to understate or deny the moral value in kinship by reducing the wish to have offspring to merely another desire of acquiring personal happiness, which can potentially be foregone for the sake of the environment. This reduction is vastly problematic. Some may certainly be able to live their lives happily without having children, but for others it may be a much greater sacrifice than opponents acknowledge. Some may very well see parenthood as their life’s final purpose and structure their entire life to achieve this goal of becoming good parents, the denial of which can entail life-altering pain. I argue that the sacrifice is too great in these cases, and one does not act viciously for not making it. A proper environmental ethics should guide us in co-existing with the natural world, but not compel us to suffer so drastically for it. Moreover, Young fails to acknowledge some of the political and cultural dimensions involved in his argument, as some populations like indigenous communities, whose lineages have been historically and systematically suppressed, have good reason to feel the need to have children, in order to preserve their cultural heritage – Young cannot implicate everyone in North America equally.
One can be a parent and still maintain a virtue of environmental altruism, but it follows that these parents must aspire to become environmentally altruistic agents and must teach their children to be the same. Due to environmental degradation, I argue that procreation, in most cases, is thus morally permissible only if these conditions are satisfied. Certainly, one can object that even the best and most eco-friendly parent cannot guarantee that their child will adopt the same virtues. But in terms of remaining environmentally altruistic, raising a child to be ecologically conscious is the best one can do as a parent, and the actions of their children are to be evaluated separately. This objection does highlight, however, the moral necessity to be an excellent parent for one who does choose to have children, since they voluntarily decide to expand their current eco-footprint. Choosing to become a parent will thus require more serious deliberation than conventionally recognized, and if one does not believe they can fulfill these environmental requirements, then having children cannot be justified. Nor will it morally suffice to have children solely for shallow reasons, or without considering at all the environmental consequences, as these remain vicious motivations. Rather, one must exercise a great degree of prudence in their decision to start a family.
Footnotes
1 Young states that his argument is primarily directed toward Americans, but that his argument also applies to anyone who consumes more than the average American (184).
2 Virtue ethics is an agent-based normative ethical theory that evaluates morality relative to the character of the agent, rather than the action. Whereas some act-based ethical theories evaluate right or wrong based on the consequences of an action (consequentialism), or on its adherence to moral duties we hold (deontology), virtue ethics regards the agent’s character in moral deliberation. In simple terms, virtues are desirable states of character that one develops through constant habituation – e.g. one attains the virtues of justice and prudence by consistently acting just and prudent. Virtues are identified as the mean between two extremes – e.g. the virtue of courage is the mean between cowardice (a deficiency) and recklessness (an excess).
3 Young briefly considers that eco-gluttony can be done based on altruistic motives, similar to the decision to procreate (186). I reject this analogy, however, and I reject that exercising eco-gluttony, even when done for the pleasure of others, is altruistic rather than vicious. Neither are these instances comparable to altruistic reasons for procreation.
Works Cited
Young, Thomas. “Overconsumption and Procreation: Are they Morally Equivalent?.” Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 18, no. 2, 2001, pp. 183-192.
~ John
